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The equitable construction of social institutions
Search every land from Cadiz to the dawn-streaked shores 
Of Ganges, and you will find few men who can distinguish 
A false from a worthwhile objective, or slash their way through 
The fogs of deception. Since when were our fears or desires 
Ever dictated by reason? What project goes so smoothly .
That you never regret the idea, let alone its realisation?
Juvenal, Tenth Satire, ctrca 117 AD 
translated by Peter Green, Penguin, 1967
When a man is told something that tums things upside down; that the tail wags the 
dog; that the fish has caught the fisherman; that the earth goes round the moot); he 
takes some little time before he even asks seriously if it is true. He is still content with 
the consciousness that it is the opposite of the obvious truth.
G. K. Chesterton, The Scandal of Father Brown
Cassell, 1929
... not at all sure what the examiners were looking for in the answers - their ideas or 
his ideas, or the former subtly disguised as the latter, or the latter masquerading as 
the former. In the end he boldly put down his own ideas, without any thought as to 
whether the examiners would find them palatable or not. He set forth an idealistic view
of a society in which all privilege would be done away with......
Michael Frayn, Sweet Dreams 
Flamingo. 1979 page 72
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Abstract
My aim was to establish a rationale for co-operative behaviour, based on my own 
experiences, elaborated and tested through academic research, and then further 
refined through conversations with a variety of people who might be thought to act in a 
way that is consistent with the rationale. The methodology explains why this process 
might be thought appropriate to a doctoral thesis.
In the introduction, some of the essential underlying premises of the thesis are 
presented, together with an outline of the shape of the argument. Briefly, that shape is 
as follows.
A set of ontological, moral, and epistemological commitments are stated. These are 
then used to derive a methodology, including comparisons with a variety of 
conventional approaches, and an attempt to assess some of the potential difficulties 
and disadvantages of the chosen method.
The rationale of co-operation that emerged from this process is then presented, and 
followed by an attempt to explain how the assertions made in the rationale relate to a 
variety of existing academic discourses. After this, the field work is discussed, both in 
terms of its progress, and as a report on the sorts of ideas that were offered to me by 
those with whom I spoke.
In conclusion, there is a brief set of reflections on how the research went, and what 
might be leamed from the process.
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Part 1
In which my aim - the participative development of a rationale for co-operation - is 
briefly introduced; and in which an explanation for my approach is explored at 
inordinate length.
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1. An introduction
§1
To begin at a beginning: I am arranging these words as I sit up a tree over a small 
stream in Provence.
I dent know where you are reading them, but I assume that such an event will take 
place; and if it doesnt, crdcesnt approximate to my understanding cf that which is 
constituted by such an event, it probably doesnt matter if I make the assumptions that 
I make.
Firstly, I assume my consciousness is implicit in the idea that some form of 
communication is taking place: and if my talking to you is to make sense, I must 
suppose that you have consciousness too.
secondly; ir we had free access to each others' consciousness, why would we 
have to talk like this? It seems likely that our consciousnesses are not directly 
interconnected.
Thirdly, the outcomes of our communications do not suggest complete 
understanding of the subject matter. The ccurse of my experience remains
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unpredictable. Owing to limited access tc eacti other's consciousness, there is a 
lack of experiential or formal confirmation which prevents us accepting 
propositions as more than subjectively certain truths, or the form of those 
propositions as necessarily appropriate.
Fourthly, since we seem to have chosen to work together in this strange disjointed 
project of scriptural communicaticn, we would seem to have preferences; and it is 
from such preferences that our understandings of what is good are derived.
Fifthly, since we have attributed consciousness and preferences to each other, we 
accept each others' moral relevance, if morality \s to be a significant term.
Sixthly, in the absence of correspondent truth as a criterion for our beliefs, we may 
have to use the pragmatic criterion of usefulness for any practical propositions of 
which we become aware; and from the fourth and fifth commitments made here, 
usefulness will clearly have to be assessed in terms of the preferences of those 
who are morally relevant.
Rather than invite you to familiarise yourself with this whole set. may I suggest that 
you think of it as a sceptical, pragmatic, consequentialist perspective? I don't ask you 
to swallow the viewpoint wholesale straight off; part of my job is to show why I think it 
reasonable to look at things from this point of view. Indeed, such an elatx>ratlon is 
essential, because the set of assumptions, in one form or another, acts as the basis of 
the whole thesis.
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That which is essential, however, is not always urgent. Before the ground is examined 
in more detail, some preliminary exploration may be well worth the investment.
§2.
In the first place; why have I started where I did?
Common to a variety of discourses is the notion that t>ehind or beyond a belief, there 
are others which are used to explain why that belief is held. Where ideology operates 
in the discourse of political analysis [Hall. 1981], pœmises feature in logic 
[Hodge,1976:54]; personal constructs are surfaced in therapeutic practice [Kelly,1955]; 
grand narratives arise in hermeneutic discourse [Taket and White, 1995a], and meta- 
methodologies and t)oundary assumptions are popular terms in systemic discourse 
[Flood and Jackson, 1991c; Ulrich,1991; Midgley,1992]. The term convnitments is 
borrowed from Kaminsky's use in relation to essential ontological assurhptions 
[Kaminsky, 1982:43].
In this discussion, the two focal terms from this set will be convnitments and ideology. 
The former is at the heart of the epistemological examination of the rôle of the social 
scientist; the latter will seem more appropriate when that role is enacted as an 
intervention in a political context. In each case, there is an attempt to identify an 
underlying set of beliefs which would support (or from which may be derived) an 
acceptable guide to practice. The referents of the two terms are consistent with each 
other; but, owing to their membership of discourses which serve different functions 
and different social grou^, their forms are distinguishable. These groups and 
functions are not, of course, by any means entirely discrete; and so the two themes 
will be thoroughly intertwined.
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This sense of a common ground, however, does not necessarily lead to the 
specification of a set of shared commitments; so where might we start? What lies 
t)eyond our differences?
Perhaps the principal difficulty about any attempt to review underlying assumptions is 
that the process can be regressive to the point of absurdity. Moving t)eyond a field of 
cognitive uncertainty does not penoit us to attribute certainty to that which we discem 
beyond, any more than removing the layers of an onion exposes an essence of onion; 
an onion is no more than the layers of which it is made up, and metatheories share the 
uncertainty of the theories to which they relate. In neither of these cases is there a 
categorially distinct emergent.
All that we can infer from our apparent capacity to discover explanations for our 
beliefs is that we have other beliefs. However, as Ulrich has implied, the 
inaccessibility of ultimate justifications is not a sound reason to refuse to enter upon 
the process of examining our assumptions [Ulrich, 1991:113], Even if the derivation of 
our grounding commitments is theory-laden, we have to start somewhere. Was 
Descartes right then to suggest that we should start from the boundary of experience; 
from that which we feel least able to doubt?
Although this may seem to invoke a notorious philosophical calamity, I hope to have 
side-stepped that confusion. As Ryle pointed out, Descartes was committing a 
categorial error in conflating the experience of thought with the existence of a thinker 
[Ryle, 1963]. We cannot infer a personal entity simply because it is convenient to 
attribute causality of thought to a further construct which belongs to a distinct 
category. The thinker is no more than the thoughts [Clark 1991]. However, there is a 
distinction t)etween the appropriateness of the method Descartes proposed in his
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Meditations and the use he made of it. Doubts about the Cogito do not refute the 
reflective methodology itself. If we are uncertain, what can we do other than go back 
and see if there is anything in experience tc which we can commit ourselves?
Descartes fcund, not surprisingly, since he was talking to himself, that he could not 
doubt that there is personal experience. Here, the boundary of the domain Is social 
rather than personal, so we might seek what is indubitable in our social experience. 
Narrowing the domain a little further, our concem is essentially with the cognitive and 
communicative aspects of society, which many have seen as central to social 
behaviour. Hewitt, for example, has proposed that
human conduct depends on the creation and maintenance of meaning; 
human conduct is self-referential; people form conduct as they interact
with each other; and society and culture shape and constrain conduct.......
[Hewitt, 1991:218]
Concerning these more particular academic circumstances. Mason has argued that 
research is itself an aspect of the social constructicn of knowledge; "the more or less 
systematic and critical accomplishment of meaning - the active conferral of sense 
upon the world." [Mason, 1992:115]
What is given, to whatever extent we can expose it, in the experience of 
communication, the process of conferring meaning? I'm happy to suggest that the set 
of ideas with which we started would be reflected in many pecple's experience; that is, 
that they can be asserted as a rationally defensible set of commitments, even if, 
reflexively, none of this can be certain. Each analysis of communication operates 
within a metaphorical construction [Krippendorf, 1993], and since these propositions 
have been expressed in a language which imposes its own implicit rationality, they 
can make no claims to unique propriety. All that can t)e hoped is that they have the
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potential to t>e shared as a set of ontological, epistemological and moral 
commitments.
(Aesthetic commitments are also taken to t>e part of the set. Ultimately, however, 
these are taken to t>e inaccessible to other critiques than personal reflection, and so 
are given as data rather than as a negotiated prelude to intellectual construction.)
For these reasons I have started as I did: by trying to give you reason to accept, 
however temporarily, the premises of sceptical pragmatic consequentialism.
§3.
The presentation of these ideas in this form is not intended to force you into 
submission; only to persuade you that they are worthy of further consideration. One of 
the few points on which Feyerabend [1988] and Popper [1963:352,1972:148] agreed, 
was that the scientific method is more concemed with assessing ideas than with 
defining the characteristics of those ideas we should be willing to consider.
This is, however, an academic paper, and certain demands must be met; so why 
might I hope that you will feel that what I've written helps to confer rational meaning 
on our collisions and collusions? On what grounds would I suggest that belief is 
justified?
Two points seem worth making at this early stage. Firstly, there is the question of the 
nature of rationality. As must be evident from the commitments made above, I have a 
limited respect for the idea of an ultimately rational syntax. I would, for example, 
qualify Richards' interpretation or language:
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[Logic] is a set of rules presupposed by the existence of language; not 
just some particular language, but any language. The most 
fundamental rule is that of non-contradiction. [Richards,1982:37].
In this, I would say, she is going too far. Language does not always operate through 
unequivocal reference, formal logic, and the excluded middle. When Grace Nicholls 
writes of
my tainted 
perfect child 
my bastard fruit 
my seedling 
my sea grape
my strange mulatto [Nicholls,1992:42] 
consistency is not a relevant criterion. To be tainted is to be imperfect, and yet 
Nicholls is using language powerfully and effectively. Richards' argument might be 
taken properly to refer only to certain forms of discourse. However, amongst these 
forms are those within which this thesis must find a heme. Ccnsistency will be 
accepted, therefore, as a significant, if not conclusive, criterion of belief: txrt it should 
also be noted that only those who have projects involving access to certainty must, to 
be consistent, show that the consistency cf their argument is grounded in indubitable 
axioms.
An altemative to the positivist project may seem more worthy of consideration.
Despite the limited effectiveness of our communication skills, we still have a 
remarkable capacity for the participative construction of useful knowledge. Apparently 
shared ideas are not, however, to be confused with certainty.
Words can convey information, a series of algebraic symbols can 
constitute a mathematical deduction, a map can set out the
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topography of a region; tHit neither words nor symtwls, nor maps can 
be said to communicate an understanding of themselves. Though 
such statements will be made in a form which best induces an 
understanding of their message, the sender of the message will 
always have to rely for the comprehension of his message on the 
intelligence of the person addressed. Only by this act of 
comprehension, of this tacit contribution of his own, can the receiving 
person be said to acquire knowledge when he is presented with a 
statement. [Polanyi, 1958:22]
Although a little unfashionable if taken to imply that communication is a precise 
transfer of data, or that it is uni-directional, Polanyi's argunment reflects the basic 
position adopted here: that while knowledge is socially constructed, it is personally 
experienced, and remains uncertain.
If, in our uncertainty, we seek to respect the personal experiences and preferences of 
others, an essential activity of any individual will be our skilful and considerate 
participation in the construction of knowledge and of social institutions. (Institutions are 
understood here to confomn to UphofPs description "complexes of norms and 
behaviours that persist overtime by serving collectively valued purposes" [Uphoff, 
1993:614]). This applies as much, if not more, to the supposedly expert interventionist, 
the social scientist. We are not, in this view, engineers or even very successful 
cartographers. We are participants in the construction of social institutions.
If we accept that there is uncertainty in such a process, we may take a further step.
We may choose to believe that the assessment of any intervention in the affairs of 
others lies with those others, rather than with ourselves as social scientists. To claim
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magisterial authority for our own assessments where there is no point of neutral 
ot)servation would seem to indicate an unreasonat>le degree of self-assurance.
This conclusion is not always welcomed by social scientists; nor are the premises. The 
persistent devotion to the axiomatic structuring cf arguments, which I distrust, is 
evidence that conservatism is alive and well within the discipline. As you become 
familiar with my understanding of understanding, my distrust will, I hope, become 
plausible and persuasive, if it is not so already. At this juncture, however, the crucial 
aspect of methodology that might require immediate examination is a distinction 
between rigidity and rigour. To me, rigidity is the principal quality displayed by the 
axiomatic processes of formal propositional logic. If A then B; A; therefore, B.
Reasons for doubting that this is an adequate approach to describing experience will 
be elaborated in possibly tedious detail in due course. For the minute, let me suggest, 
firstly, that if we dont know A with any degree of certainty, the conclusion fi is of no 
greater significance; and, secondly, that the whole style of looking at the world as a 
series of self-contained causal series may not be as plausible as the traditional 
understanding of rigour would have us think. Could we not think of rigour instead as 
the refusal to believe something merely because it is personally convenient to do so? 
This altemative might be termed sceptical rigour, the continual, undefensive, socially 
responsive, recursive and reflexive reconstruction of our shared understandings.
In simpler terms, the process could be described thus: Let us suppose A. Let us give 
the label B to whatever else I would have to trelieve in order to believe A. Do I find B 
credible? To the extent that I do, A remains temporarily unrecon^ructed; to the extent 
that B is incredible, A must be amended. A has become A'. What else would I have to 
believe in order to believe A'?
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And so ad infinitum.
The context of iselief preferred here will follow this pattern: that is. if I ask you to 
accept the rationality of my belief in sceptical pragmatic consequentialism, and in its 
implications, what else must I ask you to accept as rational?
Partly, I must ask you to believe that certain conflicting views are less worthy of 
adoption, and that partially coincidental views still leave room for an altemative 
arrangement of ideas. I will also try to show on each issue that I am addressing a 
recognised theoretical domain; my maps may use different colours and symbols, and 
describe an altemative conception, but they will cover that which has been widely 
agreed to constitute a relevant territory.
This decribes, more or less, the method I will use in seeking to persuade you of the 
rationality of my understanding. The first half of what follows will be reflexive; using 
the method to show why I think the method is appropriate, and exploring the 
implications for the behaviour of social scientists in their interactions with those who 
are not social scientists.
To summarise the argument which will follow: if knowledge is not an objective, 
correspondent and definitive description, the principal criterion of t>elief is not that it 
accords with certain knowledge of its troth. As an altemative, a criterion for belief that 
could t)e preferred is that of usefulness.
This criterion offers little methodological guidance; but it will be argued that the 
likelihood of social scientists making a useful contribution will be increased if certain
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subordinate criteria are also accepted. Firstly, if we are to claim any special status, we 
must surely be fearless, critical and rigorous in testing the assumptions on which the 
construction of our realities depends. As academics, therefore, we seek consistency 
within a chosen discourse. Such activities will be described here as the attempt to 
meet a criterion of validation. However, following from Polanyi, we may add another 
criterion. Legitimation may be described as a demand that we make our conceptual 
models accessible to the ownership of others; while, thirdly, from the privacy of 
aesthetic experience and the commitment to pragmatism, yus#ca<ron may be thought 
to require the acceptance of the utility of our interventions by those who are affected.
Eventually, then, I will argue that the utility of a belief may be gauged by the extent to 
which it has been legitimated, validated and justified: but a more precise 
understanding of what this is intended to signify will have to emerge as the argument 
is developed.
§4.
Despite the amount of attention given to the method of the research, there is a wider 
aim, which is concemed with the mode of organisation of society. I have hoped to 
contribute to the ideological constructions surrounding co-operative behaviour. Co­
operation, in the terms which have emerged, has its fccus in the equitable construction 
of sociai institutions.
Following Laszio [1972], I assume that a change of domain does not permit a denial of 
my earlier commitments; sceptical, pragmatic consequentialism. In brief. While some 
[eg: Mansell, 1994] have argued that the world might be constituted in discrete 
dimensions each of which has its cwn Immiscible rationality, Laszio suggested mat if
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there appear to be descriptive disjunctions, those di^unctions would derive from the 
descriptive systems rather than from that which they seek to describe.
Nevertheless, the commitments that have been adopted here may appear in a 
different guise when used in a different context. The discourse of political economy is 
not identical in form, content, or membership to that which concerns itself with the 
epistemology and methodology of the social sciences. Additional commitments are 
also necessary, for the field of analysis has broadened. In the discourse of political 
eccnomy, a further set of ontological commitments are invoked. The political 
economic argument favcured here is based on a conception of a universe that is 
being continually transformed, in part by factors beyond our control, but in part 
trecause of purposeful acts by conscious beings. Transformations and transactions 
can be identified and described, and their consequences assessed. Those 
consequences wili be seen to be dependent on the type of social institutions we 
con^ct; and the combined moral and ontological arguments will suggest that equity 
in their construction is paramount.
This argument, which is discussed in the second half of the thesis, seems in no way 
inconsistent with the commitments on which the first depends. Both the reflexive and 
the ideological arguments are rooted in the same set of conceptions; and this seems 
quite proper. If one assumes social scientists to be human, there is no reason why 
their behaviour shouldn't be govemed by the same criterion as the rest of society; that 
is, equitable participation in the construction of social institutions. Reciprocally, the co­
operative ideology constructed here is presumably to be govemed by the criterion of 
utility: that is, the paradigm of co-operation will have to be validated, legitimated, and 
in a form which makes its eventual justification a credible possibility.
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Does this all seem a little too much like pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps? If 
so, the phenomenon must be recognised as one cf the consequences of my finding 
positivism and axiomatic constructicn implausible.
§5.
To recapitulate the shape of the thesis, then: the reflexive theme will dominate the 
first half of the thesis, while the second half will t)e devoted to the ideological theme.
I will start by attempting tc explain in more depth why I hold the ontological, moral and 
epistemological commitments expressed here. Having explored my own beliefs, I will 
then attempt to identify a niche amid the more radical and reformative conceptions of 
the role of the social scientist that are currently emerging. Since none that I have 
discovered quite matches my aims and beliefs, an altemative method is constructed, 
and its limitations explored.
In the second half, the application of the method to the construction of a paradigm of 
co-operation will be described; though since, historically, the two strands were spun 
concurrently, this form cf presentation should not be taken too literally. Tradition will 
be respected by the presence of a conclusion, despite the iterative nature of the non- 
axiomatlc method of this research. Following the principle of a progressive research 
programme, suggested by Lakatos [1974,1978], the idea of a conclusion is rather a 
misnomer if we began at a beginning, we will also end at one.
In the meantime, I hope you enjoy our momentarily one-sided conversation.
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2, The ontological commitments
How might we conceive of the nature of the universe, and of our place in it? 
Transformation is only one of many ways, but it has a creditable pedigree.
Its use in the description of human circumstances can easily be traced to the Taoism 
of ancient China [ZhU,1996:110], and more recently to Greek schools of thought such 
as that of Heraclitus, to Indian Buddhism [Snelling,1990], and through the ^ in g s  of 
Capra [1975] to contemporary theories of matter. [Indeed, it may be generally inferred 
that the conception of the universe implicit to the syntax of our language is deceptive; 
there are no nouns, only slow verbs ] Within the common context, much diversity can 
be found, of course. The transcendental philosophy of Buddha and the materialism of 
Marx, for example, are in stark contrast, despite the links that can be traced through 
the dialectics of Hegel; but transformation remains central.
On an historically narrower canvas, systems theory in particular has demonstrated an 
awareness of the centrality of transformation; Buckley [1972], Easton [1972], 
Checkland [1981], Busman [1983], and Vickers [1984] have all contributed to the 
emphasis on this theme. Critics of this school, including Ulrich [1991] and Flood and 
Jackson [1991c], have used the strains of thought represented by Habermas and 
Foucault to draw attention to the issues of power which have sometimes been 
neglected. In the process, it has become apparent that every transformation implies a 
redistribution of costs and benefits, and the necessity cf incorporating the notion of 
transaction into the analysis of change has been emphasised.
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Not that this recognition is unique to this school, of course: txjth sociology and 
organisation theory link transformation and transaction. To Blau, following Simmel, 
transactions are the favoured analytic perspective.
All contacts among men rest on the schema of giving and retuming the 
equivalence. The equivalence of innumerable gifts and performances can 
be enfcrced. In all economic exchanges in legal form, in all fixed 
agreements conceming a given service, in all obligations of legalised 
reiations, the legal constitution enforces and guarantees the reciprocity of 
service and retum service - social equilibrium and cohesicn do not exist 
without it. But there are also innumerable other relations to which the 
legal form does not apply, and in which the enforcement of the 
equivalence is out of the question. Here gratitude appears as a 
supplement. It establishes the bond of interaction, of the reciprocity of 
service and retum service, even when they are not guaranteed by 
extemal coercion..:..[Simmel Q f^ed/n Blau 1967:1]
The distinction between the voluntary and involuntary forms of transaction will also 
feature predominantly in this discussion.
Within organisation theory, Abrahamson [1977], for example, reviews a wide range of 
theories largely in terms of the purposeful transformation of resources tc meet the 
diverse interests of those with influence over ^ e  organisation of society. The 
approach favoured by Morgan [1986] posits transformation as one of a number of 
metaphors of organisation, though on inspection it becomes apparent that 
transformation and transaction are crucial to each of the other metaphors.
Other discourses have also focussed on transactions as their central dynamic. 
Economics is perhaps the most otxvlous discipline to adopt such a perspective, but
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diversity in the perception of the processes involved is not restricted to different 
schools of economic thought. Compare, for example, the exchange of promissory 
signs through which Goffman [1969] sought to present human relations, with 
materialist market theory, as represented by Friedman's arguments [1984].
The integration of such themes has also been achieved. Sen, in his models of 
endowment and entitlement [1977,1981,1991], uses game theory to develop ideas 
about how the outcome of exchanges is influenced by its social context. Similarly, the 
concept nvelihood strategy has been used to analyse the transformation of personal, 
material and social resources and to avoid the reduction of economic behaviour to the 
operation of the market [Gudeman,1986; Bishop,1990].
Transformation and transaction is, then, taken to be an acceptable form in which to 
discuss our environment; and, indeed, ourselves, though other commitments about 
human nature will be descrit>ed later on.
3, The moral commitments
More controversy is evident in the establishment of the moral commitments. Luckily, 
hcwever, there is a well-established paradigm within which to constmct those 
commitments. When moral decisions are discussed, the implied grounds of morality 
seem to fall quite readily into a taxonomy of consequences, rights, and duties; but 
dearly the issue requires more consideration than a random choice between the three.
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A right may appear inviolable or contingent, a right to act or a right to non­
interference, but in each instance rights also imply reciprocal duties. My right not to be 
molested implies your duty not to molest me. Indeed, since a duty without an object 
towards which that duty was to be observed would be unintelligible, duties may for 
most purposes be seen as the reciprocal of rights; but if this is the case, from what 
source do rights and duties derive their moral force?
Although other possibilities may be imagined, three principal options for the underlying 
moral ground of rights, and by implication of duties, would seem to be on offer. There 
is a category which might be described as (he word ofgo&, there is an a priori 
assertion in the manner of the American Declaration of Human Rights; or, for those 
who believe that morality is a social construct related to experience, there is the third 
option: that rights and duties are a rule of thumb expression of the general solutions 
found to consequentialist negotiation. Supporting this viewpoint, Scanlon has 
disaggregated the fomrr that is taken by a right into three successive types of claim; an 
empiricai daim about what happens in the absence of a particular right: a daim that 
the consequences would be unacceptable; and another empirical daim about how the 
assignment of a right would produce a different outcome [Scanlon, 1988:84].
Perhaps it would be as well to elaborate a little on consequentialism before the 
relations between the arguments are looked at in any more detail.
Consequentialism may be divided into three movements. Firstly, there is that which 
may be described as simple consequentialism; the assumption that an event is good if 
It arouses feelings of well-being in me, and that a good intention is one intended to 
give rise to such an event. Secondly, there is transpersonal consequentialism; the 
recognition that if this is the case for one of us, it is also applicable to others.
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(Although this could t>e descrit)ed as a right to t>e taken as morally relevant or to be 
respected, this right, unless it is asserted a priori after the fashion of Kant [Paton,
1948], or given as the word of god, is grounded in consequentialism.) There is no 
inconsistency for a consequentialist to suggest that people have a right to be treated 
as morally relevant, since the right is grounded In the consequences of no such right 
being acknowledged. The third phase of consequentialism may be described as 
practical consequentialism, an attempt to balance the utilities arising from an act or an 
intention. [Brauer, 1992]
Attempts to compare utilities, It has to be acknowledged, bristle with imponderables 
and complexities; but why should we expect moral thought, which is, after all 
principally concerned with comparative values, to be simple? If it were, surely we 
could expect some previous generation, no less wise than ourselves, to have resolved 
at least the basic issues. Thus the difficulty of specifying the exact nature of utility 
should not concem us. That we do in practice make moral choices between diverse 
ends and interests shows that value-incommensurability can only refer to difficulties of 
comparison, not to an absolute incapacity.
Dewey offers a historical analysis to explain why there are many who find it difficult to 
entertain such indeterminacy;
The impact of the alteration in methods of scientific thinking upon moral 
ideas is, in general, obvious. Goods, ends are multiplied. Rules are 
softened into principles, and principles are modified into methods of 
understanding. Ethical theory began among the Greeks as an attempt to 
find a regulation for the conduct of life which should have a rational basis 
and purpose instead of being derived from custom. But reason as a 
substitute for custom was under the obligation of supplying objects and
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laws as fixed as those of custom had been. Ethical theory has ever since 
been hypnotised by the notion that its business is to discover some final 
end or good or some ultimate and supreme law. [Dewey. 1950:131]
The difficulties should not then discourage us. The term uOrity is helpful, even though 
it is often extraordinarily abused. Simply, the idea emerges from the dichotomy that 
either our values are in some way comparable, or they are completely divorced from 
each other. (Whatever the objections to dichotomies, the law of the excluded middle 
would appear to be applicable in this case.) Given these altematives we may conclude 
that, if values were incomparable, there would be no way to resolve conflicting 
preferences for ourselves, or conflicting interests between ourselves. Since it is 
evident that such processes take place, there is reason to suppose that some symbol 
that refers to the comparability of values will be helpful; a phenomenon without a 
symbol is difficult to incorporate in our shared conceptual schemes. Why there should 
be any objection to the use of the term u(#y for this purpose is not readily apparent.
It might be supposed that rights could supply an altemative moral ground, but there is 
a fundamental problem. If rights are not in the end to rely on some external factor, 
they must be so expressed and so structured that conflicts between them do not arise. 
Two altematives are generally recognised as potentially fulfilling such a function.
One altemative would be to assert that rights can be defined in terms of some kind of 
lexical ordering, so that we could identify at any moment which right took priority. 
Experience should teach us to view such a daim with suspidon; by reference to the 
law alone we should be able to deted that although statements of rights have rule of 
thumb utiljty, they are always hedged about with qualifications, spedal cases,
page 26
mitigations and circumstantial exceptions, rattier than offering a streamlined algorithm 
of priorities.
Many unsuccessful attempts have been made to establish such an algorithm. Nozick, 
for example, asserted that autonomy has primacy as a right, and that "side constraints 
express the inviolability of others" [Nozick, 1974:32]. Reliance on his system becomes 
less persuasive when he admits that "The question of whether these side constraints 
are absolute, or whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral 
horror, and If the latter what the resulting structure might look like, is one I hope 
largely to avoid." [ibidiZO] Nozick's breezy optimism may be attractive, but since there 
is a prima facie case that rights conflict, his argument cannot be thought to meet any 
criteria of philosophical rigour.
Rawls, who was also opposed to consequentialism, did not attempt to evade the issue 
of conflicting rights in offering his theory of justice. He suggested that there could be a 
lexical ordering. However, since he also accepted that lexical ordering can do no more 
than offer an approximate solution in certain social circumstances [Rawls, 1972:44], 
reliance on his ^stem would seem to be inadvisable.
The first response to the problem of conflicting rights has not thus far proved 
successful. A partial altemative has been proposed; that there are certain rights which 
are inviolable.
The primary right, it has been suggested, could be the right to respect; that is, to be 
recognised as morally relevant. However, not only does this seem to be grounded in 
consequentialism, as has been suggested above, it is also too general to provide any 
guidance beyond the idea of a practical consequentialist negotiation: as Bralthwatte
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has pointed out, as a right is pushed towards a semblance of inviolability, its 
substantive content is eroded [cited in Robinson,1964:34].
Substance could be achieved by allying the right to respect to another element. A 
favourite is the right to life, but this is dearly not inviolable; we do not expect all the 
resources of sodety to be devoted to the maintenance of life, so we do not consider 
the right to life to be inviolable. What, then, if we daim a right that life should not be 
deliberately curtailed? Would this apply to a child rapist, if the only way he could be 
prevented from raping and murdering a child was to kill him? Clearly there are 
drcumstances in which someone else's right to non-interference may conflict with 
another's. Guilt and innocence may then be introduced as variables: but what if a 
mnaway coach can be directed only so that it instantaneously kills one blind old man, 
or hits a party of thirty school-children? At least one innocent life must be sacrificed.
Apparently there is great difficulty in establishing a substantive inviolable right; yet if 
this cannot be achieved neither lexical ordering nor a compatible set of inviolable 
rights can be identified, and rights become all the more evidently dependent on an 
external moral ground. If rights are not intrinsically legitimate, the potential or actual 
consequences of exercising those rights would seem to be the source of their 
legitimacy.
Desperation to avoid this conclusion has provoked some imaginative responses; for 
example, Gewirth's attempt to isolate at least one inviolable right by asserting that an 
innocent man has a right not to torture his mother in order to save others - in Gewirth's 
argument, a city threatened by nuclear terrorism [Gewirth, 1984]. What if the 
altemative is that his mother will be tortured to death anyway by someone made up to 
look like him, and that the threat will be repeated with his wife and children as the
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subjects? Would we not then Intuitively wonder how to balance the evil 
consequences? Of course, this is all becoming rather fantastic; which only goes to 
show the lengths rights theorists have to go to in search of an inviolable right. Even if 
a substantive moral horror deserving infinite moral weighting can be invented 
[Mill,1991], the grounds may still be adequately decribed in terms of 
consequentialism, while a subordinate ordering of rights is still not accomplished.
Perhaps at this point the methodology of moral philosophy requires some explanation, 
since thought experiments apparently annoy some people. Sayer, for example, 
congratulates himself on having "deliberately avoided the philosopher's irritating habit 
of using trivial examples.. .If a philosophical point is worth making, it may as well be 
illustrated by an example which not only gives clarification but suggests its social and 
practical significance." [Sayer, 1992:7]
However, when we venture into thought experiments, we learn about our 
preconceptions rather than about the essential qualities of nature [Kuhn,1977:242]; 
and, if we accept that morality is a human construct, then it is precisely thought 
experiments that expose the underlying rationalities of our moral responses.
Enough of rights; and since duties are the reciprocal of rights, and, except by 
reference to an exogenous source only exist in relation to rights, that which applies to 
rights theory applies also to deontology. There are, however, a variety of challenges to 
consequentialism which have not yet been mentioned or answered.
Intention is sometimes suggested as a confusion within consequentialism. Bradley, 
following Kant [Paton, 1948], argued that
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The act for me means my act and no end beyond the act. This we see in 
the belief that failure may be morally equivalent to success - in the saying 
that there is nothing good except a good will. [Bradley, 1988:65]
In making this claim, Bradley conflates intention and outcomes. If the intention was to 
achieve a beneficial outcome, the intention was good. That good intentions may fail 
changes this not one whit; and the recurrent suggestion that consequentialism cannot 
be concemed with intentions or motives is clearly nonsensical.
Secondly, we may revisit value incommensurability:
..the thesis that fundamental values or reasons for action may conflict 
with one another in Such a way that we have no means of resolving the 
conflict by rational arbitration has since received authoritative statements 
in the work of Williams, Hampshire, and most particulariy, Raz. Value- 
incommensurability is evidently fatal to any utilitarian calculus, and, if 
pervasive, to any sort of consequentialism. [Gray, 1991 :ix]
This perspective, however, appears dependent on the following dubious assumptions:
•  that rationality is monolithic;
• that academic authority is an adequate determinant of complex moral 
and epistemological issues;
• and that utilitarian calculus is a mechanical process.
The first two assumptions seem dependent on rationalist arrogance; that where 
experience conflicts with a dominant theory, both experience and altemative 
explanations can be safely rejected. In my experience, people every day resolve 
moral conflicts to which no expressed rule applies, even If three well-respected 
academics declare it to be as impossible as the flight of the bumble-bee.
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If my experience Is shared, Gray's third criticism is only sustainable if one takes the 
hardest reading of calculus] and while uOntarian calculus is a term that might have 
been selected to arouse antagonism, there would be no more sense in rejecting 
consequentialism for such a reason than there would be in rejecting rights theory on 
the ground that Mussolini claimed a right to rule Slovenia. Distortions and 
exaggerations should not be allowed to undermine that which they misrepresent.
As a third popular objection to consequentialism, promising is sometimes presented as 
a hindrance:
In so far as I can see, if I could bring equal amounts of good into being by 
fulfilling my promise and by helping someone to whom I had made no 
promise, I should not hesitate to regard the former as my duty. Yet on the 
view that what is right is right because it is productive of the most good, I 
should not so regard it. [Ross, 1930:18]
Misrepresentation sometimes appears so crude as to be ^ ric a l, and it is difficult not 
to regard this as such an instance. The habit of keeping promises is in itself rarely 
denied as a social benefit, just as breaking promises is a disutility. Let us suppose that 
Ross has promised to take someone in a wheelchair to a musical with a spectacular 
opening number. On his way to help and on a tight schedule, he sees an elderly 
person struggling in the rain to change a wheel on their car, do we suppose that he 
does other than balance the amount of good produced by helping the old person, 
taking his friend to the show, and keeping his promise? If the evaluation of the two 
major activities is equal, a consequentialist would urge him to keep his promise, since 
that was an additional benefit.
A calculation that is similar to Ross's and equally reductive, is commonly used as a 
criticism of consequentialism. The form in which Nozick states it suggests that
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according to utilitarianism, a rampaging mob should be allowed to lynch an innocent 
man [Nozick.1974:28]. If utilitarianism, were simply impulsive majority rule, the 
argument might stand. If, however, the value to society of an absence of random or 
unjustified violence is recognised, it is hardly likely that even the crudest utilitarian 
calculus would, on a diachronous scale, favour an unjust lynching: even more so when 
it is recalled that Mill drew attention to the need to weight the consequences in terms 
of their severity and intensity [Mill, 1991:190]. The form of argument that anti- 
consequentialists are presenting is, in effect, to hypothesise that a consequentialist 
would reach a less compassionate summation than they would themselves. In doing 
so they are, in the first place, surreptitiously stuffing a straw man. Secondly, they are 
ignoring the process which has led them to their own conclusion, unless they are 
moral dogmatists; that is, that they have balanced all, brought all to mind, and judged 
that a certain course of action is, all in all, to be lauded above another.
Finally, Williams offers the following idea: that autonomic projects must be given great 
weight because they have intrinsic merit, apart from any supposed consequences. To 
demand that a man "should step aside from his own project and decision" 
is to make him into a channel between the input of everyone's projects, 
including his own, and an output of optimific decision; but this is to 
neglect the extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen 
as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes 
with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal. 
sense, an attack on his integrity. [Williams, 1988:49]
Why one's own projects should have an intrinsic merit above that of collective projects 
such as the construction of an equitable morality is not made dear. Nor does Williams 
explain whether he is suggesting that the same act undertaken by a mbot would have 
similar intrinsic worth; yet if it did not, the significant moral ground would seem to be
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the consequences for the actor of having such a project. In addition, Dworkin's view of 
integrity may well seem more carefully considered:
Our notion of who we are, of self-identity, of being this person is linked to 
our capacity to find and refine oneself. The exercise of this capacity is 
what makes a life mine. And, if I am to recognise others as persons, as 
independent centres of consciousness, as them, then there is a 
requirement that I give weight to the way they define and value the world 
in deciding how I should act. [Dworkin, 1988:32]
Once again we find ourselves reverting to the moral complexities of transpersonal 
consequentialism: the idea that it is the complex equilibrium of effects, intended or 
actual, that determines whether an event or intention is good or bad. If the difficulties 
of practical consequentialism are apparent, that is a reason to become more skilled in 
the social negotiations that can resolve such issues. To believe that these difficulties 
provide an acceptable reason to accredit a of rights is a feasible response, to 
which I have two codicils. Firstly, that since conflicts between rights have to be 
resolved by reference to some other principle, we must never lose sight of that 
principle. To do so leads to conceptually irresoluble frustrations when one person's 
rights have to be subordinated to those of another. Secondly, whereas non-positivist 
consequentialism asserts the primacy of invidual experience and belief, rights theory 
tends to encourage the imposition of a set of moral rules chosen by an elite who far 
from necessarily represent all those who will be affected by them.
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4. The epistemological commitments
In contrast to morality, a wide variety of epistemological models Is available from 
wtiich a methodological approach might be derived: and although this aspect of 
research is sometimes seen as a distraction from the 'real business' of the academic 
or the social scientist - Sayer claims that research design "is rarely discussed in a 
philosohically informed way" [Sayer, 1984:241] - at the least we require a set of 
epistemological commitments which will delineate the boundaries within which any 
methodology can reasonably be established. To operate beyond those boundaries 
would seem to be an ethically unreasonable extension of the role of the social or 
systemic scientist; and the scientist or academic who is unwilling to challenge the 
grounds of their belief is acting directly in contradiction of the supposed critical rigour 
of their discourse.
The epistemology that is most explicitly rejected here is that of the possibility of 
certainty in the description of social phenomena [For a general discussion, see 
Ryan,1981]. More will be said of incommensurability in due course, but reasons for 
challenging positivism so vigorously deserve to be discussed at once.
Essentially, positivism and scepticism are seen to rely on thoroughly dissonant 
premises, though it should be noted that there is a certain asymmetry in the 
relationship.
From the point of view of the positivist, scepticism must be wrong. The sceptic says 
that although there is a possibility of certainty, there is no adequate reason for 
supposing that it is ever attained. The positivist says there is rational objective or 
intersubjective certainty in at least one instance: not, it must be emphasised, that
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there might be certainty, since the conditional might negates the unconditional 
certainty, and replicates the sceptical position.
Another important point should also be noted: the positivist does not daim intuitive 
certainty, but certainty derived from the way in which the condusion has been 
reached. Positivism is methodologically ratified certainty; and since more than one 
methodology would require a certainly reliable meta-methodology, positivism, one way 
or another, assumes a unitary methodology in any domain. Scepticism is thus 
construded necessarily as a fallacy.
From the point of view of the sceptic, however, positivism is a possibility, and there is 
thus no incommensurability following immediately from the sceptical perspective. 
Indeed, epistemological incommensurability would appear to be an untenable position 
for a sceptic.
However, although scepticism can be resolved In nihilism, the more common 
response, which I share, is probably some form of pragmatism. If we cannot be 
certain, the criterion of belief becomes the utility of that belief. I do not exped the 
falling apple because of sdentific methodology, but inductively, which is to say 
uncertainly [Hume, 1748]; and while I may resped sdentific methodology in context, 
that too is an inductive belief, not a result of the methodology offering access to 
certainty.
If sceptidsm is adopted in relation to the natural sdences, the attitude is likely to be 
exponentially magnified with resped to the human sdences. One might argue that 
uncertainty in the human sdences does not refled on the natural sdences, but unless 
one is willing to believe that the universe is adually a multiverse of interwoven
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domains operating according to different rationalities, the segregation is implausible. 
One might attempt to retrieve the position by arguing that eventually all experience 
will be explicable in some positivist sense, but this, of course, is purely hypothetical, a 
confession of uncertainty, and a contribution to the sceptical case.
A pragmatist might yet believe that, although positivism is epistemologically 
untenable, the greatest utility is to believe in it. Such a conservative approach may 
appeal to some, but I share the views of Ashby and of Machiavelli, which will be 
explored later, that diversity, flexibility, and imagination contribute to the potential for 
adaptation and achievement. However, even those sceptical pragmatists who would 
concede a social benefit in non-pathological deviance [Buckley, 1981] may prefer 
positivism on self-interested grounds. Where methodological conformity supercedes 
utility as the measure of worth, authority and privileges can readily be conferred on 
brahmins and gatekeepers.
Thus, while scepticism does not in itself mirror the perception of incommensurability 
expressed by positivism, incommensurability may arise from a set of associated 
commitments. If the sceptic accepts
• commitments to utility as a criterion of belief.
• diversity as a pre-requisite of utility,
• and equity in social in^utions,
positivism becomes practically and morally incommensurable with the sceptical 
position.
Nevertheless, accommodation between the sceptic and the positivist might be 
reached in the practice of many interventions. Individual postivists tend to appear 
blameless, both because their work may, coincidentally, be worthy of reward - not
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because it is certain, but because it is useful; and because they may never have 
learned to think outside the conventions of their scientific community. Rather than 
describe the position as incommensurability tout court, therefore, it may be more 
helpful say that there are contradictory premises leading to ultimately incompatible 
discourses; and to encourage positivists to explore the inconsistencies of their 
approach.
5. Constraints on certainty
Because I have already professed the pragmatic position as my favoured response to 
uncertainty (Introduction, §1, sixth assumption), Dewey's discussion of the term trutti 
seems an appropriate point of reference for the discussion. To Dewey, truth and falsity 
are not qualities of the thing itself, but of our conception:
If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems, are 
instrumental to an active reorganisation of the given erivironment, to a 
removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their 
validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their 
office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up 
confusion, to eliminate defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty 
and evil when they are acted upon, then they are false. Confirmation, 
corroboration, verification lie in works, consequences. Handsome is that 
handsome does. By their fruits shall ye know them. That which guides us 
truly is true - demonstrated capacity for such guidance is precisely what is 
meant by truth. The adverb "truly" is more fundamental than either the 
adjective, true, or the noun, truth. An adverb expresses a way, a mode of 
acting. [Dewey,1950:128]
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From the description of truth offered by Dewey, then, truth is in no way dissociated 
from value judgements. Unfortunately, the term truth appears in general to be more 
commonly associated with a neutral transcendental claim. Common usage may have 
changed, or the context of the argument shifted, but, for whatever reason, use of the 
term truth might prove awkward. Because of this, the word piausible will be preferred 
here; although to anyone used to the carpenter's use of the word true, Dewey's 
interpretation should be immediately accessible.
Although sceptical pragmatism may appear persusasive when presented in this form, 
other incompatible epistemologies are evidently well supported. How, then, can the 
sustainability of scepticism be plausibly demonstrated in the face of critical challenge?
The first stage is to specify the context of the argument. Despite Zhu's reservations 
about distinguishing between self and environment [Zhu,1996:110], the distinction 
between consciousness and that of which it is conscious may be thought a legitimate 
starting point. Personal experience is inaccessible to others, while that which is . 
experienced appears to have noumenal reality independently of the ot)server. A 
further step draws attention to others' consciousness. Even though we cannot 
experience their experience [Laing,1967:16], we commonly attribute to it qualities 
similar to those of our own experience.
We might therefore distinguish between three distinct ways of knowing: knowledge of 
private experience, knowledge of others' experience reported in language, and 
knowledge of material entitles. More simply, we can distinguish between subjective, 
inter-subjective and objective knowledge.
page 38
The form of knowledge with which we are presently concemed is inter-subjective 
knowledge; that which is publicly constructed. The possibilities of dwelling within the 
world or within oneself in a state of Immediate perception are relevant here only in so 
far as they relate to public knowledge.
In this context, objective data as sources of certainty are limited by, at least, the 
imperfections of our biological mechanisms, which have been documented by, inter 
aiia, Maturana and Varela [1988]. Beyond this, there are the problems of selectivity 
and interpretation. Simply, our understandings of the raw data that are available to us 
depend on pre-existent conceptual maps which are personal rather than universal and 
necessary [Neisser,1976:Kelly,1969:100]. This implausibility of achieving a view from 
nowhere, to borrow Nagel's phrase [1986], obviously acts again as an impediment to 
certainty in subjective knowledge.
Furthermore, even if personal certainty were attainable, the uncertainties of language 
would take its translation into public knowledge beyond our compass. As Quine [1969] 
and others have demonstrated, there is little possibility that either the form or content 
of language is necessary or universal, or that relationships between symbol and 
referent could achieve definitive correspondence. If this is the case, not only would it 
preclude the reliable sharing of personal knowledge, but the project which seeks to 
discover necessary truth through the analysis of one or another linguistic form would 
also be bound to fail. (Chomsky's assumption of a universal underlying grammar 
recurs from time to time [eg. Flood and Romm,1995:476], but remains conjectural. I 
fail to find the conjecture persuasive, for reasons which will be explored a little later.)
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So far, then, three modes of knowing have been identified - the objective, the 
subjective, and the inter-subjective - together with four obstructions to inter-subjective 
certainty being attained through them.
Mode of knowing Obstruction to certainty
Objective Neurological unreliability (1)
Subjedlve Partiality of interpretation (2)
Inter-subjedlve Lack of definitive correspondence between 
symbols and referents (3)
Lack of correspondence between linguistic 
form and universal strudure of reality (4)
While these obstructions are sufficient to block certainty in the discrete modes of 
knowing. It could still be argued that, rather than being compounding errors, they are 
compensatory. However generous one might wish to be, this last ditch defence of 
positivism would have to establish the position from which it could be demonstrated 
that the errors were compensatory. Predictive reliablility might perform such a . 
function, and In certain technologies can do so; yet, unless one believes that the 
universe is ordered into disconnected realms, prediction would have to incorporate 
human behaviour as well as that of material objects, if a daim of reliable access to the 
truth were to be su^inable; and despite the efforts of behavioural positivists such as 
Skinner [1977] and Ajzen and Fishbein [1980] this has not been achieved.
An outline of the case for sceptidsm has thus t>een sketched. Because of the 
significance of the epistemology to the identification of appropriate roles and methods 
for sodal sdentists, the outline will be further explored, and challenges considered, in 
the two following sections. Before that Is undertaken, however, a brief demonstration 
that the pertinent Issues In the domain are being addressed seems necessary.
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The first mapping of the territory used here is that of Singer [1959, cited in Britton and 
McCallion 1994]. In Singer’s model, rationalism is seen as the state in which fact is a 
function of law, while in empiricism, law is a function of fact. This distinction replicates 
the idea that certain public knowledge can be derived respectively from language and 
from objective data, each of which positions has been, prima facie, refuted.
Singer completes his set by referring to epistemologies in which it is conceded that 
fact and law interact, but in which a priori propositions may or may not be acceptable. 
In experimentalism, according to Singer, only theory related a posteriori knowledge is 
acceptable. However, bearing in mind the uncertainty of experiential knowledge, and 
the postulate of compounded error, experimentalism no more leads to certainty than 
does any other approach. Singer's fourth category, critical science, assumes that the 
objective study of language allows false theory to be identified. If, however, language 
is not correspondent to reality in form any more than in content, scepticism remains 
the preferred epistemology.
Singer's early identification of critical science is interesting in that the critical systems 
movement habitually attributes its approach to the influence of Habermas [Flood and 
Jackson,1991c]. He distinguished between the practical and technical interests of 
humanity, and then posited an emancipatory interest through which to indentify false 
theory [Holub, 1991; Mansell, 1994]. A mapping onto the model used here might 
suggest that our practical interests relate to the intersut^ ective construction of 
knowledge in relation to ourselves, and the technical interest to the intersubjective 
construction of knowledge in relation to the material environment. As with Singer's 
analysis, Habermas' third category, critical science, seems to imply the possibility of a 
neutral position from which to point out the defects in others' reasoning; a position
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which has already been contradicted here. Whether this was Habermas’ intention or 
not remains a moot point. His nomination of the categories as ‘quasi-transcendental’ 
[Holub, 1991 ;9], and his postulation of a "unity of reason" [ibi&.61] suggests an 
equivocacy about transcendence that is reminiscent of Kant, despite the pragmatism 
attributed to him by Holub [ibid.-30].
Thirdly, and from a non-systemic perspective, it may be useful to remark that Rescher 
[1980], in a curious assault on scepticism that will be challenged later, identified three 
possible routes to certainty. These are intuition, rationalism, and empirical realism, 
which may be taken to correspond to the subjective, intersutyective and objective 
modes of knowing identified above.
While comfort may be taken from agreeing on the areas of concem with Singer, 
Habermas and Rescher, the differences of interpretation suggest that, if scepticism is 
to be accepted as the most plausible of positions, with all that this entails, the 
arguments and counter-arguments will have to be examined in greater detail.
Constraints on access to the truth
Bracketed numbers refer to the table of obstructions to certainty.
(1) The unreliability of our neural systems is probably the least controversial of the 
constraints on certainty that have been identified. Despite Heidegger's invaluable 
injunction that we should dwell In the world rather than conceive of the mind as a 
somehow discrete entity [eg; Floistad,1983:6-9], there is too much evidence of the 
fallibility of our perceptual mechanisms to encourage the idea that our brains can be
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relied on in their interpretation of neural data. (1 > 2) Even If such neural data were 
reliable, this would be insufficient for descriptive certainty, since descriptions of the 
worid would inevitably have theoretical and taxonomic components [Neisser,1976].
(2) Thus the issue of the neutrality of an observer, or of the conceptual scheme 
through which the ot)server interprets their experience is central to the pursuit of 
descriptive certainty. As innumerable philosophers of the natural sciences have 
acknowledged, such neutrality is not a serious possibility. Kuhn [1970] observed that 
the whole system which attributes to any theory the status of scientific knowledge is 
dependent on a community which has interests in defending its conceptual paradigm. 
Lakatos [1974,1978] was notably sceptical about the manner in which a core theory 
could be defended; and Planck was so doutrtful of the capacity of scientific 
communities that he suggested that
a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and 
making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventially
die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it [Planck cited
in Kuhn, 1970:15]
Feyerabend [1988] went still further, arguing that anything goes; the proper context of 
discovery is not determinable, and, as Foucault has suggested, the context of 
validation would seem to be a function of the variables of social power rather than of 
the demonstrable effectiveness of any transcendent methodology [Foucault,1988].
The underlying point can be expressed very simply: "our conceptualisations 
characterise us more than they characterise that to which they are supposed to refer." 
[Dooley, 1976:176] Similarly, from the deconstructionist perspective it is argued that 
"the practitioner of interpretive analytics realises that he himself is produced by what 
he Is studying; consequently he can never stand outside it" [Dreyfus and
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Rabinow,1983 cited in Dâvila,1993:388]. In the less flamboyant and allusive Anglo- 
Saxon tradition one may refer to Ryan's assertion that "one should not think that 
value-freedom can always be achieved just by leaving out more and more of the 
significance of what is being described. The end of that road is not a neutral 
description but a thoroughly misleading one." [Ryan, 1981:25]
Thus the distinction between fact and value may be said to be untenable because 
value commitments enter into the very assessment of evidence by social 
scientists and not simply into the content of the conclusions they 
advance ...the conceptions held by a social scientist of what constitute 
cogent evidence or sound intellectual workmanship are the products of 
his education and his place in society, and are affected by the social 
values transmitted by this training and associated with this social position; 
the values to which the social scientist is thereby committed determine 
which statements he accepts as well-grounded conclusions about human 
affairs. [Nagel. 1981:413]
Even, however, were it plausible to argue that we could suspend our interests and our 
preconceptions, there must be severe doubts that language operates in a fashion that 
would permit this to take place.
(3) Two of the problems are combined in Quine's elaboration of Wittgenstein's doubts 
of the feasibility of ostention. This issue is perhaps best approached obliquely, via 
Hollis and Lukes' argument that there must be a bridgehead of meaning [Hollis and 
Lukes, 1982]; that is, a set of terms which have undeniable equivalence in more than 
one mind. This reflects the argument offered by Winch, that
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....each society has its own concepts, its own "worid", and yet they connect 
with each other somehow through their common confrontation with the 
basic facts of human life; not earth, air and fire, but birth, copulation and 
death - these are conceptualised by all cultures and hence we have some 
sort of benchmark for beginning cross-cultural dialogue. [Jarvie,
1984:101]
Examination of Hollis and Lukes' text, however, shows that their only ground for the 
assumption of a bridgehead is that they would otherwise be forced to accept that 
rationalism is insupportable; as clear an Instance of preconceptions re-emerging as 
conclusions as one could wish to find: while Winch's assertion of the possibility of 
cross-cultural dialogue must be clearly distinguished from access to a transcendent 
truth. As Barnes and Bloor assert, there are no simple preceptual situations' which 
provide the researcher with standard meanings' uncomplicated by cultural variables 
[Barnes and Bloor, 1982:38].
In order for a bridgehead of semantic certainty to be established, and in particular to 
be established as undeniable, the Laingian proposition that "I do not experience your 
experience....your and their experience is invisible to me as mine is to you and 
them..." [Laing, 1967:16-17] would have to be completely discredited: without such a 
refutation, corroboration is impossible. Refutation does not appear to be achieved by 
Hollis and Lukes, nor by Winch or Jarvie. A high degree of empathy may be 
attainable, but intersubjective confirmation of descriptions is not, as far as we can tell. 
We remain with the problem that, as Quine pointed out, if the representative of 
another culture repeatedly points at a rabbit and utters sounds, we may reckon the 
sounds are associated with the rabbit, but we cannot tell whether the remark is 
There's a rabbit", "LO! rabbithood again" or "It rabbiteth". [Quine,1969:3]
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(3 > 4) Ambiguity is in no wise reduced by the extension of semantic analysis beyond 
correspondence - the positivist task of direct association of a single term with an 
identifiable entity. If, as Quine in Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953] has also 
asserted, all terms are interpretable only in relation to each other, we may have a 
network of speech acts which are functionally effective [Austin, 1961], but this still 
cannot be equated with direct correspondence between a linguistic event and that 
which it purports to represent. The distinction between the analytic [a prion] and 
synthetic [a posteriori] statement appears to be inapplicable if the meaning of words is 
dependent on verbal context and environmental circumstance. No statement is part of 
a self-evident ahistorical conceptual scheme; and thus no statement is capable of 
representing a formal truth that transcends its contingent frame of reference [Quine, 
1953]. In Ryle's felicitous phrase:
Meanings are not things, not even very queer things. Learning the 
meaning of an expression is more like leaming a piece of drill than like 
coming across a previously unencountered object. [Ryle, cited in 
Thomson, 1981:17]
There is an outstanding issue, however. While that which is conventionally seen as 
language would appear to suffer from intrinsic problems as a transcendent medium, 
the language of logic might tempt us to believe that the limitations of our 
circumstances can be overcome. While content may remain ambiguous, form may 
represent a universal and necessary pattern.
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The first stage of almost any such claim is to reduce the richness and complexity of 
speech to a form commensurable with a universal and necessary prepositional logic; 
though Barnes and Bloor have quite reasonably enquired as to why this reductiveness 
should be persuasive [Bames and Bloor, 1982:45]. Nevertheless, there are those who 
are willing to commit themselves to the logical positivist daim that any statement that 
is not so redudble is metaphysical nonsense; or have adopted the rationalist's 
equivalent posture that it is through deductive inference that we can transcend the 
boundaries of our situated knowledge.
Kant in many ways established the pattem for such attempts. His approach to the 
attainment of escape trajectory was that
. . .as a boundary is itself something positive which belongs both to what 
lies inside it and to the space which lies outside a given totality, reason 
partakes in real positive knowledge merely by extending itself up to this 
boundary, but in such a way that it does not try to go beyond this 
boundary, because it finds there before it an empty space in which it can 
indeed think forms for things but not things in themselves. [Kant,
1953:129]
It was through the primacy of logic that Kant proposed that we might transcend the 
boundary; but the inadequacy of this approach has long been evident, even to those 
who have devoted a working life to studying Kantian thought. In Paton's words:
We can afford now to smile at Kant's devotion to Formal Logic: and his 
defects in this matter have been so often condemned... that I need not 
dwell on this topic. [Paton, 1936:553]
Not everyone has attended to the warning sounded by the history of epistemology.
Both Wittgenstein and Ayer were attracted by the possibility of reducing speech to a
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logical format which would permit the truth or otherwise of any statement to be 
determined. Wittgenstein, of course, found himself completely reversing his position, 
while Ayer, in an introduction to a later edition of Language, Tmth and Logic 
confessed his emt>arassment at having produced such an over-assertive 'young man's 
book.' [Ayer, 1956]. Russell was also involved in these researches, but later concluded 
that
Truth is applicable primarily as a form of words, and only derivatively to a 
belief. A form of words is a social phenomenon, therefore the 
fundamental form of truth must be social. [Russell, 1927:273]
In a more technical vein, Kaminsky has argued convincingly against the plausibility of 
Chomsky's pursuit of a universal grammar, concluding that
...there is no ultimate logical form of a sentence. There is only that form 
we can attribute to a sentence on the basis of the logic we have available 
to us. More specifically, the logical form of a sentence is the form we 
think it would take if it were a member of a given formal logical language.
It is this form that reveals to us the ontological commitments of a 
language, and for this reason it is really quite absurd to take seriously the 
Chomskian view that with sufficient study of language we shall some day 
find (he universal grammar that permeates all languages. [Kaminsky,
1982:43]
Equally, in respect of logic, the futility of expecting transcendent truth from analysis of 
the form should be apparent from Russell's achievement of paradox "Is the set of all 
sets which are not members of themselves, a member of itself or not?", which was 
constructed while he was In pursuit of the perfect logical form; or from Godel's proof 
that every formal language is of necessity either inconsistent or incomplete; and as 
Walsh has commented "it is not obvious how formal logic, which is a logic of
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consistency, can supply a clue to wtiat professes to t>e a logic of trutti.” [Walsh, 
1967:312]
Even consistency is problematic. Hodge, for example, a professional logician, has 
suggested that, given that the aim of logic is to tell us in what situations a set of 
sentences is all true, the calculations necessary to detemnine the truth value of such a 
set would in any but the simplest circumstances be infinite, so that "only an angel or 
retired god could complete them." [Hodge, 1976:250]
If we are faced with choosing between a belief in an underlying universality of 
language or the possibility of discovering unexpected perspectives, the latter may very 
well seem the more plausible.
The possibility to which every tradition is always open is that the time
and place may come, when and where those who live their lives in and 
through the language-in-use which gives expression to it may encounter 
another alien tradition with its own very different language-in-use and 
may discover that while in some area of greater or lesser importance they 
cannot comprehend it within the terms of reference set by their own 
t)eliefs, their own history, and their own language-in-use, it provides a 
standpoint from which once they have acquired its language-in-use as a 
second first language, the limitations, incoherences, and poverty of 
resources of their own beliefs can be identified, characterised, and 
explained in a way not possible from within their own tradition.
[Maclntyre,1988:388]
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To summarise thus far three modes of knowing were hypothesised, with equivalent 
potentialities for access to the truth. Both endogenous and exogenous grounds for 
dismissing two of them have t)een presented.
Oljiective knowledge as a route to certainty is
•  self-contradictory in that experience teaches us that appearances can be 
deceptive (1),
•  challenged theoretically by the implausibility of asserting that any conceptual 
scheme is universal and necessary (2,3,4).
Inter-subiective knowledge is subject to scepticism t>ecause
• it is mediated by language; and the linguistic analysis of languages show them to 
be incomplete representations both in form or content - neither transparent nor 
directly referential (2,3,4)
• rationalism is experientially ridiculed by the repeated practical failure of schemes 
which assert incontravertability on the grounds of deductive purity.
There remains the third option. Although sutyectivity in the form of intuition has, by 
definition, no possibility of discursive validation, and continually demonstrates its 
predictive unreliability, it deserves, nevertheless, to t>e taken seriously.
Polanyi [1958,1967,1969] has perhaps offered the most cogent arguments for the 
primacy of tacit knowledge. The core of his argument can be appreciated by
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integrating two propositions, The first of these is that "Our txxJy is the ultimate 
instrument of all our external knowledge, whether intellectual or practical." [1967:15] 
The second concerns the nature of understanding; a process of comrehending, of "a 
grasping of disjointed parts into a comprehensive whole. ...We cannot comprehend a 
whole without seeing its parts, but we can see the parts without comprehending the 
whole." [1958:28,29]
The inter-relation of these components is perhaps best summarised in this extract:
We seek to clarify, verify or lend precision to something said or 
experienced. We move away from a position that is felt to be problematic 
to another position which we find more satisfying. And this is how we 
eventually come to hold a piece of knowledge to be true. Here is the tacit 
doing of our own,....the unavoidable act of personal participation in our 
explicit knowledge of things: an act of which we can be aware merely in 
an unreflecting manner. And this situatation appears no longer as a 
logical oddity. For we have seen that the kind of tacit powers by which we 
commit ourselves to any particular statement operate in various elaborate 
forms throughout the realm of human knowledge, and that it is this 
personal coefficient alone which endows our explicit statements with 
meaning and conviction. [Polanyi, 1958:26]
Thus the importance of intuition is evoked; "It is not by looking at things but by
dwelling in them that we understand their joint meaning We can see now how an
unbridled lucidity can destroy our understanding of complex matters."
[Polanyi,1967:18] However, Polanyi's claim Is quite dearly that tadt knowledge refers 
not to a transcendent conception of the truth, but to an idea of meaning. Essentially 
his position is pragmatic; to be effective we must at times re-integrate our analyses.
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Language can help us to reconstruct our understanding; but there is a time to move 
beyond language, even if our actions will subsequently be justifiably subject to a 
linguistic critique. Descriptive truth is not accessible by the subjective route.
Each of the three supposed modes of access to the truth - the formal, the experiential 
and the intuitive - can thus be interpreted as offering necessary contributions to our 
understanding without any of them, severally or in combination, offering us certainty. 
Scepticism, in the sense of accepting the inaccessibility of truth, becomes perhaps the 
most tenable of epistemological positions.
6, Positivist recidivism
If the argument outlined above is taken seriously, there would seem to be a need to 
explain the perpetuation of more positivist epistemologies and methodologies; and 
given the unconvincing philosophical validation of the position, a sociological 
explanation may be more convincing, if less creditable to the profession.
History offers a popular perspective on the issue. The momentum engendered by the 
success of the positive natural sciences in their technological role seems to have been 
taken to indicate the possibility of the same methodology being applied to society. 
Positivism, sometimes in the allied form of naturalism, is perhaps most closely 
associated with the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; with Comte's ideal of an 
elite of social scientists; or Durkheim's sociological rule that "All preconceptions must 
be eradicated.” [Durkheim, 1966:34]. However, in the words of Harré and Secord: 
Only if social psychologists can be persuaded to turn their attention to life 
situations of which life in the laboratory is a very small and restricted part,
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can justice be done to the richness and complexity of the daily life that is 
familiar to all of us as lay persons, and for which our language is a well- 
adjusted conceptual instrument. [Harré and Secord, 1972:152]
Of course, this argument can be discounted by claiming that our minds are 
epiphenomenal, and that the investigation of the physical brain will ultimately provide 
a complete explanation of knowing. These ontological grounds of reductive social 
science cannot be unequivocally discounted, which allows a variety of forms of 
positivism to persist, in the form of environmental or biological determinism. Ôn the 
one hand, Skinner's claim that The variables of which human behaviour is a function 
lie in the environment" [Skinner, 1977:1] still attracts some social theorists, while 
sodo-biologists such as Maturana [1988,1988 with Varela] and Dawkins [1976] also 
entice a significant number of followers.
Reductive determinism then is a distinct perspective; but it is dependent on 
epistemological optimism. Rorty*s use of the term commensurable is helpful here:
By "commensurable" I mean able to be brought under a set of rules which 
will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle 
the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict. [Rorty,
1980:285]
In this sense, the reductive view of the world is commensurable with that which is 
expressed here, but purely hypothetical. Those who do not accept our minds (as 
distinct from our brains) as significant intervening variables in the explanation of 
human experience may agree both
• that the prediction of behaviour and of private experience would be necessary to 
demonstrate their case; and
• that they show no significant signs of achieving this.
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Their assertions remain purely speculative, therefore, and of marginal relevance to the 
practical social scientist, or, indeed, to many cognitive biologists [Greenfield,1995].
The concern here is not principally with reductive determinist discourse It is with 
seeking to understand the residual positivism of those who appear to accept that 
positivism is inappropriate to the social sciences, yet perpetuate the role implied by it. 
Effectively, this interim project may be taken as a search for commensurability within 
that set of academic discourses which accepts that social reality is in part constructed 
from our imaginations.
To this end, a set of rules, (or, in sceptical discourse, commitments), which are seen 
as underlying these discourses, may be offered. This set will be taken, in this context, 
to be acceptance of the grounds of scepticism: that is, we will not seek to daim that 
our descriptions represent a convergence on the truth by arguing
• that our physical experience gives us access to an immediate objective reality;
• that we can achieve observational neutrality;
• or that we have access to any language which is in form or content directly 
correspondent to reality.
If such a set of commensurability rules can be accepted, it is by reference to them that 
conflicting statements may be settled; or at least the dissonances identified with some 
predsion. More particularly, the justification of practices which constitute sodal 
intervention can be darified.
Discourses which appear to be grounded in this set might be expected to accept their 
implications, but there are a variety of escape routes. Four categories have been
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identified here: moral panic, misrepresentation, transcendentalism, and wishful 
thinking.
Moral panic
One familiar and recurrent theme forms the first category: moral panic at the danger 
of the slide from scepticism into nihilism. Flood, for example, has argued that "In order 
to avoid skeptical despair, however, it is necessary to accept "the positivist 
moment"..." [Flood,1990:69]; and with Romm he claims that relativism is automatically 
gloomy [Flood and Romm,1995:473].
Surely an additional premise is required for either statement to attain any kind of 
logical rigour. The proposition that despair is the necessary consequence of failing to 
beBeve that one's knowledge is certain would meet the case; but is such a claim 
credible? Can it really be attested that those who are uncertain become dysfunctional? 
Is it really necessary to deny uncertainty in order to avoid despair, or appropriate to try 
to deceive ourselves? If uncertainty is our lot, what benefits do we expect to accrue 
from a pretence of certain knowledge, other than temporary refuge in a fool's 
paradise?
Midgley has argued that "Flood's positivist moment’ is embedded in critical practice, 
and is therefore as sceptical as [my\ objective knowledge ." [Personal communication. 
Summer, 1997] To this I would reply that positivism is not generally understood to 
have any sceptical component, whereas knowledge of objects can easily encompass a 
sceptical perspective. There would seem to be, therefore, a problem of translation; but 
not one which obviates the identification of moral panic. If Midgley’s reading is taken.
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however, the response to moral panic is not, in this case, the complete at)andonment 
of scepticism and critical awareness, but something more akin to their suspension.
Moral panic was also familiar to the pre-Socratic Greeks as a response to scepticism, 
but pragmatists from the time of Cameades, at least, have accepted that if we cannot 
know with certainty, there are other criteria for belief. This position will be discussed in 
greater detail later (Evolution of a methodology, et seq.). For immediate purposes it is 
merely appropriate to note the fallacy of the argument that fears of the consequences 
of embracing uncertainty should lead us to pretend that we have access to the truth.
Misrepresentation
Another popular form of epistemological escapism is the "straw man gambit" in which 
critics find it opportune to misrepresent scepticism in order to contradict it. For 
example;
The cognitive sceptic does not hold that what we think we know about the 
world is false. He simply maintains that our knowledge claims in this 
domain are unwarranted - that we inevitably lack due justification for 
making them." [Rescher, 1980:2]
How likely would sceptics be to accept this description of their attitude? A more 
perceptive expression of the sceptical position might well be to say that the sceptic 
...is not just asking "How do you know?" (in a way which implies we do 
not, of course). The skeptic is more particular he asks "How do you know 
that this, rather than that is the better hypothesis?" [Harman, 1990:150]
Simply because certainty is rejected as a reasonable crrteiion for belief, H cannot t>e 
inferred that no other criteria are permissible.
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Rescher is hostile to scepticism, hence the exaggeration ad absiadem: the sceptics’ 
assumption of uncertainty is transformed into an imputed claim that there is no reason 
to prefer one idea to another. Rescher then uses his elatx>ration to support his claim 
that scepticism is irrational. This manoeuvre is all the more mystifying in that Rescher 
appears to accept that certainty is implausible; which was all that the sceptic claimed 
before Rescher chose to misinterpret the position.
Transcendentalism
The third category of attempts to supercede, rather than simply deny, the sceptical 
case may be described as transcendental. In this set, it is usually argued that some 
intellectual technique allows us to step outside ourselves. Kant, as has already been 
illustrated, favoured this approach, and has been followed by, amongst others, 
Bourdieu.
Bourdieu argues for a social praxeology.
First we push aside mundane representations to construct the objective 
structures (spaces of positions), the distribution of socially efficient 
resources that define the extemal constraints bearing on interactions and 
representations. Second, we reintroduce the immediate, lived experience 
of agents in order to explicate categories of perception and appreciation 
{dispositions) that structure their action from inside. It should be stressed 
that, although the two moments of analysis are equally necessary, they 
are not equal; epistemological priority is granted to objectivist rupture 
over subjectivist understanding. Application of Durkheim's first principle 
of the "sociological method", the systematic rejection of preconceptions, 
must come before analysis of the practical apprehension of the world
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from the subjective standpoint. For the viewpoints of agents will vary 
systematically with the point they occupy in objective social space.
[Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:11]
There seems, however, little plausibility in the idea that social space can be 
objectively defined by researchers, who are themselves agents, so that their 
systematic constructivist deviations can be subtracted from their conceptions. There is 
no starting point to make transcendence feasible, even if hard data may at times give 
some indication of the personal interests which could encourage particular mindsets, 
and be recognised as a bias in an analysis.
Wishful thinking
A fourth category that overlaps with transcendentalism could easily attract the title 
"wishful thinking". Habermas, for example, invoked a "kind of knowledge, critical 
science, that meets the need of mankind for emancipation from false theories and 
distorted language." [Mansell, 1994:592] This would be a splendid addition to our 
intellectual capacity, but the dependence on a transhistoric structure of consciousness 
or of language [Habermas,1970] depends on an ability to attain ideological neutrality 
for which there is no evidence.
Bhaskar [1979,1989] also seems to offer an intriguing example of this tendency. 
Having referred to Lukàcs* daim that "the role of philosophy is to justify and exhibit the 
grounds for regarding the outcome of sdentific methodology as valid", he goes on to 
write that:
...such an exercise presupposes both a certain view of knowledge (so that 
it is intrinsically drcular); and implicitly of the world (that is the way the
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world must be for knowledge of the presumed sort to be possible)...I am 
going to propose a reversal in our conception of the programme of 
philosophy. On it one no longer implicitly makes certain extraordinary 
assumptions about the world ..to show the rationality of science. Rather 
one assumes at the outset the intelligibility of science (or rather of a few 
generally recognised scientific activities) and asks explicitly what the 
world must be like for those activities to be possitWe. [Bhaskar, 1979:10]
As a rescue attempt, it is reminiscent of the hero who dives into the quicksand to pull 
out the victim, since the circularity Bhaskar attributes to Lukàcs applies also to his own 
argument. He has merely entered the circle at a different point.
Distinguishing these four categories of renunciation of scepticism - moral panic, 
misrepresentation, transcendence, and wishful thinking - may not exhaust the 
attempts to shore up the notion of a positive social or systemic science. It should be 
recalled that reductive epistemological optimism does not come under the sway of the 
sceptical commitments, and may well achieve intemal consistency. To those, 
however, who accept that social reality is in part constructed from our imaginations, 
such avenues are closed. Demonstrating the inconsistencies of these theories thus 
reinforces the proposition that where scepticism is rejected despite apparent 
acceptance of the grounds of scepticism, an explanation of the discursive dissonance 
is required.
As has been hinted, reflexive sociology may provide a persuasive answer. The 
recidivist epistemologies have radical implications for the permissible scope of social 
scientific roles. If there are methodologies that allow experts privileged access to the
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truth, authority should be vested in those experts, and they need not be subject to 
significant judgement by others. If this is not the case, the social scientist is merely 
one of many participants in the construction of social reality, and their interventions 
cannot be justified by appeal to the superiority of their methodologies, of which they 
alone are guardians.
Of the conceptions supporting this perspective, the role of the Brahmin caste in India 
is perhaps the most accessible. According to Bose [1984], the original structure of the 
caste system was not predominantly hierarchical, so much as a division of labour; but 
those to whom is allocated the duty to preserve and extend wisdom are apt to use 
their authority to define their role in a more authoritative sense than the epistemology 
permits.
In a second example, Foucault [1988:309] would seem to have recognised a similar 
potential in writing of the "interplay of selection, sacralisation, and institutional 
validation, of which the university is both the operator and the receiver." Thirdly, there 
is the considered judgement of two respected professional academics:
The field of social science is replete with politicking for control over 
institutional resources, networking aimed at securing the support of 
colleagues, and the manipulation of the sources and legitimacy of 
knowledge and reputation. [Long and Long, 1992:39]
I am suggesting, therefore, that the positivism latent in the practice of the social 
sciences can t>e explained quite plausibly in terms of the maintenance of privilege. 
Others may favour the belief that social scientists can transcend the epistemic 
limitations which apply to other human beings, but I have yet to be persuaded by their 
arguments.
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Amongst which band of social scientists might I then hope to find a home?
7, Lookina for a home
To summarise the position;
In their practical applications and methodologies, many social and systemic scientific 
discourses retain the habits of their positivist origins, even though the positivist 
assumptions have since become largely untenable in the current discourse of 
epistemology. A negative conception of positivism has dear implications for what can 
and cannot be achieved; treating sodety as a describably predictable mechanism, for 
example, is not acceptable. Since descriptions are thought to be partial, but also 
function as an intervening variable in human behaviour, the researcher may be 
perceived as intervening in the construdion of sodal institutions.
One might continue by arguing that a lack of epistemological validation of positivism 
could be ethically redeemed if it could be demonstrated that the outcomes arising 
from such daims were benefidal. An alternative view, which approximates to my 
position, is that if we seek consequential good, we must accept that the form taken by 
sodety is to t>e direded by partidpative, hermeneutic and heuristic processes. A 
general case for this perspective can be culled from ideas put forward by, amongst 
others, Greenberg [cited by Levin], Buckley, Cohen, Sears and Machiavelli.
The Levin/Greenberg argument for partidpation is that;
•  it improves performance by increasing commitment;
•  from the perspedive of humanistic psychology, partidpation is essential to 
mental health;
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•  democracy is morally Inescapable;
•  and that participation Is a pre-requlslte of social change. [Levin, 1994]
On this last issue, Buckley uses Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety to suggest that, in 
order to t>e adaptive - to accept the implications of the assumption that social structure 
Is "an heuristic tool rather than a substantial social entity" [Buckley,1981:186] - it is 
necessary to nurture non-pathologlcal deviance. That conformity and uniformity are 
inadequate, and by implication that participation is essential, is supported in particular 
by reference to three claims.
Firstly, Cohen argued that the political system should t>e seen as
a circular feedback loop whereby superiors continuously modify their 
standards or expectations as definitions of political objectives change, 
and subordinates adapt their decisions and performances to these 
changing expectations and suncunding circumstances, which in tum 
changes the states of the situation toward which superiors are acting.
[Buckley, 1981;196]
Secondly, in Sear's words:
Whether the group's t>ehaviour is dealt with as antecedent and the 
individual's as consequent, or vice versa, the two kinds of event are so 
commonly mixed in causal relationships that it is impractical to 
conceptualise them separately. [Sears, cited in Buckley,1981:190]
Thirdly, it has been argued that
.... a republic has a fuller life and enjoys good fortune for a longer time 
than a principality, since it Is better able to adapt Itself to diverse
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circumstances owing to the diversity found among its 
citizens [Machiavelli, The Discourses, III.9, circa 1515]
Other views are possible, of course; but perhaps these perspectives may prove 
persuasive in the light of the ontological, moral and epistemological commitments 
expressed here. In seeking a home for my research, therefore, a commitment to 
participation and emancipation would seem to be crucial indicators of an acceptable 
research method; and the methodologies which seem to fall most readily within this 
remit are those of action research and of the soft and critical systems sciences.
Whether appropriate methodological guidance for this particular research project can 
be found within this set is less readily assertible.
Systems sciences
Systems thinking is a diverse field. The argument for general system theory, though 
the term is most strongly associated with von Bertalanffy [1968], is perfiaps most 
accessible through Laszlo's set of propositions:
Coherent and systematic theories of the empirical world are based on two 
primary assumptions:
1. That the world exists; 
and
2. The world is at least in some respects intelligibly ordered (open to 
rational enquiry).
These are the secondary propositions;
(i) the world is intelligibly ordered in special domains
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or
(ii) the world is intelligibly ordered as a whole. [Laszio, 1972:8]
If the second of the secondary propositions is accepted, there is a strong case for 
seeking a language or set of concepts which is transferable between academic 
disciplines, and in many respects this is at the heart of systemic thought.
The precise identification of such a set of concepts is, hardly surprisingly, not easily 
attainable, and there should be no confusion between a transdisdplinary terminology 
and the idea of a universal language that directly corresponds to the truth. 
Nevertheless, within the systems field a variety of tenets tend to be accepted as 
fundamental. These include the ideas of the whole being greater than the sum of the 
parts; the convenience of selecting boundaries which define systems in such a way as 
to allow study and intervention; the recognition that any system, saving only the 
universe and all that therein is, must be considered as an element in a hierarchy of 
systems; multicausality; and inter-disdplinarity [Carter et al, 1984].
Other elements of systems thinking are only slightly more controversial, although 
acceptance of their significance is not necessarily matched by agreement as to how 
we should respond. The significance of control, for example, tends to be accepted, 
even if Wiener's daim is not necessarily transferable to sodal drumstances: "...what 
cybernetics offers is the framework on which all individual machines may be ordered, 
related, and understood." [cited in Checkland,1981:34] Sodal systems are not always 
best seen as machines. In that context, however, communication is probably an 
essential element of analysis [Watson,1984:32-39; Checkland,1981:35].
Another asped of the systemic view has been well summarised by Checkland in his 
persistent wamings against confusing "a possibly plausible description of perceived
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reality, with perceived reality itself [Checkland and Scholes, 1990:21]; but this view is 
contested. Not all systemists accept that There will...never be a single testable) 
account of a human activity system, only a set of possible accounts all valid according 
to particular Weltanschauungen.” [Checkland, 1981:14].
Modernism within systems theory
The critical systems school, for example, often appears to follow Habermas into the 
transcendentalist illusion.
The exact nature of modemism is open to debate, but in this case K appears to be an 
acceptance of the necessity of a hermeneutic or interpretive analysis, combined with 
an assumption that positivism can encompass such a dynamic. Mansell has 
summarised this position with considerable clarity:
The work of Habermas, however, arguably does provide a coherent 
framework that reconciles apparently opposed paradigms via the notion 
of cognitive interests and the different forms of knowledge to which they 
give rise. Habermas argues that knowledge serves human interests in 
manipulating the environment and cooperating with others. This technical 
and practical interest gives rise to two different forms of knowledge, each 
with its own criterion of validity. Thus positivism and functionalism in the 
social sciences can be reconciled with phenomenonology and 
hermeneutics. Methods of enquiry appropriate to one interest, however, 
must not be misapplied to the domain of the other ....[there is also a need 
for] a third kind of knowledge, critical science, that meets the need of 
mankind for emancipation from false theories and distorted language.
[Mansell. 1994:592]
page 65
Reasons for doubting the feasibility of this project have already been offered. Firstly, 
the idea that we can distinguish between completely discrete areas of knowledge is 
opposed to Laszlo's proposition of an integrated universe, which has been adopted 
here. Secondly, the search for a tool that can perform this task cannot be taken to 
imply that such transcendent knowledge is available. Furthermore, and still more 
crucially, the aim of the critical systems school is emancipation [Flood,1993], yet it is 
unclear how much their project would contribute to this commendable aim unless 
Habermas is rigorously screened through a sceptical sieve.
This does not always happen. A flavour of the danger may be gained from the 
interpretation of Habermas as having asserted that "post-modemism is dearly an 
obfuscatory strategy designed to protect existing power structures" [Mansell, 
1994:592]. This is an interesting approach. To describe post-modemism simply as a 
strategy is surely to take the part for the whole. If someone is choked with a 
cucumber, would it be appropriate to categorise cucumbers prindpally as weapons? 
There may be those who are delighted to encourage scepticism, relativism and post- 
modemism as supportive of a policy of divide and rule, or as an ot>fuscation of the 
dominant power relations in sodety; but, equally, sceptical thought may have its roots 
in the rigorous analysis of the possibilities of human epistemology.
I would argue, contrariwise, that the effed of repladng doubt with an assumption of 
the accessibility of certain truth is likely to contritxjte to the concentration of power in 
sodety. To replace a secular elite with the dominance of a positivist academic elite 
who alone are qualified to tell us what we really mean is hardly emandpatory; but It 
deconstruction were taken to be an exad sdence, the likelihood is that linguistic
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interpretation would become a domain of authoritative expertise. Others would daim 
to know better than ourselves what our words intended.
From the sceptical perspective, the notion of false consdousness should not lead us 
to the assumption that there are those who are blessed with the capacity to identify 
spedfic instances of its occurrence, or of its absence. Is it reasonable to daim, for 
example, that
The very ad of partidpating in a discourse, of attempting to come to an 
agreement about the truth of a problematic statement or the corredness 
of a problematic norm, carries with it the supposition that a genuine 
agreement is possible. If we did not suppose that a justified consensus 
was possible and could in some way be distinguished from a false 
consensus, then the very meaning of discourse, indeed of speech would 
be called into question. [McCarthy cited in Forester,1983:239]
A premise of such a supposition would seem to be that we would only use speech if 
we knew it to be a perfed tool, for which there appears to be no grounds whatsoever. 
This response to the imperfedions of communication seems to me no more helpful 
than its diametric opposite; that of Cratylus who "found the whole matter so distressing 
that he thought it best to stop talking altogether and simply waggle his finger." [Hodge, 
1976:27]
Preference may be given to the belief that there is no transcendent position that would 
allow us to subtrad our prejudices. Any daim of such transcendent ability could also 
be thought to represent the anti-emandpatory role described by Foucault as arising 
when "an individual or sodal group manages to block a field of relations of power, to 
render them impassive and invariable, and to prevent all reversibility of movement." 
[Foucault, 1984:3]
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By constrast, Foucault's own interpretive dynamic may be described as the attempt 
1o leam to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what 
it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently." [Foucault cited in 
Davila,1993:402-3] Scepticism is at home with such a project, and with the 
Foucauvian position expressed by Valero-Silva:
While Habermas acknowledges a bifurcation of reason, that since it only 
occurred once can be rectified, Foucault assumes that reason is in a 
constant process of bifurcation in some way or another. [Valero- 
Silva,1995:188]
Is Valero-Silva another who misinterprets the Habermasian projection of the unity of 
reason as an attainable end, or does he accurately reflect the ambiguity of critical 
thought?
In full recognition of the contribution made within systems thinking to the significance 
of power relations, and of the variety of opinions and ideas within the school, the 
emancipatory sceptic may well experience critical system thinking as a dogmatic 
strait-jacket. This does not make a comfortable home, however pleasant it may be to 
have those who are both sceptical and critical as neighbours.
Pragmatism and the critical systems school
Just as I am comfortable amongst sceptics, so I am at ease among pragmatists; but 
since there appears to be some confusion surrounding what is meant by pragmatism, 
a brief history of the word may be helpful.
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In the first place, it should be noted that although Peirce coined the word pragmatism 
in 1878, the notion that in the absence of certainty we should refer to the apparent 
utility of holding an idea was expressed by Cameades several thousand years ago. 
Secondly, Peirce was concerned with expressing a theory of meaning, rather than 
precisely with a theory of knowledge. The extension of the term to its epistemological 
function may be attributed to Dewey and William James. However, since each agreed 
that we come no closer to the truth than through the responsible examination of the 
available evidence, and that science is a guide to action rather than a process of 
convergence on the truth, the core implications of the term seem to be relatively 
straightforward. They might be stated thus:
Certainty is beyond us, so that tfie criterion for holding to a description or 
explanation of ourselves or our ermonmerrt is utiiity. The evidence that 
we may consider ranges from intuitive subjective report, via 
intersubjective constructions, to the observation of phenomena. None of 
tNs evidence is entirely reliable, but none of it should bo di&ogarded.
Does this construction preclude my sharing a home with those who appear to dismiss 
pragmatism? In the instance of the critical systems school I have sometimes thought 
so.
Their position is neither as unequivocal or stable as may sometimes appear, however. 
Indeed, some critical theorists appear to be sceptical pragmatists. Midgley, for 
example, claims that "Reality is constituted by objective phenomena . many 
subjectivities....and power." [Midgley, 1992:160] Although a fully-fledged sceptic might 
be more cautious In the use of the term reality, there is a clear parallel between the 
two positions. Phenomena and subjectivity are shared elements. That element which
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is constituted by power sounds not dissimilar to intersubjective construction, wtiicti 
should, indeed, always be open to critical analysis.
Sometimes, then, the hostility of critical theorists to pragmatism appears to be 
misplaced. Several explanations are available. Some of those who describe 
themselves as pragmatists believe that any challenge to the sfafi/s quo is 
dysfunctional, and there are also those who describe themselves as pragmatists on 
the grounds that they are opposed to too much fancy thinking; but a carefully 
elaborated epistemological position cannot be reasonably dismissed simply because 
its terminology has been co-opted by those who have not considered its full 
implications.
To avoid any further confusion, then, let two points be made explicit about the use of 
the term pragmatist in this thesis. Firstly, that although pragmatism is opposed to 
rationalism, to conflate it on this ground with atheoretical empirical realism is an 
extraordinarily crude dependence on oppositional thinking [Flood and Jackson, 
1991a:322]. Peirce took pains to distance the pragmatic approach from an ill- 
considered faith in one's reflex responses:
I purposely slur over many points, in order to give emphasis to one 
special recommendation, namely to make a systematic study of the 
conceptions out of which philosophical theory may be built...[Peirce,
1958:145]
Obscurity thus enshrouds Flood and Jackson's daim that pragmatism is anti-theory 
because
It fails to recognise that learning can only take place if practice 
(successful or otherwise) can be related back to a set of theoretical
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presuppositions which are being consciously tested through that practice.
[Flood and Jackson. 1991a:322]
Secondly, pragmatism, as a serious epistemology that is derived from a sceptical 
position, is necessarily critical: disposed to question, in all cases, how theory and 
power might have distorted the evidence of the utility of any intervention. If there are 
those who are amoral in their use of pragmatic conceptions, who use it only to serve 
their own interests by serving the interests of the powerful, that is not an 
epistemological issue that devalues pragmatism. Indeed, the need for critical 
awareness is evident in many of the works of the early pragmatists. Dewey, for 
example, argued such a case in relation to the beliefs that influence behaviour in 
Reconstruction in Philosophy [1920]; and Peirce wrote of the Reformation as a 
process of sceptical emancipation from dogma in The Place of Our Age in the History 
of Civilisation. Fuenmayor is well wide of the mark when he states that 
Pragmatism is the closing of opportunities for unconcealment (as 
unnecessary), and therefore unconcealment is precluded by pragmatism. 
[Fuenmayor, 1991]
Pragmatism, then, is emphatically not an atheoretical epistemology, nor is it 
essentially opposed to critical challenges to established authority. Indeed, because of 
its sceptical roots, it is fundamentally directed towards a practical analysis of where 
power lies in any circumstances. If associated with a cynical self-interested 
perspective it may become amoral; but this attitude is far from being a prerequisite of 
pragmatism, and the traditions of academic pragmatism are dearly directed towards 
emandpatory objectives.
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Unhappily, therefore, critical systems thinking doesn't seem to offer a home for the 
sceptical pragmatist, even if we might feel comfortable sharing a suburb. Working 
from my commitments, I seek a heuristic, hermeneutic approach to intervention.
Nor does Checkland's soft systems approach meet my requirements. If one imagines 
a hierarchy of abstraction, Checkland's ideas tend to fall into levels which are either 
too specific or too general for my purposes. At one level what he offers is 
predominantly a technique for intervention where the actors are largely predifined with 
at least loosely circumscribed objectives within an organisational setting. At another, 
his sceptical pragmatism is congenial without offering guidance on method in contexts 
other than those with which he is concerned.
There are other approaches. Bignell and Fortune [1983] have developed a system of 
comparison with idealised models known as the failures method. This has its uses, but 
is essentially designed for intellectual analysis; it may be consultative, but it does not 
appear to be participative. One might also consider Viable Systems Methodology and 
Living Systems Theory; but the former appears to me to be too functionalist, despite 
Beer's disclaimers [Beer, 1994], and the latter too descriptively prescriptive [Bailey,
1994:626]. Each of these and other systemic approaches contributes something to a 
method for cognitive intervention without meeting my needs: that is, without offering a 
coherent methodological framework within which to design a contextually specific 
method for my particular purposes.
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Action research
Happily, however, there is a related school of thought which explores similar 
methodological themes; action research, which, while not a monolithic phenomenon, 
may be seen as the practical application of a pragmatic epistemology [Levin,1996:9]. 
Both pragmatism and AR (with some exceptions) are concerned with the role of the 
stakeholder in any intervention, rather than with an intellectual elite exposing an 
inaccessitWe truth
A shared concern with the uses and abuses of power, especially in the construction of 
knowledge, is encouraging. In addition. Busman's writings on AR, for example, are 
very clearly identified with pragmatic philosophy, as is evident from the statement that 
"I follow John Dewey in assuming that knowledge is a human artifact created as a 
means for coming to terms with the world as well as creating It" [Busman, 1983:97], 
and in his use of a research methodology which is explicitly based on Dewey's steps 
for reflective thinking: diagnosis, action planning, action taking, evaluating, and 
teaming [ibkhW2\.
Action research, and in particular those branches which emphasise participation, or 
co-generation sound quite welcoming, therefore, and a territory that is well worth 
exploring. Given the premises, however, it is hardly surprising to find some strange 
bedfellows.
Bome, such as Busman, seem to favour a formalised methodology: for example, he 
suggests that it is necessary for an effective problem solving-group to reach 
consensus on how their reality is defined [A/d: 103] and favours a fairly structured 
approach to all that the interdependence of social and technical systems [ibid: 98] may
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be taken to imply. Not all action researchers are committed to such an approach, 
however. Reason and Heron, for example, are considerably less prescriptive, 
restricting themselves essentially to a proposed methodological paradigm. 
Co-operative enquiry is probably the clearest methodological expression 
of aii the forms of collaborative enquiry. Whiie we have much confidence 
in this approach... we wouid not wish it to become a new orthodoxy.
[Reason and Heron,1995]
With such a viewpoint, I feel at home. Their approach to method is a close kin to that 
which wiii be discussed iaten the offering of conceptual tools which are believed to be 
of value. While not explicitly sceptical, they clearly eschew the possibility of an 
authoritative intellectual elite. Not all AR follows this pattern, however. Positivist 
recidivism seems intent on invading every territory.
Some theorists, for exampie, seek to colonise action research through the adoption of 
a Habermasian division of knowledge which can be used to justify the imposition of an 
elite view on the structure of any problem. The division of action research into the 
three domains of technical, practical and emancipatory [Carr and Kemmis, 1983] has 
led to the facilitator's role being described in the first two fields, respectively, as an 
outside expert and as a Socratic manipulator. Although in the third domain the 
facilitator's role is described as process moderator, there is throughout an implicit 
assumption that emancipation from tradition, self-deception and coercion is dependent 
on the superior conceptions of an outside expert [Perry and Zuber-Skerrit,1990].
Questions therefore have to be asked about the claim that
oniy emancipatory action research can unequivocaliy fulfil the minimal 
requirements for action research .[which includes the requirement of]
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participation and collaboration in all phases of the research activity. [Carr 
and Kemmis. 1983:7]
Firstly, are they equating emancipatory action research with critical research? and, 
secondly, if so, is it to be taken that emancipation is only to be achieved by pursuing a 
process which they determine? There must certainly be fears of such a tendency.
They appear to reproduce the critical positivism evident in Flood and Jackson's daim 
for an authoritative position within systemic action research:
In seeking to establish itself as the new dominant paradigm, therefore, 
criticai systems thinking demonstrates that earlier systems approaches 
are aii spedal cases with limited domains of application; [Flood and 
Jackson, 1991b:2].
In either case, there seems to be the implication that the Habermasian position itseif is 
exempt from the limitations which are inevitable in all other perspectives. (At a recent 
conference near Scunthorpe there was reason to suppose that the critical systerris 
school has become decreasingly positivist. Unfortunately the welcome realignment of 
this group of researchers is too recent to be analysed thoroughly in this thesis, [see 
Wilby,1996D
Again, positivism seems to lead towards the contradictory subsumation of 
emandpatory processes to a set of rules determined by an elite who alone are the 
proper judges of when those rules are being followed and the proper objedives 
achieved. Given the commitments that have been made here, emandpation through 
partidpation is likely to be understood in a rather different light.
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Participation
Levin, i am happy to say, seems very dose to sharing my view of the relationship 
between emandpation and partidpation.
The point is to support a process by which people can develop the skills 
necessary to formulate questions leading to an enquiry based on their 
own logic. [Levin,1994:29]
As with Freire [1972], the crudal element is that meaning is construded not according 
to either technical or procedural presuppositions of a political or intelledual elite, but 
through the voluntary acceptance of a fadlitative ador, whose attainments are locally 
assessed.
Neither Freire nor anyone else, however, can disdaim completely the exercise of 
power except by becoming totally passive. If we ad, we intervene; and if we intervene 
purposefully, we exercise power. However, confusions always seem to arise hom the 
indeterminacy of any analysis of power relations, perhaps espedally in reiation to the 
construction of knowledge; a phenomenon well illustrated by a variety of beiiefs 
expressed in the field of development studies.
Ostrom [1990:20] and Blot et a! [1993:62] argue for the practical necessity of 
incorporating iocal knowledge into the corpus of sdentific theory, but in each case the 
aim seems to be only to make allowance for local variation. The indigenous and 
exogenous knowledge do not appear to be of equal status. AHematively, Mascarenhas 
et al daimed that commitment to change stemmed from ownership, which was in tum 
dependent on all methods being developed and adapted in the field [Mascarenhas et 
ai, 1991:11,45]. Professional competition seems to piay a significant role in such 
judgements. Long and Long, for example, appeared to be staking a daim to discovery
page 76
of the actor-oriented enquiry as recently as 1992, which seems rather surprising. In the 
same academic field, the term populism has been thrown around as a useful 
peijorative. despite quite reasonable wamings about the incoherence of debate on the 
issue [Worsley,1969:197,213]. Often this seems to reflect the curious perspective that 
"I am a facilitator, you are a participative researcher, and they are manipulative" 
[Villareal, 1992:265 on Chambers, 1989]; which would only seem to reinforce the 
notion that none of us has a view from nowhere.
All in all, the gatekeepers of participative methods do not seem to have been able to 
agree any very clear standards by which others can abide. To many this may be less 
surprising than that they believe that ideal speech is possible. Even if there were no 
other reasons, it must surely be apparent that scale and complexity act as a constraint 
on the extent to which co-generation can take place. If we add to this the need for 
creativity and the sceptical assumption that we would not know even if we had 
achieved perfect participation, then equity in social construction would seem more 
identifiable in the avoidance of abuse than in a definitive model of process.
A distinction that has emerged here as crucial in this context, then, is between those 
who seek to reinforce their conceptual authority and those who seek to participate 
equitably in the construction of knowledge. We cannot avoid starting with some 
conviction or commitment. We can, however, avoid constructing a basic set of 
commitments which privilege our knowing, in Freire's words:
....this view of education starts with the conviction that it cannot present 
its own programme but must search for this programme dialogically with 
the people it serves, to introduce the pedagogy of the oppressed, in the 
development of which the oppressed must participate. [Freire, 1972:95]
page 77
Or in those of Reason and Rowan:
 we have to leam to think diaiectically, to view reality as a process,
always emerging through a self-contradictory development, always 
becoming; knowing this reality is neither subjective nor objective, it is 
both wholly independent of me and wholly dependent on me. [Reason 
and Rowan, cited in Reason and Heron, 1995:125]
The degree of participation thus appears to be a function of the status attributed to the 
interventionist's conceptual frameworks. One might suggest that if an intervention is 
simply the algorithmic application of a methodology, it cannot even be properly 
described as research; it is consuitancy [cf Thomas and Lockett,1991:100). If there is 
consultancy in which there is a possibility of the intervening discourse being 
significantly amended in view of what is learned during the intervention, this may be 
viewed as research. For a research process to be duly labelled co-operative enquiry, 
or co-generative research I would argue that the conceptual framework would have to 
arise without the beliefs of any of the participants being given exceptional status.
From this perspective, pace Levin, the social scientist is by definition excluded from 
co-generative research, except when acting in an entirely unprofessional capacity.
Such a suggestion is probably unwelcome. Nevertheless, the way in which an ideal of 
humility may lead to the concealment of special status can be illustrated by two 
examples in which power appears to be used to conceal itself.
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The first exampie arises from Russell and Ison's daim that
communication in the constructivist's view creates our sodai world. It is 
neither a transfer nor sharing of information but a process in which 
knowledge which will lead to action is created by the joint involvement of 
both parties.... [Russell and Ison. 1991:1047]
What is missing from this theoretically derived belief is the recognition that 
The terms in which the world is understood are sodal artifacts, products 
of historically situated interchanges amongst people. [Gergen and 
Davis,1985;5]
Knowledge is not created ex nihilo, but involves negotiation between representatives 
of pre-existent perspedives, which take place in an environment of sodaily 
determined power relations.
An interpretation of Foucault could be used to support Russell and Ison's vision, but it 
seems deddediy partiai, depending as it does on an exdusive focus on the micro- 
political relations, and deflecting attention from the juridico-legislative [macro-political] 
institutions, is this a reasonable interpretation, or does it ad counter to Foucault's 
apparently emandpatory intentions?
Dàvila informs us that Foucault suggested that "in political thought and analysis, we 
have still not cut off the head of the king." [Dàvila,1993:384; cf Foucault,1984:63] If 
this is taken to imply that we have no need to take account of existing power 
strudures, the bucolic egalitarianism of Armson and Ison's [1995] Village green' 
metaphor for the academic department to which they belong might be perceived as 
harmless. Since, however, the department in question conforms largely to a 
hierarchical strudure in the allocation of roles, privileges, membership and resources, 
the metaphor appears particularly inadequate. Foucault may have drawn attention to
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the way in which power acted through personal relations, [Foucault. 1991:247], but his 
point was to emphasise the positive as weil negative aspects of power. He dearly 
recognised institutionaiised differentials as significant. Consider, for example, his 
references to the priesthood, the French Communist Party, and the academic 
establishment [eg. ibid 247,52-53]. In Ison and Armson's metaphor, contrariwise, the 
critical analysis of strudured power relations is implicitly exduded, and the imposition 
of the rules of partidpation in the construction is obscured. Power of definition is used 
to conceai the exerdse of political power.
To move to the second example of this phenomenon, Maturana's use of biological 
redudionism to privilege his superfidally egalitarian disburse is both more blatant 
and more subtle. He daims that
...every process of cognition is necessarily based on the organism as a 
unity and on the operational dosure of its nervous system...all knowing is 
doing as sensory offedor oorrelations in the realms of strudural coupling 
in which the nervous system exists. [Maturana, 1988:166]
Even if this appears reductive, some see no problem, since it leads to an apparently 
emandpatory condusion - "the choreography of co-existence" - in which no-one has 
transcendent knowledge [Maturana and Varela;1988:248,245]. Maturana explicitly 
disdaims any "search for a single ultimate explanation for anything" in his work 
[Maturana, 1988:31].
The tone of voice, however, is iess reassuring:
if the reader has followed seriously what was said in these pages, he wiii 
be impelled to look at everything he does...as a world tnought forth in co­
existence with other people through the mechanisms we have described 
[Maturana and Vareia, 1988:239, ori^nai ttaBcs, emphasis added\
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That which was said in those pages can be summarised quite simply: because 
condousness is constituted in bioiogical strudurai coupiing [Maturana,1988;234], 
knowledge must have a biological explanation [Maturana and Vareia,1988;25].
Such drcular reasoning is, of course, consistent, but to be plausible the premises need 
support from outside. There seems, however, to be nothing more dosely reasoned 
than that
the observer explicitly accepts that. ...his or her cognitive abilities as an 
observer are biological because they are altered when his or her biology 
is altered [Maturana, 1988:29]; 
which I find no more convindng than an assertion that Pavarotti's abilities are 
mechanical because he would make a different noise if he were to be spread flat by a 
steam roller.
We can safely ignore the daim that knowledge must have a biological explanation, 
then, if we want to. Other neuro-biologists seem to have no difficulty in accepting that 
while there may be correlations between brain states and reports of subjective 
experience, the empirical discourse cannot assimilate and explain mental phenomena 
[Greenfield, 1995]. Nor does avoiding the extreme of solipsism [Maturana and 
Varela,1988:134] force us into bioiogism. "Man need nd be degraded to a machine by 
being denied to be a ghost in the machine." [Ryle,1963:310] Furthermore, we do not 
have to accept the implications of Maturana's contention that "...love is a fundamental 
biological phenomenon..." [Maturana,1991:89] or "a stepping stone to operational 
coherences of sodal life. " (Maturana and Varela,1988:247].
Biology is used authoritatively to show that cognitive authority is insupportable; but no 
account of the researcher given within the thesis supports the authority daimed for the
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thesis, despite the agreed necessity of doing so [Foerster.1993; Maturana,1988;27]. 
The message is irreconcilable with the medium; but the medium is the covert 
message.
In neither of these two instances are the motives of the researchers to be impugned. 
Nevertheless, in each case the authority of the researcher is covertly asserted. In the 
first exampie, the power to control the conceptual framework is used to conceai that 
power; in the second, acceptance of the conclusions implicitly confers special status 
on biology and the biologist - or to this particular school within biology.
Not that i can suggest a way of escaping this dilemma; but i cannot believe that to 
deny the existence of the problem is conducive to the attainment of genuine 
participation.
If not perfection, then good practice
Although we cannot deny the special status of the interventionist, perhaps it can be 
justified.
I certainly would not wish to daim that there is no element of expertise in partidpative 
research. To hold the view that no intervention is any more skilled than any other 
would seem to set it apart from every other human activity. Only from an extremely 
mechanistic viewpoint could it be supposed other than that we are disparate creatures, 
with different dispositions and varying abilities.
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What then constitutes good practice among expert interventionists? If we assume that 
it involves particular personal skills as well as respect for the varied contributions 
others have to offer, there are two distinct categories of criteria; participation in open 
discussion, and exceptional skill in techniques of conceptualisation.
These are dearly in opposition to each other, and an internal tension may also be 
identified with resped to expertise. Understanding is often expensively acquired, and 
not to be casually dismissed; but nor is it to be complacently hallowed. The habit of 
challenge would appear to be essential to avoid stagnation; the maintenance of valued 
conceptual frameworks has to be balanced against the need for continuous leaming.
Checkiand and Scholes [1990:16], and Flood and Jackson [1991a:322] appear to be in 
agreement on this issue. They all argue that leaming is only possible relative to an 
explicit intelledual framework. This, however, would seem to be an analytic 
proposition, offering a particular definition of leaming. What of craft skiiis, for 
example? Nevertheless, their definition would appear to be useful as a description of 
an important form of leaming, as long as the framework as well as the content is open 
to adaptation in the light of experience; and, indeed, because of changing 
circumstances. In Polanyi's words:
Man's capacity to think is his most outstanding attribute. Whoever speaks 
of man will therefore have to speak at some stage of human knowledge.
This is a troublesome prosped. For the task seems to be without end: as 
soon as we had completed one such study, our sutyed matter would 
have been extended by this very achievement. We should now have to 
study the study that we had just completed, since it, too, would be a work 
of man. And so we should have to go on reflecting ever again on our last
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reflections, in an endless and futile endeavour to comprise completely ttie 
works of man. [Polanyi, 1958;11]
Our knowledge is partial not only because of our limitations, then, but because our 
research changes that which we study; a variation of Heisenberg's principle. If we are 
to claim expertise in conceptualisation, we must be ready to deny that which we have 
previously asserted.
We are thus faced, as interventionists, with two irresoluble stresses. We must value 
each contribution as equally valid, while recognising that they are almost certainly not 
of equal value; and we must introduce our ideas to others with conviction, even 
though we must doubt those ideas.
Given these tensions, no decree seems likely to define good practice in expert 
intervention. Certain abuses can be identified, some virtues praised, and my own and 
others' ideas on the subject will be explored recurrently throughout the thesis. No firm 
conclusion will be reached, however. The balance between expertise and 
participation, and between respect for theorised experience and for genuine 
innovation are contingent upon a set of variables that includes scale, location, 
specificity, history, urgency, and the beliefs and abilities of the people involved.
Nevertheless, some structure is necessary, even if, in such circumstances, it would be 
wildly optimistic to expect to find a ready made research method to guide me through 
an unusual project. Some criteria lying t>etween the very general expressions of 
abstract theory and the algorithms of specific technique would have been helpful. 
Unfortunately the only nearly credible instance of such guidance I have come across 
has been Mldgley*s criterial triad of improvement, critical awareness, and
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methodological pliffalism [1995]; which was published too late for me. and with which I 
disagree on several issues (see ‘A brief validation of the criteria’, followinçf).
Happily, the value of a multiplicity of methods is not a contentious point between 
Midgley and myself, even if we seem to disagree about the possibility of a unitary 
meta-methodology. My preference is for accommodation rather than uniformity, so 
that while seeking to be intelligible and to appear rational to significant others, I have 
had no qualms about developing my own methodology in response to the problems 
that I perceive. Many others explicitly support heterodoxy of method; to name but four, 
Reason and Heron [1995:142] have already been quoted, and Taket and White 
[1995:1057] will be. Folks like us can be good neighbours, even if we dont want to 
share a house.
8. Evolution of a methodology
Paradigms and persuasion
Scepticism by its very nature does not teil you what you can do. it is more a 
recognition of certain parameters of the possible and permissible, principal amongst 
which is this: that if none of us is certain, no-one has peculiar authority over the 
knowledge on which interventions are based, nor over the adaptations of knowledge 
which may constitute an intervention, nor control of the procedures through which 
knowiedge and decisions are formed, if our involvement is as some form of social 
scientist, rather than as an intrinsic member of the community, we are making a 
distinctive, and possibly authoritative, contribution, whether it be to content or to 
process. While we cannot be neutral, we can be honest, and while we cannot dispense 
with our status, we can go some way towards sharing our authority.
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Honesty should compel us to admit that we are intervening, and that we are entering 
an area of decision specifically for that purpose. We dont just happen to be there. 
Although our intervention may take other forms, the générai case wouid seem to be 
that we are seeking to facilitate change in the conceptions people have of their 
circumstances, and thus of their responses. We may prefer to focus on the decision- 
making process, rather than the subject of that process, but either way we are putting 
fon^rd a particular cognitive framework.
One of the ways of doing so is the use of paradigms. The term parad i^  is used here 
in its purest form in the sense of an abstracted ideal type [Kuhn,1975] and may be 
thought of as
. *  a proposition, not necessarily in vert>al form, that cannot be tested 
empiricaily, but that can be used to generate empirical propositions;
•  not a representation of reaiity, but a heuristic and hermeneutic 
device; neither valid nor invalid, but more or less useful;
•  transdisdplinary, adaptable, and holistic, and with the capacity to be 
integrated with other paradigms;
• transculturai, and applicable from an individual to a global scale 
[Brauer, 1993a; Watson,1984;Conway,1989:77]
The term parac%m is not, however, easily contained. As Kuhn found, it has a 
tendency to leak out.
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The principal variant used here might be described as the illustrated paradigm. Here 
an essentiaiiy abstract notion is clothed in familiar garments for the sake of 
accessibility and ease of internalisation. Jesus is reputed to have made much use of 
this technique. The principle expressed by the parable of the good Samaritan is 
paradigmatic. It is only the narrative circumstances that locate the idea in space and 
time; so let us here use the term parable to refer to an illustrated paradigm.
The other usage which may arise comes from the capacity of human beings to 
become locked into a paradigm, whereupon the more appropriate term may be mind­
set or Weltanschauung [worldview]. That which could be a conceptual tool becomes an 
inescapable framework of understanding.
In practice, the pure paradigm and its offspring are rarely clearly distinguishable. 
Because of this, some work may be required of the reader to decide when a reference 
to a paradigm is to its most abstract manifestation, and when it has become 
adulterated by illustration or dogmatism.
That a paradigm should be open to adulteration may be essential if it is to offer à 
resolution to the stress between expertise and participation. The expert proposes 
possible ways of thinking about an issue, but the actors select and adapt; but for this 
process to take place it may be necessary both to clothe the paradigm and to act, at 
least temporarily, as a zealot on its behalf.
At first glimpse, then, paradigmatic intervention seems compatible with the 
commitments expressed here, but more precise criteria of practice are still required. 
We are presumably seeking to persuade others, without coercion, to consider the 
adoption (and adaptation) of a way of seeing the world. Where the intervention is very
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local, this may involve no more than being perceived as a welcome contributor to the 
process of construction surrounding others' affairs. In other instances, there may be a 
case to seek consent for comprehensive authority; a boat run by a committee in a 
force 8 gale brings happy grins only to the faces of sharks and loss adjusters.
In either case, or any in between, non-coerdve persuasion depends, as Cameades 
noted, on the perceived usefulness of a proposed way of looking at the world. Utility is 
the aim of intervention; and, to be consistent with the commitments expressed here, 
gentle persuasion of an idea's utility is the method. For practical purposes, however, 
utility offers too little guidance. Subordinate criteria are required, and these will 
eventually be expressed, as le^mation, validation, which relate to persuasiveness, 
and justification, which relates to outcomes.
Introduction to the subordinate criteria
Understanding may always emerge from a cycle between theory and experience, but 
to describe the whole iterative process is impractical. The presentation of an idea may 
not, therefore, replicate its genesis. Here the emergence of an understanding is 
presented as though the cycle began at the experiential level, and ended with a 
comparison to a widely respected paradigm of action research; that which redefines 
the cycle between theory and experience in terms of planning, action and reflection.
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It Is well within the remit of action or systemic researchers to begin with a brainstorm, 
so let the extensive and complex process through which beliefs surface be described 
in these terms.
From the participative perspective accessibility leaps to mind as an important 
criterion. Without access to the content, form, and sometimes concealed assumptions 
of a discourse, joint ownership of our socially constructed conceptual frameworks is 
impossible.
Accessibility might appear to be unqualified as a virtue in this context, if it were not 
that it necessarily conflicts with certain benefits of specificity. We cannot, for example, 
expect the stress capacity of metals to be defined in a manner appropriate to building 
bridges without mathematical calculations which are not a universally acquired 
technique. While some might argue that this is not relevant to social construction, 
social decisions are intermingled with technological possibilities and constraints in Uie 
perspective that prevails here. For this reason, accessibility cannot always 
predominate at the expense of expertise and precision.
Another subordinate criterion might be drawn to our attention by the familiar saying 
that "an expert is someone who knows more and more about less and less." There is 
apparently a trade off between the scope of a proposition and its efficacy in specific 
instances. An epistemological commitment doesn't offer us detailed help on how to 
find our way from Scunthorpe to Kirby-in-Ashdale; but, equally, when we assess the 
plausibility of any information on the subject, we intuitively bring into play a range of 
epistemological, ontological, historical, psychological and linguistic theories of 
considerable scope in order to evaluate the usefulness of the specific answer that has 
been offered to us. As a rule of thumb, it seems possible to accept the
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Susman/Polanyi doctrine - "Knowledge is gained diaiectically by proceeding from the 
whole to the parts and back again." [Susman. 1983:99; Poianyi, 1967]. Scope and 
specificity are then useful criteria in support of utility.
Participation and collaboration also seem to imply a need for a measure of 
commensurabiBty. To take the simplest reason, we need to share a map in order to t>e 
abie work together; "the more my definitions of the situation overlap those of the 
social system members, the more will their actions be understood by me." [Susman, 
1983:99] If the co-ordination of social activity requires the sharing of conceptions, it 
would appear that commensurability is an important subordinate criterion. This wouid 
seem to indicate a transdiscipHnarityXhsX is further supported by Laszlo's suggestion 
that the universe is not divided into discrete domains of knowledge. To let this criterion 
become implicit is not to degrade its significance. Rather, the expectation is that 
transdisciplinarity will be taken, within most epistemologies, as intrinsic to any social 
scientific project.
Despite this dedication to commensurablity, "my objective is not complete overlap, 
because I do not want to live their lives in the existential sense they do."
[Susman,1983:99]; nor would this meet the adaptive criterion of Ashby's Law (that 
sociodiversity is as essential as biodiversity). We do not therefore require authoritative 
or exclusive descriptions. They should be open to integration, or rational contrast, with 
other descriptions, but collectively they should display diversity.
A further implication of this presumed creative stress between diversity and 
commensurability concerns the cultural grounds of social construction. 
Transcuituralism is to be welcomed if it permits the sharing of experience, but not if it 
threatens diversity; as Shaw wrote, "Do not do unto others as you wouid that they
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should do to you. Their tastes may not be the same." [Shaw, 1948:251] Furthermore, 
the absence of diversity and sensitivity to the environment may well fail to promote 
utility, since diversity of thought will have constructed diverse sodo-technological 
environments. [Rajagopaian and Santhakumar, 1994; Chambers, 1983]. As with 
transdisciplinarity, however, and on the same grounds, transcuituralism will remain a 
mostly implicit criterion.
A final pair of criteria are derived from utility, without reference to the perceived 
benefits of participation. This is the iteration between theory and experience. Should 
an explanation be sought for the assumed utility of such a process, it may be found in 
the sceptic's reluctance to rely on either objective or rationalist knowledge alone.
A number of criteria have now been offered, and soon their relationships will be 
explored. Before that, a comment about the pairing of the subordinate criteria may 
need some explanation.
While dichotomies are recognised as a potential danger, they can also be extremely 
useful in the description of a conceptual space, and the dangers may indicate the 
direction of a constructive response. Firstly, as certainly as anything in our experience 
opposed pairs are not isolated from other pairs. Secondiy, the pairs do not necessarily 
represent good and evil, though some may be seen to be opposed in this way. Both 
dynamic equilibrium and iteration are used as altemative to opposition. In summary, 
then, the criteria of participative modelling might therefore be summarised in a tabular 
form thus:
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Criterion Status Mode of employment
Utility - disutility principle oppositional
Accessibility-obscurity subordinate oppositional
Accessibility - precision subordinate dynamic equilibrium
Diversity-commensurability subordinate dynamic equilibrium
Scope-spedficity subordinate iterative
Experience - theory subordinate iterative
Accessibility, obscurity, and precision
To illustrate accessibility is not difficult.
For example, the story of the good Samaritan is a conceptual intervention, as is also 
the Mahabatra, or the tales of Loki In Norse mythology or of the Coyote in Amerind 
folklore. Interestingly, these latter have been used by Taket and White [1995b] in the 
practice of intervention, as suggested roles for facilitators. Ackoff has written fables to 
communicate on management issues [Ackoff, 1992]. Gabriel [1991] has discussed 
how variations on stories are generated and how they are influential within 
organisations. In a similar sense, Vahl has looked at the use of stories, and noted how 
"stories constitute support systems that help ascribe actorship to individuals.." [Vahl, 
1992:5] This might be interpreted as equivalent to the notion that ideologies may be 
expressed in many different forms, including normative narratives, which include role 
definitions of independence or passivity. Attention is thereby drawn to the importance 
of the development of the normative tradition through folklore, and in particular to the 
ascribed authority, or charisrnatic ability, to amend the tradition. An example of
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ascribed authority might be found in the power structures which determine what wiii be 
seen on television, ranging from nationalised channels to those whose parameters are 
dictated by those who pay for the advertisements. An example of charismatic 
influence can be found in popular music; John Lennon's /magme is cleariy ideological, 
as is the more recent phenomenon of gangsta rap, which expresses anti-authoritarian 
and misogynist attitudes.
in considering accessibility, personai quaiities of the interventionist may be as 
important as intellectual ones. Those who favour participation are likely to be attracted 
to Gregory and Romm's suggestion that *the normative value of "openness" underpins 
the process of appropriate intervention" [Gregory and Romm, 1994:6]. Yet although 
this might appear to be a pre-requisite of intervention, there are those who appear to 
find manipulative attitudes consistent with a fadiitative approach. Taket and White, 
despite criticising Midgley for a lack of openness in communication, and adopting 
criteria such as co-responsbility, empowerment, and responsiveness, nevertheless 
encourage the use of guises, and even disguises, in intervention [Taket and White, 
1995b]. Perhaps it is best to limit the present discussion to the assertion that personal 
qualities are an important aspect of the interventionist, even though there are 
presumably sodal sdentific roles which would not incorporate immediate action 
research. The reasoning behind this assumption is that if the criterion of any 
intervention is utiiity, direct experience of life as it is led in a variety of drcumstances 
is likeiy to play a part in being able to interpret others' experiences, objectives and 
perspectives; and even those who operate strictly within the academic realm are 
involved in sodal intervention.
Accessibiiity cannot be asserted as an absolute criterion, however. While nearly 
always to be preferred to obscurity, one might have thought, accessibility can bie at
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the cost of inappropriate ambiguity. Where it can be combined with precision an ideai 
has been reached; though at times precision may be preferred to accessibility. Qôdei's 
theorem, for example, is significant to anyone with an interest in epistemology, yet few 
have the mathematical skills to deal with it in the original.
At other times the trade-off may suggest a different equilibrium. At the intersection of 
the natural and the social sciences, in socio-technologicai systems, the translation of 
specialist language may appear to be a major problem [Blot et a/,1993: Lightfoot et al,
1989]; but because precision of vocabulary and syntax seems to produce the most 
successful technologies, some degree of interdisciplinary obscurity may have to be 
tolerated.
This is not as evidently the case with social theory. Jargon may be used as a form of 
short-hand, but there are also instances in which it would appear that the obscurity is 
otiose. Opening a book at random one might come across the phrase: "a multiplicity of 
sovereign states coexist within a states-system that is coextensive with the single 
economic division of labour." [McGowan, 1981:54] Using the same number of words, 
one might write instead that "Goods and services tend to be produced where it is 
cheapest to do so, without regard for national boundaries." Has anything significant 
been lost in the translation? Curiously, a straw poll on the issue amongst six 
academics left the question unanswered, despite the unanimity of the view that the 
use of jargon is frequently misplaced.
In general, however, it may be supposed that the appropriate equilibrium between the 
needs of the audience and the demands of the subject matter will always remain 
contingent. Obscurity, however, can become a habit where it is not a necessity, and,
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where participation is a cruciai dynamic, as it is in sociai interventions, accessibility 
would seemingly need to be given a high priority.
Diversity and commensurability
The relationship between diversity and commensurability offers a second instance of a 
need to maintain a dynamic equilibrium in our descriptive systems.
Krippendorfs argument on metaphors of communication illustrates some of the 
benefits of diversity [Krippendorf, 1993]. In this he presents a number of options for 
the way in which communication can be seen, including the idea of communication as 
the transfer of a container, as a conduit, as a control mechanism, and as a dance or 
rituai. As has often been remarked, metaphors are partial, concealing some aspects of 
that to which they refer, and revealing other aspects [eg: Lakoff and 
Johnson,1980:10].
The diversity of metaphors helps us to appreciate the complexity of an issue such as 
communication. Thus t[ie anger a pedant might feel if someone were to thoroughly 
and carelessly split an infinitive would be inexplicable in the container metaphor, since 
the grammatical error has no significant effect on meaning; but in the metaphor of 
ritual it would be a formal offence with implications which would not be apparent in the 
former metaphor.
Under Confucianism, the use of precisely measured court music, 
prescribed steps, actions, and phrases all added up to an extremely 
complex system of rituals, each used for a particular purpose at a 
particular time. A saying was recorded about ICung Fu-tse: 'If the mat was 
not straight, the Master would not sit.' [Hoff,1984:3]
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In a more obviously practical context, the benefits of diversity in the models used in 
social intervention are clearly advertised in the Open University course on Creative 
Management [B882.1992]. A wide range of possible techniques is offered, on the 
grounds that the aim is to increase managerial competence, the requirements of which 
are neither predictable nor stable.
Nevertheless, as has been suggested, diversity is not an unequivocal good.
In any co-operative venture, the selection of the tools is cleariy dependent on the 
ability to agree on criteria. In this context, the counterweight to diversity may perhaps 
be described as commensurability; but commensurability is not to be confused with 
comprehensive agreement. Rather, the term may be taken to represent 
accommodation, an agreement to differ, which some have seen as an appropriate 
purpose of debate [Romm, 1994].
Rort/s usage, to which reference has already been made (page 54), may be a helpful 
starting point;
By "commensurable" I mean able to be brought under a set of rules which 
will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle 
the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict. [Rorty,
1980:285]
Well and good; yet if one adopts the hard reading of this interpretation, 
commensurability might be practically unattainable; or if attained, impractical, being 
hypothetical or counterfactual. We dearly do not, In practice, require determinants for 
every point at issue. Furthermore, such determinants would arguably be least
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accessible where they were most needed, since the rationality and the terminology of 
diverse perspectives might have few points of cross-reference.
A much softer reading of Rorty*s interpretation of commensurability might therefore 
appear to be appropriate. The purpose of referring diverse descriptions to common 
criteria, it may be recalled, is to allow appropriate tools to be selected from the options 
available. Where, therefore, there is apparent incommensurability, a helpful first step 
might be to identify the premises which lead to this dissonance. These premises may, 
of course, concern the nature of rationality.
At one level, a reference to an earlier argument may make the point. Poetry is not 
irrational for failing to conform to the canons of propositionai logic. Even "my father 
moved through theys of we", which Hodge dismisses as probably hopelessly 
ungrammatical [Hodge, 1976:22], may be intuitively sensible to those who were 
nurtured on "I am he as you are we as we are he and we are all together." If no 
description is certain or complete, we have room for many rationalities.
A rather different case arises where rigour is implicitly claimed, but only questionably 
achieved. Again, Krippendorf may be used, or abused, as an example. He claims both 
that
we have no direct access to each others' experience; 
and that "communication becomes a social phenomenon precisely when., the 
participating communicators are ...enabled to see themselves through the eyes of 
Others..."[Krippendorf, 1993:17]
At one level, this could be challenged as depending on a false premise.
Wittgenstein's private language argument is a contradiction of the idea that we can 
have a language the words of which refer to what can only be known to the person
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speaking.' [Wittgenstein, 1953:1.243] Communication is necessarily and always a 
social phenomenon. However, no feasible premise is irrational, even if discrepant 
premises may lead to incommensurability. The more significant discrepancy of 
rationality arises from the difficulty of allowing Krippendorfs two assumptions to co­
exist; how is it intelligible to suggest that we can see through the eyes of others if we 
cannot experience each others' experience?
Would it be necessary to insist that Krippendorf accepted my rationality for us to 
collaborate? What degree of commensurability is precisely necessary? Perhaps all 
that is needed to baiance the adaptive virtues of diversity is a soft commensurabiiity: 
a requirement no greater than that opposed theorists can understand why they differ in 
their premises, discursive practises, or rationality.
In the context of this argument, however, simplicity may be favoured. Can we agree 
that if diversity of description is desirable, so too is common ground in communication, 
with the baiance between the two varying according to circumstances? i find it hard to 
see why co-operative researchers wouid wish to adopt a vastly dissimilar position.
Scope and specificity
To some extent scope and specificity mirror the reiationship between 
commensurability and diversity. If we are to have ideas dealing with local issues, we 
might expect benefit from taking local variations into account. Specificity demands 
diversity. If we are seeking agreement on a more extensive issue, a high degree of 
compatibility between underlying theories is probably desirable. Scope demands 
commensurability.
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At the same time, the relationships within each pair are, I would suggest, distinct. A 
simple way of identifying the difference would be t>etween the yin of non-criticai 
regard, and the yang of critical challenge. Each is valuable, each is constructive, but 
the style is different. A dynamic equilibrium t)etween commensuratxlity and diversity 
may be seen as encouraging accommodation in the external relations between 
theories. Scope and specificity, on the other hand, are here seen as essentially 
concerned with a universalising tendency within a body of opinion which is continually 
revised by challenges between its components. Here iteration between local 
experience and general theory appears to be a more appropriate form of relationship.
To elaborate on this point: the sceptic will typically argue that there is no adequate 
reason to assume a universal rationality, or to insist on the compression of all 
knowledge into an integrated whole. Those who prefer to describe themselves as post­
modernist agree that care must be taken to avoid a tendency towards a grand 
narrative which "anticipates all questions and provides pre-determined answers;” 
[Taket and White, a/fer Lyotard, 1995a:1054]; that is, a form of thought which can 
only conceive of the universe from its own perspective and within its own terminology.
This is not, however, a denial of the usefulness of learning about how ideas relate. It is 
hard to better Dewey on this subject:
If thought or intelligence is the means of intentional reconstruction of 
experience, then logic, as an account of the procedure of thought, is not
purely formal [It is not] concerned with the inherent thought structures
of the universe, as Hegel's logic would have it; nor with the successive 
apporaches of human tnougtit to this objective thought structure as the 
logic of Lotze, Bosanquet, and other epistemological logicians would 
have It. If thinking is the way in which deliberate reorganisation of
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experience is secured, then iogic is such a clarified and systematised 
formulation of the procedures of thinking as will enable the desired 
reconstruction to go on more economically and efficiently. In language 
familiar to students, logic is both a science and an art; a science so far as 
it gives an organised and
tested descriptive account of the way in which thought actually goes on; 
an art, so far as on the basis of this description it projects methods by 
which future thinking shaii take advantage of the operations that iead to 
success and avoid those which result in failure. [Dewey, 1950:115]
There is, then, an evident utility in using our intellectual experience to improve our 
cartographic abilities. In Poianyi's words the "richness of explicit knowledge is 
admittedly related to its distinctive logical characteristics." [Poianyi, 1958:14] Peirce 
reflects this idea in arguing for a "systematic study of the conceptions out of which 
philosophical theory may be built in order to ascertain what place each conception 
may fitly occupy in such a theory, and to what use it is adapted.” [Peirce, 1958:145]
The pursuit of intemal consistency can thus be seen as a creative moment; but from 
Nagel we may take the waming against too glib an explanation:
I believe one should trust to problems over solutions, intuition over 
arguments, and pluralistic discord over systematic harmony. Simplicity 
and elegance are never reasons to think that a philosophical theory is 
true; on the contrary, they are usually reasons for thinking it false. [Nagel, 
I979:x]
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Consi^ ncy is not intended here to signify the same notion as might be implied by its 
use in prepositional logic. This is in part because the complex, rich structures of 
thought are not necessarily best accommodated by linear sequences of inference 
between axioms. If propositional logic is seen as a model of sequential inference, the 
conception favoured here is much closer to that of a network that constantly adapts in 
the hermeneutic cycle. Quine put forward this view in his thesis of the indeterminacy 
of radical translation [Quine, 1964], and in proposing that no change of use of any 
term could take place without changing the use of all other associated terms [Quine,
1969] since they are all interdependent. In this he was echoing the earlier work of 
Duhem [1969], who argued both that all theory is underdetermined by evidence, and 
that a challenge to one part of any theory is a challenge to the whole.
Underlying this is the simple ground that language is not seen as having the specificity 
that propositional logic requires. The argument offered earlier on this issue can be 
recapitulated simply by noting Wittgenstein's conversion. In the Tmctatua Lo0 go- 
Phitosophicus he adopted the view that, all appearances to the contrary, language was 
reducible to atomistic pictures corresponding to reality. By the time he was preparing 
the posthumously published Philosophical Investigations his view had changed utterly, 
and the idea of a correspondent language had given way to a metaphor of overlapping 
language games that were rooted in, and continually undergoing change, due to their 
use. Language was not seen to refer directly to reality, but to be itself an act which can 
only be interpreted in terms of the wider behavioural context. It is this latter view that 
is used here, supported by T.S.EIiot's view that
Words strain.
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden.
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish.
Decay with imprecision, wili not stay in place,
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Wili not stay still.
Burnt Norton. V
Given this understanding of language, it is grammatical and semantic criteria rather 
than the dictates of propositional logic that are taken to be crucial to social scientific 
rationality.
Nevertheless, more formal logic may be useful in identifying problerns of consistency 
or confusions of meaning. For example, circularity, in which it is asserted that a 
conclusion has t)een demonstrated when the conclusion was emt>edded in one of the 
assumptions, is distrusted; but this distrust is only appropriate within the hierarchical 
view of language. A network view has no pretensions to proof, so that while circularity 
may be evidence of analytic triviality; it may also be evidence of coherence. Making 
allowance for the sceptical view of truth, the criterion of coherence may be stated 
thus; "..a proposition may be accepted as true if it is coherent with other propositions 
which are known to be true; but it is not suggested that the truth of these propositions 
lies in their coherence." [Flew, 1979:66]
Formal logic may also contribute to an awareness of the consequences of ambiguity. 
Of course, from the network perspective all terms are ambiguous to some extent. 
However, there are pernicious uses of ambiguity, such as the sliding of meaning. To 
use an illustration selected by Hodges, Keynes' General Theory "was inconsistent 
because it maintained that the level of savings was always equal to the level of 
investment, aithough people admitted that if people saved all their money rather than 
spending H, there would be no investment. The ambiguity lies In the word save: In 
common parlance it means hoarding, but it has a quite different sense in Keynes' 
theory." [Hodges, 1976:25] The formal process of precise definiton can also dear up
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apparent inconsistencies. When critical systems writers refer to pragmatism, [Flood 
and Jackson, 1991a:322; Fuenmayor, 1991:239 efseg] their position is 
understandat)le if the demotic interpretation of pragmatism is used; but if the 
academic context is to be respected, their remarks become mystifying.
Self-evidently, within the network view of language, and more particularly in the 
overlapping language game formula, such conflicts are inescapable; and, since no 
particular form of rationality is taken to be an absolute standard, we cannot expect all 
debate to t>e readily resolved by appeals to reason [Romm, 1994]. However, although 
we may not seek consistency as an absolute good, we may wish to use the iteration 
between specificity and scope as a way of integrating our ideas under common codes.
To repeat the point made above: the yin approach to difference is one of tolerance, 
diversity sustained by the search for accommodation. The yang response to difference 
Is one of oritioal challenge, directed towards unifying an ever-widening range of 
propositions within one rationality by using specifics to challenge the theories of 
greater scope: a search for commensurability.
Theory and experience
Another relationship that interacts with scope and specificity is that which may be 
conceived between theory and experience. During the process of integrating 
interpretations of experience, specific accounts give way to generalisations. This is 
again an iterative relationship, in which experience challenges theory, which is itself 
used to Interpret the experience.
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In particular, the specific provides opportunities for empirical testing which, owing to 
multivariate complexity and at)straction, may not be available to metatheory. It may, 
however, be difficult to discover quite what has been demonstrated by the refutation of 
an hypothesis. Lakatos [1974,1978] in particular noted the capacity of metatheory to 
abandon hypotheses of lesser scope in order to preserve the central hypothesis, while 
Duhem encouraged the view that we can only test a set of theories [1969]. Shifting 
into the epistemology of the social sciences, a metanarrative which had consistently 
failed to produce desirable outcomes might be thought a suitable case for 
sut>sumation, however persuasive the metanarrative itself. In terms of the natural 
sciences, 'desirable outcomes' might be taken to mean a failure to refute a 
subordinate hypothesis. In the social sciences a desirable outcome might be taken to 
refer to an intervention which is subsequently endorsed by the stakeholders. Retention 
of a metanarrative when it has failed to provide a gukle to effective interventions may 
indicate the professional interests of a research group rather than the wider interests 
of the community.
In this sense, although the dass analysis of Marx has produced an extraordinary 
quantity of subsidiary theories of lesser scope, experience has not tended to 
encourage the view that human behaviour is predominantly a function of the extent to 
which one owns the means of production. Should we therefore dispense with the 
Marxist metanarrative even though the metanarrative itself cannot be refuted? There 
certainly seems to be a case for doing so: yet care must be taken not to dispense with 
a useful paradigm t>ecause of trivial experimental failures. When, for example, Blau 
identifies four facets of social structure - integration, differentiation, organisation, and 
opposition [Blau, 1967:327] - he is working with a wide focus that can accommodate 
both Marxism and Islam.
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integration differentiation organisation opposition
Marxism working dass 
solidarity
material
drcumstances
the role of
leadership
cadres in
transition
between
capitalism and
sodalism
dass conflid
Islam mutual support 
of the faithful
enlightment the role of the 
mullah /  alim / 
ayatollah
punishment of 
transgressors
The core hypothesis is that an analysis t>ased on these dynamics wili provide 
explanations for social phenomena, while the application invented atx>ve suggests 
that it could lead to helpful transcultural accommodations.
However, Blau derives this assertion from his metanarrative
as long as the concern with the impression he makes dominates the 
individual's thinking, he cannot t>ecome completely involved in the social 
situation or fully enjoy it, and neither can he thoroughly concentrate on 
his tasks [it)i&. 75].
This proposition would appear, however, to be contingent. A professional politician, for 
example, would seem to be an empirically grounded refutation of the idea. Should the 
metanarrative t>e rejected on these grounds?
Perhaps the answer lies in Lakatos' [1974,1978] notion of a progressive research 
programme. In this context, a metatheory is worthy of respect and investment if it 
demonstrates a capacity to generate fruitful experiments. In the social sciences this 
might suggest that it has contributed to the generation of fruitful interventions. Such a 
notion would, of course, be consistent with the idea of paradigms which has been 
invoked here; a model that cannot be tested empirically, but which can be used to
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generate empirical propositions which may be adopted, adapted and locally owned 
and tested. If it fails to demonstrate its utility in such a role, it may be unceremoniously 
ditched.
The relations between theory and experience and scope and specificity are thus seen 
to construct an intricate conceptual space; and there is still one more aspect that 
needs to be considered. How do we respond to historical data?
As Santhakumar and Rajagopalan [1994] have emphasised, interventions necessarily 
take place in an historical context, and discontinuous change is rarely successful. 
Diachronous analysis has many potentials. The investigation of historical evidence 
may be an essential part of the process of testing theory, as with Foucault on madness 
[Foucault,1991:124-167]; or, as in the case of Arrighi's The Geometry of ImperiaHsm 
[1978], a means towards the construction of a present instrument of analysis. A further 
critical function applies to tx)th theory and the interpretation of experience: an aspect 
of Foucault's project may be described as freeing oneself from a theoretical 
straightjacket not through a Kantian deduction of the necessary elements of our 
conception, but through a deconstruction of our heritage (Dàvila, 1993:403) :
While it is easy to be aware of the way in which experience interrogates theory, the 
recognition that the experience has been interpreted in the context of theory is equally 
important. Without such a recognition, and without attempts to reinterpret phenomena 
in radically diverse ways there is always a danger of simply confirming one's 
prejudices.
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9. Validation/ legitimation /  iustWii».atioii
At this point, a tjrief summaiy might I *  desiratile.
The recent aim has been to discover a set of criteria intended to make intervention 
effective, in a manner consistent with the commitments. Earlier it has been asserted
that
scepticism implies pragmatism; that is, that utility ratherthan truth is the 
primary criterion of rational belief;
if none of us has a privileged access to the truth, and each of us is moraily 
reievant, equity in the construction of social institutions is a desirable 
ob|ective;
for the idea of a social scientist to be intelligible it is necessary to 
suppose that they have some expertise;
that expertise may be experiential or theoretical: the reporting of what
is considered to be best practice in similar circumstances elsewhere,
or the offering of conceptual maps of immediate action or of social 
process;
this applies to process intervertions; the facilitator is invited or 
accepted for reasons similar to those which apply to other forms of 
intervention;
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to combine expertise with participation requires persuasiveness 
ratherthan authority;
persuasiveness without imposition is dependent in part on the 
qualities of the individual and in part on the perceived utility of the 
ideas they offer;
there is a set of criteria which may help us to identify ideas which 
offer a reasonable chance of effecting a successful intervention.
Orfterion Status Mode of employment
Utility - disutility Prindpie oppositional
Accessibility-obscurity Subordinate oppositional
Accessibility - precision Subordinate dynamic equilibrium
Diversity-commensurability Sutx>rdinate dynamic equilibrium
Scope-spedficlty Subordinate iterative
Experience - theory Subordinate iterative
Interpretation of the criteria
In constructing a method for this research, the next tasks would seem to be
• to check the criteria against some broader principle; a form of triangulation.
•  to make the subordinate criteria less unwieldy.
•  and to make the methodology more widely accessible
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The first stage of the process of simplification and triangulation is to identify higher 
order sets, and this may be achieved by reference to the action research cycle of 
planning, acting, and reflecting. [Lewin, 1946] It is necessary to bear in mind, 
however, that in this context the elements of action research are less distinct, or more 
reflexive, than in some other instances. For example, the action under consideration is 
the intervention of the sodai sdentist through the presentation of ideas, so that the act 
is itself a form of planning. Furthermore, a commitment to co-researching or co­
generation [Levin, 1994] further compresses the stages and blurs the roles. Action in 
this instance is seen very much in the tradition of praxis [Joii (on Gramsci), 1977]; that 
is, adion is not a distinct and separate element from thought, but an integration of ad  
and understanding.
Nevertheless, the cyde is useful as a way of disaggregating the components of an 
intervention, and as a means of checking that the taxonomy of the criteria is 
reasonably comprehensive. Judgements of whether that is achieved are likely to vary, 
and are open to debate. Nevertheless, as the table below suggests, this approach 
provides a rationale for identifying a simplified set of the criteria. These may then be 
used as a guide to the assessment of a conceptual intervention.
Action
research
cycle
Stages of
paradigmatic
intervention
Subordinate criteria Simplified criteria for conceptual 
interventions
Plan Design Scope - spedfidty 
Experience - theory 
Diversity- 
commensurability
Validation
- critical challenge
- theoretical consistency
- empirical evidence
Ad Offer/amend Accessibiiity - precision 
Accessibility - obscurity
Legitimation
- open discussion / free choice
- resped for experience
Refled Assess Utility Justification
- subjedive experience
- intersubjedive experience
- critical evaluation
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Some clarification may be necessary, starting with the terminology.
Validation refers to the placing of a paradigm within a recognised discourse. 
Validity is, of course, used in logic to indicate that an argument is consistent with 
a particular rationality, not that it is true. (The use of to validate as synonomous 
with to value is an etymological deviation that may, regrettably, lead to some 
confusion.)
Legitimation is taken to be an appropriate term for the offering and adoption of a 
paradigm, because both this process and democratic law are govemed by 
normative considerations.
Justification is associated with utility because of the moral content of the term and 
of the context. In keeping with the moral commitments, justice is seen to be done 
when the outcome of an intervention is approved by the stakeholders.
A second area of clarification is the relationship between the subordinate criteria as 
they were originally expressed and as they have emerged in the more accessible set; 
that is, between columns three and four above.
VaTidation seems straightfonvard enough.
Scope and specificity were discussed in terms of iteration in search of intemal 
consistency, which translates into critical challenges to demonstrate that qualities of 
rationality that are considered desirable in a theory should be met.
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Theory and experience are also iterative, so that the theoretical validation needs to be 
related to empirical evidence.
Diversity and commensurability were seen as requiring a dynamic equilibrium, through 
mutual accommodation between theories.
Validation in the vemacular could be described as asking "Does the idea make sense 
In itself? )^ a ts  happened when people have tried it? )A/hat other ways of looking at 
the issue are there?"
Legitimation is in many ways a more complex criterion.
Accessibility and obscurity are in opposition to each other, with accessibility always 
favoured. Obscurity is perceived as a regretabie side effect of detailed analysis. 
Accessibility is not, however, merely access to meaning. It is perceived here as 
access to ownership of an adopted paradigm - the reconstruction of meaning; hence 
the importance of open discussion and free choice.
Accessibility and precision are seen in dynamic equilibrium with each other; the 
moment at which precision becomes unnecessarily obscure helps in the identification 
of the balance point.
Because legitimation relies, in theory, on ideal speech, which has earlier been 
declared unattainable and unidentifiable, there are practical difficulties to overcome. 
These will be explored in the next section, but another important point is probably best
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made here. Legitimation is iterative. For simplicity's sake, I would suggest three 
stages.
The first of these is to use the experience of stakeholders and experts to formulate 
problems. This principle is related to, but not identical with, grounded theory [Glaser 
and Strauss,1968], which seems to make unwarrantable claims about the neutrality of 
abstraction of categories, and to leave too much to a methodology controlled by an 
elite. Long and Long may come closer, with their description of actor-centred enquiry 
as
attempts to unravel the complexities of meaning and social action 
through the development of a conceptual framework which accords 
priority to the understanding of everyday life situations. [Long and Long,
1992:6]
Legitimation also requires that stakeholders should assess any oonceptual framework 
after the academics have translated it into and tested it within their own discourse; that 
is, after the validation process. Thirdly, legitimation requires the voluntary adoption of 
a paradigm by stakeholders before it is implemented as the ground of any policy.
Each of the three stages of legitimation is subject to the simplified criteria of open 
discussion/free choice, and respéct for experience, which, it is hoped, represent 
reasonably the earlier subordinate criteria of accessibility and precision. In tum, the 
demotic form is an attempt to translate the substance of the criteria: "Usten to ottters, 
but think for yourself. "
The third criterion is Justifioation\ the evaluation of an intervention in terms of its 
outcomes.
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utility has been defined as the primary criterion, but dearly there are problems in 
assessment. For this reason attention has been drawn to the importance of subjective 
reports, as well as to intersubjedive assessments. Harder data are not exduded, but 
are seen as a contribution to critical evaluation, which should not disregard less 
tangible influences on people's conceptions of their welfare.
Several other points may be made in this context.
For example, a distinction between desirability and predidabiiity is important, since it 
is quite feasible that consistently acceptable outcomes will arise without having been 
seleded in advance. This is not merely an acceptance that responsive and flexible 
proc^ses can be at least as important as dearly defined goals, but also a recognition 
that we do not always know how we achieve good results. If someone's intuition is 
reliable in the production of desirable outcomes, we should not let the binary 
opposition between masculine sdence [good] and feminine feeling, connection and 
relatedness [t>ad] obstrud our progress and processes [Keller, 1992;47]. Utility as a 
criterion must take precedence; other criteria are measures of the means which are 
likely to produce utility.
A second issue concerns subjedivity, rntersubjedivity, and objectivity in relation to 
evaluative processes.
As has been argued already, the idea of utility as a straightforward computation is a 
very mechanistic conception of an intuitive process. [Keller's comments on the 
gendering of knowledge also cast an interesting light on Sedgewick, Bentham, and to 
some extent Mill's formulation of an old idea.] The data on which outcomes are to be
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assessed are not, at least In the view of the sceptic, objective. Personal reports are 
essential.
... when I say I have a toothache..(to) ask "are you sure that it's you who have
the pains?" would t>e nonsensical [Wittgenstein, 1975:67];
and the same might be said of emotions. However, emotions would appear to be to 
some extent public in their construction, if not in their sensation, and the normative, 
evaluative context is cnjctal to an understanding of the personal reports. In addition, 
our welfare does not depend solely on our individual circumstances. Without 
necessarily accepting all that he says, it is possible broadly to share Blau's view that 
People's associations proliferate through social space and time. Social 
relations unite not only individuals in groups but also groups in 
communities and societies. The associations between ihdividuais often 
become institutionalised to perpetuate the form of organisation far 
beyond the life span of human beings. The main sociological purpose of 
studying processes of face-to-face interadion is to lay the foundation for 
an understanding of the social strudures that evolve and the emergent 
social forces that charaderise their development. [Blau,1967:13]
Unless we seek to understand sodai phenomena, we ignore the context which helps to 
shape us. However, if we too readily accept that they have been reified, we may tend 
to forget that their existence and perpetuation is dependent on intersubjedive 
construction, and individual interpretation and responses. The interadion between the 
subjedive experience and the normative influence is crudai; but the analysis of the 
normative influence should not persuade us that we have an absolute insight into the 
distortions affecting.others' preferences. There is no view from nowhere. One may 
sympathise with Einhom's view of trends in the former GDR, which follows; but by
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what standard could we claim that the women in question must t>e made to conceive 
of their circumstances differently? [Richards, 1980:27]
The image of the female tractor driver is out, as is Superwoman wearing 
a hard-hat on a building site. Cinderella of fairy-tale fantasy ad dreams is 
back.. .She works, yes, but only in the household, so that her feminine 
qualities are not marred by the fatigue and premature again incurred by 
the hardships of the double burden. [Einhom,1993:216]
To summarise: justification of an intervention is dependent on its intended or achieved 
utility. That utility is understood in terms of the personal reports of those who are 
affected. The benefits to or detraction from the social environment forms part of that 
report, but the awareness of normative social phenomena also offers us insights into 
the influences on our personal experiences, in the form of critical awareness. Hard 
data may also contribute to that awareness.
In the vemacular form, the criterion of justification might be expressed thus: Is  it good 
for us together? Good for you alone? and is it good for what you think we could 
become?"
Simplified criteria fbr 
conceptual interventions
Vemacular
Validation
- critical challenge
- theoretical consistency
- empirical evidence
"Does the idea make sense in itself? What's happened 
when people have tried it? What other ways of looking at 
the issue are there?"
Legitimation
- open discussion / free choice
- respect for experience
"Listen to others, but think for yourself."
Justification
- subjective experience
- intersubjective experience
- critical evaluation
"Is it good for us together? Good for you alone? and is it 
good for what you think we could become?"
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A brief validation of the criteria
In order to assess this set of criteria, one couid argue that it would have to be applied 
to itself; but that is not immediately feasible. Justification would require more 
extensive research than is possible in the immediate circumstances. Nor has 
legitimation of the method been achieved in any detail, although those who 
participated in the field work were made aware of the methodological philosophy 
behind the research. Validation has aiso only been partly achieved. The discussions of 
positivist methodologies and of systemic and action research altematives have 
provided a broad context into which a paradigmatic research programme fits quite 
comfortably. In terms of a critical challenge from a concise set of critieria, those 
offered by Midgiey seem to offer the most effective counterpoint -  or harmony? - to 
the ideas expressed here.
The criteria he seiects for acts of intervention are improvement, criticai awareness, 
and methodological pluralism [Midgiey, 1995]. In so far, as that simple ennumeration 
goes, there appears to be little conflict Indeed, it might be possible to argue that 
improvement runs parallel to justification, critical awareness to validation, and 
methodological pluralism to legitimation. Could this be a dangerous 
oversimplification?
The first of these equations - justification and improvement - may be allowed to stand, 
in all probability.
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The second equation - validation and critical awareness -  would be impossible, if the 
criticai awareness in Midgie/s ouevre were taken to refer to the transcendence of any 
particular form of reason. Such a view would make the deconstruction of language 
potentially a positivist task, while the sceptic leaves the ultimate choice of beliefs in 
the mind of the individual. As has already been mentioned, a sceptic is always asking 
"How do you know that this, rather than that is the better hypothesis?"
[Hannan,1990:150], which implicitly echoes the Rice-Davies codicil; "Well they would 
say that, wouldn't they?"  ^Critical awareness is essentially the epistemological 
perspective of the sceptic to each and every assertion of knowledge, without any 
assumption that critical analysis allows one to subtract distortions. Happily, Midgley’s 
critical awareness "simply concerns making boundary judgements” [Personal 
communication. Summer, 1997], so that potential dissonance is resolved.
In the third possible equation, methodological pluralism is related to legitimation: 
"there is also a need for methods that explore and develop the unique perspectives of 
individual actors, or which seek out new perspectives.” [Midgiey, 1995:946]. So far, so 
good, but again the compatibility of the views is dependent on correctly placing 
Midgley’s use of the term critical.
Midgiey has written elsewhere that "...the legitimacy of using a particular method 
arises out of our criticai understanding of the context of application and the questions 
being asked..." [Midgiey, 1992b:148] This could be taken to mark him as sympathetic 
to the Habermasian derivative which appears to be the view expressed in Total 
Systems Intervention [Flood and Jackson, 1991a]: that particular methodologies can 
be determinately assigned to particular domains of knowledge.
1 Mandy Rice-Davies’ response to various denials of her clients among the Tory 
cabinet, and as fine a summary of the criticai perspective as I can imagine being 
offered.
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The question is. then, whether or not there is the possibility of a metatheoreticai 
dispensation of appropriate méthodologies, or whether the selection of appropriate 
tools is the province of the participants. While some others in the critical systems field 
seem to have been unequivocally committed to the TSI view, Midgiey appears to 
have steered a more cautious course. He has written that
....pluralists, as i see it, must give explicit recognition to a meta-theory. If 
they fail to do this, then they are engaging not in pluralism, but in a form 
of atheoreticai pragmatism. [Midgiey, 1992b;168] 
is there a point of difference? The notion that all pragmatists simply select tools at 
random would be self-evident nonsense. What is crucial is that to the sceptical 
pragmatist, and, to Midgiey, a meta-theory may define a boundary and what it 
contains, but cannot define its own context.
One point of discrepancy is quite dear, however. From the point of view of the 
sceptical pragmatist consequentiaiist, amongst whom I number myself, there can be 
little doubt that justification is the over-riding evaluative criterion for any intervention. 
This does not contradict Midgle/s assertion that "..the three concepts are truly 
interdependent; none of them couid be understood adequately without the other two." 
[Midgiey, 1995:947] Evaluation of outcomes is dearly dependent on validation of the 
assessment, and its legitimation.
However, when he goes on to say that "It is the three together that provide the 
necessary criteria for acts of judgement on the criticality and systemicity of 
interventions” [ibid\ the possibility of some darifications becomes attractive.
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For example, to a sceptic criticality and systemicity are not necessary, but contingent 
in relation to a set of commitments; though it is quite possible that Midgley's phrase 
should be interpreted as 'necessary within this discourse'. Nevertheless, systemicity 
and criticality express a particular, unsancrosanct repense to epistemological 
problems.
Secondly, there appears to be a displacement of the end by the means. Holism and 
critical awareness may be, in our conception, essential to any understanding but they 
are not ends in themselves. They are tools in the absence of which we would feel we 
have reason to doubt any assessment of intervention; but only in a positivist context 
does theorised method become sacrosanct.
Once again, it is the fear of positivism that is the potential source of discomfort; in 
particular, the manner in which a positivist epistemology allocates authority. By using 
the criteria of i^itimation, validation and justification, and by assigning priority to 
justification, the approach favoured here devolves the assessment of an intervention 
to those who are affected by it. The set of criteria asserted by Midgiey, interpreted 
postivisticaliy, couid leave the assessment of an intervention at the mercy of those 
who control these discourses.
Welcome as Midgley's attempt to identify a set of criteria as an altemative to the 
monolithic criterion of truth, I have at times feared that he would find himself reverting 
to it by a circuitous route. His most recent communications have assured me that this 
is an illusion. One should not judge someone's meaning by the company they keep; 
and It would therefore seem that we are dose to an identity of understanding.
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The argument with which the criteria of legitimation, validation, and justification are 
supported seems to be defensible in terms of others' conceptions, and with a sound 
base in moral, epistemological and ontological commitments. Nevertheless, such is 
the complexity of intervention in the construction of social institutions that the criteria 
can only plausibly be indicative. A more practical understanding of what each term 
encompasses would seem to be required.
Validation in academic terms, however, is a fairly well identified process, and 
justification is not within the scope of the research undertaken for this thesis. Through 
the field work, however, I sought some form of legitimation of my understanding of co­
operation, a necessary prelude to which was an exploration of the problems which 
might arise.
10. Methodological problems of legitimation
As the end of the methodological discussion is approached, it may t>e worthwhile to 
recall the end to which it has been directed (cf. Introduction. §4).
My concem has been with the construction of a rationale for co-operative behaviour. 
Implicit to this has been the idea that the process of construction should itself reflect 
co-operative principles; hence the emphasis on consultation and participation. The 
instantaneous ex nihilo materialisation of a rationale simultaneously in many minds 
would not appear to be a reasonable expectation; yet any more laborious and 
extensive process seems likely to deviate from the ideal of perfectly shared belief, in 
this section some of these problems, and possible responses, are explored.
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Forcing people to be free
Open discussion may in some ways be seen as reflecting Habermas' ideai speech, 
with a painstaking effort to avoid any positivist overtones. How couid we ever attain 
the neutrality necessary to identify a certain truth even if we coincided with it? The 
implications of this qualification do not, fortunately, necessarily iead to incompatible 
research practices. Openness is constructed here as not merely a question of being 
allowed to s^ak, or sharing some of the language, it aiso involves criticai challenges 
to the assumptions of others and of oneself, choice between discourses, and the 
control of the conditions of the discourse itself [Brauer, 1996].
For an intervention to be legitimated from a participative viewpoint, txjth procedure 
and content need to be transparent. This is not to say that in every case a detailed 
examination of the epistemology is required - a complete journey from the meta­
theoreticai premises and commitments to the detailed practical implications is likely to 
be impractical in many circumstances.
Monday, November 20th Took Das Kapital back to library on way in to 
work. With the best wili in the world I am quite unable to get beyond page 
two. Goodness knows how Marx thought the uneducated masses were 
going to lap it up. [Matthew, 1980:133]
Let us suppose, however, that we all support the creativity and autonomy of ieamers 
and awareness of the control and ownership of research [ison, 1990]; and that we 
broadly accept that "knowledge is socially constructed and is thus only applicable in its 
place of origin" [Russell and ison, 1991:1048]. How do we then supply a iogic for our 
roles as professional interventionists?
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Surely it would be a direct formal contradiction to base this methodology on a 
universalist assertion, even if that assertion were not self-contradictory in positing 
interactions for a closed system.
It is one's history of interactions and the closed self-generating structure 
of the human (autopoeisis) that determines what will happen and the 
nature of the information. Often the observer acts as if there was a case 
of instruction by knowledge but this cannot be the case biologically, [ibid:
1050]
Merely because the focus of research has shifted from the proclaimed objectives of 
group activity to the group processes does not make it any the less an intervention; 
and in this case it seems dear that the intervention is based on sdentific positivism.
Gregory and Romm have also drawn attention to the dangers of "...non- 
reflexive, purportedly (value-) neutral interventions..” [Gregory and Romm.
1994:5], and offered a persusasive response to the problem.
The tempering of partiality does not lie in pretended non-invoivement, but 
rather in a continued self-reflection to ensure, (as far as possible) that the 
researcher's inputs do not spring from his or her wish to ding to his or her 
own perspective. [Gregory and Romm, 1994:14]
Aithough this seems an appropriate restraint, to achieve it may be extremely difficult. 
Indeed, according to Taket and White, critical systems thinking, within which 
framework Gregory and Romm appear to be working, is as unself-critical as any other 
totalising epistemology and
can be charged with the same offences i.e. fabricating modem 
understanding of organisations and interventions and re-enfordng the
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myopie objectives of the modernist project. [Taket and White,
1995a:1054]
This may not, of course, be the case. Although the derivation of critical systems 
processes may be modernist, the practice need not be authoritarian in the covert 
imposition of processes that are consistent with a positivist epistemology. Vahi, for 
example, would appear to be conscious of this difficulty, distinguishing between 
politics as value-based intervention and research, the trademark of which "precisely is 
to reduce the biases that values introduce." [Vahl,1995:1] One of the ways in which 
this latter may be achieved is, according to Vahi, by the distribution of problems, but 
she recognises that even in these circumstances the role of the facilitator is often 
defined by local political agreements which derive from the wider hierarchy. In looking 
for models for change, ratherthan "models of..." which are essentially conservative, 
there is evidence of the critical perspective. In addition, the simplicity of reflecting 
individual concerns by using the formula "If this is where you are headed, what do you 
need to do?", may very well bring to the surface ideological conflicts. The reserved 
position of the facilitator is a practical and accessit)le expression of non-directive 
intervention.
in that sense, practise may expose the ideology through example. It may be felt,
I
however, that a more active opposition to positivism is required. This wouid appear to 
be the attitude of Taket and White, and their postmodem critique is remarkabiy simiiar 
to the premodemist sceptical position. Neither intuition nor reason are seen as routes 
to the truth, and language is not a transparent medium through which the real can be 
represented. Empiricism is not deait with directly, but science is not privileged as the 
Weltanschauung which acts as gatekeeper for all true knowledge. [Taket and White, 
1995a:1057]
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They go on to say that
The implication of this postmodern critique is the view that it is dangerous 
to see any form of methodology as inherently liberatory or emancipatory. 
Whether it succeeds in achieving some outcomes that can be seen as 
liberatory or emancipatory is only ever locally decidable. [ibid\
So far there is a high degree of consistency between their project and that which is 
implied by sceptical pragmatic consequentialism. Whether the guide to critical action 
which they derive from Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault remains as consistent is less 
clear, but whether commensurable or consistent, it is worth relating:
1. free political action from all unitary and totalising paranoia;
2. develop action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and 
disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hiérarchisation;
3. withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative Caw, limit, 
castration, lack, lacuna) which Western thought has so long held sacred 
as a form of power and an access to reality. Prefer what is positive and 
multiple: difference over uniformity; flows over unities; mobile 
arrangements over static systems. Believe that what is productive is not 
sendentary but nomadic;
4. do not think that one has to be sad in order to be militant, even though 
the thing one is fighting is abominable. It is the connection of desire to 
reality (and not its retreat into forms of representation) that possesses 
revolutionary force;
5. the group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchised 
individuals, but a dynamic collection of multiplication, displacement and 
diverse combinations. [/bk/;1057-8]
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Can this manifesto be accommodated with the more reserved expressions of 
revolutionary sentiment that form the basis of this discussion? If the theme is correctly 
understood to t>e the constructive interaction of diverse motives and perspectives, 
then there only remains one significant point of contention. The call to the t)arricades - 
"It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into forms of representation) 
that possesses revolutionary force" - is incommensurat>le with the paradigmatic 
approach.
However, the construction of a dichotomy t>etween hot t)iooded action and an interest 
in the forms of representation seems unnecessary. Whether one calls it diversity or 
proliferation, both passionate action and the development of alternative forms of 
representation of the world appear to be reasonable ways of opposing the abominable.
Whether those who favour passionate action preface it with passionate consultation or 
not is open to question. In some respects, the activist is no more concerned with the 
opinions of those whose lives they seek to change than is the mad scientist. 
Nevertheless, at an aesthetic level, passion may seem far more attractive than the 
mechanistic approach of Ajzen and Fishbein.
According to the theory of reasoned action, a person's intention is a 
function of two basic determinants, one personal in nature and the other 
reflecting social influence. [Ajzen and Fishbein,1980:6]
Furthermore, their concem to reduce diversity of understanding and conception to a 
totalitarian unity makes all the limitations of the participative approaches seem 
positively benign;
This state of affairs has resulted in a proliferation of theories linking 
external variables to behavioural phenomena. From our point of view,
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such a multitude of theories is not only unnecessary, but it actually 
impedes scientific progress, [ibkt.9]
The preference here is to welcome the heterodoxy, and to welcome the insights 
offered by
• ChecKland's soft system methodology and its subsequent elaborations 
[Checkland, 1981: Checkland and Scholes, 1991]
• by Argyris and Schôn's insights into discursive construction, with their descriptions 
of cultures which do or do not encourage the critical attitudes that precede 
learning [Argyris. 1992];
• by Ison's design principles for participative research:
mutual satisfaction from participation;
the recognition that each person's experience is unique and valid; 
the awareness of context; 
enthusiasm is triggered by personal meaning: 
individuals may not share institutional priorities; 
open, collaborative and critically informed discourse; 
social and individual construction of knowledge; 
and the importance of diversity of experience. [Ison, 1993] 
and understandings offered by others.
The essential point remains. Those of us who t>elieve in the participative construction 
of social institutions have a reflexive responsibility to make our rationale accessible. 
My preference is for the criteria or design principles that have been distilled here.
They appear to be accessible, validated, and flexible; but the richness of their 
meaning is otxviously dependent on explorations such as in which I have just indulged.
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Circularity
A second problem of legitimation lies in identifying and involving stakeholders. The 
issue, in,this context, may be stated thus: how are those who are not necessarily 
politically or academically inclined to be given a significant and independent role in 
the process of ideological formation?
Bypassing the formal political machinery that dominates ideological construction is 
possible; cultural activities have already been suggested in such a role. Structuring an 
adequately sophisticated and explicit ideology, however, may not be within the scope 
of such informal processes. Academics may therefore have a useful role in seeking to 
integrate diverse streams of ideas and ideals.
Once this function has been fulfilled, however, it would seem appropriate to check that 
the idea has not been suborned, assimilated, or perverted; ^age two of legitimation. 
Those who contributed to its formation should be given the opportunity to comment on 
its formalisation; but attempts to identify those who are qualified to make such 
comments can give rise to the problem of circularity. Does one choose those who 
agree with the proposition, on the grounds that they are prima facie those who must 
have given rise to it? If so, the proposition will necessarily be validated. Does one 
altematively look for an organisationally definitive group, so that membership of 
Friends of the Earth would make one an appropriate judge of an environmentalist 
ideology? To do so would simply ensure the orthodoxy of any ideology, and counteract 
the aim of regeneration.
The alternative that has been preferred here is to try to identify people whose 
behaviour is consistent with that which is implied by the ideology. Critical attitudes will
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be found amongst such people, since similarity of behaviour does not, pace Azjen and 
Fishbein, necessarily indicate that they share the same belief system.
This phase of legitimation is not rationally perfect, and is probably unappealing to 
those who dislike messiness; but is there a better? If participation in ideological 
formation is to be attempted, either a universal consensus must be sought, or some 
form of selective consultation must take place. Since universal consensus does not 
appear to be immediately feasible, the approach selected here may be the next best 
option.
Resource constraints
A third difficulty of legitimation relates to the previous one. Even having chosen 
behaviour as the criterion of selection, there are still difficulties in defining the 
population and the sample, especially in view of resource constraints.
Theoretically, at least, it would be possible to define certain indicators of behaviour 
that were consistent with the argument, to undertake research to identify the 
distribution of such indicators in the global population, to identify a representative 
sample, and to interview them with a view to discovering if they could share the 
rationalisation of their behaviour that was being put forward. The cost of such a course 
of action would be prohibitive even within a fairly curtailed cultural boundary. When 
the argument is offered as having a much wider relevance, it is difficult to conceive of 
such a task receiving serious consideration from any funding organisation capable of 
supporting it. The additional degree of confirmation attained would hardly be worth the 
effort, since imponderables are inherent to any process of ideological negotiation; and
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the scale of the operation would require either so much time or so many interviewers, 
or both, that additional reasons for doubt would be introduced
Legitimation in these circumstances can only ever be partial; but by seeking a range 
of interviews it is possible to support the idea that the argument did not only represent 
a deductive theoretical thesis, but a recognisable representation of the conceptual 
maps of a diverse group of people. To achieve more that this would not be a realistic 
target.
Imposed discourse
One additional element in the research was the testing of a belief that co-operation is 
a transcultural (which is not to say universal) phenomenon; that the argument could 
describe a rationale which would be equally applicable in communities with many 
distinctions in the overt patterns of behaviour. To some extent this is impossible to 
test, since those who are most disposed to agreement with an argument expressed in 
the discourse of one culture are presumably already emt)edded in that culture; while 
others might agree that in its own terms it makes sense, but would deny that it could 
be translated into the discourses of their own culture.
Clearly, given the rejection of the idea of a universal grammar, there is no possible 
means of certain translation. Thus the research may be thought of in an 
anthropological context:
There has been much recent discussion in linguistics of 'context'..., often 
thought of as a backdrop or framework to which language might be 
attached. It is important rather to see it as a process of contextualisation 
which occurs both in linguistic (or discursive) practice and in our analyses
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of it. This is relatable to Ardener's insistence, throughout his work, on 
anthropology as an 'act of translation' .[Grillo, 1989:19]
Where possible, the interviews took place in the home or working environment of the 
interviewee, after the interviewer had had an opportunity to become to some extent 
familiar with it. This is very clearly a relative matter. The extent of the openness and 
understanding in a series of such transitory relationships must be questionable. In 
addition, it must be recogrrised that their motives even for this degree of agreement 
are open to question. They could be agreeing out of politeness, or even from a wish to 
escape the attentions of an apparent madman. Some degree of checking was 
possible, in that volunteered comments, examples, or criticisms illuminated the 
respondents' own opinions, and clarified their position vis-à-vis the argument that had 
been offered. Behaviour, of course, gave an even clearer indication of underlying 
commitments, supporting or undermining individual's vertral claims, as well as the 
appropriateness of my invitation to them to participate.
A metaphor that proved popular with many respondents, which emerged quite early in 
the research, was to suggest that the argument offered was a framework around which 
different individuals could weave their own decorations. This also allowed the 
expression of the idea that, while co-operators could express their convictions to each 
other in all sorts of languages, there is a need for it also to be expressed in the formal 
language of political economy, which equates to some extent with the framework; a 
reductive structure in many respects, but one which can withstand a variety of shocks 
and assaults.
How might a more authoritative confirmation of the legitimacy of the argument be 
pursued? Presumably, if people were asked to vote for a party using the argument as
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the ground of its manifesto, a positive response would be an affirmation; but there 
would still be questions about the degree to which the voters had understood it, or 
about the variety of extraneous motives that could lead to an apparent democratic 
success. Perhaps there is no way that an ideology can be wholly legitimated, other 
than through its voluntary intemalisation expressed as observable behaviour 
consistent with the ideology. Even then, volition is never completely demonstrable.
However, the difficulties of legitimating an ideology through consultation should not be 
taken to indicate that an ideology can be legitimated by reference to rationalistic first 
principles. One may feel sympathy for Rawls' humanist conclusions, but the idea that 
one can posit what would occur behind a veil of ignorance without incurring a cultural 
bias is simply another example of the transcendentalist fallacy [Rawls,1972; Hare, 
1989; Corrado, 1980]. Consultation through the hermeneutic cyde appears to be the 
only form of legitimation that is consistent with sceptical pragmatic beliefs, in the stage 
of legitimation that lies between the abstraction from practice and the acceptance of 
an ideology as a heuristic ground for action.
If all that may be claimed is that a variety of people were prepared to recognise the 
paradigm as reasonably consistent with their point of view, what process of ideological 
legitimation could daim more?
Consistency and change
Another inherent problem with this methodology is that if the comments of early 
partidpants are allowed to affed the argument, the later respondents will be faced 
with a different presentation, and legitimation will be further eroded as a demonstrable 
phenomenon. However, some kind of balance seems to be implied, because if one
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ignores contributions and refinements, the argument is less representative than it 
might be.
This problem cannot be ignored, but if an ideology is recognised as an evolving 
discourse, the legitimation process is never absolute or complete. This view of 
ideology is clearly not a universal one; to a Muslim, the Koran is seen as the literal 
word of God, and no word of it may be changed or challenged [Dawood, 1956:10]. 
Nevertheless, during the interviews, several Muslims expressed the belief that the 
Koran is open to interpretation, for how else is it to relate contemporary phenomena 
such as intemational movements of capital with seventh century laws such as that 
concerning usury? Despite this, it seems evident that a distinction must be drawn 
between those ideologies which construct themselves as living traditions, and those 
which represent themselves as universal truths.
Co-operation in this oontext might be seen as a living tradition; and while it may be 
preferable, from the point of view of the second stage of legitimation, to hold firmly to 
one viewpoint, if legitimation is taken as an iterative whole, the processes of 
abstraction, consultation, and voluntary implementation are liable to overlap. In this 
instance it will be suggested that the argument remained sufficiently stable to daim 
that all partidpants were responding to the same core thesis; but undoubtedly there 
were significant developments, as will be seen.
inappropriate constraints on progressive research
If legitimation cannot be absolutely achieved in these drcumstances, should it be 
done at all? The answer In political and epistemological terms must be yes'. Perfect 
representation of diverse views is not possible; but dearly, in terms of political 
legitimation, some process of negotiation is necessary if the range of poltical choices
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in a mass society is to be neither impractically huge, nor reduced to the ideas of the 
most assertive members. If this process is not within the scope of a quantitative or 
purportedly objective social sdqnce, then there is a certain compulsion to ask whether 
that form of the social sciences is adequate.
There can be few doubts about the position adopted here. While this research 
undertaken has its limitations, a science which ignores relevant data because they are 
messy and transitory is selecting its subject matter to fit its method, rather than 
seeking the most appropriate method to construct potentially useful knowledge of all 
that its subject encompasses.
Therefore, despite the limitations of this research, it seems appropriate that it should 
be carried out. Legitimation of an ideology would seem to require a grounding in 
human beliefs and behaviour to prevent stultification and dogmatism. The first stage is 
to find the components of the ideology by listening. The second stage Is to ask those 
who might be able to support the ideology what they think of the assembly of the 
components. The third stage is to ask who is willing to give it a go.
This third stage has been beyond the scope of this research programme, but it is 
hoped that the second stage will prove of interest, even if only in that curious category 
of case study proposed by Langrish [1993]; "Cor, look at that."
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Part 2
In which the argument for co-operation is presented, and the assertions contained 
within it tested in relation to a selection of constrasting or supportive academic points 
of view; and in which the people with whom I discussed K are introduced, together with 
some of the ideas that they expressed.
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11. The argument for co-operation 
Origins In previous non-academic research
This argument did not emerge purely from theory, which is fortunate, considering the 
argument for the first stage of legitimation. The ideas expressed here may be thought 
of partly as the result of some twenty years non-academic action research into grass­
roots co-operative behaviour.
A comprehensive analysis of these experiences would be difficult, since they were not 
fonaally recorded. To some this might discredit them as a research programme, even 
though writers such as Chambers [1983,1989], Biot, Blaikie, Jackson and Palmer- 
Jones [1993] and Ison [1993] represent the considerable school of thought which 
emphasises the Importance of non-academic research. The importance of the 
groundedness of theory is reflected in the assertion made by SKhembiso Nyoni that 
no country in the world has over developed itself through projects; 
development results from a long process of experiment and innovation 
through which people build up the skills, knowledge and self-confidence 
necessary to shape their environment... [quoted in Edwards, 1989:120]
The environment with which we are concemed here is essentially the political 
environment. This should not be conflated with the govemment of the state, though 
dearly that is one aspect of politics. Politics is seen here as the arrangements we 
make to maintain coherence, given different ends [Potter, 1981 ;157].
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My experiences of this phenomenon during twenty years of peripatetic community 
development and travel included participation in a wide variety of projects; setting up 
three arts centres; the development of a charity for the homeless; small co-operative 
businesses in the building trade, fruit and vegetable marketing, tree-felling, and music; 
restructuring a national cyde path design/build company; and the establishment of 
Friends of the Earth in the west country as a recyding business. As well as working, 
there has been rough travel throughout westem Europe, and in north Africa, north and 
centrai America, and the Indian sut>-continent. During this time, the living was often 
communal, and, in most of the instances named, the enterprises were tilted towards a 
non-coerdve philosophy. This is not to say that coerdon wasnt a fador in most of the 
enterprises; just that it was usually contrary to the espoused values.
These, then, are the roots of the argument. As Nyoni said, there is a long process of 
experiment and innovation through which people build up the skills, knowledge and 
self-confidence necessary to shape their environment. At some point, however. If they 
are to shape their political environment it is not enough for the people simply to build 
up those skills locally. They need to find expression in the dorriinant discourse of 
political economy, or remain subordinate to the conventional positions adopted within 
it. The conceptual space that is reified as our political institutions will not become a 
vacuum just because we choose not to occupy it.
Below can be found an argument that has its origins in the experiences of many 
extraordinary ordinary people; when compressed, abstracted and formalised this is 
one possible expression of a view of the world. However it seems to be quite widely 
Shared by a variety of people of different genders, races, religions, nations, cultures, 
histories, situations and abilities - to take just a few of the ways of distinguishing 
between them. Why this ideology remains largely subordinate to the ethics of coercion
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and market exchange is not necessarily explicable within the rationality of political 
economic discourse itself, except in so far as that discourse reflexively notes how it is 
itself distorted by the interests of the powerful [Hall, 1981].
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The refined argument - after the interviews
Needs
We have needs.
Those needs may be described as social, psychological, and, some would say, 
spiritual, as well as material.
To meet those needs, we require resources. These, too, are of various kinds.
Some, certainly, are scarce: land and water, for example, are clearly finite in our 
present circumstances. Other resources would be adequate if distributional problems 
could be resolved. Food leaps to mind in this category.
There is, however, a third category which is not always recognised. For example. If 
you are creative, you do not use up some finite resource of creativity; indeed, if you 
are creative, you are more likely to stimulate my own cresrtivity than to inhibit it. 
Resources in such a category may be described as synergetic.
These distinctions between types of resources have important implications for the way 
we might seek our satisfactions. We might, for example, try to reduce the impacts of 
scarcity by re-orientating ourselves towards the satisfactions to be gained from 
synergetic resources. Nevertheless, it seems unavoidable, in the foreseeable future, 
for us to find ourselves in competition for certain resources.
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Thus (unless we believe that a self-directed, universal, and radical transformation of 
human nature is feasible), it may be asserted that we find ourselves facing conflicts of 
interest that are mostly dictated by circumstances, rather than being of our own 
choosing. There is no necessary coincidence between what each of us conceives to 
be in our personal interest. We can, nevertheless, make choices about how we are to 
respond to these circumstantial conflicts of interest.
Before looking at some of those choices, it may be helpful to decide how our 
responses could be assessed.
Perceived conflicts 
of interest
Resources
•  Scarce
• Adequate
• Synergetic
Needs
•  Social
• Psychological
•  Material
• Spiritual
The criteria
The criteria may be derived in the following manner.
In the first place, an assumption Is made that, although we may share certain needs, 
the ways in which we seek to satisfy them are diverse, both between individuals and 
overtime, Secondly, it is assumed that this diversity must be respected, if we are to
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approach fulfilment. The third assumption is that the quality of your experience is to 
be as well respected as is the quality of mine.
This set of assumptions may be summarised thus: if we are to have a collective aim, it 
will be to offer to each individual a fair chance to satisfy their needs, across the whole 
range from spiritual to material, to whatever extent is possible without preventing 
otfters from doing the same.
Two criteria - diversity and equity - have been openly built into this statement. Two 
other criteria are implicit: productivity, because the more resources we have, the more 
opportunities there are; and sustainability, because the phrase "each individual" is 
taken to include those who have not yet been bom.
It is important to emphasise two further points.
Firstly, although the criteria can be clearly distinguished in theory, in practice they are 
aspects of an integrated experience. The components do not make sense as a 
description of collective purpose except when each is considered in relation to each of 
the others; and we cannot compensate for a failure to meet one of the criteria through 
a greater success in meeting another of them.
Secondly, that which constitutes success or failure in meeting the criteria is not 
objectively determined. The Judgements presented here are opinions, not facts.
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ResourcesNeeds
Responses
Perceived conflicts 
of interest
Criteria
Sustainability
Diversity
Equity
Productivity
The dynamics of social coordination
The first choice to be made is between some form of social co-ordination and an 
unregulated war of all against all. Since the latter seems highly unlikely to meet any of 
the criteria, it wiii be assumed that some form of social co-ordination is required; and 
so it is possible to move swiftly on to the second question; whether social co­
ordination should be voluntary or involuntary.
There is immediate appeal in the idea of voluntary co-ordination , or co-operation as it 
will be labelled here. The idea that we should resolve competition over resources 
through negotiation seems to be the simpiest and most direct way of accomplishing 
our purposes. Each of the criteria can be met in this way. even though the approach is 
not without its inherent problems.
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However, co-operation is not a simple set of behaviours, and distinctions between 
forms of co-operation can be useful. The first of these forms occurs when when it is 
obviously in our immediate interests to work together. This may be called intuitive co­
operation.
We can, of course, continue to co-operate even when our interests dont imrhediately 
coincide. We can choose to act in such a way as we beiieve it wouid be best for 
everyone to act, even when it is not particularly convenient to do so. Because such 
behaviour commonly involves estatMishing a set of agreements atx)ut the nature of 
such behaviour, it can be called regulative co-operation; though the form of regulation 
may range from inexplicit local conventions to intemational law.
Indeed, in this context, it is self-evident that the rules, whether explicit or implicit, 
statutory or normative, must be willingly accepted if co-operation is to remain 
voluntary. Since this implies that everyone who is affected by a decision has a right to 
a voice in the decision-making process proportional to their interest, this third aspect 
of co-operation may be described as procedural co-operation.
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Resources
Lawlessness
Needs
Social co-ordination
Perceived conflicts 
of interest
Voluntary
Co-operation
• intuitive
• regulative
• procedural
Criteria
•  Sustainability
• Diversity
• Equity
•  Productivity
Coercion
The immediate alternative to the voluntary co-ordination of social life is coercion; that 
is, involuntary co-ordination. The argument is that because people are lazy, selfish 
and greedy, they have to be told what to do for their own benefit.
This argument doesn't really stand up when we compare our experience of coercive 
systems with the criteria that have been stated here. Such systems tend to be 
unproductive because social organisation is too complex for any elite to make 
consistently appropriate decisions. They fail to meet the criterion of diversity, because 
individuals cannot make their own choices. They may start with ideals of equity, but
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since the ruling group is unaccountable, this criterion too is soon neglected; and the 
costs of maintaining such an unresponsive system tend to make it unsustainable quite 
rapidly.
This is not to say that we can necessarily co-ordinate our activities entirely without 
coercion; a point which will be discussed a little later.
Voluntary
Co-operation
• intuitive
• regulative
• procedural
Social co-ordination
Involuntary
Coercion
Criteria
• Sustainability
• Diversity
• Equity
• Productivity
Market ideology -  the invisible hand
At this point it is tempting to suggest that all social systems are simply a mixture of co­
operative and coercive dynamics, but there is a school of thought which suggests that 
the analysis used here is inadequate: that there is an additional factor which has not 
been taken into account.
The additional factor is the invisible hand, and the ideology that espouses it is 
commonly, and rather misleadingly, known as 'market theory*. This label is misleading 
because it co-opts the term market, and attaches it to a mechanism known as the
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invisible hand, which is supposed to magically transform the pursuit of self-interest into 
the common good.
The virtues of the market - its productivity and the diversity it encourages - are not, 
however, dependent on the JnvisitMe hand or on market theory*. The essence of the 
market is not the ideology that claims we need have only minimal concem for each 
other, but the division of labour, the appropriate allocation of resources, and the 
benefits of exchange; and these are all quite amenable to co-operative forms of social 
co-ordination. If we relied only on what we could produce for ourselves, our 
productivity would be woefully low. Through the division of labour and exchange, we 
can increase the quality, quantity and diversity of our productivity. This is not a 
contentious point. There is no reason why co-operators should not be in favour of 
markets, in the sense of institutions for facilitating exchange. What is at issue is how 
we can ensure that the process is reasonably equitable.
To market ideologists, this is not a problem. If everyone specialises and then trades 
what they have produced in the market, it is argued, there is an incentive for everyone 
to produce what best meets other people's needs; and since you can only trade what 
you have produced, each person finds themselves entitled to neither more nor less 
than they deserve.
The greatest beauty of the system is that it is automatic; or, in the imagery associated 
with the ideology, that 'it is guided by an invisible hand'. There is, therefore, no need 
for deliberate intervention to achieve equity. Social co-ordination can take place 
entirely through the market process, in which the pursuit of self-interest Is magically 
transformed Into the general common good.
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Would that this were so.
Firstly, it is not the case that everyone gets what they deserve. We do not all have the 
same opportunities. Those of us who are provided with health and education, and 
access to capital, information and influence have a consistent advantage over those 
who do not. The result is that a market organised according to the invisible hand 
ideology leads to an intensifying differentiation that is quite clearly based more on the 
chance of birth than on merit.
Secondly, the idea that we do not need to accept any responsibility for each other 
(beyond the negative responsibility of not seeking actively to harm or deceive others) 
encourages us to look at each other as objects and as opportunities for exploitation. 
Market ideology leads to social fragmentation and alienation.
Thirdly, the idea that we have no positive responsibilities to each other encourages us 
to try to avoid the true costs of our productive activities. A consequence of market 
ideology is a noticeable tendency to neglect our social and environmental 
responsibilities.
When market ideology is compared to the criteria, therefore, a mixed picture emerges.
In terms of the production of some types of resources, most notably those which meet 
our material needs, market ideology appears to be very effective. However, it also 
appears to be destructive of the resources which help us to satisfy our social and 
spiritual needs, so that although allowing a great deal of diversity in some respects, 
from a broader perspective it is not clear that it meets either of these criteria 
adequately.
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In terms of sustainability there is an equal degree of ambiguity. While innovation and 
ingenuity certainly seem to flourish under such a fluid system, experience suggests 
that environmental and social costs are allocated effectively only through coercive or 
co-operative measures, and not through the market itself. Sustainability is only 
maintained under market ideology by acting in a manner contrary to that ideology.
There can be little doubt about the fourth criterion, however. The market is not a 
magic mechanism that transforms self-interest into the collective good, nor is there an 
invisible hand to guide the market so that everyone gets what they deserve. No 
society in which the central dynamic is market ideology has a significant chance of 
achieving equUy.
Nevertheless, because of the high cost of determining outcomes in advance, co- 
operators may at times appear to rely on market forces to determine fair distribution. 
One would expect them to seek confirmation that justice rather than expediency was 
being served; but, as with coercion, a certain interdependency between the dynamics 
is implied.
Voluntary
Co-operation
• intuitive
• regulative
• procedural
Social co-ordination
Involuntary
Coercion
1
Magic mechanism 
The market
•  intensifying 
differentiation
• alienation
• externalisation 
of costs
I Criteria• Sustainability
• Diversity
• Equity
• Productivity
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The failures of cooperation
It may have been noticeable that while the failures of coercion and market ideology 
have been dwelt on, those of co-operation have not been specified.
In a sense, the problems have already been identified, however. They are, on the one 
hand, that we cannot rely on everyone to co-operate; and on the other, that the 
transaction costs of discovering the total circumstances of any exchange would t)e so 
great as to prevent most of them taking place. These problems may be tagged as non- 
co-operation and scale; and it may be noted that these are the problems which 
coercion and the invisit>le hand supposedly address.
In this way it becomes apparent why the three dynamics are not, in practice, mutually 
exclusive.
Consider coercion in relation to co-operation. In the first place, there is no absolute 
standard which allows us to determine where persuasion stops and coercion begins, 
despite the poles being clearly distinguishable. Nor can the argument that there will 
always be some people who behave intolerably* be rejected out of hand.
There is, however, a crucial distinction between relying on coercion as the central 
dynamic of a society, and using it as a regrettable necessity. Instead of being 
universal and self-reinfordng, coercion in these circumstances is used reluctantly and 
defensively, as a last resort; reformatively, rather than vengefully; and not impulsively, 
but on the basis of agreed norms or what constitutes intolerable behaviour - norms 
that have been agreed through co-operative procedures.
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Similarly, as has already been noted, co-operators are likely to find themselves using 
some approximation of a market ideology; a temporary assumption that an exchange 
is equitable, simply because it may well be too costly to investigate all the potential 
consequences of our transactions before we undertake them. The distinction is that 
co-operators do not attempt to absolve themselves of responsibility for those 
consequences.
There is, instead, an acceptance that inequities affecting and being intensified by such 
exchanges must be identified through procedural co-operation, and compensatory 
mechanisms instituted through cultural or political means.
Symmetry
The likelihood thus seems to be that even in an essentially co-operative society, both 
coercion and market ideology will have a part to play. One series of possible 
deductions is that
•  each dynamic deals with the problems of the other two;
• there is a symmetrical relationship between the dynamics:
• and that, therefore, any practical form of social co-ordination will incorporate 
elements of each of the dynamics.
The first and third observations seem to reflect experience, but the second does not 
appear to be correct. There is not, in the end, symmetry between the three dynamics.
When we seek to integrate them, we do so by assessing the way in which the 
strengths of one compensate for the failures of another. The symmetry breaks down at 
this point because neither the market ideology nor coercion is capable of managing a
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sustainable equilibrium. Coercion is directly opposed to co-operation and destructive 
of the flexibility of the market, which is its primary virtue. The free market, through its 
tendency towards intensifying differentiation, creates inequities which require coercive 
measures if radical instability is not to arise; an instability which is reinforced by the 
demeaning of social solidarity. At the same time, the free market, through its tendency 
towards monopoly is even destructive of itself, and of the trust and social solidarity on 
which both it and co-operation depend.
Thus, if an equilibrium between the three dynamics is to be sustained, with the aim of 
optimising our capacity to meet our welfare criteria, we must rely on our capacity to 
negotiate the construction of our social institutions. Procedural co-operation, in which 
everyone has a voice to decide the rules, must be given priority, and the authority to 
decide when coercion is justifiable, and when market exchange has been inequitable.
The relationship between the dynamics is not therefore seen as symmetrical. 
Precedence must be given to procedural co-operation.
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Needs
•  Social
• Psychological
• Material
• Spiritual
Resources
•  scarce
• adequate
• synergetic
Perceived conflicts 
of interest
Voluntary
Co-operation
• intuitive
• regulative
• procedural
Lawlessness Social co-ordination
Involuntary
Coercion
Magic mechanism 
The market
• Intensifying 
differentiation
• Alienation
• Externalisation 
of costs
Criteria
• Sustainability
• Diversity
• Equity
• Productivity
procedural co-operation
intuitive co-operation
market coercion
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A footnote: Liberal democracy and other hybrids
The similarities between this conclusion and the traditions of liberal democracy do not 
disqualify the argument as a recommendation of co-operation; nor do they indicate 
that the policies which are undertaken in the name of liberal democracy meet the 
criteria expressed here.
Within such polities, it is commonplace for both coercion and the invisible hand to be 
presented as dynamics which are intrinsically justified, while the argument offered 
here suggests that their use is only acceptable within a framework of regulation in 
which everyone who is affected has a voice.
Obviously, perfectly balanced negotiations are an unattainable ideal; but perfection 
being beyond our grasp is not a reason for giving up entirely, or for substituting for 
procedural co-operation one or other of two dynamics which we know to be intrinsically 
incapable of meeting our objectives.
A different set of responses is indicated. The whole web of implications cannot be 
stated briefly, but some possibilities can be illustrated. (Incidentally, they appear to 
defuse several commonplace criticisms of co-operation.)
Our educational systems should develop our skills of holistic interaction, and stress 
the often neglected recognition that each individual is dependent on their social 
environment for the opportunity to fulfil their potential. Everything we do is built on the 
efforts of others.
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Simultaneously, utopianism must give way to a recognition that some measure of 
coercion may t>e inescapable, and some measure of market exchange acceptable. 
What is crucial is that the operational parameters of these measures should be 
decided collectively.
Leadership, for example, need not be coercive. When someone is able to provide an 
imaginative blending of what each of us desires, and is prepared to abjure the 
opportunity to perpetuate their influence through the atxise of power and denial of 
opportunity to others, leadership can be a creative response to the problems or scale.
Nor Is there good reason to refuse to reward particular classes of action. Incentives 
are not intrinsically vicious. It is only when their distribution arises from inequity of the 
power to define merit that motivation through differential reward becomes obscene. 
Furthermore, encouragement to make positive contributions may be preferable to 
punishing deviance as a response to those who are reluctant to participate responsibly 
in the community.
Strategies which are hybrids of the three dynamics are potentially valuable, and 
possibly essential; but the central issue remains the same. The hybrids, just as much 
as raw coercion and Imperfect markets, become dysfunctional unless their uses 
remain sutwrdinate to the collective voice of procedural co-operation.
In conclusion
It will probably have been noted that this analysis places immense importance on our 
capacity to construct our environment through mutual understanding.
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This is intentional. There are certainly physical constraints, which may be at>solute, on 
what we can achieve, but there are also huge opportunities for us to achieve the aim 
of offering to each indh/iduai a fab’ chance to satisfy their needs, across the wttoie 
range from spirituai to material, to whatever extent Is possible without preventing 
others from doing ttie same.
If the principal component of this achievement is leaming to listen without fear, 
express ourselves honestly, and reach agreements, there is plenty of evidence that 
these skills are not beyond our capacity.
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12. Validation
That, then, is the rationale of the primacy of co-operation in social organisation which 
emerged from the first and second stages of legitimation.
Although the interviews that comprised the second stage will be discussed in due 
course, the next sections will deal with the validation process. In the methodological 
discussion, validation was seen as focussing on intemal consistency, critical 
challenge, and empirical evidence. Consistency Is a fairly straightfonvard criterion. 
Critical challenge is made in awareness that academic rigour demands that we be 
individually and collectively self-critical [Gregory, 1990], since "at some level, the 
sociologist must identify - either positively or negatively - with her object of 
investigation." [Eyerman and Jamison. 1991:40]. Empirical evidence is offered, 
though, of course, at times this is evidence not of quanitifiable phenomena, but that 
people have used a compatible way of thinking of these issues.
Needs
Amongst the terms which are used fairly interchangeably in common language are to 
need, to want, to crave, to yearn, to desire, and to wish. There is a common 
distinction, too: that which we are said to need is sometimes contextualised as being 
in some way more real or essential than that for which we simply wish. A practical 
consequence of this is that definition of a daim as a need will often bear with it the 
idea of entitlement, which is not the case with that for which we merely yearn. The 
covert message of such a distinction is that there is a criterion which allows us to
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distinguish t)etween the two sets of emotions; but exactly what that criterion is tends to 
remain debatable.
Nevertheless, four types of criterion can fairly readily be identified, however. These 
can be referred to respectively as objective, market determined, idiosyncratic and 
normative. The labels represent the following ideas.
that there is a set of needs which is objective and universal, and that what is 
wanted beyond that is more than can be reasonably demanded;
that there is a continuum between needs and wants which can be inferred from 
market behaviour;
that the distinction is purely idiosyncratic, and inaccessible to extemal 
assessment;
that the distinction between what one needs and what one merely wants is relative 
to cultural constructs.
A difficulty arises in that these categories can be mixed within an ideology. For 
example, one could argue rationally that needs are those urges which can be 
objectively identified and bear entitiements, while desires are idiosyncratic and our 
own responsibility. Furthermore, the idiosyncracy of desire can be hallowed as sets of 
autonomic projects [Williams, 1988; Nozick.1968]; or it can be argued that desires are 
culturally or biologically determined [Galbraith,1968,1974; Dawkins,1976], but 
inaccessible to objective identification due to their complexity.
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An ineluctable tide draws the argument towards the quagmire of motive. What makes 
us want things? Inevitably this is a favourite playground of the psychologist, and 
perhaps equally inevitably, it is a playground in which incommensurability is the 
predominant style. In a quagmire the predominant style is sauve qui peut.
Using Rorty*s paradigm, one might seek to agree what would constitute adequate data 
to decide between altemative conceptions, but such agreement does not seem to 
have been achieved. Indeed, the point seems indeterminable, if one considers three 
problems:
1. How could we reliably distinguish between a measure of precognition and hee 
will?2
2. We cannot speak intelligibly (within the conventional westem academic discourse) 
of how a human would t>ehave if they were without corporeal substance.
3. How could we communicate with someone who had not been subjected to 
environmental influence; and without that communication, would any commentary 
on their behaviour be adequate? (This is, of course, a reflection of Heiseneberg's 
uncertainty principle.)
To indicate briefly, then, some of the incompatible but underdetenminable responses 
to the question of motivation, one might select simply amongst the biological school of 
motivational theorists, whose preferred data ranges from dreams to genes. There is 
Freudian bio-cognitive determinism, as expressed in The Ego and the Id [1962]; the 
genetic determinist, represented by Barash's Sociobiology: the whispering within
2 1 have discussed the problem of self-determination elsewhere, and concluded that 
while Ryle's Plotinian argument [Ryle, 1963] must throw considerable doubt on the 
plausibility of such a position, we have little altemative but to constmct our beliefs as if 
we have free will. Indeed, this empirical conclusion may be the best or only evidence 
of free will that is available. A debate with Rose on this issue in the context of 
personal change is presently a welcome stimulus [Rose, 1996].
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[1980] and Dawkin's The Selfish Gene [1976];or Maturana and Varela's The Tree of 
Knowledge [1988].
An altemative form of determinism is found in the behaviourist school associated with 
Watson [Behaviourism, 1924] or Skinner [Abouf Se/iawourrsm, 1974]. For this school, 
neutral observation of stimulus and response provides the requisite evidence: but for 
those who believe that the environment's influence operates through an intervening 
cognitive mechanism, such as Goffman [77ie Presentation of Self in Everyday Lifé, 
1969] and Harré and Secord [TTie Explanation o7Socra/6e/iavk>ur,1972], personal 
reports are central to interpretation. Similarly, Kelly's theory of personal constructs 
suggests that we are guided by a personal mode of construing the world, and that 
environmental data are definitely sutx>rdinate to an a^reness of such constructions 
[Adams-Webber,1979:1-11].
Perhaps the moM useful contend for the discussion, in view of the incommensurability 
of these conceptions, is philosophical; but even those who have committed 
themselves to a study of the issues seem baffled. There is not even agreement on 
whether there is an entity - the self - to which desires can be attributed in a coherent 
manner.
Parfit's thought experiments sought to describe a thinker, as distinct from the 
continuity of thought which is all that the Plotinian view concedes [Clark, 1991]. 
Courageously undermining his own attempts. Parfit declared that such an effort might 
be technically and possibly deeply impossible [Parfit, 1986:219]. Wilkes came to no 
clearer a conclusion:
The 'unity* and 'continuity' that the condition of consciousness was inter 
alia trying to supply was, in so far as we do enjoy such unity and
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continuity, adequately explained by the requirements of rational and 
purposeful activity in a complex social environment, and by the interplay 
of the many faculties of the human organism. [Wilkes, 1988:231]
In the face of such uncertainty, it seems reasonable to suggest that each theory of 
motivation is underdetermined, in Lukes' sense of the word: "theories may be 
incompatible with each other and yet compatible with all possible data." [Lukes,
1981:396] If we accept this view, how are we then to proceed to understand needs?
In the first place, within the sceptical perspective, it is possible to dismiss the 
objectivist argument. We do not need to enter the
fictional non-existing world constructed by the scientific observer - yet 
another imperialistic imposition which does little more than reflect the 
preconceptions and interests of the social scientists involved.[Schutz 
cited in Doyal And Gough, 1991:19]
Benn and Peters seek a way round this by suggesting that there are objective public 
needs with a superstructure of private needs. The support they offer for the idea of 
objective needs is to argue that the need for a pair of spectacles is not normative 
[Benn and Peters, 1959:141]. This is, in itself, debatat)le; if not through norms, how 
might we identify a need that carries with it an obligation to others? or if there is no 
obligation, of what relevance is the distinction between public and private needs? 
Policy shifts in Britain since the time of writing have clearly reallocated spectacles 
from a public provision to the private sector, except for the means-tested few. To 
support their argument, Benn and Peters would have to show that those needs which 
imply an obligation to others are distinguished other than nonmatively. which they 
have failed to do.
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A more fundamental point emerges from this controversy. It is possible to be aware of 
a distinction without being able to allocate phenomena to particular categories. 
Although we may be able to assert that there are circumstances which give rise to that 
which may be categorised as an essential need, we cannot infer that the categories of 
needs and wishes are clearly distinct. A hierarchy of needs seems a reasonable 
response to this problem, though, as will be seen, there are difficulties with this; and 
even the superficially most objective of needs remains culturally determined. To a 
Buddhist, "all phenomena of the universe coming and going momentarily and 
unceasingly at all times are illusory and unreal.” [Hsu Heng Chi. 1989:4] Our 
conception of needs is due to our attachment to the egotistical illusion, while "in 
dharma there is no self" [ibid\. Even survival needs imply a normative or personal 
assumption.
Can the idea of objective needs thus be discarded as unproven and impractical? In 
addition to the points just made, pragmatism suggests that the utility of such a 
viewpoint is low, since it would underwrite the authoritarian structuring of society. [To 
write "an ethical pragmatism rooted in sceptical premises" each time would be tedious 
for both writer and reader. Pragmatism will be taken henceforth to refer to the position 
that has been elaborated earlier in the text ]
An ingenious way of bypassing these objections is sometimes put forward, however. It 
can be argued that we indicate our needs through our market decisions. This is, of 
course, a highly reductive and abstract argument, dependent on the assumption that 
those who have authentic and justifiable needs will always have the power to bring 
forth an appropriate supply. In the first place, there is a false assumption that there are 
no structural obstructions to converting a perception of need into effective demand. In 
the second place, capitalist industrialism has an evident interest in creating needs -
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indeed, may even be argued to be dependent on the creation of a state of perpetual 
dissatisfaction.
Veblen, in opposition to the demand calls forth supply* formula, pointed to the 
extrinsic nature of needs nearly a hundred years ago:
wants and desires, the end and aim, the ways and means the amplitude 
and drift of the individual's conduct are functions of an institutional 
variable that is of a highly complex and wholly unstable character.
[Veblen, 1984:180]
More recently, the same issue has been raised by Galbraith [1968], who pays 
considerable attention to the notion of interruptions to the accepted sequence of 
events between demand and supply;
..persuasion helps to accord serious importance to frivolous wants. It 
makes the taste or crispy sensation of the imaginative breakfast food 
important...it gives similar meaning to other meaningless products. Thus 
it helps to conceal the tendency, with increasing production, to increasing 
unimportance. [Galbraith, 1974:158].
Robinson, too, shares this view, having written that "No-one who has lived in the 
capitalist world is deceived by the pretence that the market system ensures 
consumer's sovereignty." [Robinson, 1972:274] For a more complete examination of 
this position, O'Donnell [1981] can be recommended.
Beyond this clear refutation on the ground that the economic idealist's model has no 
clear correspondence to experience, there are further difficulties in this route to an 
objective analysis of needs. To turn to Robinson again.
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The first essential for economists ...fis] to combat, not foster, the ideology 
which pretends that values which can be measured in terms of money are 
the only ones that ought to count.[/bÂf:14]
If we depend on the analysis of market transactions to identify needs, there is an 
automatic distortion that exaggerates the perceived significance of the choices of the 
individually wealthy or of median groups. The manner in which this skews our vision of 
the world, or leads to infrastructural bias, is complex; but the building of roads for out- 
of-town retail areas is indicative of how market mediated expressions of preference 
may be incomplete. Do we want to increase our car dependency? Do we support the 
predatory pricing that threatens small businesses? The sum of individual short-term 
rationality may not lead to collective or longer term individual welfare; and the market 
is not a reliable expression of our needs.
An altemative approach is thus required if we wish to have a practical understanding 
of needs. The approach that has been adopted here is to take the whole set of 
perceived needs, wants, wishes and desires, and to seek a taxonomy which seems 
likely to provide sul>sets appropriate for most people's interpretation of their own 
experience. Clearly there is a set which encompasses all that anyone at this moment 
wants; there would appear to be no difficulty with that construct, though movement 
over time prevents any claim that it could be definitive. The issue of a taxonomic 
description of the sut>-sets requires more caution.
Any way of differentiating experience may be seen as culturally determined; 
categories are taken to be not aspects of the universe itself but of our conceptions of 
the universe. The test of an appropriate taxonomy from the point of view of the 
pragmatist is how useful it is. In this case, utility suggests that it must be acceptable to 
a wide range of people, without being so bland as to contribute nothing of sut)stance to
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the argument for co-operation. Another difficulty is that, if perceieved needs are 
constructed as being infinitely diverse, no taxonomy can be adequate; only a very 
long list could have any credibility.
Doyal and Gough to some extent follow this line of thought:
...because of the holistic impact of society on human consciousness and 
on the formulation of what is and what is not a t>asic need, it is impossible
to compare cultures In short, human needs are socially relative, and
stipulate only what some groups of humans prefer over others. Attempts 
by those in one culture or social formation to impose their conception of 
t)asic needs onto any other is no more than cultural imperialism - the 
pursuit of specific group interests. [Doyal and Gough, 1991:13]
Their response to this perspective is to argue that
While it may be true that all human goals are specific to particular 
cultures, in order to achieve any of these goals people have to act. It 
follows that there are certain preconditions for such actions to be 
undertaken - people must have the mental ability to deliberate arid to 
choose, and the physical capacity to follow through on their decisions.
[Doyal and Gough, 1986:69]
There are several difficulties to this approach, however appealing its conclusions may 
be; to wit, that enablement is the only justifiable response to a recognition of others' 
needs. Firstly, there is a cultural assumption that people desire autonomy, so that 
Doyal and Gough are liable to the challenge that an imposed autonomy is just as 
much an authoritarian act as any other. To attribute a universal desire for autonomy is 
itself, in their terms, "no more than cultural imperialism". Secondly, there is a rather 
blurred catégoriel error. This can be clarified in the first place by referring to Max- 
Neefs distinction between needs and satisfactions, which is also helpful in other
page163
respects. Needs may be considered to be universal to humans, or at least widely 
discernible, while the satisfactions of those needs may be very diverse. [Max-Neef, 
1986:49] For example, it can be argued that we all have a need for affection, but that 
in some people that need will be satisfied by the companionship of a bearded collie, 
while for others, nothing short of an extended family in a stable community will do. If 
we accept that distinction, satisfactions are those experiences which have an intrinsic 
capacity to meet a need.
Applying this perspective to Doyal and Gough's argument, it may be seen that 
particular forms of empowerment are an attempt to satisfy their perception of a 
second order need for autonomy. (A second order need is one which is felt not 
because of the intrinsic value of its being met, but because it allows one to satisfy a 
first order need.) By privileging this set of selected satisfactions, they are imposing 
resource priorities which are not attributable to any negotiated decision. Can they 
. assert with atxsolute certainty that we would always demand autonomy before we 
demanded food security? Their argument can therefore be seen as a useful 
contribution, but one that must be handled with care: its conclusions may be at odds 
with its premises.
Maslow*s approach is markedly different. The hierarchical structure he offers presents 
a base of physiological needs, a second layer of safety needs, followed by 
belongingness and love, and the penultimate set; the need for esteem. All of these are 
termed deficiency needs, without which there is little chance of achieving the 
culminating glory of self-actualistion - becoming everything one is capable of 
becoming [Maslow, 1970].
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His approach has several flaws. In the first place, he assumed self-actualisation as a 
category, identified those he tielieved had attained it, and sought the shared 
characteristics of that group. This is problematic in its circularity [Stevens, 1981:73], 
but, as has been argued, this is not an insurmountable challenge in itself. To seek 
evidence we must always make a set of assumptions. The problem lies rather, it may 
be thought, in the identification of needs as a hierarchy, with an individualistic glory as 
the peak of human development. Maslow sought to defuse this problem by arguing 
that the distinction between selfishness and unselfishness disappears when it is 
recognised "the most ethical and moral of people are also the lustiest and most 
animal." [Maslow. 1970:179]
Maslow"s argument remains highly conjectural, and, from a pragmatic point of view, 
potentially very damaging. Several difficulties arise from his adoption of a hierarchical 
view. In the first place, this approach encourages an understanding that those who are 
self-actualised are superior to all others. If it were to be adopted as a personal 
paradigm. It would seem likely to promote the ruthlessness and coldness that was 
often identified as a characteristic of Maslow's group by others [Stevens, 1981:73]. An 
altemative view of the peak of human development might be found in the Buddhist 
philosophy that all dharmas [ways of righteousness] are without self [Hsu Heng Chi, 
1989:4]. There is nothing intrinsically necessary about Maslow's choice of self- 
actualisation as the apex of the hierarchy.
Nor, of course, is it necessary to make use of a hierarchy at all to describe needs. 
There is a failure to distinguish between urgency and importance in the view that one 
level must be satisfied before the next becomes significant. A more useful model 
might be one in which it was recognised that the saliency of various needs varies over 
time, for a variety of reasons, which includes physiological imperatives. Apart from
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freeing sympathetic needs from their subordination to the autonomic, there is another 
pragmatic advantage in the non-hierarchical approach. If it is taken that lower order 
needs are never entirely satisfied, or can easily be stimulated by a consumerist 
culture, there is implicit in Maslow's hierarchical metaphor an encouragement to 
neglect the higher order social needs in the pursuit of baser gratifications 
[Weisskopf,1973:178].
Early writers on economic man allowed him - and though only by 
implication, her - higher non-material needs. Gradually these were lost 
sight of, because economists only knew how to analyse lower needs.
Finally their very existence was denied. [Walker, 1989:9]
The implications for the global community will be elaborated in due course; but to 
indicate the train of thought, a focus on material needs can be painfully and 
unsustainably resource intensive.
For these reasons the hierarchical view is also rejected. The range of needs identified 
by Maslow is nevertheless consistent with the view preferred here, as is the non- 
hierarchical analysis of Mailman, who offers autonomy, identity, affection, 
participation, understanding, protection, sustenance, play, and creativity [adapted from 
Max-Neef, 1986:49]. In the research undertaken here, and in teaching in prison, I 
found Mailman's list to be too cumbersome and too specific for easy internalisation. 
Neverthless, if political inferences are to be made, some attempt to subdivide the 
whole set of human needs is required. Some intermediary taxonomy would seem to 
be appropriate.
Erikson may act as the source or a suitable analysis. He described human well-being 
as resulting from the integrated satisfaction of our needs in the social, psychological, 
and somatic domains [Erikson, 1977]. Several of those with whom I have spoken are,
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however, reluctant to subsume the spiritual within the psychological, and the point 
seems inresoluble. For every one such there is probatHy another who will deny a 
metaphysical aspect to humanity (remember that, to Maturana, love is a biological 
phenomenon [Maturana, 1991:89]).
The taxonomy of the whole set of needs that is used, therefore, consists in three or 
four subsets: social, material, psychological, and spiritual [7] needs. This analysis 
appears to be sustainable in the context of other theoretical constructions, and 
potentially useful through its influence on the argument for co-operation.
Resources
The term resource is used here in the sense offered by The Oxford Etymological 
Dictionary: a resource is a means of supplying a want. In the context of this argument, 
this reference allows a neat symmetry. We have needs; that which can be used to 
meet a need is a resource.
There are evident objections to this. If we consider the set of social or psychological 
needs, the model constructed here could seem to be an incitement to exploit other 
people. On further consideration, however, it is possible to see that this is not a 
necessary implication; indeed, when the class of synergetic resources is considered, it 
may be seen that such a reading is unsustainable. Put simply, win/win outcomes allow 
us to meet our needs through others while providing the same service for them [Levin 
and Desjardins, 1970: Davis, 1983]. Despite the adequacy of this response, however, 
some further explanation of the use of the terms may be helpful.
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Scarcity of resources does not seem to offer any immediate problems as a construct. 
Since at least the Club of Rome report of more than twenty years ago [Meadows et al, 
1972], which incorporated the recognition that certain resources are finite, and 
demands made upon them extreme, the notion of resource scarcity has been a 
common theme. Even before this, Carson's Silent Spring [1968] helped raise the issue 
of the self-destructive behaviour of capitalist consumer society. The Brundtland report 
[1987] contributed further to the debate, in particular by emphasising the notion of 
inter-generational justice.
There have been arguments offered to suggest that scarcity is an irrelevant concept. 
This seems usually to be based on the notion that technological advance allows more 
to t>e produced from less; but while technological advances can undoubtedly improve 
resource utilisation, estimates of future demand and technological advances remain 
purely speculative, and our present circumstances continue to be constrained by 
scarcities of, for example, pure water.
Associated with technological optimism, is the view that resource management is 
simply a matter of getting the price right. A number of texts under the general heading 
Blueprint for a Green Planet \pearce, Markyanda, and Barbier, 1989] have contributed 
to the understanding of how more resource costs can be intemalised effectively into 
industrial practice. For example, the notion that the polluter pays has become a 
popular maxim. Nevertheless, scarcity management is a recognition, not a refutation, 
of the limitations of the resource base. Thus, the scarcity of resources is recognised as 
an ever-present phenomenon even if one accepts the debatable premises 
that the market is the appropriate medium of social organisation; 
that the complexity of allocating and intemalising costs is not beyond our 
management;
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and that the human resource intensity of measuring non-market values is 
acceptable.
At this juncture it is possible to irnagine economists preening their collective selves, 
since economics is often predicated as the allocation of scarce resources between 
human units whose rationality leads them to make infinite demands on, by implication, 
scarce resources. In many ways the most interesting aspect of this argument, 
however, is that it is centred on a one-dimensional view of human behaviour. Rational 
economic individuals are seen as constraining their greed only because 
each persori knows that the choice between any such collusive 
arrangement and the breakdown position is a matter of co-operation since 
the former is tiettér for both. [Sen, 1991 ;132]
Nor is it possible to prove that this is not the case. The possibility of altruism is purely 
hypothetical. Any action can be subsumed within the motive of self-interest by 
following the notion that love of self is ameliorated only by the need for the approval 
of others. Rawls has expressed this cynicism dearly:
What moves men are various interests, the desires for power, prestige, 
weaith and the like. Although they are dever at produdng moral 
arguments to support their daims, between one situation and another 
their opinions do not fit into a coherent conception of justice. Rather their 
views at any given time are occasionai pieces calculated to advance 
certain interests. [Rawls, 1972:386]
Thus the scarcity of resources can be viewed as endemic, owing to human greed. A 
less ego-centric construction, however can be placed on sodal and psychological 
needs:
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How selfish soever man may be supposed, there evidently some principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it. [Smith,1759:9]
If we take pleasure from the pleasures of others, synergy, and, by implication, 
adequacy are possible.
An interesting example of this might be the redistribution of food resources in the 
world. The planet apparently has sufficient resources to feed the present population, 
but the gross overconsumption of resource intensive food products in one part of the 
world distorts the opportunities of others to survive [Oxfam, 1995]. In this sense, it is 
clear that these resources could be considered adequate as easily as scarce, in a 
global context. Distribution is the problem; or, arguably, lack of motivation in the 
absence of maldistribution.
This is the crucial problem; to what extent are the concerns of others our concem too? 
One does not need to take the strong line of Singer, who felt no need to take account 
of proximity and distance in his moral calculus [Singer, 1987:24]. If we accept only 
that we have a less than infinite capacity for compassion, we are likely to remain more 
affected by immediate than by distant joy or misfortune. Nevertheless, a simple belief 
that one's own life is degraded by the avoidable misery of others and enriched by their 
innocent well-being is sufficient ground to argue for a re-distribution of global 
resources. Many now considered scarce could equally be considered adequate if they 
were differently distributed.
An interesting sidelight on this issue is raised by the prisoner's dilemma model, and a 
variant known as the Trucking Game. The most beneficial outcome for both
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participants is achieved when they co-operate. Under threat, however, there is an 
increased level of conflictuel behaviour [Deutsch and Krauss, 1965]. This reinforces 
the idea that a cynical view of human motivation is a self-fulfilling ontology. If others 
are a threat, we tend to get our retaliation in first. It seems reasonable to suggest, 
therefore, that where an economic view of rationality prevails, the evidence to support 
its premises will be created by the belief itself. For example, in free rider experiments, 
40% to 60% of most classes of participants resisted the temptation. The exception 
was economics graduates, of whom 80% took advantage of a free ride at the 
collective expense. [Marwell and Ames, 1981 cited in Etzioni, 1988:246].
Reciprocally, empathie behaviour might increase in those circumstances in which the 
potential consequences of selfless behaviour are evinced by practice.
That this perspective is the more comprehensive rationality in tenns of welfare and 
the satisfaction of needs is reinforced if a further notion relative to resources is 
accepted. This contention is that, especially in the case of human resources, there is a 
synergetic cycle, in which the total availability of a resource is not diminished by its 
use, but increased. To take a simple, intuitive example: where a friendly response 
predominates within a culture, the opportunities for reducing personal defensiveness 
creates a positive feedback cyde [Rogers, 1990a]. A less individualistic analysis might 
suggest that the understanding arid estimation of the self is rooted in the way we are 
constructed within a culture [Mead, 1943]. Since that culture is also a product of our 
behaviour, attitudes and expressions, it is easy to see how a positive environment can 
lead to esteem for the self as a member of a community, which reinforces the 
motivation to contribute positively to the positive environment.
Two important qualifications must be made. Firstly, that, at the individual level, 
synergy may be less evident. Being friendly can be exhausting. The contribution to a
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collective fund of goodwill, on the other hand, suggests that support from other 
sources will t)e regenerative. Secondiy, non-critical regard [Roger, 1990b] cannot be 
thought of as a universal panacea, at least if the arguments of writers such as Argyris 
and SchOn are given credence. Starting from the premise that human organisations 
need to adapt to changing circumstances, they have argued that organisational 
cultures can be hostile to open debate about change [Argyris, 1992]. A positive 
environment might therefore be seen as one in which mutual criticism is interpreted 
not as a personal challenge, but as an opportunity for mutual growth.
The case for synergetic resources is not entirely dependent on the acceptance of 
empathie benefits. Creativity seems to meet similar criteria, in that one individual's 
genius can readily be the trigger for productivity in another, if only by contributing to a 
culture in which the unconventional is recognised as a potential source of common 
benefit [Hudson, 1968].
The idea of synergy has a recursive function in relation to the constructs used here; 
the idea helps to explain why the idea is not always understood. The widespread 
perception of the world as a tiattleground between groups and individuals competing 
for scarce resources is a paradigm within which people may become locked. Within 
that context they will not experience synergy, yet prying people loose from this 
conception is not always a feasible strategy. Empathy can be denied. The resistance 
to the view that resources are adequate and synergetic as well as scarce is 
understandable, especially if the argument for self-fulfilling ontologies is accepted.
The importance of synergy is far-reaching, since, if satisfactions can be substituted, a 
rational cultural perspective might shift attention from intensive use of scarce 
resources towards those satisfactions which are derived from synergetic resources;
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but what evidence could persuade those who do not share this Weltanschauung 
remains a mystery.
A brief note on individualistic analysis
Using an argument which is strongly based on the importance of social relations, but 
which is also rooted in an apparently individualistic conception of needs may t>e seen 
as inconsistent. Since there is an appeal to systemic thought as well, an explanation 
may appear to be doubly necessary.
My response is threefold. Are there distinctive social emergents which are not evident 
in an holistic appreciation of the individual? What reasons are there for selecting a 
particular point on a hierarchy through which to enter an analysis? And can welfare be 
identified separately from individual experience?
To take each of these in turn: the relevance of systemic thought lies in the idea of 
emergents; if society is the whole, what characteristics does it have that are not 
evident in, or predictable from, the parts? Interestingly, Blau, who is not specifically a 
systemist, uses a similar perspective;
The basic social processes that govern associations among men have 
their roots in primitive psychological processes, such as those underlying 
the feelings of attraction between individuals and their desires for various 
kinds of rewards. .. The simpler social processes that can be observed in 
interpersonal associations and that rest directly on psychological 
dispositions give rise to more complex social processes that govern 
structures of interconnected social associations, such as the social 
organisation of a factory or the political relations in a community. New
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social forces emerge In the increasingly complex social structures that 
develop in societies, and these dynamic forces are quite removed from 
the ultimate psychological base of all social life. [Blau. 1967:20]
Among the emergents that Blau identifies at the level of macro-processes are the 
significance of value consensus, micro-macro articulation, and the development of 
enduring institutions.
This is not the place to examine in detail whether he is justified in making these 
assertions. Nevertheless, one could argue that while there are scalar differences in 
these respects, they do riot justify the term emergent. Individuals experience 
dissonance and conviction, fragmentation and integration, and continuity of identity 
[Rose and Mathews,1996]. The continuities, discontinuities, consistencies and 
discrepancies both within and between individuals makes the intemal life and social 
life to some extent isomorphic in this respect. Similarly, although language might 
seem to be a pure emergent [Wittgenstein, 1953], His so internalised that Its use 
becomes an essential aspect of any psychological investigation.
I remain unpersuaded that there are social emergents which are not echoed in any 
adequate understanding of the individual; though as to whether this is inevitable or 
not, I remain uncharacteristically diffident. At present, I tend to share the view of Doyal 
and Harris that socialisation ensures that the structures of the individual reflect the 
structuring of society. [Doyal and Harris, 1986:80 efseq.]
In the second place, that the whole may display emergent characteristics is no reason 
to ignore the components. Problems will arise, a systemist might argue, if one moves 
up the hierarchy of systems without recognising emergents, a notion I have no trouble 
endorsing; but the Idea that there is a particular point on the hierarchy from which one
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must always start would seem to require substantiation. Rather, as I have already 
suggested, our experience might be interpreted most effectively by reference to 
biological and personal variables as well as those which lie in the environment. For 
evidence, I would point to Marx's social analysis, which asserts that classes are 
historical phases in the development of production, and that the dass struggle must 
lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat [Marx,1968:379]; but the lack of 
substantiation of this thesis may owe quite a lot to a failure to attend to individual 
motivation within dass phenomena.
These are reasons for doubting the necessity of concentrating sodal analysis on the 
charaderistics of the group; to which may be added that the definition of the group is 
always to some extent arbitrary or culturally dependent, and that few of us are not 
influenced by our membership of several groups
A third aspect of my reasoning is semantic and ethical. This construction mirrors 
Ryle's didum on the self: sodety cannot intelligibly be said to exist independently of 
its constituent members. Built onto this is the ethical consideration. If we accept 
consequentialism and the Laingian experiential daim (that I cannot experience your 
experience), we cannot consistently argue that there is a sodal good which exists 
independently of the personal experience. To invert this thought is to recognise that 
the welfare of society is the welfare of its members, present or future, even if at times 
that implies that an individual benefit has to be subordinated to the colledive need. It 
is nd sodety, however, that must be given precedence, but the welfare of individual 
others, or, at times, those social phenomena on which others' welfare may depend.
Finally, I have not seen a case made to suggest that the scale of a sodal group does 
more than Intensify or ease the Influence of an emergent. In these drcumstances, to
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work from the individual to the group, in the awareness that there could be emergent 
variables, seems an appropriate mode of analysis.
Criteria for the assessment of ideologies
Selecting appropriate criteria to distinguish between ideologies is potentially an 
immensely difficult point.
Consider a political issue such as autonomy. On the one hand, Nozick and Hayek are 
amongst those who have presented the view that autonomy is the primary good 
[Nozick, 1968; Hayek, 1978]. On another hand, Hayek qualifed that view [ibid, 257], 
and Nozick repented it:
Democratic institutions and the liberties co-ordinate with them are not 
simply effective means towards controlling the powers of government and 
directing these towards matters of joint concern; they themselves express 
and symbolise.... our equal human dignity, our autonomy and powers of 
self-direction. [Nozick, 1989:354]
Islam's principal assertion, on the third hand, demands obedience to the will of Allah 
[Dawood,1974:5,7]; an ideal expressed in other forms by other religions. If without 
effort it is possible to list three such diverse views as the primacy of autonomy, a 
preference for social solidarity (Nozock's later works), and a recommendation of 
submission to holy will as focal criteria forjudging our behaviour, is there any 
conceivable set which will meet all cases?
Firstly, the aim is not to find a universal set. Mutual accommodation is all that can be 
expected. Secondly, the methodological criteria of validation to be applied to the
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ideological criteria have been set out; theoretical consistency, empirical evidence, and 
critical challenge.
Of the validation criteria, theoretical consistency can be met by demonstrating that the 
criteria selected here fit with the ontological, epistemological and ethical commitments 
that have been declared, and with each other. Empirical evidence and critical 
challenge are rather more difficult. The most useful validation (as opposed to 
legitimation or justification) may lie in the presentation of evidence that the criteria are 
seen as relevant by other ideologies, while also showing in which respects they 
diverge.
In checking for consistency, priority might be given to the ethical position; the question 
being discussed here is not what is, since this would be a positivist view, but what 
should be. Let consequential equity, then, be the starting point; and since it has been 
argued that the ideological criteria are inter-dependent, let its relationships provide the 
structure.
equity - sustainabil^. dearly if those who are yet to come are to be 
considered, sustainability is fundamental to any distribution of resources.
equity - diversity: the argument linking these two criteria has already been 
explored. In brief, where people have different and varying tastes, equity 
requires diversity. Sustainability is thus the maintenance of possibilities 
rather than the stock-piling of consumer durables.
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equity - productivity: the idea of productivity as it is used here should not be 
confused with an ever increasing value of market transactions. In this 
context, productivity relates to the whole set of needs. Equity is seen as an 
ethical principle; but practical reasoning endorses its significance. A 
perceived lack of equity can lead to destructive conflict. Schumacher's 
comments on right livelihood are also relevant, as they are indicative of the 
synergy of honest service [Schumacher, 1973:ch1 .IV].
Other relationships between the criteria also have to be considered within these
ethical parameters. Thus
productivity - sustainability: productivity is constrained by sustainability 
through the need to allocate scarce resources over time. A conceptuai shift 
towards those needs which are more readily met by synergetic resources 
may therefore be thought desirable. Accompanying this principle is the 
recognition that seemingly scarce resources could become adequate if the 
perceived, or persuaded, need for them could be diminished among those 
with most power to command them.
productivity - diversity, from all of the arguments above it will be evident 
that productivity is not seen here as open to measurement by either 
objective definition, or by aggregation of monetary exchanges. The 
contribution made by individuals, groups, or the whole set of humans can 
only be interpreted in terms of the diverse satisfactions that are 
experienced.
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To complete the set:
diversity - sustainability: one dear implication of this relationship is that 
diversity in our satisfactions is constrained. Sustainability creates limits on 
our choices. However, since this appears to be our lot in any case, the 
constraint merely adds to the incentive to seek responsible altematives to 
those satisfactions that we may intuitively conceive as necessary. The 
diversity of possible satisfactions which may be sought in the future suggest 
that sustainability is concemed with keeping options open, a prindple 
reflected in the now popular notion that biodiversity is in itself a resource. 
[United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,1992]. At 
the same time, the diversity of possible satisfactions creates opportunities, 
espedally in the use of synergetic resources.
This set of assumptions has already been summarised thus: if we are to have a 
collective aim, it will be to offérto each individual a fair chance to satisfy thet needs, 
across the wtiole range from spiritual to material, to whatever extent is possible 
wittiout preventing others from doing the same.
It is to be hoped that these elaborations help to show how the ideological criteria are 
consistent with this aim and with each other. If it also seems that they are in tension, 
this is not evidence of inconsistency. As was also stated earlier,
although the criteria can be dearly distinguished in theory, in practice 
they are aspects of an integrated experience. The components do not 
make sense as a description of colledive purpose except when each is 
considered in relation to each of the others; and we cannot compensate
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for a failure to meet one of the criteria through a greater success in 
meeting another of them.
The prohibition against substitution is a recognition that tensions between the criteria 
exists. However, in the ideological contextualisation that follows, these tensions 
appear to be represented either within other ideologies, or in their failures.
Mentioning the possibility of failure inevitably brings a second recurrent issue to the 
foreground. Success or failure in meeting the criteria, or in finding an appropriate 
equilibrium between them, is not, of course, thought to be objectively determined.
Some degree of intemal consistency has been demonstrated; but what happens when 
the set of ideological criteria is in contrast to the criteria associated with other models?
There will be no attempt to claim that all ideologies share the same set; to do so would 
be ludicrous. Even to attempt to list all those which are familiar would be problematic. 
Instead, some of the recently dominant ideologies are mapped in relation to the 
selected criteria. The ideologies that have been chosen are market ideology, liberal 
democracy, and Marxism. To demonstrate the flexibility of the set, the ethos of 
authoritarianism will also be considered.
Marxism
Marxism is, in theory, clearly in favour of equity. This Is one of the consistent elements 
Of traditonal and neo-Marxist thought. Albert and Hahnel [1978], for example, have 
shown how, in traditional Marxism, the materialist dialectic leads to an analysis of
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class exploitation through the appropriation of latx>ur surplus. However, they then go 
on to say that
In a sense we see capitalist institutions as potentially moldable to the 
point where all the contradictions emphasised in orthodox crisis theory 
can be perpetually postponed. But this is a fundamental dividing line 
between an historical materialist interpretation of Marx and a praxis 
oriented interpretation. [A)id:81]
Nevertheless, in the latter interpretation, the inequities of capitalist production 
continue to be a focal point, even if they are now seen as a consequence of the way in 
which people create themselves and are created by social conditions, rather than as 
determined by technological progress.
Sustainabililty in the Marxi^ analysis is more concemed with social stability than with 
environmental degradation. The traditional argument of capitalist decay has been 
recently expressed thus:
The strongest justification for world revolution today is that human kind is 
literally faced with the long-term dilemma: either World Socialist 
Federation or Death. [Mandel,1989:180]
Cardoso represents a more modem view, despite retaining an essentially Marxist 
analytic, though in his case it is intemational imperialism rather than dass conflict 
which lies at the core of his perception. The combination of desire for development 
with concem for environmental sustainability and doubts about the sustainability of the 
intemational order is compressed into a single statement:
The form of incorporation of the Amazon derives from an intemational 
oligopolistic economy which finds in the State (with all Its contradictions 
and conflicts) a basic supporter for rapid accumuiation. [Cardoso,
1980:126]
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The dependency theory of capitalist expansion reinforces the almost self-evident point 
that Marxism was concemed from its beginnings with productivity. In Frank's 
dependency arguments, capital accumulation was seen as having a determinant role 
in the wealth or poverty of nations, and all political activity lies in the dynamics of 
production and exchange. {Frank, 1978]. If this school is taken to represent a variation 
of orthodox Marxism [So, 1990:92], it retains the tools of its tradition, which seemed at 
times to be preoccupied with the cash nexus as a measure of productivity; 
the labour theory of value is not a metaphysical notion, despite the 
impossibility of empirically calculating values, for it expresses definite 
facts about material life. [Fine, 1989:10]
Perhaps this impression is over-rated by some. Marx expressed dear concerns for 
other values in his repugnance for commoditisation of human relations, even if many 
conventional Marxists tend to be overwhelmed by the possibility of achieving an 
objective sodal sdence [eg: Roxborough, 1979:1,59].
While the notion of objectivity has tended to become an embarassment to Marxists, so 
too has that of diversity and choice. The authoritarian tradition is well-expressed by 
Myrdal:
Successful economic planning with all its implications of conditioning and 
directing economic life - and indeed, the prior ability to reach operational 
agreements - requires a stable and effective, intemally united 
■ govemment, conditions of law and order, sodal disdpline, and more 
generally, national consolidation. [Myrdal, 1968:719]
Lenin would have been proud of him, if his argument for the subordinacy of each 
individual to the party is anything to go by. [Lenin, 1966].
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Neo-marxists, however, seem to have accepted the evidence that central planning is 
not the be all and end all. Given the changes in China [Goodman and Segal, 1989] 
and eastern Europe [Elnhom, 1993; Lewis,1995; Platteau, 1994] this would be hard to 
deny, and there is considerable doubt as to whether the centrally planned economy is 
fundamental to Marxism, or whether a more flexible conception is possible.
Many critics have argued that while capital planning may be effective 
where there is a single clearly defined aim to be achieved - for example, 
rapid industrialisation or the construction of a war economy, accompanied 
by severe constraints on individual consumption, choice of occupation, 
and so on, which are more or less willingly accepted or imposed upon the 
population in order to attain the goal - it is less effective in developing the 
production and distribution of the great range of consumer goods and 
services characteristic of a modem society. [Bottomore, 1990:64]
Clapham has endorsed this position, and also taken note that it is not merely a 
question of consumerism. The authority of the state has a cost to the individual which 
is often expressed in a form of alienation to which Marx did not refer [Clapham, 1992].
Nevertheless, the criteria chosen for the assessment of ideology are evidently 
relevant, at least, to Marxism. Equity and productivity are central to the story. 
Sustainability must be approached with a more dichotomous understanding. There is 
on the one hand the sustainability of the social form, and on the other of the biosphere 
on which it depends.
Sustainability was present in the original theory, in the view that crises in successive 
social anengements would work themselves out towards the emergence of an ideal 
communist state. If environmental sustainability was not given the same attention, it is 
worth noting that the issue was not at the forefront of thought at the time in Europe.
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That it is significant within the Weltanschauung is apparent from the attempts to 
integrate the theme in various forms of neo-Mandsm, such as that expressed by 
Cardoso.
A similar argument can be put forward for the relevance of diversity. While seemingly 
antipathetic to such a subjective notion, Marxism, which is far from monolithic, has 
had within its broad boundaries many who recognised and developed the more 
libertarian ideals implied in the Communist Manifesto: "Workers of the world unite; 
you have nothing to lose but your chains.” Gramsci displays this tendency as clearly 
as anyone:
If the relation between intellectuals and the people-nation, between 
leaders and led, is the result of an organic participation in which feelings 
and passion become understanding and thence knowledge. then and only 
then is the relationship one of representation. [Gramsci, 1977:102]
One might go further and suggest that the failure to be aware of these criteria for an 
ideology contributed to the current decline of Marxism. Any interpretation of the 
failures of the centrally planned economies would surely have to note, at least 
implicitly, the lack of diversity as a critical factor; which eventually led to the 
unsustainability of the system.
The criteria are thus at least not refuted by the Marxist experience; and market 
ideology offers, willy-nilly, much support for them.
Market ideology
In many ways this is an easier demonstration, in part because of the simplicity of the 
neo-classical argument. Little has changed since Smith wrote of the productMtyVnat 
could be achieved through the division of iabour, and of how the process of exchange
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ensured equity, since, thanks to the invisible hand, everyone would receive their 
deserts. In addition, since demand would call forth supply, that the butcher, the baker 
and the brewer would respond to the diversity of the wishes of the consumer [Smith, 
1976]. These themes of equity, diversity and productivity married by innate motivation 
has been echoed by Hayek [1960], Friedman [1973] and others, but the underlying 
logic remains unchanged. Whether the model bears sufficient relation to human 
experience to be an adequate ground for a practical ideology is another question 
which will be addressed later; but three of the criteria are evidently fundamental to the 
perspective.
Sustainabiiity is a more complex issue. The sustainability of the social systems in 
which the neo-classical doctrine has historically predominated has been impressive, 
and clearly a source of pride to its advocates. However, as long as market ideology 
remains embedded in compensatory mechanisms, as has been the case, the 
arguments for the self-destructiveness of the pure ideology remain. Fukoyama's 
triumphalist daim [Fukoyama, 1989] that history is at an end in the global supremacy 
of market based liberal democracies should not be taken to indicate that it is the 
market ideology in itself that has outlasted authoritarian communism. Indeed, market 
democracy, in the constraints and compensation with which it hedges the market, may 
be seen to represent an underdeveloped co-operative form, rather than a market 
ideology.
The environmental consequences are altogether another matter. Strictly within the 
free market model, resources are allocated according to the willingness to pay for 
them. This creates a set of difficulties associated with the perceived individualistic 
rationality of extemalising costs, and the high transaction costs of ensuring that they 
are appropriately allocated. At the extreme, where there is a public good with very
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diffuse benefits, the market is extraordinarily inefficient. The economistic view of this 
is expressed by Barbier, in his concem that
pervasive and cumulative environmental degradation [could lead\ to an 
absolute constraint if eco-systems are destabilised and essentially 
collapse. [Barbier,1989:113]
The response has been to recognise this limitation of the free market, so that the 
ideology becomes more accommodating of intervention.
The overall message of this book is that if sustainability of the ecological 
processes underlying economic activity is recognised to have value, then 
sustainability must be explicity included as one of the objectives to be 
pursued by economic policy makers and planners. [Barbier, 1989:205]
A variety of techniques for accomplishing this objective have been devised, many of 
them discussed in books such as Blueprint for a Green Planet [Pearce et a/,1989]. The 
limitations of this perspective have already been discussed [page 167]. Of more 
immediate concem is the observation that the free market ideology has been forced to 
incorporate environmental sustainability as a criterion, even though it acts as a 
constraint on the free market's paradigmatic interpretation of equity, diversity and 
productivity [Levidow ef a/,1996;Collins and Eamshaw,1992;ln^n and 
Vergracht,1989;Groenwegen and Vergragt.1991].
Liberal democracy
Dunleavy has distinguished between three essentially pluralist positions within the 
llt)eral democratic debate. Liberal anti-pluralism is very similar to the neo-classical, 
free market position outlined atx>ve, distinguished by the extent to which the market is 
seen as an adequate mechanism for allocation of resources, and the limited range of
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transactions or social parameters wtiicti necessarily fall outside its scope. Nor is ttiere 
a precise tx>undary t>etween Dunleav/s ottier categories wittiin ttie litieral democratic 
taxonomy. Conventional and neo-pluralist liberal democracy differ only in ttie extent to 
which citizen rights are represented through the democratic state as opposed to the 
need for specific interest groups. [Dunleavy, 1981:200].
Each of these latter categories can be traced to the idea of a social contract: 
an agreement between individuals, or between individuals and a 
governing power, in which some personal liberties are freely surrendered 
in return for the advaritages of having a well-organised society, or good 
govemment. [Flew, 1979:328]
An element of sophistication, leading to pluralism, is evident when
the political system also offered to all members of society extra chances 
to influence the state through any groups they cared to join or create for 
themselves. Moreover, when such groups competed for the ear of 
govemment, the competition was seen as essentially fair - in that a 
group's influence might depend not so much on its wealth and resources, 
but on the commitment of its members, their organisational ability and the 
strength of their arguments. [Bradshaw, 1986:75 see also McCarthy,
1983:212]
Clearly, then, the principle of equity is embedded in the various forms of liberal 
democracy, though it is intended to operate through political rather than economic 
mechanisms.
ProauctMty is recognised in the accountability of the state for the welfare of the 
citizens. The conventional democrat would probably argue that the vote offers 
adequate responsiveness to diverse wishes. Pluralism is an attempt to accommodate
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diversity beyond the democratic principle of majority rule, which can also be 
interpreted as the denial of minorities. SustainabiPty of the social system is supposedly 
inherent in the adaptation of the state to the expressed concerns of the citizens who 
comprise it.
Environmental sustainability may then be seen as a constraint, as with Marxism and 
neo-classical theory, or as a consequence of pluralist pressure. The operation of the 
intemational polity can reasonably be classified as a liberal pluralist democracy^, and 
the Earth Summit held in Rio in 1995 demonstrated the place of environmentalism on 
the intemational agenda, as did indeed the earlier Brundtland report [Brundtland ef a/, 
1987].
Thus it would appear that the four criteria - equity, productivity, sustainability and 
diversity -are largely shared among ideologies. Should this be taken to indicate that 
they are appropriate to the analysis of ideologies, or that they are too nebulous to 
have any practical significance?
If one considers the case of authoritarian ideologies, the critieria do not appear 
completely lacking in discrimination. An authoritarian elitist might claim that their 
ideology is equitable because there are genuine, intuitively assessed differences in the 
essential merit of different sectors of society. Sustainability of the system may be seen 
as appropriate to the natural order, and of the environment to continue the benefits to 
the elite; and restricting the Isenefits of producdon to a few creates fewer strains on the 
environment. However, although diversity may be one of those benefits for the 
privileged, H Is a luxury not accorded to those whose role is defined in terms of
3 Of course, it is no closer to perfection than any other manifestation of democracy; 
but the principal intemational organisations tend to present themselves as committed 
to democratic ideals.
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servitude, either to god or to the elite. Authoritarian elitism does not, therefore, meet 
the interactive criteria that have been set out in the co-operative rationale.
This seems to illustrate quite well that the criteria, despite the apparent convergence 
amongst the popular ideologies discussed above, are neither universal nor trivial. 
Whether they are adequate is, of course, open to debate; but, where theory is 
habitually underdetermined, any pretence of universality should be a cause for 
suspicion. The ideological criteria - equity, sustainability, productivity, and diversity - 
would appear to be validated by reference to the methodological criteria; that is, in 
terms of theoretical consistency, and in the combination of intelligibility in the face of 
critical challenge with the evidence that they are shared concems.
Circumstantial conflicts of interest
Common usage often contrasts competition and co-operation in ways that lead to 
bafflement and confusion. To compete, as it is understood here, is to have different 
objectives and interests, while to co-operate is to work together. It is therefore quite 
feasible to compete and co-operate simultaneously.
One way of approaching the issue is to distinguish between circumstance and 
response. The circumstances do not dictate which class of response is evoked. 
Circumstances may be seen as a continuum between complete mutuality of interests 
and a zero sum game in which my gain is automatically your loss. Responses to 
these circumstances vary between the co-operative and the aggressive; t>ut it is 
important to note that competition can readily be seen in this scheme as a form of 
regulative co-operation in response to some degree of conflict of interests.
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mutuality
CIRCUMSTANCES
conflict of interests 
zero sum game
RESPONSE
co-operative aggressive
To elatx)rate a little on this: when co-operation is a response to an identity of 
interests, it may be called intuitive. A further point, which will be dealt with more fully 
a little later, is that our apprehension of shared interests may be achieved through 
negotiation, but can then t>ecome an unqualified gestalt. Any other than a co­
operative response to such circumstances would seem to be perverse. This is not to 
suggest that the gestalt encompasses all purposes and all times. Within its boundary, 
however, there is a mutual conception of an identity of interests.
As interests diverge, it might be thought that co-operation must cease. Indeed, the
contrasting of the terms rnay make it difficult to realise that co-operation can persist
when the drcum^ances are conflictual, but, as has been suggested this is clearly not
the case. The tendency, engendered by their linguistic opposition, to see competition
and co-operation as mutually exclusive, fails to recognise that it is only in the zero
sum game that mutuaiity entirely ceases. In all other cases, there is at least a shared
interest in regulating the response to the conflicting interests. To repeat Sen's
' * ■ . '  • 
formulation, where there is less than perfect mutuality, each person knows that the
choice between any such collusive arrangement and the breakdown position is a
matter of cooperation since the former is better for both. [Sen, 1991:132]
page190
Except in extreme circumstances, ttien, co-operation is a matter of agreed rules.
First order competition persists, txit constrained wittiin second order co-operation: that 
is. people will work together to negotiate rules within which different interests can be 
accommodated.
A further distinction and a clarification are required. The distinction is this: within this 
framework, co-operation is distinguished from co-ordination, by assigning to the 
former term voluntary acquiescence, while the latter is seen as the whole set of 
behaviours in which everyone follows a set of rules.
The clarification that is required relates to the three-level ordering. At the first level, 
circumstances may be practically competitive, but co-operation may be the 
appropriate second level response. At the second level, by implication, the setting of 
the rules will t>e competitive, since they will affect the first level outcomes. Once 
again, however, a co-operative response may be possible, in that there could be a 
shared interest in the rules governing the first level being equitably negotiated. All 
stakeholders' interests are recognised in setting the boundaries of conflictual 
behaviour. Obviously, since the first order conflict persists, this implies the need for 
third-order rules on how to set the second-order rules, and an infinite regression 
looms.
This is, however, quite consistent with the sceptical position. There is no ultimate 
reference point. On the other hand, the slide into nihilism is restrained by pragmatism 
in the philosophy espoused here, and pragmatism suggests that the regression be 
halted before confusion sets in. Hence, where intuitive cooperation is not a feasible 
response, a second-level of co-operation is identified as regulative cooperation; and
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the process of setting the rules so that all people's interests are recognised may be 
described as procedural co-operation.
An Idea which emerged from the field work is also quite helpful in this setting. Many 
respondents spoke of the idea of agreeing to agree. This, in my conception, is the 
last term of any regression; the n  ^level. In between one may subdivide the 
continuum into any number of hierarchies that is convenient; and for the purposes of 
the paradigm I have chosen to use three levels.
It may be useful at this point to explore the ideas a little further. In particular, there 
seems to be some usefulness in identifying a third dimension to be added to the 
dimensions of circumstance and response. This would be the degree of empathy that 
obtains between actors. In this context it might best be considered a parameter; that 
is, a variable which may be taken as a constant for the cases immediately under 
corisideration. To contextualise this thought further at any given moment in any 
given cultural set, the degree of intemalisation of others’ needs may not be open to 
great variation, but is nevertheless potentially a variable.
circumstances
T
responses
Degree of empathy
Clearly the variatrles represented by these dimensions are interdependent, so that the 
cube may be thought to contain volumes of higher or lower probability: an interesting
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idea, but not, unfortunately one that can be explored as part of the present 
endeavour.
Let the argument above be considered a claim of consistency: that the argument 
confortns to a widely accepted notion of rationality. In addition, I hope to show that it is 
supported by parallel constructs in others people's perspectives, since contextualising 
the intelligibility and resilience of the theory is the other requirement of its validation.
Some allies are easy to identify. For example, one of the analytic tools that Ostrom 
[1990] uses reflects the three orders of co-operation discussed in this paper. First 
order co-operation is described as operational; second order co-operation appears to 
equate to her collective choice rules, with third order co-operation matched with 
constitutional rules.
Support Is also available from the political perspectives examined earlier for their 
relevance to the ideological criteria. Market theory assumes that intuitive co-operation 
is minimal, except in the domestic domain. Regulative co-operation is expressed in 
the constraints placed on transactions; essentially, that outright deception and the use 
offeree are forbidden. Procedural co-operation is seen as superfluous, since objective 
analysis of the market mechanism defines the rules that are in everyone's best 
interests. The overlap with liberal democracy is again evident, however, in that those 
transactions which are recognised as being beyond the market's scope are similarly to 
be managed by some form of procedural co-operation.
Liberal democracy is in itself an attempt to identify processes that reify the 
legitimation implicit to the social contract; a set of guidelines for procedural co­
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operation. Marxism is in many respects a critique of ttiose failures. Gramsci and Altiert 
and Hatinel have already t)een used to illustrate how the authoritarian and determinist 
strains in traditional Marxism have largely given way to a recognition that the 
definition of appropriate rules is to t>e negotiated rather than imposed. This tielief is 
somewhat complicated by the idea of false consciousness:
...submerged in reality, the oppressed cannot perceive clearly the order' 
which serves the interests of the oppressors whose image they have 
intemalised. [Freire, 1972:38]
Procedural co-operation may then be subject to a critique by an elite, which has been 
challenged in the earlier discussion of the critical movement.
Foucault might be more associated with the present model. To repeat:
While Habermas acknowledges a bifurcation of reason, that since it only 
occurred once can be rectified, Foucault assumes that reason is in a 
constant process of bifurcation in some way or another. [Valero- 
Silva,1995:188]
Thus, while the structuring of our relations is central to Foucauvian thought, there is no 
assumption that a single rationality can expose a point of equivalence of power.
To relate these positions to the construct developed here, procedural co-operation 
might be seen in both the Habermasian and Foucauvian constructions. For the sake of 
contrast, let us take Habermas as represented in the positivist critical perspective. In 
such a case, there would be an elite operating at a fourth level, at which the rules for 
identifying procedural co-operation were interpreted, but a fifth level, criticising their 
analysis, would be unnecessary. Foucault's concem could then be reasonably 
portrayed as being at this fourth level, given his interest in the techniques of analysing 
procedural co-operation. However, unlike critical positivism, this analysis would
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include an acknowledgement of the infinite regression. Derrida might be seen as 
circling to and fro along the further reaches of the regression, without ever quite 
linking these to the levels described here as regulative and procedural co-operation.
In answer to a question put to him, some years ago, whether, "the 
theoretical radicality of deconstruction can t>e translated into a radical 
political praxis," he admitted that he had never succeeded in relating its 
method to "existing political codes and programmes." [Sham Lai, 1995]
By contrast, the crude authoritarianism which was briefly discussed in the previous 
section never gets beyond the second level.
More difficult, in some ways, than contextualising the stratification of co-operation is 
its contextualisation with other notions of co-operation. This is in part because they 
tend to rely on contrasts between co-operation and competition that are incompatit>le 
with those which emerge from this set of constructions. You may recall that 
Gompetition is understood here to refer to attempts to resolve circumstantial conflicts 
of interests through second order, and preferably third order co-operative responses.
Definitional nuances such as these often seem to cause problems, perhaps because 
much of the work on the conceptualisation of co-operation emerges from sociology 
rather than from philosophy. Some respond to the difficulties by becoming virtually 
atheoretlcal; Paton, for example, asserts that co-operation is what co-operatives do 
[Paton, 1978]. This must surely be seen as a questionable reduction, but other 
constructions have a broader application.
Keller has drawn attention to the gendering of competition as a masculine recognition 
of hard realities, while women grow sentimental over harmony and co-operation 
[Keller,1992:52]; t)ut although this may be a useful insight into the connotations of
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usage, gender analysis is only one aspect of ttie macro-political economic analysis on 
whicti ttie focus rests tiere [Rictiards, 1982:25]. Keller also refers to Kropotkin, whose 
evolutionary approach inverted that of Darwin by rooting adaptive success in mutual 
aid [Kropotkin, 1902]; and to Ghiselin who claimed that
No hint of genuine charity ameliorates our vision of society, once 
sentimentalism has been laid aside. What passes for co-operation turns 
out to be a mixture of opportunism and exploitation...[Ghiselin, cited in 
Keller,1992:48]
Perhaps each of these contrary views could tie interpreted in terms of regulative and 
procedural co-operation, whereby a win/lose confrontation can be converted to a 
win/win game either immediately or in the longer term, or at least minimise the losses 
by reducing wasteful aggression. If Ghiselin chooses to view such processes as 
opportunism and exploitation, that is surely his loss.
Regretably not all analyses oan be aceommodated by the paradigm that has been 
constructed here. Craig, for example, attempts to deal with many of the same issues 
[Craig,1993:§2], but does not do so in a way that I find intelligible. We would agree 
that conflict does not always oppose co-operation. However, he then goes on to quote 
Coser approvingly:
Social conflict may be defined as a struggle over values or claims to 
status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting 
parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralise, injwe 
or eliminate their rivals. [Coser,1968:232 my emphasis]
Define terms as you will; but to assert this and then to daim that co-operation can 
coexist with conflict seems utterly inconsistent to me. How do you co-operate with 
someone who is trying to injure and eliminate you in pursuit of their particular interest? 
Craig also characterises the commitment to achievement of a goal combined with
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disagreement over ends and means as one of simultaneous high conflict and high co­
operation. Is it not simpler and more constructive to make use of the categorial 
distinction between circumstance and response?
Again, Craig defines competition as a sub-type of conflict; well and good: tHJt he then 
goes on to claim that competition implies a win-lose situtation. His example is that of 
sports teams, which are seen to co-operate amongst themselves, but compete with 
each other. This is not inconsistent; but a richer analysis might emerge from the 
recognition of sports as a simple example of regulative co-operation, which allows 
partially inconsistent interests to be managed for mutual benefit. (Procedural co­
operation is implied if the involvement in the games is taken to include a voluntary 
acceptance of the rules.) In competitive sports, although you may not get everything 
you want, you will either gain enough from the process to feel that overall you are 
benefitting by continuing, or you, and others, can benefit by the assertive process of 
discovering what you are good at.
While Craig's analysis leaves me dissatisfied, Etzloni's model of communitarianism is 
more entertaining, in that it shares many features with the rationale offered here, while 
diverging in one very important respect. The similarity is most apparent in terms of a 
tri-partite analysis and the doubts expressed about the rationality of the free market. 
However, when the relationship between coercion and co-operation is considered, 
some doubts arise about the implications of Etzioni's deontological moral 
commitments.
To take the areas of correspondence first; Etzioni's I, We, & They formulation bears a 
clear relation to the rationalities of the market, of co-operation, and of coercion 
[Etzioni,1968:27]. The co-operative paradigm is reflected in Etzioni's view of the
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market as ultimately self-destructive; of competition as constrained conflict; of the 
importance of tmst; of the role of participation in social construction; and of the 
potential social tienefrts of competition [Etzioni,1988:250,182,138,7,203].
It is when the role of an elite comes into focus that a significant element of dissonance 
may tiecome evident. Amongst the straws in the wind are the perceived need for a 
controlling overlayer without which, it is asserted, "a societal grouping ...will be unable 
to assume an active stance" [Etzioni,1968:74,107]; the implication that a certain fomn 
of socialisation is a pre-condition of participation - "society requires a balance, and 
builds on properly socialised individuals" [Etzioni, 1988:11]; and most particularly in 
the devotion to the deontological position that "actions are morally right when they 
conform to a relevant principle or duty." [Etzioni,1988:12, emphasis in the original\
Clearly there is a difference in the moral ground between the arguments of Etzioni and 
myself; but in what sutistantive way is this different from the notion of a co-operative 
self-management qualified by a recognition that coercion may at times be 
inescapable? If there is a difference, it would seem to lie at the implicit fourth level of 
co-operation, the roie of which is to assess the third level [procedural co-operation.] in 
the co-operative paradigm, the nth level is conceived as being as open to access as is 
possible. In Etzioni's model the nth level appears to be a self-perpetuating assimiiative 
process, from which permission to participate at the level of procedure is determined. 
Deontology positions moraiity as an exogenous phenomenon, and therefore 
potentially attributable to an authority beyond the opinions of equal members of 
society. Whether that authority acts through deontoiogists or through social scientists, 
it may be seen to over-ride the communitarian commitment to participation. Granted, 
Etzioni argues that we have a responsibility to explore
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the sources of these goals: to what extent are they formed freely by 
memt)ers of a community or imposed by powerful actors, whether it is the 
government, a foreign power, a corporation, or a labor union? [Etzioni, 
1988:136 emphasis in original.]
However, Etzioni also seems to assign ultimate judgement on the propriety of 
procedure to some selectively accessible authority.
We cannot escape judging goals, not in simple terms of according them 
merit and demerit points based on our personal preferences or values, 
but in terms of an ethic whose criteria can be justified.... [Etzioni,
1988:136 emphasis in original; the mode of iustification is not made 
expliciti
Is this sufficient to validate the suspicion that Etzioni's model is primarily exclusive; 
that membership of the community is not innate, but approved in relation to definitive 
standards that are the special province of a moral or intellectual elite? On the other 
hand, can it be denied that, although the co-operative presumption is of inclusion in 
the community, children will be expected to leam a measure of social responsibility 
before they become full members?
If there is a difference, then, it would seem to be derived from the difference in moral 
commitments; and it is here that Etzioni's arguments may be thought to lack rigour. 
His representation of deontology is highly dependent on the rejection of utilitarianism; 
but in the course of this project he is highly selective about the form of 
consequentialism he reports, and does little more than repeat the traditional 
objections.
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He claims that no significance Is attached to intentionality [Etzioni,1988:12]; and while 
it may be possible to find utilitarians who adopt this position, consequentialism has 
already been shown to deal with the issue. He repeats a form of Ross's 
misrepresentation [ibkt^Z], by assuming that consequentialists give no moral 
weighting to transgressions such as deceptions. Similarly, he appears to believe that, 
to a consequentialist, all means are justified by the ends they serve [ibid:24]-, which 
could only be the case in the unimaginable circumstance in which a means had no 
intrinsic moral consequences.
His major objection, however, seems to t>e that consequentialism encourages us to 
treat others as means to our own ends [Etzioni,1988:12,244]. Given that probably the 
most familiar aspect of utilitarianism is that we should seek the greatest good of the 
greatest number, this denial of the interpersonal element of consequentialism is 
curious to say the least. Possibly he is too ready to conflate consequentialism with the 
most reductive forms of market rationalism to add emotive appeal to his deontology. 
What makes this conflation yet stranger Is that Etzioni is dearly aware of the ideas of 
"interdependent utility":
All we have to suppose Is that the perception of one party. A, of the 
welfare of the other, B, is a variable in A's utility function such that when 
A perceives that B is better off, A's utility value rises. [Boulding, 1981:6 À 
preface to Grant's Economics: The Economy of Love and Fear cited in 
Etzioni,1988:26]
Surely In this light, Etzioni is not justified in arguing that
Ethically, the l-utlllty concept remains true to the hedonistic version or 
utilitarianism; altruistic acts are explained by the actor's pleasure;
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authentic, altruistic acts, acts of self-denial or sacrifice are incompatible 
with this concept. [/b/d:26]
What Boulding is describing is the win/win possibility that arises from empathy, and 
which encompasses acts of the highest altruism. Wherein lies the benefit of insisting 
that an act that can arise from love should only be performed out of a sense of duty?
The only conclusion that I find in any way convincing is that Etzioni is struggling to 
maintain a necessary distinction between the fulfilment of duty {affkrmation) and 
pleasure {satisfaction -hedonism) in order to validate deontology, and hence authority. 
There is no need to detail his assertions, since they simply iterate the notion that the 
two value sets are not reducible to a common factor [Etzioni, 1988:12,21,22,23,26]. 
However, he then proceeds to cut away the foundations of his argument, by asserting 
that
 we shall see that people seek a ba/a/ice between their moral
commitments and their pleasures (a judicious mix) rather than seeking to 
maximise' either. [Etzioni, 1988:67]
Surely a balance between incomparable entities is unintelligible, ipso facto, if you 
claim a balance on empirical evidence, you concede commensurability; and why this 
should not be described as utility is in no way made apparent. Furthermore, Etzioni's 
recommendation of the intemalisation of norms [1988:45], would also seem to suggest 
that the distinction between affirmation and satisfaction is contingent, not absolute.
Scepticism is further encouraged by the strangeness of the methodological argument 
[Etzioni, 1988:21-31]. One element in his opposition to the commensurability of values 
Is that
page 201
Once a concept is defined so that it encompasses alt the incidents that 
are members of a given category.... it ceases to enhance one's ability to 
explain. [ibid:27]
I find this is an extraordinary comment. Firstly, the memlsers of a given category are 
necessarily encompassed by the definition. That is what makes them members of it. 
Secondly, a category identifies at least one common characteristic of its members; 
and does not the distinction between all the members of the set squares and all the 
members of the set circ/es enhance our ability to explain shapes? Similarly, does not 
the distinction between all members of the set ublity and all members of the set 
disutility enhance our ability to explain behaviour? [cf: Adams-Webber,1979:5-11]
To say that we achieve greater explanatory power by creating further distinctions, as 
he does, seems neither controversial nor relevant. Not all members of the set squares 
are blue squares, but this cannot be taken to infer that blue squares and red squares 
are not both squares. Affirmation may be distinguishable from satisfaction - as Sen 
argues, intellectually motivated compassion can be distinguished from empathie 
compassion [Sen,1977:326]; but if we are able to balance them, we clearly experience 
them as sharing at least one characteristic.
The methodological assault on consequentialism is, therefore, of very doubtful value. 
Etzioni's deontology seems simply to emphasise a particular aspect of 
consequentialism, and to seek, unconvincingly, to make the part the whole. Why 
should he do this? I have no other explanation than this: while interper^nal 
consequentialism is endogenous, deontology may be based on an exogenous 
morality, which allows for an elite which allows or denies membership of the 
community according to understandings which are not universally accessible. Only in 
implementation, perhaps, would it be possible to detect whether my doubts simply
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represent esoteric pedantry, or an area in which practical accommodation might be 
hard to achieve.
Either way, in the context of validation, such theoretical dissonance is not prohibitive. 
Empirical evidence, as has been argued, is difficult to produce in these circumstances, 
because of complexity and counterfactuality, and because the rationale of co­
operation proposed here has not been used as a conceptual intervention. All that can 
be achieved is to show that the paradigm intersects with other models which have 
been accorded a fair degree of status by the academic community.
Consistency may thus be claimed for the relationship between competition and co­
operation, and critical challenge has tested the limits of assurance of the construction.
Tripartite divisions: co-operation, coercion and the market
Dichotomies have a poor reputation in some quarters; justifiably so, if they are 
abused. The simplistic allocation of gender attributes has demonstrated this amply 
[Keller, 1992]. Nevertheless, if we are to differentiate at all, we cannot escape the 
creation of boundaries between that category to which we attribute a characteristic, 
and all those phenomena which do not share that characteristic.
The boundaries may have qualities of their own, such as flexibility, porousness, and 
depth. From depth of boundaries can be infemed the continuum and the included 
middle [McNeil and Jaros,1966]. By cross-referencing categories we create various 
other forms of set, by cross-referencing series we create grids, and by cross- 
referencing continua, we create spaces, which can be multiplied by other dimensions.
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It Is in such a semantic context that the three types of dynamic used in this analysis - 
co-operation, coercion and the market - have t>een selected. Because of the 
grounding of this paradigm in an ontology of transformation and transaction, the 
manner in which transactions (or exchanges, or processes of entitlement) are 
undertaken is necessarily crucial to the development of the ideological paradigm. One 
distinction t)etween modes of transaction lies t>etween those to which all parties agree, 
and those in which some transaction is imposed.
There is no supposition that the tx)undary t>etween voluntary and involuntary 
t>ehaviour is at)solute, or that we have a reliable means of telling one from another. 
Theory tells us that our differentiations are simply a convenience. Nevertheless, we 
can distinguish between the idea of seeking to act according to our own conception of 
our preferences, and being pressured to conform to someone else's. The distinction is 
Intelligible in most language games, it would seem, even if a deontological culture 
might put different moral loadings on the components to those suggested, for 
example, by those who favour autonomy.
However, because of an awareness that abstract simplicity can easily become 
simplistic, an inductive critique seems appropriate. From this one may deduce 
altematives to the ontological context which juxtaposes co-operation and coercion. In 
particular, in the co-operation/coercion dichotomy there is an implicit assumption that 
in attempting to respond to transformation and transaction we have only forms of 
persuasion ranging from the empathie to the coercive. This ignores exogenous 
mechanisms; ways of arranging matters which are due to some natural or supematural 
order. Supematural authority does not fall within the set of commitments adopted 
here; and without wishing to offend those who sincerely believe themselves
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acquainted with the will of such a source, familiarity with the word of god is seen as an 
illusion which is reducible to a predominantly coercive practice.
From another point of view, there are attractions in the idea of inherent relationships 
between phenomena, of which we can take advantage. All technology, it might be 
claimed, is based on such processes. Amongst exogenous social mechanisms, that 
which seems to have been most evidently reified in social practice as a mode of 
transaction, is the market.
On what grounds might one make the claim that it is distinct, rather than a "transient 
and expedient amalgam" [Streeck and Schmitter, 1985:2] of the other two dynamics? I 
would argue the case on two grounds. Firstly, that analysts seem to have found it to 
be persistently and consistently useful in the interpretation of social forms; and, 
secondly, and to me more importantly, the market may be differentiated as a mode of 
transaction. Whereas, in their purest forms, co-operative transactions are 
characterised by an unconditional mutuality, and coercive transactions by the imposed 
distribution of interpersonal irresponsibility, market transactions are characterised by 
calculative reciprocity. (Another fomn in which this could be expressed might be to 
describe the rriodes of transaction as, respectively, moral, immoral, and amoral.)
There are secondary characteristics of market transactions which contribute to their 
differentiation. Part of the logic of calculative reciprocity involves the synergy of the 
division of labour. Specialisation and exchange suggests a need to invent a medium 
of exchange, a store of wealth, and a unit of comparison - to wit, money. These 
characteristics are, however, readily Imaginable as aspects of co-operative or coercive 
societies, even if they would appear with a different complexion. Indeed, the
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distinction made t>etween market institutions and market ideology has already 
emphasised this point.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the ideology based on calculative reciprocity may be 
viewed as a distinct variable, ultimately irreducible to coercion (imposed distribution) 
or co-operation (unconditional mutuality), or to a combination of the two. In summary: 
the ontology of transformation and transaction leads to an analysis in terms of the 
clearly distinguishable dynamics of co-operation, coercion, and the market.
Is this argument enough to meet the criterion of theoretical consistency? Lessons 
have been leamed from some perceived failures of other approaches. Particularly 
useful has been a confrontation with Streeck and Schmitter's argument for a 
quadripartite analysis. A little later the suggestion will be made that, as valuatHe as 
their ideas may be in many respects, they are not well supported methodologically; but 
the wish to support this perspective has forced me to examine the basis of my model 
with greater rigour. There can be considerable benefits in banging ideas up against 
each other until they squeal.
Other contrasts have been less constructive, even if they have been useful in drawing 
attention to potential failures of consistency. Unsurprisingly transcendence makes an. 
appearance. Jefferis walks into this one, being able to recognise the individualism 
from which neo-classical economics is derived as a partial view, but remaining 
convinced that the mode of production is the true basis for distinguishing one society 
from another [Jefferis, 1988:17]. Others "cannot penetrate appearances to the reality 
of exploitation" [ibktAS], but implicitly Jefferis can.
Consistency, in these circumstances, is, however, difficult to assess as a criterion. Is a 
theoretically incoherent or inconsistent paradigm necessarily less likely to meet the
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superordinate criterion of utility than one which is consistent? Given that assessments 
of utility are likely to be plagued by complexity and counterfactuality, one's answer 
seems likely to depend on one's faith in the value of academic validation; but, willy- 
nilly, that is the game we are playing.
Be that as it may. and for what it is worth, a contextualisation of the tri-partite analysis 
of the co-operative paradigm is the next stage of the process; and, thankfully, I 
acknowledge that Uphoff [1993:610 ef seq\ has already done much of the work by 
juxtaposing a set of comparable models.
He refers, for example, to Hunter's model for the modernisation of peasant societies 
[Hunter, 1969], in which the first sector is described as bureaucracy, involving forced 
compliance; the second sector refers to market mechanisms in which "decisions are 
left to individuals to calculate without reference to broader interests or the public good" 
[Uphoff, 1993:610]; and the third sector which operates through voluntaristic 
mechanisms such as bargaining, accommodation and discussions. Despite minor 
differences in boundary selection, this is clearly a replica of the model used here, 
even to the assumption that
These different methods of seeking and gaining compliance can be, and 
indeed should be, combined to compose an overall strategy of rural 
development. [Akf:610]
Others have shared this conception, in a variety of fields. Uphoff reports a variety of 
consistent typologies: Etzioni's coercive, remunerative, and normative categories; 
French and Raven's coercive power, reward power, and referent power; and 
Boulding's threat systems, exchange systems, and integrative systems. Galbraith's 
taxonomy matches slightly less well, although conditioning is coercive, and the
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compensatory and condign dynamics seem to describe the tension between empathie 
voluntarism and individualistic market rationality, even if they do so from a slightly 
different perspective. Interestingly, moving into the realms of behavioural science, 
there seem to be approximate isopmorphs of the tripartite model used here. 
Hirschman, cited in Uphoff, talks of exit, which is a threat of leaving, voice, 
representing exchange, and toyaity, representing a recognition of interdependent 
utility.
EXIT VOICE LOYALTY
COERCION EXCHANGE CO-OPERATION
There are other sources of support. Michelson [1994:17] has drawn attention to the 
Dalberg-Larsen distinctions between public-, market- and self-regulation as legal 
forms. Hodgson [1984] argues for an impurity principle, in which a functional 
democracy is understood to be constituted by a viable equilibrium achieved between 
planning, markets, and participation.
A note of caution might not go amiss, despite the apparent consensus. We could all 
be chasing each other round in circles, and there would be no unequivocal evidence to 
demonstrate the futility of our conservatism.
Of course, just as Galbraith's analysis seems to cover the same territory without 
exactly reproducing the same map, there are others who have offered variants on 
what seems to be essentially the same intuition of social organisation. Burrell and 
Morgan's map of social theory offers, on one axis, consensus/regulation to 
conflict/radical change, and, on the other, subjective or objective epistemologies. 
[Burrell and Morgan, 1979]
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subjective objective
consensus / regulation
conflict /  radical change
To me this appears to use familiar elements, but to arrange them in ways that calls 
into question any degree of shared semantic reference. For example, by combining 
[inter-] subjectivity and consensuality, one might achieve something like voluntarism; 
but why should regulation be confined to this end of the continuum, when regulation 
can so evidently also be a product or cause of conflict, or, indeed, of an objective 
epistemology, which appears on the other axis; and why should radical change be 
opposed to consensuality, out of which it can arise? Comparing this model with the 
Uphoff analysis calls for a new descriptive term, and it will be labelled Escherian 
isomorphism, which may be defined as the sensation one has when familiar entities 
assume unfamiliar relationships and behaviours.
Streeck and Schmitter, on the other hand, appear, at first blush, to share the 
Uphoff/Hunter model, even though they suggest that there is a missing element They 
quite reasonably draw attention to the difficulties of devising theories of social order, 
and to the tendency
1] to reduce actors to ideal types;
2] to assume that interaction will lead to equilibrium;
3] to assume that behaviour is mutually adjusted and predictable;
page 209
4] and to believe that the particular metaphor is empirically correct and normatively 
proper [Streeck and Schmitter, 1985:1].
Somewhat confusingly, although these characteristics appear to be postulated as 
dangers, they subsequently seem to become the criteria for Streeck and Schmitter's 
own addition to the taxonomy of community, market and state, which is association.
Quite explicitly they use the conceptual framework within which these models are said 
to have been constructed as the mould for their own: [1] ideal type actors are devised 
[/bftf.ll], [2]equilibrium is foreseen [ibici:22\, [3] associations are promoted as 
progenitors of social adjustment and normatively acceptable results [ibxf.28]; [4] and 
the empirical ground is very firmly asserted [ibidiZ].
Reverting to my preferred criteria, there would appear, therefore, to be claims both of 
utility and of validity. Claims of empirical verification are combined with a somewhat 
confused suggestion that, although the traditional methodology is of dubious value, it 
can be used to validate their own altemative.
Their methodological position is made no clearer by such contrasting statements as 
these:
...economists - as far as we know, without exception - have treated 
associations as cartels, and associative action as a major cause of 
inefficient, suboptimal resource allocation. [ibidiA] 
and, as an inspiration for their construction of associations;
 when John Maynard Keynes reflected on the consequences of The
End of Laissez-Faire' and searched for a new order, 'somewhere between 
the individual and the modem state', he naturally looked backward
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....towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies'. Let us follow 
Lord Keynes' suggestion.... [ibictAO]
Ttie validation of ttieir theory seems, thus, to me, to t>e confused. I would not 
challenge the potential usefulness of the idea of associations; and legitimacy is to 
some extent implicit in the interest that is said to be shown by social scientists in the 
idea [ibiriAA] - though to my mind less than would be indicated by public interest in the 
idea. In terms of methodological validation, however, I feel that their arguments are 
inadequate.
Firstly, the problems which become criteria, as ennumerated above, are contingent.
An ideal type taxonomy of social order does not necessarily have these failings; and, 
secondly, if these failings are to be avoided, a clearer distinction needs to be made 
between the idea of a dynamic, an ideal type, and a practical example. An ideal is 
taken in this context to refer to an archetype. A social dynamic is a relationship which 
leads to a distinctive behavioural pattem. A social dynamic may thus be illustrated by 
an ideal type, which represents such a pattem. There is also the possibility of 
describing an empirical and approximate manifestation, which might be described as a 
practical example, and may even be the source from which the dynamic is abstracted. 
Whiie this terminology may not be in widespread use, the underlying principles 
conform to Weber's ideal-type construction process, and to his injunction not to 
confuse the ideal and the empirical [Burger,1976].
Certain implications may help to clarify the perception of inadequacy in Streeck and 
Schmitters claim. Firstly, the movement from induction to abstraction must 
authentically sever the dynamic from its roots, before the ideal type is reconstructed 
without reference to its origins. (This method should be familiar to those who have
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studied Ctieckland's SSM [Naugtiton,1984;39D. Secondly, a set of dynamics, if it is to 
serve a practical analytic function, needs to consist in constructs which are clearly 
distinguishable, yet accessible to combination in such a way as to inform the analysis 
of all phenomena which lie within their field.
Streeck and Schmitter do not appear to have met these criteria in their 
representations of the traditional dynamics. The process they have undertaken seems 
to have been to take practical examples of distinguishable organisational types - 
community, state, and market - and then added a fourth: association. Membership of 
community, for example, is said to be ascriptive, which would seem to be more 
consistent with ttte state's guiding principle of hierarchical control than the 
spontaneous solidarity attributed to community [Streeck and Schmitter, 1985:5]. 
Abstraction, as they have approached it, has failed to produce clear distinctions.
More conclusively, I would suggest, their eager failure to explain associations in terms 
of state, market and community is not indicative of the inadequacy of the underlying 
idea, but of their interpretation of it. Simply consider their definition of the principle on 
which associations are said to operate:
The central principle is that of concertation or negotiation within and 
among a limited and fixed set of interest organisations that mutually 
recognise each other's status and entitlements and are capable of 
reaching and implementing relatively stable compromises [pacts] in the 
pursuit of their interests. [ibi&AO]
This is surely a description of co-operation between organisations; though later this 
view is qualified by the introduction of market forces, in that the transactions tietween 
them are seen to be based on calculative reciprocity [itx&AZ], rather than the 
unconditional mutuality which might be inferred from the original description. There Is
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also the interpolation of a coercive element in the relations between the organisation 
and its members [/l>/d:11], again qualified by the non-ascriptive nature of that 
membership, which makes it to some extent voluntary and co-operative. The 
relationship between the set of organisations and the wider society is again based on 
calculative reciprocity [ibi&AQ]. All in all, then, it seems quite simple to see the 
associations that they describe as a manifestation of all three of the transactional 
dynamics; but predominantly of those which are described in this thesis as coercive 
and market.
A distinctive element might be discerned in the idea of a limited and fixed set' [see 
quotation above]. This proves, however, to be an illusory distinction. The emergent 
associations are not such neatly packaged phenomena after all, being "disparate, 
uneven, and pragmatic responses to particular dysfunctions and conflicts" [ibk/;8]; and 
furthermore, are said to be distinguishable from "'harder', more formalised types of 
organisations whose boundaries are easier to define." [ibi&A 8]
Even this slight but potential reason for accepting that a fourth dynamic has been 
discovered Is thus contradicted within their own text, and their crucial claim seems 
unsubstantiated. Observation may Justifiably have led them to discem
the emergence in Westem societies of systems of bargained interest, 
accommodation, and policy concertation....[/bkf,*3] 
but their understanding of the three dynamics has dedeved them into a highly 
questionable assertion that
the iogic according to which these systems operate cannot be reduced to 
the respective logics of community, market and state, or explained by ad 
hoc mbces of these. [Streeck and Schmitter, 1985:3]
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If the principles which are abstracted from their models - spontaneous solidarity, 
dispersed competition, and hierarchical control - fail to explain associations, that may 
well be due to the inadequacies of Streeck and Schmitter's process of abstraction and 
theorisation, not because of an inherent problem with the underlying argument.
This is not, however, to suggest that their work has no value. In terms of utility, the 
idea of association may be welcomed as the identification of a prevalent manifestation 
of the interaction of the dynamics. Furthermore, they may well be justified in arguing 
that some form of regulated self-regulation' [/bid.*22] would contribute to the resolution 
of the conflicts and complementarities of community, market and state which they 
express so clearly and concisely.
community and market [-] community obstructs freedom market undermines normative 
values
community and market [+] community encourages good 
faith
market extends the range of 
possible transactions
state and market [-] state distorts markets markets undermine the state's 
authority
state and market [+] state provides a legal 
framework
market is a supplementary 
mechanism
community and state [-] community frustrates 
centralism
state breaks down communities
community and state [+] community offers 
spontaneous solidarity
state contrilxites to a ioss of 
identity
adapted from Streeck and Schmitter, 1985:2
Their contribution may perhaps most happily be used as an elaboration of a technical 
aspect of subsidiarity rather than as an analytic tool with a wider range of applications.
Pursuing this methodological theme, another challenge to the model constructed here 
could be based on its differentiation from Weber's famous categorisation of the bases
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of authority in society: the traditional, the charismatic and the bureaucratic. These, 
too, can be accounted for by reference to the dynamics that are favoured here; both 
the traditionai and the bureaucratic are essentially coercive, while the charismatic is 
essentialiy co-operative, uniess one assumes that the followers are dupes.^
There seems then to be an intersection between the two sets of analytic toois. Could 
one therefore infer a claim that, using an approximation of Weber's methodoiogy, a 
superior anaiytic tool has been constructed? That is not my intention, except in so far 
as times change. Weber was operating within a different ontology, in which authority 
was widely assumed to be necessary to social order. As self-definition has become 
more widely valued, Rothschild-Witt has found it appropriate to add to the Weberian 
modei an observed value rational category. This approximates to a more participative 
co-operation in which organisation is dependent on a reasonabie degree of conformity 
to a consensual set of substantive ethics [Rothschild-Witt, 1979]. In proposing such an 
addition, Rothschild-Witt extends the range of Weber's model, though not so far. I 
would suggest as that which has been constructed here.
One further point emerges from these observations, concerning the iteration between 
theory and observation. Rothschiid-Witt is expressly committed to a grounded 
approach, and while recognising the dangers of rationaiism, I have grave doubts about 
the potential for social innovation where anaiysis is restricted to the mindsets of 
conventional opinion.
^Aian Thomas has questioned this third relationship [private communication, 
June,1996]. However
The Charismatic ieader gains and maintains authority solely by proving
his strength in life  Above all, however, his divine mission must prove'
itself in that those who faithfuiiy surrender to him must fare weil ... [and) 
His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognised by 
those to whom he feels he has been sent. [Weber,1970:249/247]
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If our sets are to contribute to our understanding, empirical ad/roc distinctions are 
unlikely to be particularly helpful. Empiricism is inadequate because while we can 
explain the inductively constructed categories in terms of the dynamics, we cannot 
perform the reciprocal task. Identification of the dynamics may arise through analysis 
and abstraction from manifest social structures, but we cannot explain the relations 
and make informed choices between categories without theorising them, in addition, 
out of the dynamic elements we can construct many other options, recognise variants 
of, and, indeed, the similarities of observed social structures, rather than seek to make 
innovations conform to the patterns and conventions of the past.
Thus, following Buckley, we may prefer,
instead of asking how structure affects, determines, channels action and 
interactions, [fo] ask how structure is created, maintained and recreated. 
[Buckley, 1981:188]
For these reasons the methodological critique from those who wish to emphasise 
induction is not accepted. As Etzioni says, "Social scientists are much too quick to be 
satisfied with correlations" [Etzioni,1988:17]. The iteration between theory and 
experience is perceived as being an essential, and indeed, inescapable aspect of 
social analysis.
Innumerable other theories could be taken into account in this contextualisation. All 
that can be demonstrated, however, is that the model used here has allies, and that 
there are grounds for retaining the perspective in the face of implicit and explicit 
Challenges from a variety of sources.
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Coercion and the market
Perhaps the greatest problem In validating the arguments concerning market, coercive 
and co-operative dynamics lies in the complexity, conterfactuality and 
underdetermination of the evidence. The dynamics, according to the understanding 
expressed here, have not been seen in their purest forms. Thus, even if the 
relationships between variables could be disentangled, the interpretation of the 
evidence will always depend on assumptions of what might have happened given 
other intitial positions or contexts, and will be open to conflicting theoretical inferences 
[Przeworski, 1991:103].
Nevertheless, it is possible to assert that some arguments are intelligible within a 
given discourse and are supported by selected evidence, ^ ile  others require a certain 
suspension of disbelief. Assessing the dynamics under discusson - co-operation, 
coercion and the market - in terms of the chosen criteria - equity, diversity, 
sustainability and productivity - is thus an attempt to present a plausible explanation of 
how they might contribute to the construction of viable and satisfying social 
institutions.
Two further points: firstly, the evidence that follows is ali at the level of the state. I felt 
that the dynamics are less easy to contrast in interpersonal examples, and that in the 
case of organisations function often determines the pattem of behaviour, confusing 
any contrasts that might be displayed. Whether or not the conclusions that are drawn 
are transferable to scales of interaction other than the state is a matter of judgement.
Secondly, inequality is not perse inequitable. Differentiation of reward has been 
accepted as potentially acceptable within a co-operative perspective. All that can be
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demonstrated is ttiat t>otti coercive and market oriented societies appear to intensify 
differentials of reward, and ttie onus migtit be ttiougtit to be on ttieir proponents to 
explain ttie justice of ttiese outcomes.
Coercion
From the point of view of conventional rationality, the failures of coercion and free 
market ideologies are not hard to argue.
Coercion, by definition, assigns little significance to equity or diversity. The central 
idea of the use of force is to make others conform to a conception other than their 
own, so that even if the distribution of goods and services is equitable, political equity 
is a necessary casualty; and diversity is similarly disregarded as an authoritative 
criterion. Productivity, on a narrow definition, can be high, though if the whoie range of 
satisfactions are taken into account, psychological and social needs can be perceived 
as being unlikely to be fulfilled, unless it is believed that dependency is the most 
vaiued of human circumstances. Simultaneously, restrictions on feedback and 
structural disincentives seem to constrain the potentiai of highly centralised systems, 
at least in comparison to other economic paradims. The experience of centrally 
planned economies tends to support this view, and wili be discussed in due course. 
Observation further suggests that the sustainability of the environment is chalienged 
under the incentive and information systems that obtain in rigidly hierarchical 
societies. The sustainability of political systems of this kind aiso appears problematic, 
though explanations for this phenomenon often depend on assumptions about the 
resilience of Independent attitudes.
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Some flesh can readily be put on these bare bones. Coercion as a state system is 
perhaps at its most intense in the totalitarian state. This was identified as having 
an official ideology to which everyone is supposed to adhere, focussed on 
a perfect final state of mankind'; a single mass party usually led by one 
man, organised hierarchically and either superior to or intertwined with 
the state bureaucracy; a technically conditioned near complete monopoly 
of control by the party and the bureaucracy subordinate to it, of the 
effective use of all weapons of armed combat; a near complete monopoly 
similarly exercised over all means of effective mass communication; and 
a system of physical or psychological terroristic police control; and central 
control and direction of the entire economy: [Schapiro afler Friedrich,
1972:18]
No example of this would be perfect, but the Soviet Union and its satellites seem to fit 
the bill, and may thereby be used to illustrate some of the typical consequences of the 
coercive state.
On environmental sustainability it has been suggested that
The major environmental problems of the central and eastern Europe are 
rooted in the socio-economic structure of the past 45 years. The 
structure's major characteristics have included state ownership, 
centralised planning, unrealistic pricing, obsolete and inefficient 
industries, non-enforcement of environmental laws, and indifference to 
environmental concerns by state authorities. In addition, putHic 
participation was prevented and state environmental data often kept 
secret. [IIASA, 1992:19]
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The Nations of the Earth Report [UN,1992,vol3:459] prepared by the former republics 
of the USSR endorses this view, while an another aspect of coercion is implicit in the 
report of the Russian Federation.
For decades, the economic development of Russia was characterised by 
rigid economic isolation from the world economy and over-militarisation 
of its economy as a result of East-West confrontation and the arms race.
Under these conditions, main economic tasks were accomplished at any 
price', including impact on the environment and unsustainable use of 
resources. [ibi&.Z9Z]
The political sustainability of coercive totalitarian states can also be thought 
questionable, though many regimes have proven remarkably resilient. Schapiro puts 
a lot of weight on the leadership role [Schapiro, 1972:124], which might be taken to 
indicate that sooner or later a dearth of ruthless but effectively populist successors wiii 
lead to collapse and transformation. If the Incas are considered as totalitarian it could 
be argued that the concentration of the ieadership may aiiow extemai or internal 
challenges to capture authority the more easily [Schaeffer,1970]; and Nazi Germany's 
Third Reich demonstrated the dangers of the universalising tendency of 
totaiitarianism. However, the most potent threats in the iong run may be the failures of 
productivity and equity that seem to hamper even the most idealistically founded of 
coercive regimes, combined with the seemingly irrepressible instinct of the human 
being for autonomy and a iicence for diversity.
Diversity is not, of course, one of the virtues iikeiy to be recognised in a coercive 
regime, at least of the type descritied by Friedrich. In such circumstances, the 
exercise of an instinct to diverge is likely to be perceived as deviance; and in view of
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the later collapse of the authority of the communist parties, Shapiro's comments on 
deviance in eastern Europe, written in 1978, are instructive:
In no state has deviance reached proportions where it challenges the 
system-maintenance capacity of the regime. Whether its manifestations 
will represent a threat to the legitimacy of given regimes in the future, 
however, remains to be seen. The outcome will be determined, first, by 
the ultimate success or failure of each regime in efforts to socialise (and 
resocialise) all elements of society; second, by the degree to which the 
social norms and values promoted by the regimes are in balance with one 
another and are accommodated to the realities of increasingly 
sophisticated and differentiated modernising societies; and, third, 
perhaps, if one accepts the view that rising levels of deviance indicate 
recognition by the regime of the functionality of some forms of deviance, 
by the degree to which an understanding develops by which the regime 
grants autonomy to its citizens in some areas, in exchange for a tacit 
comitment on the part of the citizenry that it will not use greater autonomy 
to challenge the Communist order. [Shapiro, 1978:37]
History has now answered some of these questions. Clearly socialisation in 
submission to the state has proved inadequate. It also seems probable that the 
regimes of eastem Europe proved too inflexible to accommodate the social and 
technological development demanded by comparisons to capitalist democratic states. 
Thirdly, Shapiro seems to have shown considerable insight into the dangers to the 
authoritarian state that is involved in manoeuvres that now tend to be associated with 
the term perestroika.
The categorisation of diversity of behaviour as deviance is seemingly an inevitable 
concomitant of coercive regimes. That this eventually constitutes a threat to the
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sustainability of social arrangements also seems a reasonable inference both from 
theories of adaptation such as that of Buckiey [1981], and from experience. Even in 
China, in which the traditional Confucian culture of respect for authority may have 
reinforced the primacy of the state, market institutions have become an essentiai part 
of policy pcinan and Ye,1989], even though Sen was able to write in 1973 that 
the question of dissociating choices from the individualistic preferences 
and individual welfare seems to have been fairly central to the Chinese 
experiment on work motivation and the cultural revolution. [Sen,
1973:100]
While individualism and diversity may be seen as of intrinsic merit to many people in 
many cultures, self-interest as a means to a wider end of economic productivity has 
not passed unnoticed in states other than China. Indeed, while Russia since the 
counter-revolution hardly supplies evidence of the inevitabie vitality of capitalist 
reform, the evidence on productivity in the centraiiy pianned eœnomy indicates that 
coercion may evince intrinsic liat>ilities in the organisation of production.
The problems of a centrally planned economies have been analysed many times, and 
the sheer complexity of the task is a œmmon theme. In addition, many perverse 
incentives have been identified: notable amongst these are the reservation of 
productive capacity, and inattention to quality, to technological investmertt, and to cost 
effectiveness. [Goldman, 1973:301; Dyker,1992:177] In addition, management of the 
economy becomes even more complex when data is manipulated for ideological 
reasons [Flakierski,1992:172]; and, as Przeworski has argued, common owership fails 
to resolve certain problems familiar to westem economists:
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stealing from oneself is individually rational, since the part privately 
appropriated [or not performed] is larger than the individual s share of the 
common loss. [Przeworski, 1991:116]
Khanin described the consequences thus:
A crisis in the economy (as in medicine) is a temporary state of decline, 
which ends with recuperation. The prerequisites of recuperation are laid 
during the period of the crisis. In a catastrophe, by contrast, a self- 
destructive mechanism is operating, impeding the revival of the 
economy. Such a self-destructive socio-economic mechanism became 
rooted during the years of the totalitarian regime in the USSR. [Khariin,
1992:10]
A further quotation demonstrates that Khanin's assessment is hardly, if at all, 
exaggerated.
Why amidst all this capital deepening, and in the aftermath of an 
industrialisation drive...did productivity manage to decline by around 3
per centage points over 25 years? .An economic history of the
country since 1930 is the history of investment ratios consistently in the 
region of 25-30% of nationai income, comparable to high investment 
westem economies like the West German and the Japanese. The 
problem in the Soviet Union has been the escalating inefficiency with 
which investment funds so mobilised have been moved.
[Dyker,1992:144,204]
Is low productivity inevitable in a coercive society? The apparent exceptions tend to 
be special cases. Singapore is a highly authoritarian state, but the authority is directed 
towards social conditions which support a laissez fàire economy. Campos has written
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on behalf of the World Bank that "critical and most fundamental principle” that was 
held in common by the high-performing Asian economies was the creation of 
institutions building trust that the benefits of economic growth would be equitably 
shared [Campos, 1993:6]. Voluntary submission to a national plan is not coercion in 
the totalitarian sense; and perceived equity in distribution does much to offer incentive 
to those whose work is highly disciplined. In the quintessentially coercive state, there 
is no need to be concerned with such issues.
The case of the Soviet Union exemplifies this point. Inequity is perhaps the 
characteristic of a communist regime that is least consistent with its ideology, so that 
its prevalence is a reasonable indicator of the effect of centralisation of power in such 
a context. The pattern can be followed in Scott's history:
By the middle 1920s, then, Lenin the communist has established the 
basis of a highly differentiated pattern of inequalities . ..The most 
significant change that Stalin made to the structure of inequality and 
economic differentials was to irnpose a doak of secrecy around
it. Kruschev's efforts to remove the rigidities of the Stalinist system
were, however, blocked by the vested interests of the powerful and the
privileged The Brezhnev regime saw a reaffirmation of differentials
and privileges in offidal policy. [Scott, 1994:139,140]
The ratio of income circa 1978 could be calculated, despite the secrecy, as the 
disparity between the monthly salary of a marshal of the Red Army of about R2.000 
and the maximum pension of R120 [/bid]. At a ratio of over 16 to 1, this contrasts 
Interestingly with the figures quoted by Phillips of the concentration of pre-tax 
household Income In the west circa 1980. There is some distortion since the data has 
been calculated in quintiles, txit it is nevertheless interesting to note that although the 
ratio in the USA was of the order of 12 to 1, and in Britain 8 to 1, in Japan, the
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Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany the ratio was no higher than 6 to 1. [Phillips, 
1991:9]. Another measure of inequality reinforces, though it does not duplicate, these 
data. The Gini coefficient, which measures the deviation from equal distribution, gives 
a figure for 1967 of 0.28 for non-agricultural households in the USSR [LeGrand, 
1985:10]. In Britain the comparable figure for 1975 to 1979 was steady at 
approximately 0.373 [Ruehl,1985:13], though it rose swiftly to 0.4 within two years of 
the Thatcher government taking office. Allowing for the lower wages and massive 
employment in agriculture in comparison to other industries in the USSR, [Scott, 
1994:141 ; Flakierski, 1992:174-5] it certainly does not appear that there is necessarily 
a vast disparity in the income distribution between a centralised communist economy 
and market democracies.
Inequalities in a communist state may always be attributed to consensus on rewards, 
and therefore equitable, or even to inevitable, if temporary, market effects. Many 
might be wary of taking high profile work without incentives to compensate for the 
risks. The likeliest explanation, however, might t>e thought to be that those in power 
can reward themselves and their supporters, even in the context of an egalitarian 
ideology.
The Free Market
The free market ideal-type also contains inherent weaknesses. Marshall's classic text 
on markets helps to illustrate why:
Of course some of those who are really willing to take 36s. rather than 
leave the market without selling, will not show at once that they are ready 
to accept that price. And in like manner buyers will fence, and pretend to 
be less eager than they really are. So the price may be tossed hither and
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thither like a shuttlecock, as one side or the other gets the better in the 
'higgling and bargaining' of the market. But unless they are unequally 
matched: unless, for instance, one side is very simple or unfortunate in 
failing to guage the strength of the other side, the price is likely to be 
. never very far from 36s.; and it is nearly sure to be pretty close to 36s. at 
the end of the market. [Marshall, 1936:270]
In terms of a description of how self-interested and deceptive relations take place, 
there is much to praise in this description. As a recommendation for the total 
management of society there are many issues that it would clearly fail to address.
Firstly, the very idea that the equilibrium of the market is other than a theoretical 
model assumes that all other things are both equal and static. If the market did clear, 
as Marsall suggests, then one might daim that
resources are allocated in such a way that all gains from trade are 
exhausted, no-one can be better off without someone being worse off, 
and the resuiting distribution of welfare would not t>e altered under a 
unanimity rule. [Przeworski, 1991:101]
This is the Pareto outcome, which is "in itself a very limited good" [Sen, 1973:105], 
and notorious for its aggregation of welfare irrespective of the utility of a just society. 
Referring again to Sen, it can be argued that
If the utility of the deprived cannot be raised without cutting into the utility 
of the rich, the situation can be Pareto optimal but truly awful. [Sen,
1994:6]
Yet even if one accepts Pareto optimality as an equitable outcome, the idea that it 
might come about through a free market is extremely suspect. There is an implicit 
assumption that markets do behave rationally, and another that there is no cost in 
adjusting to market influences, neither of which is rationally sustainable.
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Indeed, the supposed capacity of the free market to achieve its equitable and 
productive goals is dependent on assumptions that are clearly not related to any 
commonly observed circumstances. The necessary conditions appear to be utterly 
implausible:
perfect information: this is clearly impossible, if only because of the cost 
to the purchaser of discovering the provenance of every good, and the 
perceived interest of the seller in disguising negative aspects of the 
production process;^
free entry and exit to the market differential access to information, capital and 
markets makes this an implausible ideal;
a homogeneous product for this to be attainable It would be necessary to 
suppose both that there was no branding of goods, that substitution between 
categories of goods and services was impossible, that ancillary services such as 
distribution were uniform, and that all the other free market conditions applied, 
which is not the case;
iarge numbers of buyers and seliers: every company, given business 
rationality, is seeking to achieve a monopoly, and given economies of scale, the
5 It is interesting to note that Adam Smith was heartily sceptical of the possibility of a 
free market. He wrote that any proposal for a new law from the mercantile class 
ought always to be listened to with great precaution, ought never to be 
adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with 
the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes 
from an order of men whose interest is never exactly the same with that 
of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to 
oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, 
both deceived and oppressed it. [Smith, 1976:267]
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concentration of economic power is a consistent historical trend [Hot)st)awm, 
1968:§11 ; Donaldson, 1981]. Certainly, there is a flux in the concentration; but 
the change in the name of the monopolist does not significantly alter the 
evidence of the distortion to the market. [Criteria of free market from Morgan, 
1985:7]
The free market remains an idealised model. There have been attempts to assert that 
despite its purely abstract nature, it provides a reliable predictive mechanism, and 
may therefore be considered a positivist descriptive mechanism [Friedman, 1979].
The notorious inaccuracy of econometric projections scotches this proposition to any 
but the true devotee of theory before experience. [Brauer.l 993b:537]. in terms of 
wider criteria, it must also be evident that even were reductive economics predictively 
successful, it would not follow that the claims for the equity, productivity, sustainability 
and diversity of market outcomes were sustained.
The idea that free market transactions optimise equity is an inference from suspect 
premises, not an objective observation. Marshall, typically of theoretical economists, 
marginalises the assumption that any participant in the market has an advantage - 
"But unless they are unequally matched... " - whereas to critics of this view it is 
evident that such inequalites are endemic to any but an imaginary model.
All we need to see is that one partner is compelled by need, the other by 
want; the latter can wait while the former, pressed by need cannot. As a 
result the terms of trade will mirror the distribution of power....We can 
now recognise that the concept of market failure* as used in conventional 
economics is misleading. It implies that the market is an inherently 
perfect allocator, and when left to operate by itself will lead to optimum 
economic conditions [but] contrary to what conventional economics
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posits, so called market failure is inherent in the nature of the market 
Itself. [Lux and Lutz, 1988:27,28]
We do not enter the market with equal access to information, influence, capital, or 
preparation, nor with identical positions relative to risk and urgency, so that the 
significance of the disparity between model and observable circumstances can 
scarcely be considered trivial. The necessary equity of market outcomes exists only in 
hypothesised circumstances which do not prevail, and arguably could not even 
possibly obtain in any plausible projection of human development.
Nevertheless, market theorists can reasonably argue that, except in an ideal world, 
distribution according to needs would fail to provide the appropriate incentives. 
Distribution on the grounds of perceived merit has been accepted both by neo- 
classicists [market value] and by Marxists [labour input], but the difficulty is that merit 
"is a bit of an accident not only in its origin, but also in its being treated as merit.”
[Sen,1973:105] Equity would seem to demand that compensations for disadvantage 
be taken into account, since
A society that permits significant inequalities among its members in 
advantages and disadvantages for which they are not resonsible, will be 
perceived as failing to treat them equally; it distinguishes in its treatment 
of them along morally arbitrary lines. [Nagel, 1991:106]
A more particular point has been made, however, in the argument for a co-operative 
ideology: that where the market is unfettered there will be a tendency towards 
intensifying differentiation, intuitively this makes sense, since those who are in an 
advantageous position will have the power to reinforce their own privileges. Indeed, 
social mobility data for the UK. inadequate though they may be [personal
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communications: Peter Unthwaite, ESRC; Usa Marker, Child Poverty Action Group; 
Colin Robinson, lEA] suggests that even over a period in which redistribution could be 
said to have remained a consensual ideology for most of the polity most of the time, 
the accident of birth, and the advantages to which that is attached, appear to be the 
most significant variable in determining the rewards that society offers.
There are, of course, too many variables to make any assessment of this issue easy, 
but ideological shifts in government help to show how an increased devotion to market 
outcomes tends to lead to intensifying differentiation. Phillips has shown how the 
mean incomes of the top 5 per cent of income recipients in the USA and of the highest 
quintile acderated sharply after Reagan became President on a free market platform. 
[Phillips, 1991:13] By constrast, that of the lowest quintile fell, and of the second 
lowest barely held its own. The qualitative observation that
Poverty breeds a style of life which reinforces the conditions which lead 
to poverty. Resources which might lead to betterment and development 
are drained out. [Fusfeld, 1973:269] 
is not seriously challenged by the quantitative data. A similar reversal of long term 
trends towards equitable redistribution took place in Britain after the accession of 
Thatcher [Ruehl, 1985:13]. There is thus at least prima facie evidence that the 
theoretical disposition of the free market to intensify differentiation is supported in 
practice, to the extent that the OECD, traditionally of a free market disposition, warned 
that wage inequality could prove a threat to the social fabric [OECD,1996].
A more comprehensive view, based on analysis of quantitative data, is offered by
Williamson:
there is enough historical evidence to suggest that: most newly 
industrialising countries in the nineteenth century did undergo rising
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inequality t>efore undergoing rising equality in the twentieth century; most 
did not undergo a rise in poverty rates, although the rate of escape from 
poverty was slow where rising inequality was pronounced; rising 
inequality never played a critical role in making rising rates of non-human 
capital accumulation possible; and rising inequality did play a crucial role 
in making rising rates of human capital accumulation difficult.
[Williamson, 1991 ;138]
Several important points may be made in connection with Williamson's conclusions. 
Firstly, the notion that inequality is a pre-requisite of growth is contradicted. Secondly, 
in explanation of the phenomena described above, he argues that "we are led back to 
factor markets in searching for the sources of inequality, and to the labour markets in 
particular." [ibkt.20]
Here is a particular and crucial element in the structural failure of free market theory to 
contribute to equitable outcomes. In this context, theory is only very tenuously 
applicable to circumstance, since labour markets are in no wise free markets. There is 
no homogeneity; free entry is constrained by skills, location, legislation, and restrictive 
practices; information is imperfect; and only in a full employment economy can there 
be said to be many buyers in comparison to sellers of labour. Inequality is thus to 
some extent administered through the latx)ur markets, and the twentieth century 
equalisation process, though partly attributable to full employment policies which 
stimulated growth in recession and kept labour demand high, was also due to 
compensatory public investment in education, and to laws which redressed the 
imbalances of power in the labour market. The equalisation process may thus be seen 
as owing to constraints on the free market rather than due to its operation.
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If we are to reach a reasonable assessment of the evidence, we may have to rely on 
instances where there is a marked change of national policy, such as the policy 
reverse from Keynsianism to the laissez faire ideologies of Reagan and Thatcher. 
Where the variables are too many to ever have completely reliable evidence, the 
change of government from a redistributive consensus to one in which redistribution is 
supplanted by a safety net ideology, and which seeks to free the labour market from 
inconveniences to employers, may be as dose as we can find to convindng empirical 
evidence of the effects of free market ideology. Between 1979 and 1992 in Britain the 
proportion of the population living on less than 50% of the average income after 
housing costs rose from 9% to 25% [CPAG.1996]. Unless one supposes that some 9 
million people have become degenerate in the space of a dozen years, or were 
undeserving of their income before 1979, even such simple data seems to indicate 
that only on a very curious understanding of merit can the free market be thought to 
lead to equitable outcomes.
The second criterion, productivity, is very narrowly defined in terms of market 
transactions. Referring back to Marshall, it is evident that the market mechanism is 
intended to make any sympathetic concern for others superfluous. In such 
drcumstances, sodal and emotional needs can only be thought to be addressed on a 
very confrontational interpretation of human nature. Alienation would seem to be a 
certain outcome of such an ideology. In Scanlon's words
Having a system in which certain goods and services are exchangeable 
and can be purchased may further attitudes towards those goods, towards 
others, and towards ourselves that one may rationally wish to avoid.
[Scanlon, 1977:45]
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Furthermore, as has already been suggested. Immediate decisions cannot be 
considered as an expression of unmediated self-understanding. Productivity comes to 
be measured in tenns of volume of economic transactions, rather than the production 
of human welfare, even though the health of the market is not identical to the health of 
the community or the individuals within it.
The question is ....not whether, under the existing circumstances of 
individual habit and social custom, a given expenditure conduces to the 
particular consumer's gratification or peace of mind; but whether aside 
from acquired tastes and from the canvas of usage and conventional 
decency, its result is a net gain in the comfort or in the fulness of life.
Customary expenditure must be classed as waste in so far as the custom 
on which it rests is traceable to the habit of making an individual 
pecuniary comparison - in so far as it is conceived that it could not have 
become customary and prescriptive without the banking of this principle 
of pecuniary respectability or relative economic success. [Veblen,
1925:99,100]
Where Veblen concentrates on the political ideology, Galbraith was as much 
concerned by the influence of the commercial:
Production only fills a void that has itself created. Consumer wants can 
have a bizarre, frivolous, or even immoral orgins, and an admirable case 
can still be made for a society that seeks to satisfy them. But the case 
cannot stand if it is the process of satisfying wants that creates the 
wants. .. Because the society sets great store by ability to produce a high 
living standard, it evaluates people by the products they possess. The 
urge to consume is fathered by the value system which emphasises the 
ability of society to produce. The more that is produced, the more that
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must be owned in order to maintain the appropriate prestige. [Galbraith, 
1973:89]
This point of view has been challenged by Hayek, but not very convincingly, one 
might think:
The innate wants are probably confined to food, shelter, and sex. All the 
rest we leam to desire because we see others enjoying various things. To 
say that a desire is not important because it is not innate is to say that the 
whole cultural achievement of man is not important. [Hayek,1973:202]
On the contrary: much of the rest of what we leam to desire is learned through the 
skilful but mercenary persuasion of those whose profit lies in making us dissatisfied 
with what we have. Furthermore, the question at issue is not whether the whole 
cultural achievement of people is important or not; the question is whether it is 
designed to benefit a few or the whole, and the sustainability or triviality of that 
perceived benefit.
To interpret this debate - individual choice vs collective welfare - in the context of 
systemic discourse, it may be said that the outcome of the whole system may not be 
predictable from the components alone. Localised individual rationality does not 
necessarily lead to the optimisation of either individual or collective circumstances. 
Keynes demonstration of this in respect to the individual rationality of firms in a 
depression is an adequate confirmation of this principle; and one may share Tobin's 
mystification that
the preferences of individuals are only worthy of respect when they are 
expressed In the markets ..[while] ...the preferences of the very same 
individuals expressed politically should be regarded as distortions. [Tobin, 
1973:168]
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Since information about the consequences of tx>th economic and political decisions is 
always incomplete and counterfactual, neither system can be presented as an 
inherently reliable producer of desirable outcomes [Fried, 1977:185],
Neither equity nor productivity, then, is served as well by the free market as the 
abstract theory would lead one to suppose. Equity is not achieved because the 
distributions of the market are affected by factors associated neither with merit nor 
with need. Productivity, though great in some respects, is limited: firstly by the 
tendency of the ideology to act against empathie social and psychological needs; and 
secondly by the distortion of needs to meet the interests of the producer. Furthermore, 
Glyn quotes the World Bank as denying "that income inequality leads to higher 
growth. If anything, it seems that inequality is associated with slower growth." [Glyn, 
1992:20]
The diversity that is one of the proudest claims of the free market ideology is also 
open to question. Essentially, those social arrangements which support commercial 
competition frequently threaten those others which include amongst their aims non- 
market objectives. Immediate individual rationality may support shopping at hyper­
markets, but the cumulative effect is the throttling of small town centre enterprises, 
which may not be so desirable to a minority of citizens; or even, perhaps, to the 
majority. It is only through intervention in the free market that oligopolistic tendencies 
are curtailed and diversity sustained; from which it follows that the free market is 
inherently opposed to diversity as well as supportive of it.
In a general sense, the all pervasive application of market ideology may be seen 
simply as an interference in the natural tendency to operate in another manner. It is 
not purely libertarian. It may be less intensive than a totalitarian state, but conformity
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to its demands can t>e just as intrusive and unforgiving towards those who do not 
conform to the requirements of capitalist society.
The individual had to succeed or be lost, forgotten, thrown upon the scrap 
heap. The individual who could not make a fortune or secure a niche for 
himself had to face poverty, isolation, neglect, unemployment and 
possibly scorn and abuse. Therefore friction was the essence of life.
Against such a background of experience, law is a feeble instrument 
indeed, and custom has no roots. [Tannenbaum, 1938:28]
More formally, the extension of Durkheim's theories of alienation in the twentieth 
century USA led to the perception that culturally defined success goals forced those 
who could not succeed by institutionalised means towards the alternative positive role 
of innovator, or the deplorable fate of overconformity, retreat from society, or 
rebellion. [Merton, 1938]
With this appreciation came the recognition that deviance is
not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of 
the application by others of rules and sanctions to an offender'. [Becker,
1963:9]
One might feel it necessary to qualify this position by accepting that, for example, 
socio-pathological terrorism cannot be met with other than defensive hostility; but 
much crime can also be viewed as the pursuit of normative goals by non-institutional 
means, by those who do not have access to institutional levers. In recognition of this, 
Sumner has argued that the interest in deviance in the mid-twentieth century USA 
represented
part of a process of moral renewal and ethical reconstruction, part of a 
social democratic movement which held that society itself was the 
patient. [Sumner, 1994:314]
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To repeat one of the slogans that I habitually use: the health of the market is not 
identical with the health of the community; and to doubts about authentic diversity in 
tangible productivity must be added doubts about the opportunities for attitudinal and 
behavioural diversity that are available within a society constituted through a free 
market ideology.
While the free market is less intensive than totalitarianism, then, it may be viewed as 
imposing constraints on behaviour which lead to alienation, and a self-reinforcing 
labelling of outsiders [Becker, 1963]. Behaviour that is not valued in the market is 
scarcely valued at all, as the demotic query "If you're so clever, why arent you rich?" 
amply indicates. For deviants to be re-incorporated into society requires positive steps 
that the individualistic market society is not inclined to take; and, indeed, requires a 
recognition that the market does not fulfil all justifiable perspectives of what 
constHuties a good life.
The fourth criterion is sustainability. Two aspects are worthy of particular 
consideration. One is political sustainability, since an adaptive system reduces the 
costs of transformation. The other aspect is environmental sustainability.
What threatens Spaceship Earth is a profound imbalance between the 
totality of systems by which human life is maintained and the totality of 
demands, industrial as well as agricultural, technological as well as 
demographic, to which that capacity to support life is subjected.
[Heilbronner, 1973:174]
The prima facie case against the free market in this respect is that
The efficiency of markets depends on the identity of private costs and 
social costs. As long as the brick-cement producer must compensate 
somebody for every cost imposed by his production, his profit maximising
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decisions about how much to produce, and how, will also be socially 
efficient decisions. [Ruff,1993:23]
Quite simply, it is in the interests of the profit maximiser to extemalise costs; and the 
costs of enforcing internalisation are habitually too great to be realistically applicable 
[Turvey, 1993:139]. Nor should it be forgotten that social costs can also be 
externalised. Massey has argued effectively that the capacity of large scale industrial 
concerns to relocate in pursuit of profit maximisation devolves the social costs of 
adjustment on the original locality and the wider society [Massey, 1981:312,313]. 
Discontinuity once a path has been established is not recognised as a responsibility of 
those who absort>ed the benefits of social investment.
Even the most ardent advocates of the free market seem to have accepted this point.
It is precisely the existence of such indivisitHe matters - protection of the 
individual and the nation from coercion are clearly the most basic - that . 
prevents exclusive reliance on individual action through the market. If we 
are to use some of our resources for such indivisible items, we must 
employ political channels to reconcile differences. [Friedman, 1973:149]
Of course, the inadequacy of the free market is not trumpeted in this respect, but it is 
evident that the internalisation of environmental costs, to the extent that has taken 
place, has been a consequence of political action, not of the market 
[IISD,1995:Robinson,1992]. This impression is reinforced when one considers the 
United Nations Nations of the Earth Report [1992]. While those societies whose 
ideological ground has shifted attribute many of the problems to the socio-economic 
structures that previously prevailed, the capitalist economies, sucn as the USA and 
the UK prefer to avoid the topic. The Netherlands, however, is reasonably explicit:
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The dependence on other countries for raw material and Income from 
exports means that performance of the Dutch economy and the standard 
of living of the population are partly maintained by exploiting the 
'ecoscape' of other countries. This in turn causes the unsustainable 
production of underpriced commodities and environmental degradation, 
particularly in the developing world. [ibkt.\/o\ 3,162]
As for political sustainability, the record is impressive on a selective view. In part this 
may be an impression created by the simplistic historical determinism which obsessed 
many critics of the system. Lenin, for example, would appear to have offered a poor 
prediction in claiming that
..before the respective national finance capitals will have formed a world 
union of "ultra-imperialism", imperialism will inevitably explode, 
capitalism will turn into its opposite. [Lenin cited in Arrighi, 1978:14]
However, as has already been argued, the adaptability of the market system is a 
product of the liberal democratic systems within which it has been emt>edded. Both 
the political and environmental sustainability of the capitalist states is dependent not 
on the free market but on the constraints to the free market which arise from political 
action.
Summary on coercion and the market
Comparisons between various forms of government are rarely satisfactory;
The discrepancies in accounting conventions and in weights according to 
which different outputs are aggregated, the startling disparities in the use 
of inputs, the differences in starting positions and in comparative
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advantage render judgements almost meaningless; [Przeworski, 
1991:119]
For the purposes adopted here the dissatisfaction may be doubled, since the 
examples only approximate to the ideal-type dynamics under discussion.
Nevertheless, it may t>e said of the individualistic market dynamic that
There is a personal dimension of life in which egalitarian impartiality has 
no place, t)ut which interacts with the public domain to generate 
inequalities that raise serious issues of social justice. Individual choices 
and efforts and personal attachments which are in themselves 
unexceptionable combine on a large scale and overtime to produce 
effects that are beyond individual control and grossly unequal. [Nagel, 
1991:120]
As for the likelihood of co-operation degenerating into another form of elite 
administration, Przeworski feared
that the historical lesson is more radical, that what died in Eastern Europe 
is the very idea of rationally administering things to satisfy human needs - 
the feasibility of implementing public ownership of productive resources 
through centralised command; the very project of basing a society on 
disinterested co-operation - the possibility of dissociating social 
contributions from individual rewards. If the only ideas about a new social 
order originate today from the Right, it is because the socialist 
project...failed in the East and in the West. True, the values of political 
democracy and social justice continue to guide social democrats such as 
myself, but social democracy is a programme to mitigate the effects of
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private allocation and market allocation, not an alternative project of 
society. [Przeworski. 1991:7]
Perhaps Przeworski would be less downcast if he recognised that the equitable 
management of a variety of social technologies can be seen as a radically 
transformative process which might meet his Ideals. Co-operation is not without its 
problems, however.
Co-operation
In the first place, let a simple proposition be established as a commitment. I suppose 
that if all instances of divergent interests could be resolved by equitable negotiation, 
there would be no justification for any measure of coercion, or any need for costly 
devices such as money. Alas, although I have an explicit bias towards co-operation in 
this argument, certain factors force me to qualify this view. The two great obstructions 
to the ideal are, firstly, exploitation, often of trust or of power; and secondly, scale, 
with its concomitant of complexity, and thus of exponentially increasing cost.
Once the basic proposition has been explored, issues arising from political responses 
will be investigated. Since the magic mechanism of the market has already been 
discussed, it will receive comparatively little attention.
Olson constructed a logic of collective action which led to the conclusion that any 
large scale co-operative polity would tend to degenerate owing to the costs of
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supporting the group, and the impossibility of ensuring that public goods would be 
equitably funded [Olson, 1968]. His pessimistic view does not have to be accepted in 
its entirety to recognise it as one description of a set of problems which are inherent to 
the practice of voluntary social co-ordination.
In effect, the first of the problems to which he refers is one of scale. As numbers 
increase, so too does the difficulty and expense of achieving a voluntary consensus. 
This assertion is supported in theory by the multiplication of diverse objectives, the 
geometric progression of their relationships, and by the arguably exponential increase 
in the complexity of language as an attempt is made to find an adequate overlap 
between different vocabularies and usages. Secondly, co-operation is based on trust, 
which is a form of public good. Anyone may take advantage of trust, and, by doing so, 
does more than simply fail to contribute to it; they contribute to its erosion. For this 
reason K is hard to see co-operative modes of behaviour completely renouncing all 
forms of coercion. The two problems of co-operation may therefore be seen as those 
of scale and of exploitation. How does one achieve coherence amidst complexity 
without relying on coercion or spurious magic mechanisms such as the free market?
One possible answer is that the market is an effective response to the problem of 
scale. The discovery of a mechanism that approximates to voluntary exchange, but 
which has far lower transaction costs, might readily arouse admiration; and the 
introduction of a medium of exchange with an approximation of universal acceptance 
could provide this. Money and the market make a lot of practical sense as a response 
to the problem of scale.
Similarly, restrained coercion might be a suitable response to the problem of 
exploitation; not a simple reversion to the use of force. Collective decisions would be
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taken as to when trust was being abused and must be constrained; and the objective 
would not be vengeance, but reform.
Thus market exchange and coercion may be seen as responses to the weaknesses of 
the social dynamic which is intrinsically best designed to meet our needs. It is 
interesting to compare this argument with Nozick's daim that his ultraminimalist state 
is just on the grounds that it could be derived rationally from a state of nature in a 
morally permissible way [Nozick, 1974:293]. This moral epistemology is dubious. 
Norman pertinently asked
How can we possibly determine what rights people would have in a state 
of nature, if such a condition is a purely imaginary one? There are no 
apparent constraints in determing what rights we may choose to ascribe 
to them.... Not only does the hypothesis of a state of nature fail to 
illuminate the concept of rights, it is quite generally a useless fiction.
[Norman, 1987:139]
The same prindple applies here. I dont know how or in what sequence or stages 
sodal technologies have emerged. However, I nevertheless find it useful to think of 
coerdon and the market as compensatory technologies, of little interest if it werent for 
weaknesses in an otherwise satisfactory system of co-operative self-management.
This theoretical perspective is intelligible in many contexts. From the neo-dassical 
economic perspective, voices are often heard asking: "How can the individual judge 
what is sodally desirable or what actions he can take that will benefit the community?" 
[Friedman.l984:11] To relate this unambiguously to the present argument: Friedman 
is, in effect, constructing the problem as one of complexity, and implicitly of scale; and
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even if his response to the issue is different from mine, we each seek to escape 
coercion.
His response is to trust the market. Mine is to try to understand the potential of 
equitable social construction. As the market is to the economy, it can be argued, so is 
leadership to politics; a set of techniques intended to mitigate the effects of scale and 
complexity. They differ in that market assumes that the rules necessary for an 
equitable society are natural laws, while political approaches require the additional 
stage of procedural co-operation.
It must be borne in mind, however, that persuasion and leadership often verge on the 
coercive; and are sometimes blatantly so. Coercion is not only made manifest in the 
form of fisticuffs. Nevertheless, to use Sooklal's phrase, leadership can be co­
operative, if the leader is "a broker of dreams." [Sooklal, 1991]
Two distinctive views help to locate this metaphor somewhere between an 
authoritarian and self-organising society. Shils used the paradigm of centre and 
periphery for his analysis;
The centre, or the central zone, is a phenomenon of the realm of values 
and beliefs. It is the centre of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, 
which govern society....The central value system is not the whole of the 
order of values and beliefs espoused and observed in the society. The 
value systems obtaining in any diversified society may be regarded as 
being distritnited along a range. There are variants of the central value 
system running from hyperaffîrmation of some of the components of the 
major, central value system to an extreme denial of some of these major 
elements. ..[Shlls, 1975:3,4]
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Exploitation from the unaccountability and opacity of the centre, and of deviance from 
the periphery, is also expressed:
Authority has an expansive tendency. It has a tendency to expand the 
order which it represents towards the saturation of territorial space. The 
acceptance of the validity of that order entails a tendency towards its 
universalisation within the society over which authority rules ...They [the 
officers ofauthorUy\ use their powers to punish those who deviate and to 
reward with their favour those who conform... [ibkhB]
Ewin's argument is normative, and constucts a model of a more fluid, idea-mediated 
social environment.
...morality and a social or communal life presuppose a background of co­
operation for people and therefore presuppose, by and large, those
qualities of character which are necessary for co-operation What I
object to are the ideas that morality can be accounted for exhaustively in 
terms of rules, that all moral justifications depend on moral rules, or that 
morality consists ultimately of rules rather than of ideas, virtues, notions, 
or what have you. [Ewin,1981:7,21]
Between them, Ewin and Shils construct a continuum between the formalised rule and 
the consensual, substantive, and often tadt ethic to which Rothschild-Witt refers; and 
within that continuum are many processes. Some sets of rules are simply imposed, 
but co-operation is always likely to give rise to formalised rules as a response to its 
weaknesses.
The response is not without its dangers. Responding to scalar problems through 
fonnallsatlon of procedures can steer a community into bureaucratic coercion, as
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Abrahamson [1977] clearly saw In his study of the relationship between participation 
and bureaucracy. Bureaucracy may be seen as that form of government which 
represents "a tendency within an organisation to disengage itself from those very 
interests which it is supposed to work for" [ibid:22], reflecting very clearly degeneration 
through the emergence of formal coercive rules as a distortion of the representative 
ideal.
In principle, the legitimation of the executive txrreaucracy is through representation, 
which is intended to translate the co-operative ideal into a practical form. Different 
views have been held of the possibilities of attaining this. Amongst those whom 
Abrahamson cites are Weber "Each form of administration demands some form of 
authority since its govemment requires that some kind of power to give order is 
delegated to a certain person." [Weber, 1968:545]; Marx, in that "In the communist 
society, where no dass differences exist, bureaucracy becomes superfluous... 
absort)ed by sodety" [Abrahamson, 1977:49]; and Michels, whose iron law states that 
"the demands of effidency and democracy are always solved to the advantage of 
those forces ading on behalf of effidency;" [ibid: 65].
Bureaucracy thus receives a mixed press as a response to the problem of exploitation 
arising from sodal technologies intended to deal with issues of scale. An alternative 
approach is to attempt a more radical transformation by avoiding the metaphor of 
hierarchy, and construing sodety in terms of networks, of which a key feature is the 
preference for trust and co-operation over power and authority [Thompson, 1991:243- 
246]. In effed, subsidiarity gives weight to the advantages of co-operation, whereas 
hierarchical views are more appreciative of the benefits of centralisation 
[Brauer,1996:Ouchi,1992].
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Whichever of these responses one may prefer, the withdrawal of certain aspects of 
interpersonal negotiation clearly has to be legitimated. Leadership issues are not well 
incorporated in the paradigm, but their emergence in the process of the research 
suggests the possibility of doing so eventually.
Theoretically, however, the paradigm would appear to have good companions, and 
experience endorses the usefulness of the core idea: that the principal threats to co­
operation may be seen as scale and exploitation.
That there are benefits to co-operation at more than the purely local level is 
encouraged by the research of Ostrom. In her analysis of managing common property 
resources, she makes use of a tripartite analysis. The political triad is familiar the 
market and central direction are contrasted to "the capacity of the individual to 
extricate themselves from various types of dilemma situations." [Ostrom,1990:14] It is, 
however, important to note that the Common Property Resources [CPRs] with which 
she is concerned are managed exclusively; appropriators are a defined and inflexible 
group. Her models are therefore only applicable to a limited range of situations, and 
dependent on the extent to which "nesting" [subsidiarity] is feasible.
The empirical evidence she supplies of effectively managed common property 
resources in a variety of cultures is backed up by a theoretical examination of the logic 
of prisoners' dilemma games when applied to centralised coerdon under conditions of 
uncertainty. Hardin's tragedy of the commons [Hardin,1968], which assumes that 
public goods will always be abused, fares rather poorly under this examination, even 
though Ostrom does suggest that the deontic operators - require, forbid, permit - are 
always present. The inevitability of coercion is therefore supported as a limit on co­
operation, and she also concedes some limitations of scale as propounded by Olson.
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The co-operative movement also provides plentiful evidence of the problems of scale 
and of exploitation. This often takes the form of degeneration; that is, the perception 
of individual deviance incurs some authoritarianism, though other factors such as 
efficiency or simple greed for power can also lead to an exploitation by an elite.
Comforth et at have listed some of the explanations of degeneration: Marx suggested 
the infiltration of capitalist practice; Braverman argued that capitalism cannot tolerate 
autonomy; the Webt)s stressed the lack of discipline; and Meister wamed of 
managerialism [Comforth efa/,1988:112]. Nevetheless the authors asserted that 
degeneration is not inevitable, even though simple collectives may be limited by size. 
They also helpfully identified three types of degeneration; constitu^nal, which relates 
principally to problems of commitment in membership; goal degeneration, which is a 
problem related to co-operative working in a commercial environment, and 
organisational, which concerns the hardening of hierarchies. Two of these types are 
exploitation issues; the first as a problem of exploitation of others' commitment, and 
the third either as a reaction to deviance or as an attempt to gain the privileges of 
authority. The second type interacts with these, but is essentially a problem of scale. 
Although there are some advantages in collective decision-making, having even five 
people discussing decisions is more costly than having one who listens, so that the 
edge competitors acquire may put instrumental pressures on co-operators.
The Basque Mondragon co-operative complex displays a number of these 
characteristics. The constraints of operating in a commercial environment have 
ensured that management is professional, though accountable, and discipline for 
deviance at work is accepted as necessary.
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Cooperateurs may therefore tend to create for themselves a more 
disciplined' environment, although it is not dear that they themselves will 
perceive it as being more disciplined. The different nature of the incentive 
system induces members to align their priorities with those of the firm . 
without compulsion. [Bradley and Gelb, 1983:48]
Financial incentives may appear coercive, but where co-operatively agreed, they 
represent regulative co-operation. On the issue of scale, since a number of strikes, 
there has been a limit placed on the size of any individual business within the family. 
However, although the ratio of wages has widened in response to the need for 
professional management [ibid, 18] degeneration into a centralised coercive structure 
based on market relations between capital and labour has not occurred.
That problems of scale and exploitation mar the co-operative ideal is reproduced in 
much of the literature on the subject, emerging in many different forms. Woolham, in 
discussing a whole food co-operative noted that
The informal style of organisation that was favoured appeared to rest 
upon a number of presuppositions: a bedrock of shared understandings 
and consensus about aims and objectives, about the future plans of the 
collective, about levels of mutual trust, and an assumption that all 
tensions and disagreements between members might be solved
informally [bu( \ ... the concepts of trust and commitment were not
collectively defined but subject instead to continually changing definitions 
...[Woolham, 1987:12]
At first sight this may not appear to be a scalar or exploitation problem, umii one 
realises that it Is the need for a continual devotion of resources to equitable 
negotiation of the norms of regulative co-operation that is at the heart of the difficulty.
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Between two people, this might not be a problem. When five or fifty people are 
growing and changing in an fluctuating environment, some strategem is necessary.
Stryjan suggests that
The central challenge is ..that of 'shaping' members who are capable of 
successfully running their organisation, and of redesigning it so that it can 
accommodate and eventually mould its future members. In other words, 
the core process of self-management is that of reproduction of 
membership. [Stryjan, 1989:65]
However, although this appears to be a rational and humane response to the problem 
of diversity, it may still be viewed as a coercive measure to deal with the complexities 
arising from scale.
DeveKere [1993] has argued that even questionable techniques such as this will be 
ineffectual unless the ascribed values are intemalised. In an ingenious study of 
colonialism and co-oper^ion, he shows how the organisational systems of co­
operation were introduced by the Dutch, British, Belgians and French, but without the 
persuasive component of a coherent and assimilable ideology. Without this 
coherence, degeneration is assured. Where indigenous co-operative ideologies have 
been introduced by the state to legitimate co-operatives, or superimposed on existing 
institutions, Develtere remarks that they have become instruments of the state. 
Incoherence becomes an issue, related both to scale and to exploitation.
The reduction of all issues to these dimensions of scale and exploitation would be a 
denial of the multiplicity of perspectives, even though experience and theory seem
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supportive of the feasibility of doing so. That is not the aim here. In proposing the 
model that has been produced here, the crucial test is whether it is useful. One test of 
the advisability of devoting resources to a trial is to see whether the argument makes 
sense within itself, is supported by evidence, is intelligible in the academic discourse 
relating to the issue and can withstand the challenges which arise from comparison 
with those other theories.
On the whole, it can be suggested that this has been achieved.
Validation reconsidered
The process that has just been undertaken is theoretical validation. Before moving 
towards a report of the field work devoted to the second phase of legitimation, the 
importance! of theory deserves another mention.
In the first place, whether the set of analytic tools is explicit or implicit, all analysis is 
grounded in theory as weil as data. Even those methods that assert the primacy of 
data rely on theory to do so. Glaser and Strauss' grounded theory argument, as 
expressed by Rothschild-Witt, is as good an example as any:
theory generated from data....will have more power to predict and explain 
the subject at hand than will theory arrived at through speculation or 
logical deduction. [Rothschild-Witt,1979:511]
Clearly they are relying on a coherent but particular epistemological theory. In so far 
as they are reminding us of the dangers of rationalism it is possible to go along with 
them. If their method is interpreted as an encouragement to recognise the categories 
that non-academics use, they share accommodation with co-generative researchers.
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The difficulty with their approach is perhaps that they appear to dichotomise grounded 
theory and a prion reasoning [Glaser and Strauss, 1967:2-3]. I depend instead on the 
iteration between deduction and induction. One might ask, in relation to the criterion of 
consistency, if their epistemology is grounded.
Despite the thoroughness of their examples, the closest to a deduction from a priori 
reasoning that I could discover was their description of Etzioni's analysis of complex 
organisations [ibich 142-144]; yet even here the contention is merely that his core 
variable of compiiance structuæs is deduced from other logico-deductive 
classifications. Perhaps Etzioni did believe that this construct was so conceived; but 
the notion that dominant gvups in society have ways of directing the behaviour of 
others strikes me as being one that has been expressed in many forms in literature, at 
least, before Etzioni’s use of the idea in 1961. Try Shakespeare's Richard III, if you 
doubt me. Etzioni may have related a particular definition to various conceptual 
schemes, but he did not deduce, a priori, the idea.
Nor do I believe that Glaser and Strauss’ category of social loss [ibid: 23 et seq] was 
derived any less from an oscillation between pre-existant interpretations of the world 
and their own experience. To believe that the category emerged independently of pre­
suppositions necessitates the belief that Glaser and Strauss were somehow shielded 
in their joumey through the educational system of the USA from the recognition that 
societies tend to assign differential values and entitlements to its members.
At the centre of this problem, then, is the attempt to overcome the problems of 
rationalism by laying spurious claim to an exemplary empiricism. Neither logic or 
experience, severally or together, however, allows us to daim that we can "accurately 
represent the world's prominent features.” [ibich 227]
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Glaser and Strauss are redeemed for me by their practical renunciation of the 
theoretical claims into which their rhetoric leads them. We share commitments to the 
search for workable guides to action; to the generation of useful innovative constructs; 
to comparative analysis; to the continual adjustment and reformulation of theory; and 
to accessibility and eclecticism [ibid: 227,143, Part 1,243,239,3].
While celebrating their contribution, however, we can also leam from their failures of 
validation; in particular, their presentation of their method as though they could 
generate categories independently of pre-existant theory. Let us accept that theory 
and experience are not merely interdependent. As sources, they are indistinguishable, 
and as resources they are inseparable.
Firstly, the selection of method, of data, and of a perceived problem area is either 
random or theoretically grounded. Secondly, categories may be added to adlib, but, 
unless they are related by theory, it is hard to see what one does with them. Thirdly, if 
each research environment calls forth a different set of categories, there can be no 
teaming except at the local level. Theory is required if we are to integrate apparently 
disparate views. If the aim is understanding leading to action, inductive data is 
inadeqate, offering, in its virgin state, observation without explanation, and obstructing 
the construction of altemative understandings.
The perspective adopted here is that neither a priori nor a posteriori theories are 
adequate in themselves. To assume that theory can be generated from data without 
the selection of a precedent theory is inconsistent with the second of the sceptical 
assumptions; that is, that neutral observation Is not feasible. To assume, on the other 
hand, that a priorf theory is complete is to contradict one of the sceptical assumptions; 
that the fonu of a language allows us to expose transcendent truths. From a sceptical
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viewpoint, theory is justified by its utility; and both experience and theory suggest that 
each must be considered in relation to the other if utility is to be optimised.
Nor is there an end to the process, or a convergence on the truth. Each intervention 
changes that which is being described. Constant iteration is fundamental to the 
method of research described here.
In my previous experience I explored co-operative forms of social organisation. The 
abstractions from that experience, akin to Glaser and Strauss’ grounding, matched the 
first stage of legitimation. This led to the present research, in which I refined the model 
I had constructed and took it back to a co-operative constituency [legitimation 2], 
before testing what emerged against companionable and contrasting theories 
[validation]. In the meantime, a new cycle has begun, rooted in the concems 
expressed by those with whom I spoke [legitimation 1/cycle 2]. And so it goes.
The report on the fieldwork combines a reflection on L2/C1 [second stage of 
legitimation / first cyde] with an exploration of L1/C2 [first stage of legitimation / 
second cyde]. Chronology is less important than content to each of these attempts, so 
that the story of my field work is grouped for the most part around ideas rather than 
being temporally structured. I hope that this allows you to enter into my experience, 
both because that is why this has been written, and because the people I met were so 
damn interesting.
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13. The process of the field work 
The second stage of legitimation
The aim was to discover if the co-operative paradigm is legitimated by those whose 
behaviour appears to be validated by it; and simultaneously to refine the paradigm.
The process: following Polanyi [1967], there would seem to be reason to examine the 
components of the argument, and then to seek to understand it as a whole [gestalt]. 
The first step in the second stage of legitimation, then, involved something similar to 
construct validation; although, given the epistemological commitments adopted here, 
the mechanistic/statistical method that often accompanies such validation was not 
seen as likely to be the most productive. The second aspect was to present the 
paradigm in a more narrative/visual gestalt form, and discover if it was seen by 
participants as compatible with their own conception. At an times I took notes, and 
wrote these up within a few days, both as a record, and in order to concentrate my 
appreciation of what had been said.
The particulars: the first step was undertaken through a questionnaire.This broke the 
paradigm into simple assertions with which participants were asked to agree or 
disagree on a scale between 0 and 5. Where there was a negative response the 
issues were discussed to see whether the dissonance was semantic or structural.
When any problems arising had been discussed, participants were asked to read a 
narrative expression of the argument to assess whether, when the components were
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assembled into a whole, the paradigm proved acceptable as a rationale of co­
operation.
This two step approach took piace within a more general drift away from the detailed 
towards the holistic. The later the field work, the greater the likelihood that I would 
simply relate the paradigm. Indeed, as I became more confident in presenting it, I 
found it possible to discuss someone's ideas first, and then superimpose the paradigm 
on their conceptualisation. My worries that this would set the issue up as one of 
confrontation was not realised. I found it relatively easy to present the paradigm in a 
way that allowed others to see it as an isomorph, or translation, of their view rather 
than as a challenge. Had there been no debate or dissonance I would have been 
concerned. In practice, however, participants would usually query some aspect of the 
paradigm; but the problem was almost always refinement, extension, a matter of 
emphasis or a semantic confusion. In summary, of the 117 interviewees, there are not 
more than eight whose support I would be hesitant to claim, and this is either because 
of linguistic difficulties or because, for one reason or another, the presentation was 
incomplete.
I am not suggesting that there has been unanimous agreement that the co-operative 
paradigm is the definitive argument. What the paradigm does allow is the presentation 
of a coherent explanation of the co-operative commitment within the discourse of 
political economy; and, where there is room for different interpretations of a co­
operative response to circumstances, the paradigm helps to make apparent the 
reason for such equivocacy.
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The particiDants:
A brief outline of who was involved and in what way, followed by a more illustrative 
report of what took place, may be helpful. A statistical analysis of the characteristics of 
the participants appears as Appendix A. Although quantitative social research is in 
itself inadequate for an understanding of human behaviour, there is no suggestion 
here that it cannot draw attention to phenomena that are worthy of explanation.
Location Participants Form of interview
Open University colleagues trial run of the questionnaire
Brighton members of a wholefood co-op questionnaire and narrative
Asilomar,
Califomia
self-organising stream at a 
conference
questionnaire and narrative
Oregon members of co-operatives, a 
commune, and others
questionnaire and narrative
Dessau [east 
Germany] and 
en route
conference and personal 
contacts
questionnaire and narrative, narrative 
alone
India, Nepal, 
Bangladesh
some arranged meetings with 
academics, members of co­
operatives, aid workers, and 
grass roots community workers, 
and some casual encounters 
which were afterwards 
developed.
no questionnaire; in most cases the 
narrative version of the paradigm was 
used, in a very similar form to that which 
appears in this thesis; in some cases this 
was impractical, either because of 
language, or t>ecause someone whose 
views 1 sought to understand was not used 
to sustained abstract construction. 1 have 
sought to represent that which i 
understood from our discussions, without 
claiming that they always supported the 
particular rationale expounded here; in 
some ways such interviews were closer to 
first than to second stage legitimation.
Bristol narrative community sector workers
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Serendipity seemed to me 
legitimate, given that I make no 
claims that the participants fomi 
a representative sam^e. Two 
Brazilian friends who happened 
to visit, for example, or a 
Slovenian friend whom I visited, 
were just as able to contribute 
as those whom I selected 
through more calculated 
means; though of course they 
had to display co-operative 
behaviour to be invited.
narrative
The Open University
My first step was to construct an argument based on my years amongst co-operators, 
and my academic work to date. I then dismantled the argument into a series of 
propositions. The resulting questionnaire appears as appendix B.
I asked eight people for their responses. One threw the questionnaire into the bin on 
the principle that questionnaires are necessarily invalid. One agreed, absolutely, with 
everything I said, which I found equally unhelpful. Another was unavailable for 
discussion. Of the remaining five, each helped to sort out some initial problems of 
obscurity or ambiguity, so that by the time I took the questionnaire to Brighton, it had 
been thoroughly revised, and was much more accessible.
Having asked the participants to score their responses between 0 - strong^ disagree, 
and 5 - strongly agree, it was possible to assess the result quantitavely. Agreement 
was taken to be an average response of 4 or more; and consensus demanded that the 
range of responses should be less than 2. There were 43 propositions, of which 32 
were agreed, and on 32 of which there was consensus. 30 had consensual agreement.
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Where the propositions averaged under 4. with a response range greater than 2, in all 
but two of the ten cases it was possible to identify ambiguities or semantic difficulties 
which could be remedied. In the ninth, which concerned the relations between merit, 
need and luck and the allocation of rewards, major restructuring was necessary. That 
particular formulation disappeared. The tenth proposition in this set, though 
interesting, was not essential and was dropped; it related to the comparative 
sophistication of coercion, free market theory, and co-operation as ideologies.
For neither of the two propositions on which there was concensus to disagree was 
there a score lower than 3 - tend to agree] one of the propositions claimed that the 
quanty of our rives is the quarity of our awareness, the other that we have a need to 
feet that we have made a difference. I inferred, in part from the subsequent 
discussions, that these were clumsily phrased or contextualised, and amended the 
propositions; and if each idea continued to stimulate debates, I never felt that either 
proposition was seriously challenged. Rather, those I spoke with proved to have subtle 
understandings of these issues which would bear more examination. Only one 
proposition, conceming the need for protection from some of die dangers of the 
environment was agreed without consensus, due to an obscure semantic objection 
from one respondent. At no later point did anyone have difficulty with accepting the 
idea.
One might have great fun with further mathematical analysis, but since the aim was to 
identify ambiguities and obscurities, this did not seem fruitful to me. In the event, 
although much subsequent refinement occurred, this initial process allowed me to 
make the questionnaire more accessible and reliable. Thereafter where there was 
disagreement I was able to identify quite readily the confusion, or the need to amend 
the paradigm. The principal example of the need to amend arose from my attitude
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towards the market. I had not initially distinguished between market institutions and 
market ideology, so that even honest trade seemed to be the subject of my scorn.
That this was inappropriate quickly became apparent when I visited the wholefood 
shop in Brighton, even if I did not begin to resolve it until I visited Oregon. To many, 
the spirit of the argument was dear, but I am indebted in this and other cases to those 
who insisted on a dear formulation.
Brighton
The choice of a wholefood co-operative in Brighton as a starting piace was 
drcumstantial, but tumed out to be a good one. I was at the time keen on the idea of 
doing a work-for-research exchange, both in order to compensate those whose time I 
took up, and as a way of becoming familiar with the habits and personalities of those 
with whom I spoke. As a result, I spent several happy days packing spices, selling 
flans, and washing up.
Over a period of a couple of weeks I interviewed seven members of the co-op: 
questionnaire; discussion; ask them to read the whole argument; and ask if they felt 
that it was an argument that was reasonably consistent with their point of view. All felt 
it was, though each had a nuance to add. These informed the development of the 
paradigm, though some comments were additions rather than refinements; and one 
discussion led to the eventual reform of the argument conceming the market.
One might ask how participants could agree and yet encourage change. Everyone, 
however, seemed to appreciate that there could not be an all-encompassing 
algorithmic rationale. Of greater usefulness would be an explication of attitudes which 
would allow Intelligent discussion; and If, at times, the words on the written page failed
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to express exactly what was understood In discussion, this was part of the process to 
which they were contributing. In the case of the market dynamic, it was clear to the 
Brightonians that I was not condemning their work, into which I cheerfully joined, yet 
we shared the belief that the Thatcherite ideology was both incredible and vicious. 
Particularly during these early stages, then, the acceptance was qualified by the 
admission that a particular form of ideas had yet to be structured and/or expressed 
concisely and precisely; but this is, if you think of it, an inevitable part of the process 
of mutual contraction.
Another point might be made at this point. Although I started with a workers' co­
operative, this was merely a convenience. My interest is in co-operation as a dynamic 
rather than with any particular manifestation of co-operation. There is much 
persuasive historical and analytic literature on co-operatives themselves [for example, 
Bartlett, 1993; Bartlett and Pridham, 1991; Bradley and Gelb, 1983; Clayre, 1980; 
Comforth and Stott, 1984; Comforth etal, 1988; Handysides, 1994; Holmstrom, 1993; 
Macfariane, 1987; Robinson, 1986; Srivinas, 1993; Thomas, 1992; Kularajah, 1968; 
Qureshi, 1947; Oakeshott, 1978.] These are often technical manuals, however, rather 
than attempts to explore why co-operation might be a preferable approach to life, 
though the case studies in particular offer many insights into motivations and 
rationales. I would also like to point out that in all the co-operatives I've worked in, or 
those that I have visited or otherwise known, there have been recurrent problems of 
principle; wage differentials and decision-making processes being two familiar 
examples. Attempts to resolve issues of this type are often addressed in literature on 
co-operatives; for example, in Thomas and Comforth's model for democratic decision- 
making in worker co-operatives [Thomas and Comforth, 1989]. However, it becomes 
apparent that the model is intended to raise issues rather than provide an utterly 
reliable set of procedures for resolving them; so that the research I have undertaken
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might be seen as approaching the same issues in another direction. Rather than 
working from experience to theory, I am encouraging reflection on experience in the 
light of theory. Each approach has, of course, its own utility.
ISSS and Eugene, Oregon
The conference of the International Society for Systems Sciences at Asilomar in 
Califomia gave me another opportunity to test the argument in an academic context; 
and since there was a self-organising group within the conference, there was a ready­
made set of participants. Indeed, the nature of this group may have had considerable 
influence on the increasing focus of the paradigm on the importance of social 
construction as the heart of co-operation.
At the time, however, my attention was still more on the disaggregated components 
than on the presentation of the argument as a whole. In that respect, this set of 
interviews was useful; with academics there was much of interest said on 
methodological issues, and there were seriously co-operative people amongst them.
In Eugene, however, I struck an even richer vein. Oregon has been a haven for those 
who tired of the Califomian social revolution of the sixties, and Eugene, a medium­
sized agricultural and university town, has attracted many of them. I was still working 
with the questionnaire/narrative method, and found that there were many acute 
perceptions about specific issues, such as the role of the market, centralisation and 
disaggregation, individualism and social responsibility, and decision-making 
processes. It was probably here that I became most aware of the urgency of sorting 
out my understanding of the market, since the most committed of co-operators here 
had none of my English middle-dass prejudices about trade.
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In addition, the narrative element of the process was moving slowly to the forefront, as 
I found it more possible to express the ideas fluently. The reductive questionnaire was 
gradually replaced by a report of the ideas which seemed to have something of the 
exploratory impetus of a story. Hereafter, narrative gradually subsumed the more 
analytic mechanistic presentation, without, I believe, any loss of coherence or detail.
An advantage of this was that people who would not have been willing or adept at the 
more laborious process could contribute to the gestalt. As those with whom I spoke 
helped me to find expression for the underlying ideas, and to relate them to each 
other, it became less necessary to ask for responses to partial analyses. 
Simultaneously, those ideas which were presented obscurely were attaining new and 
more helpful forms; for example. Mailman's nine part analysis of needs was giving 
way to the idea of a material, psychology, social, spiritual [?] taxonomy. Such 
changes might be understood as indicating significant progress; if one can grasp the 
whole, and the whole is coherent, each part is explained by its context.
Nevertheless, the onerous and demanding business of questionnaire/narrative could 
only be gradually abandoned. I was amazed at how few people excused themselves 
from a process that would last two or two and a half hours, even if it was both pleasant 
and essential to frame the interviews in a social environment. No way did I expect to 
understand the comments that people had to offer unless I had spent some time in 
their company, either purely socially, or by lending a hand with some enterprise in 
which they were involved. At times this was tenuous; some people preferred to 
approach the interview as a deliberate choice to help me with the specific activity of 
interview. With others, however, I became involved in delightful friendships, during the 
course of which we would find illustrations for our det>ates in the way people used the 
public park, or the strip feiling of the trees in the hills around Eugene.
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Eastern Europe
Despite my increasing interest in the narrative form, I persisted with the questionnaire 
for the next trip I made, which was to a conference in Dessau, in what had been East 
Germany. This proved worthwhile, in that the participants there mostly had some 
academic background, but were attending as practical people with an interest in the 
social economy.
One particular aspect of the paradigm sorted itself out during this trip. Those with 
whom I'd spoken had accepted the notion that although concern, consent, holism and 
listening are essential to co-operative practices, the status of these principles had 
remained equivocal. In discussions here, I was edged, rapidly, towards the idea that 
any attempt to codify ideal speech is as likely to lead to authoritarianism as to equity. 
Rules are always open to abuse Only understanding satisfies. Perhaps this trend in 
my thinking reflected the high number of east europeans amongst those with whom I 
spoke. After all, the communist dream had become something akin to a Communist 
nightmare through some such process.
Perhaps because of this, questions about ascribed membership were raised quite 
often; though I could never be certain which factors encouraged the salience of an 
issue in my research. Was it the development of the argument, the comments of 
participants, or wider environmental factors? One should not be surprised that in 
eastern Europe many people enquire how you choose with whom you should co­
operate; yet in the quartet with whom I travelled the question had been of immediate 
consequence. (I'll tell you about that later.)
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Discussions about coercion also led me at this stage to formulate more clearly the 
distinction between coercion as a central dynamic, and coercion used reluctantly, 
reformatively, minimally, and only where ratified by agreed codes. Not surprisingly, I 
was also becoming increasingly aware of the need to explain why, if each of the 
dynamics compensates for weaknesses in the others, co-operation should be given 
precedence. You now know how I reconstructed that; but not that it really sorted itself 
out on the Rajastan Express, between Bombay and Delhi.
So it was with all aspects of the paradigm; ideas sewn somewhere, and germinating in 
another. On the codification of ideal speech I had recognised in Dessau that equitable 
construction remains indescribable in substantive tenns. Respect for others, and the 
involvement of those affected by constructions, are largely unquestionable 
characteristics; but they do not allow us to specify how we or others should behave.
In India I came to the conclusion that it is attitude that matters, and that this is not 
definable. It is dependent on an holistic poetic understanding, and recognisable 
without being directly transferable. In Oregon I had observed this at a farming 
commune, even if I hadnt formulated the idea so dearly. We go back again to 
Polanyi, to the prindple that in communication we are dependent on the intelligence of 
our audience to assemble the fragments that are conveyed into a grasp of meaning. If 
that induces acceptable behaviour, it is an incredible achievement, even if it is 
reproduced by each of us each day. Knitting together the ideas of over a hundred 
partldpants from around the world cannot be done as though ideas were building 
blocks; hence the continuing shift towards narrative and free response, rather than 
questionnaires.
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An interlude in Hull
Before going to india I had been aware that the questionnaire might often prove 
cumbersome there. Because of this, I spent some time establishing what I understood 
to be the core of the argument, and portraying it in a visual pattern. Not only did this 
provide coherence to my efforts to understand what had gone before, it also enabled 
me to present the narrative without notes, more or less as a conversational piece. The 
degree of detail that I would include varied considerably with my audience, and at 
times I would enter the presentation from a different angle. Having that structure, 
however, allowed me to respond much more freely to my circumstances, while 
ensuring that the whole argument was presented.
A group of 52 third year students at the University of Hull gave me the chance to test 
my assumption that memory, if not necessarily understanding, would be improved by 
the visual presentation. The results are presented in appendix C, and the manner of 
presentation also made it easy to identify areas in which clarity was lacking. Since the 
major difficulty seemed to lie with the distinctions between intuitive, reguiadve and 
procedurai co-operation I subsequently paid particular attention to elucidating this 
theme; though very often it would be expressed in the imagery of those with whom I 
was speaking.
India, Nepal and Bangladesh
Legitimation is a complex business, and the problems identified in advance did not 
disappear. There is no way of proceeding, as far as I can see, that allows any clear 
daim of legitimation; and where language barriers and cultural confusion play a part,
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any claims are necessarily rather muted. Nevertheless, if co-operation is a rational 
response to human circumstances, the paradigm should t>e recognisable in some way 
to those who have not been impregnated with western cultural values.
Language in itself was not often a problem, in part because the paradigm had by now 
been simplified and clarified. More importantly, I was able to assemble a set of local 
images to illustrate the points I wished to present. To illustrate this point: short-term 
individual rationality suggests that in Kathmandu you simply throw your garbage into 
the street; or that, as an Indian bus driver, you simply draw up where you can get out 
of the bus station, even though this means that you are almost invariably blocking the 
exit for others. Images such as these are undoubtedly helpful, but do not necessarily 
permit you to convey a more complex integrated argument to others. With those who 
have been educated in the westem tradition there is, of course, a common discourse; 
but I did not wish to exclude others on such grounds.
Because of this, where there were people who seemed, through their behaviour, likely 
to illuminate some aspect of the co-operative philosophy, I devoted time to learning 
from them. Typical of this approach was the observation, tempered by discussion, of 
the habits of two businessmen, one in Kathmandhu, the other in south India. Each was 
happy to discuss particular issues, but with neither was it feasible to legitimate the 
paradigm. Nevertheless, I feel that my understanding was extended by our brief 
friendships.
In other instances, legitimation could only be claimed partially. The guru of Varanasi 
bus station was superb, but constructs the world in a different discourse. Logu, an 
indigenous member of an international commune at Auroville, has only recently 
learned to speak English. Neither could he be said to have legitimated the paradigm
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through thorough understanding and approval, yet at a level of personal conviction, I 
am persuaded that each did; Hanrihar the guru through the common metaphor of 
cricket, Logu through a conversation which would not have sounded out of place in the 
Archers, or some other demotic conveyor of moral debate.
Many of those with whom I spoke were highly educated, and were happy to spend a 
lot of time talking in general terms as well as discussing the paradigm itseif. Included 
in this set were a number of Muslims, with whom I explored the issue of religious 
authoritarianism. An interesting contrast was provided by the Catholics with whom I 
spoke; and although the contrast between exogenous and endogenous morality 
remains an irrecoverable dichotomy, my presentation of the co-operative paradigm to 
250 members and staff of a Catholic college in Kerala was received with great 
enthusiasm.
Narrative was the principal medium throughout this trip, and towards the end I was 
well able to make an insertion of the paradigm far less intrusive than the earlier 
process had allowed. I would explain what I was about, discuss the other's experience, 
and then present the argument in relation to their ideas. However, although this was 
preferable, I do not take it to indicate that the earlier more reductive processes were 
redundant. The whole must be understood independently of the parts, but it may be 
necessary to look at the subsidiary wholes in order to understand anything at all.
Bristol
This was a homecoming. I spent five years working in the community sector in Bristol, 
and no-one there was more than one remove away from me. In addition to the
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benefits that this brought, shared experience brought common illustrations which 
allowed subtleties to be readily made apparent.
By now the paradigm was like second nature to me, and I found that comments were 
almost exclusively developments of the idea rather than amendments to my portrayal. 
At last I felt easy in explaining the issue of asymmetry between the dynamics. Even 
Simon, with whom I have been arguing about any and everything for fifteen years, 
could only raise a debate by perpetuating our disagreement about the extent to which 
leadership is necessary (his position) and the extent to which it inhitxts growth in 
others (mine). This made me happy. The paradigm doesn't seek to resolve this 
variable equilibrium, only to acknowledge that it exists. Puritanism in co-operatives 
leads to many problems; excessive pragmatism leads to degeneration. The proper 
balance is negotiat)le, with the equity of the negotiations not accessible to objective 
determination.
So has the paradigm been legitimated?
I t)elieve so, within the epistemic constraints and limitations of the resouces that were 
available; but a second question seems to t>e called for. Has the paradigm become 
merely a trivial bundle of irresolute platitudes?
I think not. The acceptance that we have no certain anchor for our beiiefs or 
prescriptions is in itself important; and I believe that, beyond this, the paradigm Is a 
flexible tool for analysis. More will be said of that in the extroduction. Before that,
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however, a more personal report of the field work will be offered - the first stage of 
legitimation of a new cycle of the research.
There has been a temptation to make it tidy. Intellectual curiosity pushes me in that 
direction, and advisors seem enamoured of neatly rounded theses. If the process is to 
be understood, however, it seems more appropriate to leave the confusion exposed; 
and no one has described it better than Nicolas Freeling:
Perhaps he had spent his days looking at things which interested him, very 
closely and carefully, storing himself up to the brim, soaking himself to
saturation Later on he would distil, but first came the process of fermentation,
during which the Impurities and irrelevancies scummed up and heaved and 
tumed into the thick crust of rubbish that the winegrowers call the hat', while 
sediment sank, and the turbid unattractive liquid clarified, and the sugar got 
lighter and grew wings as it tumed into the alcohol [Freeling,1967:136]
14. Further thoughts of the participants
Problems of conceptual intervention 
Trajectories
Each of the participants knew of my belief that, if the way we see the world influences 
our behaviour, conceptual change may be an effective form of intervention. Many 
people had comments to make on this issue, or experiences which formed my 
understanding.
Rajagopalan, a professor at the Indian Institute of Technology in Madras, for example, 
was concerned at the way in which technologies exported to India failed to take 
account of the historical trajectory of the society. In the context of this research, the 
problem might be expressed as one of dissonance within changing individuals, or
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between them and their social environment. A response that may be worthy of 
consideration is that change will always produce conflicts; the questions are how the 
costs of rearrangement balance against the benefits, and for whom. For example, one 
may identify, on the one hand, the hope that open markets will lead to open politics, 
and on the other, that open markets tend to benefit a comprador dass very 
disproportionately [Freedland, 1995: Frank, 1978].
Historical determinism is, however, clearly not the message here. Within a variety of 
constraints, we can choose to vary our social trajectories; and, given the 
interconnectedness of the world we cannot avoid interference. The trajectory is never 
entirely local. The part may not be able to operate through substantially different 
dynamics to the whole.
A colleague of Rajagopalan, a historian, drew attention to the way in which 
international structures constrain or shape local development. In India, the feudalism 
of the caste system was replaced by exploitation by the British Raj, through military 
force, political rnanipulation, and industrial power. This has since been replaced by the 
effects of the conditionality rules of the IMF and the World Bank, and the cartel of the 
G7 group of countries. The global market does not only reinforce intemational 
disparities, it imposes coercive structures on iess developed economies which may 
not accord with their preferred trajectory. Is this the constraint we wish to impose?
Krishna illustrates some of these issues rather well. He worked at the guest house in 
Khatmandu, but his duties left him lots of time for sitting on the roof talking about this 
and that. With the Nepalese elections coming up, there was lots to talk about.
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He is of the chetri caste; petit tx>urgeois, roughly speaking. His family have a small 
farm in the hills. He supports the panchayat party, which seeks to perpetuate the 
hierarchical system of councils topped by the king and his ministers. He sees this as a 
grass-roots co-operative structure, but understands why I tend to see it as coercive. 
Nepal is not Europe. Stability is needed, and the rate and mode of change must be 
decided on local circumstances. As for the free market ethic, he sees that as 
dangerously destabilising, since it withdraws the responsibility of care for the 
unfortunate that is explicit to his culture. He is doubtful about the communists, 
however, even though he believes that redistributive taxation for health and education 
is a good idea. Essentially, I reckon that his traditionalism has elements of god made 
them high or lowly, and ordered their estate'; but although this doesn't quite match my 
idea of the division of opportunity, Krishna's ethic of gradual development of 
participative capacity strikes me as a sane response to Nepal's circumstances.
Two points arise from this. Firstly, that change in Nepal has been motivated by 
intemational pressures. Secondly, that the importation of aiien political cultures may 
be uncomfortable; and, I would argue, a paradigmatic intervention, focussing on social 
dynamics rather than reified practices and structures, may well be of more use. They 
certainly seemed to contribute to the discussion between Krishna and myself.
The experiences of Periaswamy, an ex-registrar of co-operatives, indirectly supported 
this view. I met him in Pondiherry, an independent state of a few square miles, with a 
defiantly French tradition and an extraordinary resembiance to Brighton.
My notes refer to his enthusiasm, and his belief In the Gandhi/Nehru tradition. One 
could hardly challenge his statistical authority on the restructuring of wealth and 
opportunity brought about by this ideology. He argued that the practice of co­
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operation, developed through economic mutual aid, is a prime factor in the evolution 
of society. Soft tx)undaries allow people to be assimilated into the movement, and the 
ideal of each person having an equitable share in the governance of society will 
emerge from the experience of success and coalescence of local co-operatives.
This might appear to invert my priorities. Successful practice leads people to change 
their minds; and I happiiy agree that change through intellectual conviction, or 
conceptual intervention, may never be an adequate way of producing a paradigm 
shift. However, following Develtere's [1993] argument that the colonial imposition of 
co-operative mechanisms had, in general, failed, the success of the Indian co­
operative movement may be attributed to the indigenous cultural changes of the late 
1940s. Unless there is an ideology creating spaces for the practice, social innovation 
will often be smothered in a hostile environment. Without Gandhi's vision, Nehruvian 
economics would have had no political base. Practice may endorse theory, but 
innovative practice is dependent on changes in conception.
Support for the use of paradigms (rather than more traditionaliy structured 
information) as a means of conceptual change comes from the experiences of 
Sameer, a Nepali, and Jan, a Dutchman working for the Netherlands development 
agency SNV. I met both at the University of East Anglia, where we all read 
Development Studies, and they are now both employed in Kathmandhu. Each is 
committed to evolution towards self-management, but sceptical about the transfer of 
specific technologies. Paradigms, however, may offer support to local traditions by 
exposing similarities to successful projects in other environments without seeking to 
Introduce Inappropriate social structures; or they may stimulate more radical 
Innovation. Either way they are a minimally coercive form of intervention.
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From the point of view of Nepal, presentation of the co-operative paradigm would 
build on tradition. Until the political reforms of 1951, fruit, flowers, and water were all 
common property resources; and irrigation and temples were cared for by local 
associations. Building on this tradition is easier if there is a rationale for doing so. and 
successful projects seem to be combine ideas that are familiar to the stakeholders 
with a coherent, supportive, but non-prescriptive philosophy.
One project in the hills around Kathmandu which had claimed the admiration of both 
Sameer and Jan, has been reported thus:
The collective benefits of bonus savings coupled with a transparency in 
daily operations have inspired goodwill and an eagemess in the 
remaining six wards to improve upon and expand these ventures. As the 
number of Tamang [lower caste] workers in these dairies grows, new 
opportunities open for their families. These openings have offered male 
farmers new responsibilities and experience, greater mobility and access, 
exposure to extemal linkages and heightened levels of camaraderie 
between the Brahmin and Tamang communities, indeed, the dairies have 
become pivotal meeting places at the day's end, where men pursue
lengthy discussions on local and national issues [nevertheless,
gambling and drunkenness have increased and] more girls are dropping 
out of school to assume livestock responsibilities. [Bhatt, et al,
1994:28,33]
From the last sentence it may have become apparent that gender issues are 
Significant, and the difficulties of influencing ideologies in some such areas will be 
discussed in a while. Nevertheless, from my discussions with the principal motivator of
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the scheme, I believe that an essentially paradigmatic approach was used. The 
principle may have been imported but the practice was of local origin.
Both Jan and Sameer were, in general, somewhat cynical about the claims of projects 
where staictures had been changed without changes in understanding. The powerful 
simply remain powerful in a different context. A neat illustration of this point: women 
are often co-opted onto committees, not so their voices may be heard, but so that they 
will act as a channel of communication to those who will have to implement the 
decisions.
One may infer that promoting co-operative ideas as a form of conceptual intervention 
is ethically acceptable; encouragement came from inter alia an English painter, an 
economist and a nuclear scientist from Kerala, a management consultant from Cape 
Town, and a pastrycook from Brighton.
As the pastrycook pointed out, the idea that the t>ehaviour arising from free market 
ideology is rational depends on a specific understanding of rationality, using as his 
example the idea that the scarcity of many resources was a consequence of attitudes 
towards consumption. How do we get people to think differently?
The management consultant, unsurprisingly, is already deeply embroiled in 
conceptual interventions. Amongst her notions were these:
complexity requires self-organisation, possibly through shared vision 
creative thinking can transform apparent conflicts of interest into win/win 
opportunities [cf: Fisher and Ury, 1982:§4] 
dont think /, think We.
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Our perspective was shared by Dr Paramaswaran, who was worth the three days 
travel it took to meet him. Trained as a nuclear engineer in Moscow, he then worked 
for the Atomic Energy Authority in Bombay for a number of years, before dedicating 
himself to KSSP (similar to the Workers Education Association of the UK); a national 
literacy scheme with 3 million volunteer teachers; and the CPI(M) [Communist Party 
of India (Marxist)]. He describes himself as a Marxist-Hindu philosopher, and was 
happy to see me as an ally in the ideological counter-offensive. (He's gloriously 
rhetorical, and got me talking like that too.)
The economist and the painter were less specific, txit eager for co-operation to be 
expressed as a rational form of social organisation. Non-coercive persuasion making 
allowance for existing social trajectories seems to be agreed; but obviously wherever 
such an influence is intended, an understanding of existing ideologies and of their 
flexibility is an important factor.
Other people's ideologies
The Hindu tradition appears to be highly accessible. A generally reliable reference 
book [Flew et a/,1979:148] suggests that it is definat)le neither as a religion, nor as a 
philosophy. This impression tends to be confirmed by Shanta Lall Mulmi who 
comfortably professes a Hindu faith which is nothing like the sectarianism of Siv 
Shena or the BJP. He runs a health education NGO, the aims of which are to 
disseminate healthy practices to the villages, and to retum information to the 
Department of Health; even though the aforementioned department apparently 
consists of two chairs and a table with a broken leg. Interestingly, Mulmi's organisation 
uses Hindu texts such as the Mahabarata as a medium for primary health care 
education. Narrative paradigms, or parables, can have more appeal than more 
abstract models.
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He was very sympathetic to the co-operative paradigm, which we went into in depth. 
Quoting from my notes;
Authority, for him, is vested in the people and expressed through 
networking and the sharing of infomnation. The establishment is not that 
keen on information being shared - viz: the drug information network, on 
which it wants to keep its paws - and it is difficult to bring about change.
Political transformation is not always swiftly followed by social change.
The honcho in each village remains the honcho, though the health worker 
inevitably, if gradually, subverts the hierarchy and reminds the Nepalese 
of their rich tradition of mutual aid.
Mulmi is devoted to the idea of participatory democracy, reinforced by religious beliefs 
which express the principle of mutual respect. When Krisna said "I am the universe", 
he was expressing the unity of life. How does this reflect on market ideology? Perhaps 
the self-obsessed pursuit of wealth derives from fear, in a country in which there is no 
NHS, no pension, no guarantee of a dignified old age. The lack of mutual insurance is 
a vicious spiral, which Mulmi is trying to reverse.
in his interpretation, then, the Hindu tradition is accommodative. Paradigmatic tools 
from other contexts are welcome not as a transformation of Hindu beliefs, but as a 
contribution to their development and synthesis with other beliefs. Islam, however, 
appears to be a different kettle of fish.
Mobin is a senior aid worker in Dhaka. He agreed with me that Islam and feudalism 
help to reproduce coercion in Bangladesh, though to Mobin, and to others, this is a 
distortion of Islam. Having read the Koran in translation i can see his point of view. 
Nevertheless, although Bangladesh is not constitutionally an Islamic state, the inter­
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locking of interests of clergy and landowners forms a powerful coalition. In Bangladesh 
the solidarity is involuntary for many people; conscription, rather than participation. 
Mobin would like to see a sense of national identity emerge, and to emerge through 
participative cultural development rather than one of the many forms of jingoism.
Mobin sees Islam, then, as potentially creative, and the co-operative paradigm as 
consistent with his understanding of it. He rather reminds me, in retrospect, of Sharma 
from Ham, whom we will meet later. To one, Islam expresses the idea of mutual 
responsibility, to the other, Hinduism. Neither is persuaded that the wholesale adoption 
of Westem values would be a benefit; but finding shared understandings could 
advance us severally and together.
Traditonal structures are however very resilient. Where alternative modes of 
organisation are not supported by ideological evolution, success can be curtaiied. As 
an example, consider the Christian church in south India.
Tangam describes herself as a bachelor girl. She helps to co-ordinate three canteens 
at local educational institutes for SEWA [the self-employed women's association], and 
is also a field worker. The centrality of procedural co-operation is inherent to the ethic 
of her work, but since it is predominantly with women, it was interesting to note that 
she saw religion and caste rather than gender as the greatest obstruction to its 
development.
Tangam took me round Marianad, where she was brought up, and where she owns a 
home. It was founded by the local Catholic Bishop, who established a housing co-op 
there. When it became apparent that the fishermen were being exploited by the 
entrepreneurs, co-operative fishing and marketing was introduced. Success led to
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assimilation by competing politicians from both the Congress and Communist parties, 
and on the death of the Bishop, the church hierarchy seems to have attempted to 
revoke his libertarian influence; since then the village has been suspended between 
the quasi-co-operative form and the increasing pressures of a liberalised market. One 
enlightened bishop doth not a summer make.
I leamed more of the problems from John Kurien, an intemational sodo-piscatologist 
who was involved in the formation of the fishing co-ops, and of the federation of allied 
co-ops building boats, and other activities. Market liberalisation has been very 
threatening. Traditionally, as Bose confirms [Bose,1984], common property resources 
were to some extent allocated according to caste, on the principal of the division of 
labour. Sustainability was thus built into the system, given the loyalty to the family that 
is part of the Indian tradition. Now high technology has much the same effects as it 
has in the North and Irish Seas; depletion of stocks, bankruptcy of fishers, ownership 
of fleets shifting to extra-territorial corporations. The market does not ask many 
questions about the consequences of technological change, which can viciously 
constrain opportunities for those who become ex-stakeholders. (Gerald Midgley would 
probably say, "hence the need for systemicity and criticality in assessing 
improvement", with which I might find myself quibbling rather than arguing.)
John was always very keen on letting go, but appears resentful of the degeneration of 
that which he helped to create. If there is a summary of his response, it may be the 
value of conscientisation over politicisation. On my notebook cover is the emphatic 
slogan not structure, not procedure, but attitude. The attitude of the Church 
establishment did not change. There was merely a minor perturbation in the extension 
of its authority. (Dr Thomas of Palai had something to say on this subject as well.)
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While running through the faiths, I could hardly omit Buddhism. Niraj, a young fax 
office manager in Kathmandu, was very happy to connect the co-operative paradigm 
to the Buddhist Tao. Indeed, my notes say that he could have t)een quoting from my 
papers. Lust leads to aggression and stress. We should seek to understand with other 
men and women how our needs can t>e met. Coercion is only permissible if defensive 
and reformative. What of those who suffer misfortune? They must be helped if they 
really cannot help themselves, but each of us is responsible for our own salvation.
Only through the path of right livelihood can we transcend our bodily manifestation. 
Nor can we coerce others into supporting the poor; voluntarily, or not at all. Honest 
dealing always; and first you must understand the person, holisticaily.
Niraj lived in Bangladesh for three years, and, as a Buddhist, felt uncomfortable with 
the doctrinaire Islamic environment; so if Allah tells them they are right, who tells you 
you are right? Its a matter of social evolution, he says, and I tend to agree. Buddhism 
has been a 2,500 year stream of moral and political discourse. Isn't it brilliant that after 
only 25 years of adult life I've managed to duplicate some of its teachings?
I should perhaps mention that non-religious ideologies will be explored later, but on 
the Indian sub-continent, from which my examples have so far been taken, theism is 
as prevalent as is materialism in southem California.
Bending ideologies - the case of gender
The possibility of conceptual change preceding structural change are evident, one 
might argue, in the instance of gender in the westem world. Indira Koirala, inspiration 
for the dairy project discussed a little earlier, spoke with me about gender and
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procedural co-operation, and in doing so helped to relate the ideas of conceptual and 
structural change within an existing trajectory.
Her recipe is gradualism, loads of encouragement, social space, and time to listen and 
grow. Hear your own voice, listen to that of others. Conceptual intervention is the tool, 
turt ethnicity and cultural traditions are significant variatWes. The Tamang women 
traditionally have more to say in the home than do the wives of Brahmins. Property 
rights, consumption entitlements, and investment in health and education carry heavy 
gender t)iases [Elson, 1992]. The patriarchal traditions of the Brahmins may have 
reinforced these traditions when they moved into the valley, but they also introduced 
ideas of entrepreneurship and innovation. The weaving together of disparate ideas is 
dependent on understanding, which is where paradigms may come in.
I asked Indira about the role of the market and leadership, and found that talking in 
paradigmatic terms provided a common ground on which to set out our disparate 
experiences. Of the market - yes, as a tool, contained within the idea of community: of 
leadership - women from various castes were being selected as treasurers and 
secretaries to local groups on the grounds of their competence, and definitely 
leadership is constructed, by her Institute for Integrated Development Studies, as a 
facultative role within a forum. Shared understanding without the transfer of alien 
technologies?
Indira's gradualism contrasted amusingly with the more charismatic approach of Mrs 
Ram Devi Shrestra, regional organiser in ilam for a Nepali women's organisation. 
She'd been away organising, and her home was organised and her daughters were 
upfront and educated, and when one of them translated for me, Mrs Shrestra seemed
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rather surprised that anyone might not share the co-operative paradigm. Coercion and 
market contained by social construction, OK.
So what of gender coercion? Indira Koirala's point had been that when men consulted 
women about getting another buffalo, it would be the buffs health with which he'd be 
concerned. Mrs Shrestra sailed past such difficulties simply t>ecause participation is so 
self-evidently the only way to make full use of people's talents and commitments that 
men are bound to come round. Confidence is the key factor and a belief in the 
righteousness of women having a voice. Cultural change again seen as the key, even 
if the approach is rather different to Indira's.
Rao, a lecturer at the Co-operative College in south India, was less sanguine. We 
spoke a lot about what I'd been doing, and he helped me contextualise many of my 
more ravelled experiences. His work at the Institute of Co-operative Management 
concerns extending the milk co-operative tradition into the women-oniy sector. One 
aspect of this reflects again the social context of the market, and of the need to work 
towards procedural co-operation, rather than to limit ourselves to calculative short 
term group advantages. Simply, when a womens' milk co-operative t)ecomes 
successful, it's very difficult to stop the males in their families from intruding; and it is 
also virtually impossible to ensure that husbands do not expropriate the profits once 
they have been distributed to the women members. Structural change without cultural 
change?
ideologies which endorse male domination need not, of course, be predominantly 
religious. It Is hard not to see Islam as fundamentally opposed to gender equity.
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Nevertheless, Tasnim and Nalla are two women working in development in Dhaka 
who see islam more as a cultural tradition than an exposition of the word of an 
omnipotent, omniscient and etemai iseing. The coercive aspect of Islam is a regional 
cultural tradition imposed on a religion; vested interests use the authority of religion to 
enhance their own privileges.
I found this interesting; that two educated urtian Bangladeshi women should see Islam 
more closely as I would like to see it, as one mode of expression of mutual concem 
and responsibility. Perhaps i should also emphasise that Islam is more tolerant of 
other beliefs than the stereotype that is popular in the West acknowledges. Richard 
the Lionheart must have looked mighty like an invader from outer space to the 
average Saracen, and many of our images have been formed by heroic tales of the 
Crusades.
On gender, both Tasnim and Naila were quite clear that change was taking place, and 
that the middle-class evolution of women's roles would eventually be translated as 
consistent with the Koran and the writings of the Prophet. After all, his wife was very 
influential in the presentation of his life as a model of behaviour. Neither is entirely 
persuaded that Mohamet could have foreseen all the circumstances of modem life, so 
that the protection of women seems anachronistic in many ways. Neither, however, 
felt that the Koran is as inflexible as a Muslim zealot; and they expect to bring up their 
children in the faith, though reflecting their own understanding of it. It is important, 
they agree, not to confuse the rituals of a religion with its inner significance. That they 
are in a position to express beliefs such as this, however, is in part due to their 
comparatively liberated family backgrounds, in part education, and in part because 
they work for a British aid organisation that is committed to offering opportunities to 
Bangladeshi women.
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A dignified contrast was provided by Rafi, a liberal Moslem working at a Christian 
college in Kerala. There are similarities between his view and those of Tasnim and 
Naiia. indeed, none of the Muslims with whom I spoke doubted that the Koran requires 
interpretation, nor that the prophet intended that interpretation to be a matter of 
individual conscience, though guided by respect for those who were dedicated to its 
study. There are Muslims who think otherwise, of course, but they weren't the sort to 
start chatting with you at a station chai stall. Rafi, on the other hand, was.
He is a biochemist, a loving husband and caring father. As far as he is concemed, the 
Koran t>elongs to everyone, not to the gatekeepers. If one were to seek to encapsulate 
its message it would t>e brotherhood and social justice. Rafi attended the World 
Islamic Congress in Tamil Nadu, where 14 lakh [1.4 million] participants needed no 
policing. Conformity to the Koran is a liberation, since through it we can come to 
understand the natural harmony of the universe. This, crucially, includes the natural 
dependence of women on men, and men's responsibility towards them. To Rafi 
respect means something different in the context of gender than it does to me; but I 
have rarely seen a woman who appears happier than his wife, and she is a well- 
qualified iinguist who could have a career. How could I accuse her of false 
consciousness for choosing to serve and obey her hust>and when they lead a happy 
useful dignified life?
Rafi s opinion was echoed by the unmarried Farooq. He would be happy for his wife to 
work if she wanted to and had the better job - but being Muslim she would not want to. 
Women are weaker, men must protect them.
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A gender equality paradigm wouid not find a responsive audience among all Moslems, 
then. A conceptual shift must perhaps t)e gradual, as Indira suggested. This is another 
reason to use paradigms pragmatically rather than theories didactically. Paradigms do 
not pretend to mirror the truth, and can be so sub-divided that rejection of one aspect 
need not include rejection of others; it's easy to agree to differ. By contrast, White's 
suggestion that Bangladeshi feminists should take the role of practical joker, 
aggravating the patriarchy, then leaping nimbly back before they can respond, was 
widely treated as risible; a classic instance of inappropriate transfer of social 
technology [White, 1992]. In Manhattan such a pose might get you a TV contract, in 
Bangladesh it's more likely to get you t>eaten or stoned.
Not that there are not shared views between east and west on gender issues at the 
paradigmatic level. Mary, a medical practitioner i met at a conference in Califomia, 
and Gita Sen, a professor at the Indian Institute of Management, independently saw 
gender attitudes as t>eing particularly pervasive and hard to transform since they form 
a concealed ontology for so many of our social structures. Gita Sen proposed that 
men had traditionally been trained for the market, women for negotiation and 
compromise. Mary argued that the greed and fear which motivate both market and 
coercive ideologies are typical of the masculine discourse. Widespread gender equity 
may be dependent, then, on transforming the mode of social organisation.
This idea was also reflected in my conversation with Debora, a lecturer at Berkeley. 
She wrote that
there is a growing consensus that the atomistic conception of 
Indlviduaiism, along with the Newtonian worldview from which it is 
derived, has contributed substantially to the entropy of environmental 
destruction and social disintegration....Far from subordinating the
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individual to the whole, most of the systems views we have examined 
emphasise the importance of participation and involvement. However, in 
contrast to the atomistic and competitive conception of individualism, 
which promotes separateness and isolation, the systems view of the 
individual is primarily concemed with relationship. Hierarchical and 
exclusionary forms of social organisation result from a fearful and 
defensive conception of individual autonomy....more co-operative forms 
of social organisation could t>e fostered by an understanding of the 
integral connection t>etween the welfare of the individual and the welfare 
of the social and environmental context within which s/he exists. Not only 
do we need to break down the defensive isolation of the self, we need to 
leam how to create contexts that foster the interconnected and 
interdependent aspects of our increasingly fragmented selves.
I love that to bits, but does all this seem very Californian? Is all this talk simply utopian 
day-dreaming? I think not. Whether people can work from principle to personal 
change or not is a contested issue. [Goldstein, 1981; Honey and Mumford, 1992] 
Nevertheless even imitation, a practical form of learning, depends on the capacity to 
imagine oneself other, and if that is not conceptual development, I dont know what is. 
Whether a paradigm is better expressed as a parable or a model may vary; and the 
question of whether a paradigmatic conceptual intervention is unequivocally distinct 
from proselytising dogma has yet to be resolved.
Dogma
Several times I was presented with variations on Shaw's comment that revolutions 
change nothing but the name of the oppressor. Am I simply seeking to replace one 
tyranny with another?
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The senior member of the Brighton food co-op emphasised that, although he 
sympathised with the rationale I was putting forward, there is no single solution, and 
that ideas must evolve alongside social practice. I dont think I had disagreed before. 
Nevertheless, I probably tended to emphasise the transience and undogmatic nature 
of the co-operative paradigm thereafter. Any paradigm, in my conception of the role of 
the social scientist, is a tool. Familiarisation, even with a relatively straightforward 
paradigm, may initially require a fairly uncritical acceptance, but this is only a prelude 
to the rigorous testing that is recommended if there is any chance that the paradigm is 
to be adopted. As Tomy Cherian, a fiery young teacher of English in Kerala, said: the 
locus of power may shift, but power is very rarely dispersed; and an education system 
which discourages asking questions and challenging opinions may contribute little to 
equity in the construction of social institutions. At that simple level, the aim of the co­
operative option may appear unequivocal; to encourage open debate. In practical 
terms, of course, co-operation is not always so simple.
Another Brighton wholefood worker, with a degree in social administration (and two 
children), suggested that accepting procedural co-operation as a principle does not 
mean that consensus is always attainable. While those who are opposed to any 
negotiation may have to be coerced, genuine disagreements may be inescapable, and 
majority rule may have to prevail: the ability to accept wholeheartedly decisions which 
differ from those you might have taken requires a maturity which is not always 
evident. The difficulties of consensual working were raised by others, here and 
eisewhere. "Two cheers for democracy" [Forster,1972] summed up the attitude of the 
longest serving memt>er of this co-operative. At the time I was attempting to specify 
the criteria of Ideal speech; I stopped.
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Perhaps, however, the principal influence in this respect was Tess. She is the 
daughter of a carpenter, the grand-daughter of the first communist in Uppsala, and 
contributed a range of subtleties to my understanding. She persuaded me that my 
criteria for ideal speech - concem, consent, holism and listening - should be 
subordinated to the simple generalisation that those who are affected by a decision 
should be fairly represented in its formation. She also stressed the importance of 
distinguishing between the spiritual and the religious, and of joy rather than duty as the 
mainspring of mutuality. (Maybe I should set her onto Etzioni.)
An English academic also encouraged me to shy away from any attempt to define 
ideal speech. She pointed out the persistent problem that if the guidelines are 
designed and owned by insiders, the discourse is always controlled by them: they 
retain the rights to approve or disapprove of processes, since they are the ones who 
are supposed to understand the issue. The important point is that equitable discourse 
is understood as a prindple; in which respect, Habermas' pure intersubjectMty isn't a 
bad formulation [Habermas, 1970]. The mode of expression, however, will depend on 
the circumstances, and, to take in an earlier point, the historical trajectory.
This recognition would seem to support the skeletal simplicity of paradigms, as was 
evident in another instance. Alex comes from British Columbia and also influenced my 
thinking on the mode of presentation of ideas. He is young, with wealthy parents, and 
is experimenting with alternatives to their perspective on life. Leaming is important to 
him; he was disappointed not to see it described as a need, but accepted creativity 
and play as evidence of good intent. His response was, however, a nudge in the 
direction of abandoning the specificity of Mailman's seven part taxonomy of needs. A 
shift of focus from detail in the parts to the shape of the whole emerged as a trend in
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my presentation, then, both for needs and for ideal speech; an avoidance of dogma 
through seeking to strip away cultural impedimenta.
Nevertheless, we cannot simply assume that everyone wants to live with the buzzing, 
blooming confusion of continual reconstruction. Another of the Brightonian wholefood 
workers led me to believe that some paradigm of ideal speech might be welcome after 
all. She suggested that we need rules, even if they should be a matter of 
understanding rather than veital quibbling, and equitably constructed. "Dealing with 
people, " she remarked, "is the most crucial and difficult skill, so stnicture can be 
helpful; but a caring attitude is most essentiai." Attitude is preferable to rules, then, but 
rules may be helpful; how do you develop the preferred attitudes without transmitting 
some message? and if you do, what and how?
Attitude not rules
Two workers producing co-operative Tofu in Oregon had thought a lot atx)ut the 
process. From one of them came an emphasis on security as a pre-condition as well 
as a consequence of co-operation, to be pursued by t)eing "committed to 
understanding and respecting each other, not being afraid to say what you really 
mean, and taking each other seriously;" with the codicil that collective working can 
allow people to push through their plans and then evade responsibility fortherh. From 
the other came support for the significance of fourth level co-operation, linked to the 
notion that we need "to feel that one's life is significant beyond itself."
6,000 miles away, Sarah works at a city farm in Bristol that has just transformed itself 
into a co-operative. She puts a lot of weight on people leaming how to get the most
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from meetings, and I'm sure she's right. The core skill, she suggests, is creative 
listening. She also echoed Bosse, a Swedish journalist, with the idea that the 
identification of a cultural hegemony can t>e misleading. He had pointed out, sutJtly, 
that many people profess free market irresponsibility while contributing voluntarily to 
community welfare. This cognitive dissonance could be exploited to let them see their 
ideologies in a different light. Not surprisingly. Bosse is a joumaiist, just come from 
setting up local radio in Estonia. Sarah confirmed that there is a lot of dissonance 
about. Even though the cartoons her daughter watches émerge from a capitalist 
system, the greedy are often portrayed as stupid and ugly. In a complex world are 
simple messages always deceitful?
Another Jane was next on the list. She and Andy and i worked the green movement 
together for some time, and they still do. I would like to think that my work could 
contribute to what they're doing. It's certainly intended to do so, though this present 
project may take a long time, and may be a failure in its immediate form. We all know 
about that. You prod and try, suck it and see, and when an opportunity arises, you all 
pile in through the breach in the establishment's walls. Both Andy and Jane have 
taught me about infinite patience, and Andy taught me street theatre too, which is very 
useful at academic conferences. We used it for agit-prop in the green cause, and to 
some extent the communication of the argument may depend on such techniques.
You mustn't try to fool people, but nor is it appropriate to confuse tedium with 
worthiness. The message Jane would always like to reinforce is the importance of trust 
in building any social institution.
I couldn't help but trust Lief, my ageing Oregonian farm  commune hippie companion.
In his role as security guard at the Fourth of July party he dealt with any attempts to 
subvert the event by finding you a beer or giving you a hug. If you felt insecure, you
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went to him. To report our conversation on top of the farm canteen at the fair in 
academic terms would be faintly ludicrous. Two well-matured and well-stoned musical 
carpenter hippies celebrating trees, life and music on a summer's day speak in 
shorthand. Some of the more accessible understandings that emerged were these.
"All there is is one spirit of life, and what happens inhibits or furthers life. Community 
is life enhancing. Spiritual needs are fundamental. Attitude rather than intellect leads 
to righteous behaviour......Change is necessary but as Frank Hert)ert said "Language
cuts the grooves in which our thoughts must run;" to change our thoughts we must
change our language Pain is a fierce ally membership must be dear,
responsibilities must be accepted, apprenticeship may be necessary it maybe
looks like the ship is sinking. Some will weep, some will grab, but we're trying to go 
down with honour, and, who knows? There's a chance we'll save the ship...”
As for my role, as someone trying to express a way fonward using the language of the 
old grooves. Lief enjoyed the vision of me jumping up and down and waving a flag 
and, in the tradition of Suggsy"s dedaration, advising the world: "Dont iook there, iook 
here! This is the heavy, heavy monster sound....Monsters....ROLL!" Like I say, two old 
hippies....
Vet is that so silly? A far more serious conversation took place with a Danish visitor to 
the commune, himself from a Christian community in Denmark. He was troubled in his 
spirit and his mind, and though we seemed to share many ideas, the feeling of 
community kept slipping away. Back home they find they have to move so far up the 
chain; if they want organic fertiliser they have to have a herd of cows; if they want a 
herd of cows. .. He works as an environmental noise sdentist, and contributes a lot of 
capital to the community when he's there. I couldnt help feeling that it's easier for
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those of us who feel that if there is godliness it is in all of us, rather than in an extemal 
entity. Nor am I sure that my view of co-operation can live with strong religious 
convictions, which attribute omniscience to a god, and, all too frequently for my tastes, 
to the priesthood thereof. He was also evasive, and could neither disagree with nor 
endorse my model. Something was nagging him, and the commune fanners have a 
point. It is not by intellectual conviction, in the end, that a new world will come about, 
but through leaming to love each other and ourselves. Was the melancholy Dane 
strong up by the attempt to reconcile dissonant roles which are incompatible, or am I 
imposing a Hamlet persona too glit>ly on him?
Which takes us back to the structure vs attitude conundrum, if roles - whether God's or 
ours -carve grooves in which we run, can we create social forms, or should we seek to 
develop our capacity to construct off the cuff, on the ron, from a deeper 
understanding? (Kohlberg's post conventional morality comes into its own again. 
[Kohlberg, 1981D
This stuff is right up Subtxj's street. He had just completed a PhD at the LSE and was 
retuming to take up a post as leader writer on The Hindu, a respected national 
newspaper. His interests coincided with mine, and we talked political philosophy for 
hours on a train, and in cafes and in his brother's home in south Madras. The point of 
agreement was the outline of the paradigm; the points of contention concemed the 
philosophy of procedural co-operation.
Subbu's argument, following Rawls to some extent, is that the state must be neutral 
between conceptions of the good. A successful social contract is that which balances 
the interests of sectoral interests within the state - "social arrangements to minimise 
conflict", as he said. Looking back a year or so later, I recognise the similarities
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between Siva and Subbu's outlook, and perhaps grasp one of the points Alan has 
been nagging me about.
I recognise individuals and individuals interacting, but pay iittle attention to formaiised 
groups. This, I would suggest, is because i am discussing a way of acting and 
constructing in which it is assumed that all people are ipso facto morally relevant. Co­
operation is fluid, to my mind, while traditional ideologies may have tended to 
emphasise structure and boundary maintenance rather than process. [Subbu goes for 
structure as the manifestation of procedural co-operation; I go for process, or, better 
still, attitude.]
Of course, there is the possibility that most ideologies start as images of modes of 
behaviour and become stultified once they become manifest in organisations and 
political structures. The Indian co-operative movement sometimes strikes one like 
that.
One way in which messages become ossified is when the word of a leader becomes 
sacrosanct. This is one of the problems I have with Gramsd, whom I suspect of 
having inspired Dick, an old school socialist from the valleys, and a colleague of mine 
in the recycling trade. According to Gramsci, we need an intellectual elite to overthrow 
the cultural hegemony [Joll,1977], so that the people can lead themselves to the 
promised land. Fair enough, I suppose; but do not the words of leaders become 
sacrosanct beyond their time and place? Islam comes to mind again.
A traditionaiism that appears to be induced by Islam is very noticeable at times. I 
visited a kitchen garden project out in the sticks, where a young man was having a 
huge success; but when the family from whom he leased the land were asked why
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they didn't foilow suit, the answer was that they were rice farmers. That's it; what you 
are is what you stay.
Ahmed Farooq came from the same area. I went with friends up to an island village in 
north west Bangladesh - an island amidst sea during the floods, and fields at other 
times - for the new year, and Farooq was an educational project supervisor. We spoke 
quite a lot at>out Shakepeare, and quite a lot atwut co-operation, sitting in a garden by 
candlelight, watching people crossing a stream on a bamtxx) bridge.
He was supportive of the paradigm, but his strong Islamic faith conspired with my 
scepticism to lead to some friendly dissonance. To recall one of his comments; he 
would be happy for his wife to work if she wanted to and had the better job - but being 
Muslim she would not want to. Women are weaker, men must protect them. Usury we 
could agree on; you eam by working, not by owning. Negotiation is an interesting 
issue; he is bounded by definitive constraints, I am bounded by my commitments, 
which are at least superficially more adaptable. Holistic welfare is shared, but the 
motives are different; he wishes to obey the explicit instructions of a benevolent god, I 
go for empathy. Nevertheless, his personified God represents the transcendence of 
incorporation and ego, and we also agreed that if you perceive something as beautiful 
but bad, or good but ugly, you have some sorting to do - the Ahmed-Brauer-Kawimura 
Theory of Aesthetic and Ethical Harmonisation. (Kawamura was a feliow student of 
mine studying philosophy, who introduced me to a variety of Japanese conceptions.)
Perhaps the most crucial point of variance between Farooq and myself was that he 
favoured charismatic leadership, consensually supported, whereas my view of 
procedural co-operation lays a lot more emphasis on participation. The point at which 
leadership becomes oppressive or non-adaptive is not always easy to discern; but
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essentially I think that as circumstances change rules have to t>e adapted if their 
orlginai intention is to be fulfilled. The influence of leadership can be perpetuated past 
its healthy shelf life.
Consider the intemational commune at Auroville. My notes t>egin: 'Aurobindo sprouted 
the Mother, the Mother the Ashram, the Ashram Auroville...' Aurobindo was a guru. 
The Mother was an acolyte and organiser, who built the ashram, which is a place of 
beauty and holy calm. Auroville was bom out of the ashram as an intemational 
commune, on land donated by the state. There is a tradition of stress, because the 
ashram seniors still want to run the commune, but the commune believes it now owns 
itself. Germaine Greer got into a tussle with Suzanne Moore in The Guardian because 
having paid her dues, she felt that Moore was not showing the respect that was 
appropriate. One of the moot points of life is the question of when an apprenticeship 
becomes a sharing, or when the acolyte has superseded their sponsor.
Problems of leadership and proscription, then, are not peculiar to authoritarian 
religions. All the same, much can be leamed from that context, and juxtaposing 
Catholicism and Islam is interesting. My friends Maria and Paul, aid workers in 
Bangladesh, are Catholics, so that the question of the coerciveness of religions such 
as theirs and that of the Muslims became an unresolved area of det>ate and 
speculation.
Paul talked quite a bit about the self-reinforcing process of dogmatism in the social 
and psychological realms'. I'm not sure I'd use the same terminology, but I can see 
what he means. A culture may encourage a style of opinion-holding Irrespective of the 
content. More importance is attached to the strengths of one's beliefs than to the 
content. Paul might have enjoyed Richard Bawden from Hawkesbury, Oz, leading a
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discussion the other day on how to transform people from dogmatism to relativism. A 
model that he used, illustrated t)elow, suggested a spiral of personal development.
holism
relativism
holonocentric ecocentric
egocentric technocentric
reductionism
objectivism
According to Richard Bawden, there is a common evolution starting from egocentriclty 
and developing anti-clockwise. Since it is in some ways a paradigmatic presentation of 
theories of child development [Piaget,1969; Erikson,1977], there is a fair degree of 
validation. I would argue that the relativism of the egocentric and the holonocentric 
are rather dissimilar. Egocentriclty is not relativistic as an epistemology, since all alien 
views are simply seen as mistaken. That apart, however, I can imagine the paradigm 
being a useful context for considering how you move people round the cycle, 
especially where there are in-built constraints on interpretation of dogma, as is the 
case in the hierarchy of Catholicism, and the traditionalism of Islam.
Dr Thomas at St Thomas' College In Kerala talked of this with me as we walked the 
evening hills, for all the world like Father Brown and Flamt)eau on Hampstead Heath 
[Chesterton,1992:20]. He is committed to faith; i to scepticism. The significant
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distinction, we agreed, was that faith is only open to endogenous critiques, while 
scepticism demands a continuous openness to new perspectives and radical shifts in 
understanding. Dr Thomas saw the stability of faith as an emotional necessity; which 
is, curiously enough, a pragmatic rationalisation of faith. While it is conceivable that 
faith will lead to submissiveness to a religious elite. Dr Thomas was clearly more 
committed to an almost pantheistic, empathie and poetic vision. At some of the meals 
we shared, we were almost conspiritorial. For him to live in peace in his community, it 
is as well not to raise the question of the church's response to the collapse of eastem 
European communism. With one less enemy, one might have thought that discipline 
could be relaxed; but one might percieve instead a form of triumphalist opportunism. 
While the devil is on the back foot, that is a good time to reinforce the authority of the 
church. (Do you recall the fishing community at Marianad?)
I think it would be fair to represent his position by the idea that we must choose faith 
t)ecause we are incapable of handling the unexplained; an attitude which would offer 
hope and comfort to Flood and Romm's conviction that postmodemism is always 
gloomy [Flood and Romm,1995:473]. This is problematic to me, as I have explained, 
and one of the reasons for my concem can t>e explained via a colleague of Dr 
Thomas.
With Father Matthew there were two issues. First of these was whether the Bible 
should be taken literally, and on this we could agree. He suggested that the Creation 
could be understood as true in the discourse of the time, txjt that, essentially, faith is 
ineffable, and therefore all descriptions of it are to some extent metaphoric. (He's 
working on a PhD: Death and Transcendence In the wtxks ofHelruich Boll.) On the 
second point we disagreed. He believes that the moral metaphor requires a brahmin 
caste to translate and interpret ft, whereas I see the metaphor as being a construction
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in which all can participate. Religious groups which have no clergy suggest that it is 
possible to see morality as exogenous without brahmins.
Dick the Gramscian might agree with him, on more or less similar grounds. (Marxism 
and Catholicism often seem to attract people of similar casts of mind.) Dick had an 
interesting response to the co-operative paradigm. It's populist, he says; but that isn't 
incompatit)le with an implicit rigour. Ignorance and alienation make people suckers for 
capitalism, he says; how do we create conditions in which people not only want to 
have a voice but insist on it? "I believe in giving people responsibility, but I'm also 
very demanding. I have no hang ups about power, and I don't suffer fools gladly."
An account of my experiences in an east Nepali village a long day's scramble away 
from Ilam, may help to construct the tension between an active faith and 
authoritarianism.
I cant give Scran's real name. He was a Christian missionary at a time when they 
were banned by royal decree as an unacceptable intervention. Christianity is seen as 
an alien cultural influence in many parts of the east, and aggressive proselytising is 
understandably unwelcome. The Nepalese monarchy dkJnt want its oligopoly upset by 
an altemative, perhaps, while I'm just against cultural hegemony in any form.
He moved up into the hills ten years ago when the village was three rice-straw huts. 
Using his own savings he founded a school, around which the village grew into a 
Himalayan equivalent of a Hampshire village. He wanted to bring Christianity to poor 
people because he saw the caste system as Inequitaisle, Hinduism as a hindrance to 
economic development, and the gods as rather arbitrary sadists. In my notes it says
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[He] operates by living according to Jesus as best he can, and by iiving 
the story and reiating the parabies, he is not offering others a voice, but a 
vocabulary. This is not to say he is intolerant of others' voices; simpiy that 
he has faith in the voice he has heard, and wants to live his life sharing it.
 [He] is a pragmatist not a dogmatist.
As a pragmatist, he has a programme, visiting house to house, openly 
Christian, but more concerned with talking about hygiene and rabbits, 
using the respect he has gained in the neighbourhood - six teachers now 
at his school - to gain an ear, but using neither this nor the school as a 
means of indoctrination. Simpiy, this is Jesus' story, and it works for me.
... Jesus is full of stories about oxen and asses and grinding com, the 
imagery is not anachronistic here - living in harmony with what we have, 
growing together.
This approach may not be unique, but I think it's effective. Consider one of his 
converts, whom I met in the market in Ham. He is a soldier; a bombardier. After 17 
years he'll take his pension and go t)ack to work in the village, where his wife and 
children await him. He'll try to start up a business, but for the general benefit, not 
dominated by the pursuit of personal gain. Leadership is important, but he is very 
clear that this is a matter of inspiration not coercion; and pragmatically based. As with 
his mentor, he believes that if you show through your life how good living can be, and 
tell the story, others will follow your example.
I can picture him in the cafe where we spoke, excitable, getting his english words 
confused but never satisfied until I was clear on each point, and then eager to know 
whether we agreed; not so much intellectual co-generation as shared excitement. In
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my opinion, he, and even more particularly his teacher, were involved in cultural 
intervention in one of the least oppressive styles; offering ideas in a digestible form, 
as one child of god to another. The Sikkimese missionary, however, was quite odious 
to me. and a pure process interventionist. He didn't care what people did, as long as 
they did it within the religious franchise he held from the authorities at the missionary 
training college run by rich Madrasi Christians.
We were stuck with each other in a lamp-lit hut because of a thunderstorm. To prove 
his point he had brought a thirteen year old boy, who recited a dream he had. 
Interpreted by one of the teachers at Soran's school. I could retell the dream in all its 
lurid glory, but basically he dreamed that Kali was going to carve out his heart, and 
then a blue-eyed bloke with a blonde beard and a white nightshirt appeared in a 
golden glow and Kali imploded. For this he was petted and rewarded; and maybe he 
really did dream it, and mayt>e like Snobby Price in Major Barbara, he just realised 
that every time you cry out that you've been saved you get a cup of cocoa and a 
biscuit.
I'm not at all sure how you avoid this; but perhaps what I've said makes it clearer why 
I'm extremely dubious about the suggestion that imposing process does much more 
than encourage a few locals to memorise your rule book. Soran offered a process 
paradigm, through active parables. He didn't tell others how to organise their own 
communities, yet they profited from that of his which they adopted.
Getting things done
Who first commented on the curious choice of the label business? Accomplishment is 
clearly distinguishable from simply being busy. Soran was busy, but it is for the 
outcomes that he is worthy of praise.
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Sometimes aid agencies faii by this criterion. When I went to UEA, the Development 
Department presented a lecture to celebrate twenty years of failure. They were quite 
explicit about that; with the curious post-script that now they had it right. Why we 
should trust them, I dont know; but govemments define academics as clever so that 
when things go wrong they can say that they had given their money to and sought the 
advice of the cleverest people; what more could they have done?
I dont think there's muon doubt that the use of overseas aid is very mixed in its 
effects. The Dhaka field director of a major British charity described Bangladesh as a 
basket case. Before there is an awareness of the possibility or of the need for change, 
assumptions must be challenged. Those who accept drought as an act of god might 
do well to ask why they believe it; and, subsequently, what they might do about it. 
Deforestation, private theft of public resources, and mega-dams in India may be part 
of god's will, but it might be possible to negotiate with her/him on the issue. So, along 
with the immediate alleviation of the direst poverty, she believes in education; and so 
do I, and neither of us means being trained to act as an economic unit.
The Ford Foundation representative was suspicious of ideology, talking a lot about the 
importance of pragmatism. Since I believe that clarity in ideology is a necessity to 
pragmatic politics, we were always at odds, not over the paradigm itself, but over the 
way in which an ideology might be used. My response to this point of view is that we 
all have ideologies and that it is probably preferable to be aware of them, if only to 
increase the chances of reconciling them with those of others; and to achieve intemal 
consistency. In the five year plan report of a major indigenous charity supported by the 
Ford Foundation, it was argued both that in various sectors there is imperfect and 
distorted market operation' which requires correction, and that there is a need to
page 301
'correct market imperfection and bias and provide strength to the poor in the markets 
which become more free.' I don't suppose I need to draw attention to the contradiction 
inherent in intervention to liberate markets; but I would like to point out that the co­
operative paradigm resolves this paradox, and might thereby contribute to a clearer 
understanding of the policies they seek to promote.
In other respects we were in complete accord. He was very strongly into networks and 
advocacy; aspects of what I now tend to call the equitable construction of social 
institutions. This was evident in the charity to which I've just referred, one of whose 
senior officers i met. He shared the Ford Foundation's concem for effective practice, 
and in their advocacy programme I found much to admire, even if charisma seemed 
to take precedence over participation. Since one of the essentials of their programme 
is to establish contact with sympathisers in groups not traditionally aligned with the 
social development perspective, there may be good reason to fudge ideological 
issues. My preference for bringing forward controversial issues and increasing our 
capacity to handle diversity is only an article of faith; but comparing Argyris and 
Schon's view of learning organisations [Argyris,1982], in which such skills are seen as 
fundamental, with the emollient bureaucracies that prevail in so many inadequate 
organisations, i am not tempted to change my mind for the present.
Loyalty and coherence, though effective in many respects, can be dangerous.
Leaming to think for yourself is a pre-requisite of participation; dissonance the 
adumbration of synthesis. One of the least effective projects I visited, in the Nepali 
hills, had had a tradition of being fanatically well organised in a hierachical form. 
Failure was recognised in the form of a massive reonemation; a failure i would 
attribute to neglect of cultural, as opposed to structural, change.
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Illustrating this perspective was a Gorkha, a supervisor on construction projects, 
recently joined. He is word perfect in the jargon; consultation, bottom-up initiatives, 
facing the people, making sure that the poor and the women have a voice, even, gawd 
help us, dialoguing problems. The people are aware, he says. Communists and 
Congress working together to promote small-scale accessible business opportunities: 
income generation through chickens and pigs and rabbits and kitchen gardens, some 
for consumption, some for exchange.
Why was I so suspicious of him? Was it because his attitude to the local people 
reminded me of some Germans joking about Schwabians and Saxons. These are dim- 
witted farmers, lacking vision, initiative and ambition. We Gorkhas are a vigorous 
people - we may get drunk and throw money around, but we're willing to take risks. 
We're entrepreneurs and innovators, i think he was just carrying out orders, which 
happened to instruct him to be participative; but working in a highly structured 
hierarchy the word had no authentic referent.
A colleague of his is responsible for administration on this project in eastem Nepal, 
and must have done a superb job under the old project leader. When I ask him to tell 
me about his work, he talks, I am willing to swear, for an hour without breaks or 
hesitations, describing the stages and sub-stages prescribed as appropriate for every 
village project. [Did the Roman army not used to do this? Every camp, everywhere in 
the world, was laid out the same; come to think of it, is not Macdonald's run on the 
same principle?]
Despite this, the administrator is eager for change. What worries me slightly is that 
although he favours, theoretically, self-definition, he does not apply it to himself. We 
discussed the co-operative paradigm in some detail, and he follows it without difficulty;
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and accepts it. I don't believe he'd be equally ready to believe Stalin if he were the 
next to come in, but it made me terribiy aware of a particular problem. Where people 
are forced into dependency, whether through circumstances or through other people's 
lust for power, the skill of self-definition atrophies; and as Dave in Bristol pointed out, 
the first essential of co-operation is a sense of identity, even if the second is 
transcendence of the ego.
So how will Ton, the new Dutch project director, deal with all this? Pretty weli i would 
have thought. We spent quite a lot of time discussing people-centred development 
and so on. Of course, no subject exists in isolation, and sometimes its easier to 
understand what's going on by looking at the adjoining fields of study. On one side of 
the MHP is technoiogy; bridges, irrigation. On another, agricuiture. Micro-economics. 
Innovation. Politics. Anthropology. History. What's missing? Philosophy?
Maybe this isnt just paranoia. Maybe that's what is missing. Ton studied with Norman 
Long, and I'd read Battlefields of Knowledge, his recent magnum opus, so let me 
quote from it;
The essence of the actor-oriented approach is that its concepts are 
grounded in the everyday life experiences and understandings of men
and women In essence, we are interested in developing theoreticaily
grounded methods of social research that allow for the elucidation of 
actors' interpretations and strategies, and of how these interlock through 
processes of negotiation and accommodation. [Long and Long, 1992:5]
This is necessary, he believes, because good poiicy depends on research, and he has 
no faith in simplistic systems thinking' or ethnographic particularism' [lbld:4].
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How strange this sounds, i can foiiow what he means, but I cant see how it differs 
significantly from soft or critical systems or other faciiitative interventions. The overail 
aim is to present
a useful conceptual framework for people to analyse their own life 
circumstances and to assess the possible strategies for action. [ibid:272] 
Sounds like a process paradigm to me. The peopie's content. Long's conceptuai 
framework. No intervention is neutral; but if no intervention is neutral, how do we 
intervene justly?
One's answer is likeiy to depend on one's ideoiogy, and in that respect Thomas and 
Lockett's injunction to make one's premises expiicit appears reasonable [Thomas and 
Lockett,1991:100]. If one follows this line of thought in the context of the co-operative 
paradigm, the traditional social scientific intervention may appear to be coercive. I 
have also heard an academic in a development studies department give a lecture in 
which he proposed that in the aftermath of any Bangladeshi disaster, the victims 
should simply be given money to make what arrangements they please. The idea that 
preconditions such as perfect information, protection against deceit and extortion, 
many suppliers, and free entry to the market would be met in these circumstances 
seems highly implausible; yet it is on the basis of these that the efficiency and equity 
of the markets is postulated, indigenous and expatriate aid workers in Dhaka shared 
my bafflement at this proposal.
Whether in less extreme circumstances simply doling out money to those in distress 
would successfully remediate their condition is perhaps less likely to be met with 
incredulity. On the other hand, even, or especially, market ideologists tend to reject 
the idea that throwing money at a problem will make it go away. Furthermore, simply
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imposing market discipline has been seen to have such disastrous effects that even 
the IMF and the World Bank have recognised the need for reform [Laii,1990].
Talking with Ton and others contributed greatly to my appreciation of just how difficult 
it is not to be dogmatic when you have the power; and the rich who intervene in the 
affairs of poor nations inevitably have power. Of course, my approach is not neutral. 
That which distinguishes it is, I think, the focus on paradigms. Neither the content nor 
process of local decisions is open to imposition; ail one can offer in conceptuai terms 
is accessible sets of tools. It is up to local social systems to incorporate them if they 
choose to do so; and perhaps this would provide an inbuilt response to the problem of 
trajectories.
Nevertheless, one can only act according to one's best beliefs; and, of course, mine 
are as likeiy to be disastrous as anyone eises. One reason for supposing that my work 
might be futile would be if my human ontology is skewiff: what if people do get their 
kicks from win/iose rather than win/win scenarios?
It was a relief to chat with Dr Satheesh, a manager at a milk producers' co-operative in 
Tamil Nadu. Rather than introduce the model early, i was now discussing others' 
interests in general terms, and then superimposing the paradigm onto what they had 
said, to see where it fitted. Although he agreed with the general sense of the 
paradigm, he thought it failed to make enough allowance for animal aggression in us. I 
asked him if his doctorate was in biology, and he said no, he was a vet. We thought 
this very funny; but he may be right. My intellectual commitment is to our potential to 
transform ourselves thrcugh our Imaginations, but It would be simplistic to deny that I 
have all sorts of urges which may be innate and irrepressible.
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Anyway, let's pretend that he's a cynic, even if the third point suggests that he's an 
interesting and caring one. This was his argument for faise consciousness: corruption 
can be both an inhibiting and a facilitating factor. To serve people well you may have 
to deceive them as to how you serve them. I disagree. Violence breeds violence, 
deceit breeds deceit; but I have to acknowledge that the political system in India would 
probably prove almost entirely intractable to any interventions of mine. Mutual back- 
scratching is not just a social institution in India. I would say it's the national sport. All 
the same, such wheeling and dealing can be done for the interests of the few or the 
interests of the many. As Dr Satheesh says, corruption can be facultative as well as 
inhibiting.
Rao (from the Co-operative Management institute) and I were later to agree that, in 
any case, where an instrumental ethic dominates, there is a strong possibility that the 
trust-based culture of co-operation will be eroded by opportunism. In India, the 
emphasis on the commerdai success of cooperatives may be seen as encouraging 
this; responsibility to the community may be implied in most circumstances, but, very 
often, co-operatives are merely seen as an alternative form of running a business.
The Co-operative Development Foundation in Bangalore, where I met two of the 
management team, was strongly disposed towards this point of view. Understandably, 
given political intervention in and manipulation of the co-operative movement in India, 
as well as its sponsorship, there are those who are fiercely defensive of the co­
operative's right to independence; to serve its members interests. A summary we 
agreed of their position reflects their rather rational economic behaviour' model of co­
operation, in contrast to the more subtle delights of empathie and synergetic benefits, 
and the compensation through procedural co-operation for the failures of the market.
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It's not that they didnt agree It would be that way In an ideal world; but they doubted 
that it could be sustained on any large scale in the foreseeable future.
in connection with this, I found that a number of people worked through homogeneous 
groups to build co-operative practice. Solid foundations, indeed, but does this address 
the wider issue? and, in desparate circumstances, should it? Is concem for others a 
luxury? Many people also mentioned the part security has to play in allowing co­
operation to blossom.
Two Bangladeshis stressed this last point. Both were highly impressive, though they 
are very contrasting characters. Each operates effectively and to widespread 
admiration on aid projects with a budget of about $1 million. Mobin deals with 
emergencies, which are as common in Bangladesh as rice in a paddy field; Siddique 
was dealing with the urban programme. In developing mutual aid, he consistently 
found the best results were aohieved when starting with homogenous groups, whether 
the tie was gender, family, or region of origin of the participants.
On the other hand, a criticism of the Bangladeshi NGOs was made by a local 
development consultant. He had read The Lords of Poverty [Hancock, 1991] a book 
which extends Chambers' theory of development tourism to suggest that aid 
organisations end up merely serving themselves. When we praise effectiveness at the 
expense of ideals, we perhaps should remember that the corruption of ideals may 
itself be eventually ineffective.
The same issues arose in Oregon, mutatab's mutandis. My meeting with Dwight and 
Russell of the Eugene [Oregon] Farmers' Co-operative reflected the CDF argument. 
They took me out to lunch at Annnie's Diner, and ate steaks while I had a salad.
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Although both come from farming backgrounds in Washington state, and each has a 
university education, they are radically different. Dwight thinks of himself as a working 
stiff, and brought Russell along as the intellectual of the organisation. Where the 
aitemative currency and the bio-regional movement (which you have yet to meet) is 
idealistically motivated, Dwight and Russeii are principled pragmatists. We could 
agree on all sorts of things, like the inadequacies of the market, and of coercion, but 
there was a sticking point, even though they also agreed that the communities of their 
childhoods were something else. The sticking point was that Dwight could only see co­
operation arising from mutual advantage in what is, to me, a very narrow 
individualistic sense. A link that I could not establish for him was that this was 
inconsistent with his belief that those who bought individual insurance policies outside 
the co-operative movement for the sake of a few dollars were letting their fellow 
farmers down. His faith in market driven efficiency seems to me irreconcilable with his 
community values; but I failed to persuade him that the two were part of one system 
and needed to be treated as such. One is loyal to one's family and friends, but you 
only owe fair trading to others, i'll have to think more about this. If Dwight is right, he 
may have hit on a practical bio-regional solution.
I reckon, though, that he's underestimating the extent to which fair trading involves 
loyalty, if the market depends on fairtrade, it depends on something way beyond 
calculation of personal or even family or small group advantage. An image that sticks 
in my mind comes from the backwaters of Bangladesh. I sat under a grass canopy on 
a mud floor with the twenty or so committee members of a credit union, who were 
trying to decide what to recommend should be done with their capital. The suggestion 
that was making most headway was that they should comer the local market in rice, 
and double their money later in the year.
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Problems of scale
Whatever one hopes for universal peace and harmony, there can be little doubt that 
scale is a major problem for those who seek the equitable construction of social 
institutions.
One response would be to reduce the scale of human communities. In Oregon this is a 
popular idea, widely known as bio-regionalism. One of the founders of Alpha farm, a 
commune outside Eugene, is much committed to the idea. Her status as a consultant 
to major international companies on issues of trust adds an interesting piquancy to her 
views. I tend to disagree, in that, practically, I think that there are certain global 
phenomena which have to be dealt with globally. Perhaps an intensification of 
subsidiarity would have my vote, but disaggregation does not. My moral beliefs also 
rebel at the idea. We cannot disregard the needs of others even if they live half a 
globe away.
Disaggregation is not a principle that can be rejected out of hand, however, even if 
some of its manifestations appear naive. I met with a radical bio-regional free- 
marketeer who is promoting an aitemative currency, on principles not dissimilar to the 
LETS approach. Unfortunately, although the motto on the currency is "In each other 
we trust", it is gradually becoming apparent to her that promoting a different kind of 
bank-note is not enough. The market isnt a perfect medium, it was never just the 
banks back east that made the American dream turn sour. We cant transform society 
simpiy by changing the currency, even though widespread currencies clearly reduce 
choices in local economic management in many ways.
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If that sounds derogatory, it is not intended to do so. Any effort to build a self- 
managing society deserves praise to my mind; and while unpersuaded by the 
disaggregation argument, I cannot but notice how much it reflects the desire for 
community. A conversation which tilts me towards subsidiarity was held in the garden 
of a hotei where i met Dr Nehal as we each contemplated a particularly graceful tree.
He is a highly educated man, of wide experience, working as a human ecoiogist in the 
Himalayan border regions. With him I was able to explore the whole argument as an 
academic construct; as one of the lenses, in his metaphor, through which we might 
seek to understand our experience. He couid accept it as a paradigm through which 
his views could be expressed, and contributed his own glosses and emphases:
From his experience in the hills, he had formed a view of the evolution of co-operation 
as a necessary aspect of marginal ecologies, which couid be destabilised by alien 
cultures and expectations. Such events are increasingly likely, with the softening of 
administrative boundaries as political, cultural, and economic systems cease to be 
topographically coextensive.
Leadership would be significant in determining outcomes, but in a naive democracy; 
coercion, corruption and deceit are more common than leadership as the brokerage of 
dreams. In part this is due to the power of theatrical populism, and low expectations of 
benign, equitable rule, but the shape of society is also important. Indian society might 
be portrayed as a pyramid, compared to the British rhomboid, which is disheartening if 
one believes that a pragmatic middle class is necessary to sustainable social 
evolution. Nehal also mentioned the re-evaluation of the British Raj at Jawarhalal 
Nehru university. Traditional hostility has apparently given way to an acceptance that
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in part the Raj was a form of benevolent coercion, without which the development of a 
trend towards equity might have been an even less happy experience.
Among the cultural phenomena influencing this trend, according to Nehal, are the 
problems of sectarianism, subsidiarity, and, potentially, disintegration (Nehal is of 
Hindu-Moslem extraction); and ttie voluntaristic nature of redistribution in Asian 
religions [Bose, 1984:113], which inhibits the building of the rhomboid society.
Two more comments about the size of society, each concerning ex-Yugoslavia, again 
stressing the tension t>etween the arguments. Poidi, a software wizard from Slovenia, 
felt that his country, a nation of some two million people, may be about the right size; 
but a more cohesive factor may be the common tongue, or the sense that a European 
nation did not belong in a Balkan state, or even the small farmer tradition, which 
combined independence with co-operation, according to Poldi. Another point which is 
of interest is that Slovenia has a high suioide rate, whioh two Slovenian sociologists 
and Poldi agreed could be something to do with cohesion through conformity. There's 
nowhere for the oddballs to go except the coffin.
The second point concerns Bosnia. The English painter wrote that Ih e  horrors in 
Bosnia are if anything due to a lack of coercion and an inability of any power e.g. UN, 
Nato, Europe, to take effective action." My response is to look at the mind-set of those 
who believe in a rights based morality. From such a viewpoint, intervention in the 
affairs of another state is difficult to justify, since the autonomy of sovereign states is 
one of the stranger myths of conventional politics. To tum Nozick's argument on its 
head, [Nozick, 1974:293] If a state came into being by illegitimate processes, how can 
it then claim sovereignty? And since history suggests that every state in the world has 
been imposed on its citizens, (and that the social contract is a very limited
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acknowledgement of the right to participate in the creation of social institutions), the 
autonomy of the state is a myth adapted by the powerful to protect their primacy. This 
opinion may be doubled in the case of Yugoslavia, the creation of which was evidently 
expedient for the Yalta powers, and without consultation with the people.
Not that it would be reasonable of me to question the absence of a plebisidte in 1945 
in the Balkans, indeed, imposition of boundaries may have been the most useful 
response in those circumstances. It is their perpetuation regardless of the interests of 
those affected which I question. Subsidiarity would be my preferred aitemative. but if I 
were Slovenian, I would have been as secessionist as they come.
Ail this, of course, supposes that the market doesn't erase the need for political 
negotiation of some kind. Opinion seems reasonably consensual on the principle if not 
the degree of this assumption, but it may be worth noting that if labour and exchange 
could be conducted in a spirit of right livelihood, the market might function as God's 
hand. Mahatma Gandhi expressed this Buddhist belief on a pillar in the station at 
Bangalore - not, i hasten to add. that he was a spray-can graffiti vandal; this was a 
posthumous poster quoting him.
Service which is rendered without joy helps neither the servant nor the 
served. But all other pleasures and possessions pale into nothingness 
before service which is rendered in a spirit of joy.
Ethical trading
Such synergy is not the common experience or outlook, I fear; yet the idea of ethical 
trading as a response to the problem of scale makes market institutions a vital 
ingredient of the imperfect society. My detestation of most of what Margaret Hilda 
Thatcher stood for seems to have confused me on this point initially.
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One of the workers at the wholefood co-operative was sufficiently critical to trigger a 
major change in my outlook, although it was not until i'd been in the hotbed of west 
coast USA market enterprise that the issues really sorted themselves out. The father 
of this member is an oddbaii, who successfully entered the computer market to 
subsidise a communal style of life; yet what I seemed to be saying was that market 
and co-operation are irreconcilable.
The resonse I offered him was, I think inadequate in many respects, though it 
contained some interesting points. My inadequacy was due to a failure to distinguish 
dearly between the market as a useful mechanism, and the market as an ideology. In 
the former role, it is dearly subordinate to co-operative institutions, while the 
ideological interpretation often denies any strudurai limitations, and therefore of any 
need to compensate for them. At the time i analysed the problem by asking why 
people should use co-operative dynamics within the family and the dan, and yet be 
scornful of their generalisation to wider sodety. My answer was based on the idea that 
the ability to appredate coerdon is probably innate; to understand the possibilities of 
trading fairly accessible; but to accept the rationality of mutual responsibility requires 
both insight and faith in others. Why, then, do people not rejed market theory, I 
asked? Because they are too stupid, I answered.
i do think there is some sense in this response. I dont believe that the problems of 
scale are the only reason why many people are reludant to extend their domestic co­
operative attitude to the wider community; and i also tend to believe that the 
aggression of the free market ideology has tended to invade the domestic realm. 
Nevertheless, if John remained dissatisfied on this point, which he did, it was an 
encouragement to me to sort out this mess of ideas. To blame my opacity on the
page 314
obscurity of the subject matter, even if it is complex, was never acceptable, since my 
very task was to try to clarify the rationale. I believe I did, eventually. The market as 
an institution in which we exchange ttie differentiated products of our specialised 
latx)ur can be highly t)eneficial; ttie market ideology, which claims that the outcomes of 
all such exchanges are Just, is nonsense. The optimal fCrm of social organisation will 
encourage market exchange; but it will also encourage social responsibility within the 
market, and in compensating for the structiued faillies of distribution of ttie benefits of 
exchange.
Was I merely stupid in not recognising this, or is it like the crossword due? Once you 
know the answer, its easy. Similarly, if eventually my argument appears to be Sybil 
Fawtt/s spedal subjed - the deedin' obvious - that may be a tribute to my analytic 
and integrative skills rather than evidence that I've spent most of these years of study 
down the pub.
A development management consultant in Dhaka, Javed, had similar difficulties in 
resolving these issues, though as a Moslem he couldnt resolve them in the company 
of a contemplative pint. From a socialist educational bias he had swung behind the 
free market. He could agree with the paradigm, but would be very reludant to 
intervene more than minimally in market forces, essentially because of the complexity 
issue. My notes tell me we were eventually recondled by the market 
institutions/market ideology distinction; but how to get one without getting the other we 
couidnt decide.
Had I visited Oregon earlier I might not have suffered so long in awaiting the 
distinction that allows one to detest and revere the market simultaneously. Carol is 70 
years old, but still trades for a iiving, whatever she can trade. There are several co­
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operative outlets for home-produced artefacts, and she is involved in most of them. 
She has chickens too in her backyard, i think it was principaliy through her that i 
recognised that whiie part of my attitude to the market at that time was due to a 
revulsion at many aspects of Thatcherism, this was grafted on to a good old English 
middle class snobbery about trade. Carol persuaded me, with her practical 
Episcopalian notions of contributing what you can, that there is no more honourable 
profession than manufacture and exchange. Commerce is a form of co-operation. 
Exploitation is not a necessary corollory of trading. Through that i came to the 
distinction between market as institution and market as ideology, which is now central 
to my way of thinking. (Amongst other contributions from Carol was my introduction to 
the slogan "Commit random acts of kindness and senseless beauty ")
The market idea was reinforced strongly by two of the workers who produced tofu in 
the same town. Both of them believed in trade, and did it weli. They are the prindpai 
movers behind a business that is successful on many levels. I think they also liked the 
way I worked when I lent a hand, though they didn't have to reward me with enough 
tempeh to feed me for a week. Just being allowed to dean out the milk fridge which 
Ken Kesey had donated to the co-op would have been reward enough. Only connect, 
whether it be with each other or with your cultural roots; or in my case, disconnect 
from my cultural roots. Commerce is co-operative, and whiie professors and lawyers 
may not sully their hands directly, who has the power to validate their daim to more 
than their fair share of the output of sodety? Is it the small shopkeeper, or is it the 
middle dass professional? Two guesses, and it's not the shopkeeper.
We're ail involved in constructing the reward systems of our sodeties, even if only 
through aquiescence. What troubles me is the contrariety of the messages that are put
Out.
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Bosse, the Swede, and one or two others commenting on the dissonance between 
expressed faith in the market and actual practice. Prakash typifies this. He is a 
wheeier-deaier in Kathmandu, whom i got to know because I asked him to make a 
shoulder bag to my own design.
This occasioned great excitement, as it might represent a brief market advantage. 
(Patents mean nothing in the bag trade. Innovations are copied very rapidly:) All in ail, 
production of the prototype took several days, during which I spent a lot of time sitting 
cross legged in the shop with Prakash and his friends drinking tea. People come and 
go. Some deals are done. Prakash explains to me through a translator - Vishnu, from 
the cafe next door - that he is a businessman. He believes that market freedom is the 
great motivator, and that under such a system people get what they deserve. At one 
point a mountebank appears and downs, touching my foot. No-one gives him money. 
Lazy people should be made to work. (On Nepali roads, in the hills, gangs of women 
break stones for ten hours a day with small hammers; work for food, and a share in a 
shelter.) Thieves should be punished. People get what they deserve; it's obvious.
Nevertheless, I notice that when an old friend comes by looking for work, Prakash is 
upset by not having any to offer him. Someone goes off on the motor-bike to fetch the 
dips needed to complete the bag. When he returns, there is a commotion; the dips 
were more expensive than expeded. There is much discussion about whether the 
charge should be passed on to me. (Vishnu tells all later.) The collective decision is 
that it should not, even though i've said nothing. Businessman? Prakash? I don't 
believe that he's a rational economic man. The major dynamic in his life is prindpled 
social construdion, even Involving the women. The market he believes in is not the 
market ideoiogy, but the institutions of the market. He's synthesised market and co­
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operation for himself, as far as I could judge his behaviour over three days; but no 
public ideoiogy validates his position for him.
The same contradiction was evident in Mahabalipuram, where I met Siva. 
Mahabaiipuram is a tourist resort for both travellers and Madrasis, partly because of 
the stone carving, partly because of the beach. When Siva's dad celebrated 
independence here on August 15th 1947, it was very different. Siva runs a small shop 
on the main street, just up from the bus depot. His dad was a bailiff for a landowner 
nearby. Their family history is woven into the land and its people, and the 
maintenance of tradition is paramount to him. It is a charitable tradition. Siva would 
give bananas to a beggar, and, at the festival of the cows, he stripped out quite a high 
proportion of his small stock to provide gifts for the orphanage. At the same time, he is 
rather aggressive in business. He delays payment for stock, if he can get away with it. 
His loyalty is to his family.
I remained puzzled by him. His practice was mostly more consistent with the paradigm 
than was his theory. He tended to see the world as largely corrupt, and therefore to be 
treated with chicanery; the ideal is impossible, live in the world as it is. especially 
when you have no pension rights. Once i defined community as that set of people 
from whom one doesn't expect immediate reciprocity. Stariding by that, the lesson of 
Siva might be that communities with strong boundary maintenance -as is the case 
with both Tamils and Teiugus - allow two sets of standards; not a very original thought, 
but well worth recalling, even if it took several days of conversations to recognise what 
was baffling me.
Honest trading was also central to the practice of Mr Sharma, proprietor of the best 
tea shop in Ham. He was my favourite in the town, him and his family and friends.
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Patrician, perhaps, though in no way pompous, and accepting responsibility to the 
community as befits a Brahmin. Of aii the conversations we had, the iast was the 
finest, because he'd imported a teacher from the school, and the town hall scribe, who 
is the iocai representative of Amnesty. Others joined in untii H was seething with 
debate.
We talked quite a bit about local economics, and the problem of capital access, and 
so on. Everyone agrees that the political reforms are welcome; out here the old 
system was even more oppressive than in comparatively cosmopolitan Kathmandu. 
Coercion no good, but what's the relationship between the market and the culture? Do 
you pay the lowest wages you can get away with? They're glad to eat, says Sharma, 
and i'm not getting rich. Everyone laughs, including the staff who sleep on mats out 
the back, when the hubbub's explained to them.
Sharma is an Indian, and the Nehru/Gandhi tradition is to share the work around, as 
anyone who has tried cashing a travellers check at the Bank of India will know. 
Investment and trade is nevertheless seen as the key to prosperity, but what everyone 
seemed to like the most was the paraphrase of Bose; while it cannot be denied that 
"western capitalism has made the productive forces of the world yield richer fruit" man 
is, in the end, beholden to society. The Brahmins were assigned higher status and 
rights, but urged to adopt poverty willingly. Charity should ameliorate inequality [Bose, 
1984:113,168].
So cultural conservatism in one way; respect for the higher traditions of the Hindu 
faith. Sharma's children will be taught as he was. If one wishes to graft onto this a 
more entrepreneurial spirit, there is no conflict, initiative deserves a just reward. Just
page319
like Carol in Oregon; honest trading is not vicious. It is the very breath of social 
involvement; but responsibility is the heart of it.
Is there any reason why this principle should not extend to international trade? Mobin. 
the emergency organiser in Dhaka, was particularly interested in relating the model to 
the position of Bangladesh in the global market. Bangladesh has an advantage in 
cheap labour, and that’s about it. A lot of remittances from the Middle East and Britain 
has allowed some accumulation of capital in areas like Syihet, but domestically there's 
not a lot going for it. Global competition simply means that Bangladesh remains poor, 
and without a huge development in human resources is likely to remain so. People 
like Mobin can help their children, but it is quite likely to be help in escaping, rather 
than to transform Bangladesh. Aid programmes can soften the edge of extreme 
poverty, but the Rostowian notion of a sequence which all nations can foiiow to 
become capitalist democracies is far fetched as long as the market is the dominant 
global ideology. Either we olaim simply that the meagreness of the resource base 
available to those bom in Bangladesh is a case of tough luck, or compensatory 
mechanisms are essential to justice in the global economy.
That is a position that has already been established, of course. What might be 
extracted from the contributions mentioned above are some of the subsidiary 
dilemmas that have to be resolved or understood: and the same applies to another 
response to scale.
Leadership
if I had messianic tendencies, I would have two acolytes; except, of course, that 
acolytes are not what I would seek, which would be alright with them.
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Both worked at a fruit juice co-op in Oregon, and were anxious that I should make my 
message more of a crusade. Is this the tradition of moral leadership? Both were angry 
about their society, about the way power operates in it, through the media of 
persuasion backed up by brutal coercion. Lesley met me at the Oregon Country fair 
having read the summary of the argument and said she agreed with everything I'd 
written. I bet she pats stray dogs on the head, too.
Young, brave, and angry; and so were many others angry at the way in which 
leadership has become a matter of connivance and deceit - or possibly always has 
been. No-one felt this more strongly than some Brazilian friends of mine.
Margo has been a friend for a number of years. She visited me with her boyfriend 
Rodrigo. She is a medical research worker. He is a marine biologist.
Marga spoke mostly of the need for a new ideoiogy in Brazil, where the cynicism of 
both the poiiticai and religious establishments is horrendous. Mutual respect is alien 
even to the middle classes, she says; if you see a purse lying around and do not steal 
from it, everyone will think you a fool. Families may encourage loyalty within, but they 
do little to promote social responsibility, in her opinion, and if they dont counteract 
public cynicism, she doesnt know who will. She also related a wonderful story about a 
co-worker who just wouldnt co-operate, and how a trust based group came close to 
implosion because of him. For Rodrigo, it was the marketing of the market ideoiogy 
that represented the grossest distortion of leadership. An insight he offered was the 
way in which conceptual diversity is threatened through the market, by the constant 
trashing of the imagination by those who have something to sell. For each of them, 
the moral and political leaders of Brazil are as innocent as someone deliberately 
selling thalidomide as a headache tablet.
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As in Brazil, so in India; but the corruption there perhaps lies most deeply not in the 
number of rupees that are salted away, but in the way that the idea of mutual 
responsibility is derogated. G N Rao, an economist at the Institute of Development 
Studies in Thiruvanantipuram had this to add to my understanding. Firstly he reflected 
the notion that the nation-state is less useful as a unit of analysis than it used to be; 
although the concept of India, he said, is still highly significant.(Didnt Halsey claim 
that the nationalistic structure was disintegrating into racial and regional affliliations?) 
Market ideoiogy accentuates this trend, in that it legitimates individualism. The middle 
classes no longer view public service as the goal. The young ideal is to become a 
highly paid technocrat, with the opportunity to work in the USA as the ultimate goal. I 
was reading Penelope Fitzgerald's Innocence at the time, and she quotes Gramsd on 
"the intellectuals who owe nothing to the middle class, and who will resist the 
temptation to depart their birthplace for the cities." [Fitzgerald, 1986:120]
Another aspect of disintegrating loyalty is the abuse of common property resources. 
Landowners pump water, regardless of falling water tables and saline intrusion. Village 
tanks (small reservoirs) are no longer cared for communally. Social solidarity is 
definitely not chic.
Does chic seem an inappropriate term for such a serious matter? G N and I, as well as 
Dr Nehal from the Himalayas and Tasveen Singh of the India Express [5/1/95] were in 
complete agreement that Indian politics is dominated by the theatre of personality, and 
perhaps the culture of entertainment is shifting, in Bollywood movies the traditional 
hero is a humble hero who saves the community from oppression; kids today watch 
the videos which sell songs, in which sexual attraction between young consumers is 
the predominant theme. Sound bite and theatre may well encourage the adoption of 
iconic magic mechanisms such as the free market, or the racialism evident in Shiv
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Sena or the Telugu Pride movement, if the market depends on encouraging people to 
seek trivial and short-term satisfactions, why should not the political market behave in 
the same way?
Concurrent with such cynicism is the other Indian tradition, which is well represented 
in Kerala by the KSSP. I was introduced to its history by Radhakrishnan, who is 
auditor of the public employees' pension fund, and a KSSP activist.
KSSP was founded in 1962 to translate scientific texts into Mayaiayam, the Keraian 
language, but more to stimulate enquiring minds and counter superstition than to 
produce nuclear physicists. It has evolved since then, through the idea of science for a 
social revolution, towards advocacy and networking, as well as education through 
street theatre. Enablement for all through the sharing of the intellectuals might be a 
reasonable summary; Gramsd, thou shouldst be living at this hour.
Co-operation, unfortunately, has a mixed reputation in Kerala, as it does in other parts 
of India, because of political intervention. Co-operatives have thus become assodated 
with corruption, sedoral interest groups, and technocracy, at the expense of the 
prindpie which might have once motivated the movement. So the macro-micro 
articulation of politics spins round, and the scale at which co-operation can best be 
introduced remains a puzzle. Nevertheless, i am frequently recalled to Liefs notion 
that my job is to wave a flag and say "Look what these guys are doing here." In terms 
of accessibility this probably applies best to small and medium scale enterprises.
Medium scale leadership
Simon was a dose assodate of mine in Bristol, and we have had a construdively 
combative relationship for all the time we've known each other. Typical of the
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conversations we've had was Simon's assertion that it is not our circumstances that 
are competitive, but our conception of our circumstances. The issue of ascription also 
surfaced. Do we enter social contracts voluntarily, and do we have the power to 
amend them? Since Simon is something of a charismatic leader, and an effective one 
at that, we are always slightly at odds on this issue. I share with him the idea that 
many people if not inspired by someone else will remain unconstructive; but I differ 
from him in believing that it is only by creating the space for others to experience 
creative social construction that the potential can be unlocked.
It is fairly typical of the relationship between Simon and me that a matter of degree 
should have us gesturing and expostulating Our disagreement on that issue is 
symptomatic of Simon's impatience and ubermensch mentality, from my point of view; 
and my deplorable unwillingness to take responsibility from Simon's. I'm glad the issue 
of leadership came up, though. There was lots of it about in the good old days in 
Bristol, and for all my naive yeamings, I have to confess that most of the community 
projects which seemed to me the most delightful originated with an individual or a 
small group with a strong sense of purpose and a talent to persuade. This experience 
is replicated in the literature on producer co-operatives [Bradley and Gelb, 1983:12; 
Paton.l 978:32; Woolham, 1987]. However, there also seems to be a strong case for 
distinguishing between those who have the qualities necessary for innovation and 
development, and those who can maintain a project in the longer term. Management 
literature these days seems to reflect this recognition; that no individual meets every 
requirement. Complementary teams are the way to get things done. What such 
literature often seems to miss is that this may imply a network differentiated by 
function, but not necessarily one In which decision making powers and financial and 
status rewards correlate with centrality.
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Another who, in terms of activity at grass roots level, is your man comes from a 
village in Kerala. Ganghadaran is a teacher and an activist. Some might say he is an 
example of facilitative corruption, since his teaching duties seem to be suspended at 
times to allow his community work to progress. It would be hard not to admire 
someone so dedicated and hospitable, but I must admit to doubts about the technique.
Gangadharan is a great one for starting from the objective realities of the situation, 
which he believes will lead scientifically to the solution. As with many Marxists, I think 
he underestimates the significance of dreams in the redesign of society. Not that he is 
not consultative. In his panchayat they have assembled volunteers to survey the area, 
and committees have been formed to act on the social, economic and ecological 
inadequacies discovered. This is great in terms of praxis, I would guess - leaming by 
doing, debate and action hand in hand. Some of the outcomes are excellent, too, but I 
couldnt help feeling that the successes have been more than coincidentai with the 
presence of a charismatic leader, and surely depended on the support of networked 
KSSP supporters in strategic positions in the state ministries. Success may, therefore, 
be less attributable to the technique of participation, and more due to other factors.
To take another example, the President of the Presidents of the Panchayats of Kerala 
is extremely interested in the education projects, and I was much impressed with what 
they have been able to do. His achievements may, however, have a lot to do with his 
fame throughout Kerala for his handlebar moustache and for having chased the British 
out. The more I think about it, the more persuaded I am of the significance of a leader 
as a broker of dreams. Would Ganghadaran be more effective if he were to accept 
that he is himself a charismatic leader, and that he could accomplish more if he were 
less concemed with the formal structures of participation?
page 325
Even if we accept the ideal of equitable participation, the practice of it, even the 
identification of good practice, is essentially problematic. This was the topic around 
which many of my conversations in Kerala revolved. Leadership through the 
construction of a shared vision seems to me to be a seriously under-rated form of 
equitable participation. In the case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi, charismatic leadership and 
institutionalised power seemed, to me, to form a curious mix that displays both the 
power of vision, and its potential use to reinforce the status of the visionaries.
The story may be familiar. KDB is well known in development circles, partly because 
of its successes, and partly, I suspect, because of the marketing genius of Dr 
Panickar. He was seconded from the Indian Administrative Service, the civil service 
elite, when national legislation on conditions for beedi rollers led to the withdrawal of 
out-of-Kerala capital. The embarassment of losing 12,000 jobs almost ovemight led to 
considerable co-operation between state authorities, national institutions, workers, and 
the powerful local unions. Within a few years, the 12,000 jobs had been recreated, 
under vastly superior work conditions: better wages, job security, a say in the running 
of the firm, health assurance, and so on. In India, however, state investment in a co­
operative means that labour does not hire capital: the state will tend to hold a golden 
share in the control of the firm. On the other hand, if we accept the idea that the firm 
has responsibilities to the community in which it is embedded, one seemingly 
approriate way of ensuring this is that the elected representatives of the community 
should have a hand in the management of the firm.
In this case, then, there appears to have been genuine advantages to the workers in 
having a visionary leader, but the power conferred by success has tended to reinforce 
the status and authority of the leader and his cohort, rather than to allow others 
opportunities to make manifest their visions. Dont get me wrong. Dr Panickar has
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done an amazing job, and the two colleagues who vetted me before I met him were 
seriously committed to some democratic ideal. They debated the paradigm with me, 
accepted its relevance to their work, and the tentative identification of dissonance that 
I made; that is, whether the element of benevolent elitism represented a pragmatic 
compromise in a hostile environment, or the maintenance of a privileged elite who 
might, having cleared a space, allow others to operate within it.
I tend to think the latter. They, very reasonably, proposed the former. They have the 
labels for the packets of beedi printed in Tamil Nadu, where the non-unionised labour 
allows lower costs than in Kerala; but at the same time they agitate for the 
unionisation of latx)ur in Tamil Nadu, in order to give the workers a say in the running 
of firms. Perhaps the most useful way of interpreting this is to suggest the following: 
co-operation has to be shown to t>e effective at the intuitive or calculative level if the 
more abstract principle of procedural co-operation is to become widely understood and 
expected.
But what if the cynics are right, and these are not pragmatic steps, but a new mask for 
an old feudalism?
Ascription and self-definition
If one wished to express the whole issue of ascription vs self-definition, I dont think 
one could do much better than Amanda did. She was working at one of the projects to 
which I contributed in Bristol, as well as helping a collective women's help line. 
Experience has taught her to be wary of white men offering women empowerment.
She is a painter, frustrated at the moment, but hopeful. What she said which struck
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me as a fine summary was this; There is not an omnipotent creator into whose works, 
I, as an artist, walk..."
From the summary to the particular; Subbu, the blind leader writer, sees India moving 
from the ascription of feudalism and the Raj to a more associative and volitional form; 
while Chandran of the IDS in Thiruvanantapuram argued that India is structured by a 
hierarchy of ascriptive loyalties, from family, via community largely defined in terms of 
race and language and locality, to caste.
However, although an interesting set of perspectives could be gleaned from my Indian 
conversations, it was in eastem Europe that I was most aware of ascription, or 
perhaps I should say, of its aftermath. A woman running an employment scheme in 
north-eastem Germany helped me to explore the idea that the west had been sold to 
the east deceitfully. We agreed that the market in west Germany had been dependent 
on the social institutions in which it was embedded; but there seemed to be no plan to 
help those who had been brought up to follow ascribed roles to leam how to participate 
in social construction.
A lot of what I leamed came about through a joumey I made to a conference in 
Dessau. For example, the agreement to seek agreement was emphasised by a very 
competent and co-operative Berliner woman, as well as by many people in Oregon. It 
is not difficult to understand how authoritarian communism, which insists that 
everyone must get on well together should produce such a response. Cultures which 
determine with whom I must co-operate are of immense potency, as I discovered on 
my overland joumey to Dessau.
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One of my companions was at the Isle of Wight in '69, as was I; and if hippies and 
Quakers recur in these reports, is it surprising? My other companions were from an 
artists' co-operative, whom John had invited, without consulting me, to join us. An 
hilarious script could be developed from the joumey, because I became quite simply 
infuriated by one of my companions. From some perspectives the woman in question 
is, I am sure, an inspiration. Unfortunately, my ideal of leadership (where leadership is 
vested in an individual) is of the leader as a broker of dreams rather than as a 
charismatic egomaniac.
If ever I had the opportunity to observe how a presumption of consensus can be 
manipulated, this was it. The most obvious manoeuvre is a persistent refusal to 
compromise, and to assume that anyone who displays a willingness to split the 
difference with others, will split the difference again. Zeno's tum to be living at this 
hour and when I could no longer maintain my policy of gracefully acquiescing in 
majority decisions, the inversion that describes democracy as the denial of minorities 
became abundantly clear. Others have studied these operations in more detail than I 
have. The important point, however, breakdown can be very costly, so that the 
unwillingness of members to risk breakdown can become a lever of power. I was able 
to choose breakdown. Many are not in a position to do so, if only because they 
recognise that if they choose this course, they may be the subject of much 
resentment.
Events inform us as well as interviews, and this was dearly an area in which more 
exploration of the implementation of cooperative ideals could inform my experience, 
interestingly, Fisher and Ury only discuss negotiations from which you can walk away 
[Fisher and Ury, 1982]; and this is one of the difficulties of the bio-regional approach 
to the problem of scale, for if you walk away from your home territory to where do you
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walk? Many young Polish women dont like the roles on offer to them, but they do not 
necessarily have much choice beyond walking to the truckstops along the German- 
Czech border and working as prostitutes.
These issues of ascription and social construction were relevant to many of those who 
attended the conference at Dessau, who had come from the old centrally planned 
economies to discuss how collective self-direction might be possible. My intuitive 
understanding of an eastem European perspective, to the extent that there is such a 
coherent body of reactions, was clearly limited, though I have come more to grips with 
it over the last few years. I was still using the questionnaire at Dessau, and Ulf, a 
student, was mightily suspicious of the approach. After 25 years growing up in 
authoritarian society he didn't want co-operation to be another set of rules, he wanted 
it based on trust.
Ironically, I felt that there might be an excess of trust of westèmers. I fear that seme of 
those with whom I discussed my ideas simply clapped their hands in astounded 
admiration because I might be an altemative authority. Those in power nearly always 
like to think they are loved for themselves rather than for the effects they might have 
on others' lives; hence, I imagine, the sanctification of sycophancy under the banner 
of fitting in.
Lyudmilia and Valentina were so enthusiastic about my argument that I suspected 
them of some hidden motive, which may have been unjust. Valentina is a lecturer in 
Kiev, one of those who were invited to address the conference. Lyudmilia was also 
Invited from the Ukraine, where she Is an entrepreneur In the retail trade. Her 
experiences have been mind-boggling. In talking about them she piled chaos on 
catastrophe, then tossed it all aside with the breezy remark that it didn't matter much,
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because she and her husband are optimists. Perhaps that is the explanation for her 
enthusiasm for my argument. Although I believe it may be a useful contribution to 
debate, I'd be surprised if it answered all the world's problems.
Perhaps it was the contrast with Tess that made me cautious in accepting their praise. 
I've mentioned her already as the daughter of a carpenter and the grand-daughter of 
the first communist in Uppsala; and from her free-thinking background she rigorously 
challenged everything I'd written.
Martin was challenging, too. His family's farm was retumed to him after reunification. 
Eventually he wants to run it as an organic commune. For him. the importance was 
not in the detail, but in the spirit of the argument. Where I asked if force might always 
be necessary, he preferred the term controt. I am uncertain whether or not it was at 
this point that the distinction between coercion per se and as damage limitation 
entered the argument, but it may well have t>een. The form that I have adopted has 
been to suggest that in the latter case force was used reluctanctly, minimally, with 
normative sanction, and with a reformative intent, rather than as a justifiable principal 
dynamic of social organisation.
This appealed to the Berliner woman whom I mentioned, Octavia, whom I met in the 
company of Elvira, a Ukrainian. Both are middle-aged professional women, each 
involved in the transitional issues for people like themselves. They raised the 
ascription issue by asking whether the Mafiosi can be said to co-operate amongst 
themselves. A fair question: entry Is voluntary, even if once in you cannot get out. 
Eventually my resolution to this problem was to suggest that since discourse assigns 
roles, rights and responsibilities [Goffman, 1969], an emancipatory or co-operative 
discourse must permit free entry, involvement and departure [Brauer, 1996]. Perhaps
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the most consistently repeated issue, however, was the feeling that the free market 
ideology is Incomplete. The simplistic triumphalism typified by Fukoyama [1989] was 
encouraging a binary opposition that failed to recognise the virtues of solidarity and 
the inherent failures of market structures. Foremost amongst these to Octavia and 
Elvira is the destruction of trust that the ideology promotes. As I suggested in the 
validation process, the market can be ascriptive too, especially in the way that those 
who do not share market values tend to be defined as deviant.
Krystof had more faith in the market than that. He is the director of a major indigenous 
development agency in Poland. Few of the consultants foisted on eastem Europe 
were competent in business, in Krystofs view, let alone on wider social issues. Since 
this is a market effect, I felt that he was contradicting himself rather; but at that stage I 
was still mired in my antipathy towards the market, and my confusion presented a 
satisfactory resolution of the point. Luckily I've met him since, and he accepted the 
resolution I offered in the paradigm; as I must accept that the market can be 
emancipatory as well as ascriptive.
Overall it seemed to me that there were at that conference many east Germans who 
were aware of the limitations of both market and coercion, and frustrated by the lack 
of a coherent ideological altemative.
Christian who runs a youth club/pub in Dessau practices what I preach. Marion and 
Karen, who are responsible for re-development projects in the north, are also stressed 
by the conflict between the dominant ideology and what they believe to be effective 
practice. Anne, working in women's projects in Dresden, could also have used leaming 
materials that offered an altemative to perpetually improving washing powders. There 
is a space in the education system for something other than the simplistic
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individualism that is promoted, willy-nilly, by an international culture dominated 
hierarchically by those with a probably sincere belief that what is good for them is 
good for others, and that their wealth is evidence of their genius and individual 
creativity. If you're so clever, why ain't you rich?
There are alternatives, of course, though I am not alone in being underwhelmed by the 
ability of the co-operative and socialist movements to offer a coherent rationale for 
their beliefs. Nor do I feel that there is a lack of ideas or examples.
Dave Thomson in Bristol contributed a lot. He's another old mate, working co­
operatively as the circumstances allow, trained as a social worker and still recycling 
paper. He reckons you leam co-operation in the home as a child; so how do we 
persuade parents to respect their children? How do we leam how to build a shared 
vision? The conventional education system teaches conformity not self-definition. One 
gloss he put on this is well worth quoting, I believe. "Unless you have a sense of self, 
co-operation is coercion by another name."
Most impressive to me, however, in many ways were the loose-knit group of women 
whom I met in Delhi. This opportunity arose through my friendship with a Sikh woman 
during the development studies masters course. She has retumed to India, and is 
working in several women's organisations in the capital.
Several organisations? Several used to mean something approximating to discrete, 
but the structure in which these initiatives take place is more complex than that. The 
term I have coined to describe it is chiaroscuro network. This refers to the painting 
terms for the use of light and shade, and came to mind because of a film I saw, and a 
description of the light in the basti areas - the modem slums of Delhi. The film was
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looking at the patriarchal destruction of a women's religious sect. One of the points it 
made was that the devotees shared an arena for dance. When men took over, they 
reified their egos in phallic towers in the middle of the space.
To me the chiaroscuro network represents a slight modification of the network tradition 
which sees people as the nodes, with a web formed by the lines that link them. I see 
the network as an adaptive social phenomenon within which people have the 
opportunity to define themselves and change roles and status. Just as the women 
used to dance, while others sat in the shady surrounds, so do the Delhi women I met 
move around, sometimes taking the limelight, sometimes supporting others. Although 
during my week in Preeti's company I met and spoke with many of her colleagues, I 
only specifically interviewed four, Preeti, Juhi, Maya and Sarojini. The first three all 
felt comfortable with the co-operative paradigm. With Sarojini I just discussed her 
work.
Her work in some ways exemplified the chiaroscuro network to me, since she has 
maintained her connections with a variety of organisations, and used the social space 
created to synthesise a number of initiatives. At the heart of her efforts is the attempt 
to validate indigneous medical knowledge, including meditation and hert>al medicine 
in the context of westem science.
Preeti operates in a similar way, though she is still finding her feet. She has various 
roles in three women's organisations, and is seeking to make user friendly woman 
controlled contraception available. There is a core group with which she works, each 
of whom has other responsibilities in other areas. I attended one of their get-togethers, 
and wouldn't pretend that what they are doing is all easy or sweetness and light. It 
must also be conceded that many of them are being subsidised, as Preeti is, by a fond
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father, or enlightened partner. Whether their approach could be replicated in another 
context, and whether the paradigm of chiaroscuro network is worth developing are just 
two of the questions which will remain loose ends.
I must, however, say a little more about Juhi. Juhi is now administrator for the Indian 
Association for Women's Studies, another network. She's pretty assertive, with a vivid 
mind. We spoke a lot about the way in which social contracts are formed, particularly 
in the context of the chiaroscuro organisations. Given the flexibility and movement, to 
say nothing or the self-definition, it is easier for people to experiment, and Juhi 
believes that an apprenticeship/leadership paradigm makes sense where you can 
move between the various roles. While the division of labour is good for efficiency, K 
can also lead to entrenched differentiation; but where there is an ideological 
commitment to mutual support, fluidity can t>e retained with the benefits of 
specialisation and expertise; and when you leave a particular arena, you remain part 
of the net.
One other point that came from our meeting: changing our view of ourselves doesn't 
necessarily change others' views of us. Juhi has managed it, however. Her husband 
does the cooking on altemate nights, which even in Delhi would be looked on by many 
as dangerously radical. Self-definition can lead to all sorts of stresses where society is 
predominantly prescriptive.
Even where it isnt, the continual negotiation of personal deals is likely to prove more 
wearing, if potentially more rewarding, than everyone wearing explicit uniforms. At a 
co-operative in Bristol, John and Jane are in the co-ordinative roles these days, and 
talking to them severally and together the focus of the conversation became stress: 
positive stress as well as negative stress. Jane in particular spoke of the negative
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stress that others' expectations of you can arouse; but the ability to redefine one's 
roles, rights and responsibilities as one goes along is very valuable, if the 
organisational structure can sustain it. There was no thought of turning back.
They weren't alone in raising the issue of stress. Many of those who work in co­
operatives, including the wholefood co-op in Brighton, find it a concern. Although there 
is opportunity in participation, there is also responsibility. The workings of the 
organisation can pervade every waking hour, in thought if not in deed. The 
chiaroscuro network strikes me as a potentially useful paradigm in this context. You 
can move from light to shade, from activity to rest, changing roles as well as linking up 
with people who are not in any formal organisational relation to you.
Participation and the ownership of language
Following on from this, there is the whole question of the ownership of language. I've 
already referred to my interest in how roles, rights and responsibilities are layed out in 
discourse, and how each discourse has conditions of entry; involvement and 
departure. Before that paradigm developed. I'd already had several intimations that 
my choice of language would be an issue.
For example, a young man and young woman who work together making the pizzas 
and other more exotic delights that are sold in the Brighton shop took me to a yard 
decorated by a 1953 Dodge, and by neon signs proclaiming the supremacy of 
Budweiser. A den of intemational capitalism, then, although both of these are proud of 
their working class origins. Beer from a Jug and three glasses softened their attitudes, 
which had been tending towards suspecting me of another bloody ideology. They 
accepted my explanation; although i share Poianyi's view of the primacy or tacit and
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intuitive knowledge, the ideological battlefield is a vert)ai one. If we do not contest it, 
we are dooming ourselves to live in a hostile environment. She liked that. Her grandad 
was an intelligent and literate, though not literary, northern socialist, and it felt as 
though she was wondering what he'd have thought of my ideas. Apparently he might 
have approved of them, since after discussion, they did; but, they celebrated the 
creative and the emotional in particular, as well as the intuitive; theory is all very well 
but the affective constituents of belief have to be addressed.
Greater difficulties might be expected where other languages are spoken, but the 
possible dislocation is greater than this. Rationalities, cultural histories, and personal 
experience vary widely. My failure to keep this in the forefront of my mind was an 
occasional problem.
Take, for example, Vishnu in Kathmandu. His mother runs a cafe. Dad is a doorman 
at a hotel. Sister is very beautiful, an efficient waitress, and spits into the street with 
great accuracy. The cafe's for locals, though I dont suppose I'm the only traveller 
who's eaten there. TheyVe become used to me over several days, and amused by my 
business with Prakash the bagman.
Vishnu, like Krishna, is a chetri, but unlike Krishna is a communist. Reading business 
studies, but a communist. Does he believe in state ownership? It's better than private 
ownership. What about the problem of incentives? Yes, with the market there are 
more things and cheaper. So what about taxation - yes; health, education, and so on. 
Why should the hard working man shell out his eamings to the lazy? Because too 
often his eamings are the product of his access to capital, which is a matter of luck.
Not of righteous living in a previous incamation? Get real, John. How do we decide 
what is luck and what is deserved? The people must decide. The panchayat system?
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Was that not good for the poor? More responsible than the market? "Yes, but the 
panchayat it was not completely help." What of communism? In unity is strength.
Getting not very far not very fast. Then we hit on forestry and it all comes clear. I have 
a paper with me on various initiatives treating the forests as a common propery 
resource. Mum notices the illustrations. Family discussion, though dad's not there. Out 
near Jiri, where they come from, the forests though the property of the crown, were 
managed by the local community. Then, when the panchayat system came in, the 
forests were moved into public management. Corruption and the tragedy of the 
commons superseded sustainability. Commercial management was no answer; they'd 
just strip the land and move on. So back to community management? If it can be 
done, the trust rebuilt.
What do I infer from this? That if a paradigm is at all applicable, you listen to them 
first, and then you can express it in their language - but the validation of the constructs 
used in a paradigm, their honing and refining, requires something like the specificity of 
a questionnaire. Techniques for first stage, second stage and third stage legitimation 
are not necessarily identical.
Others face similar problems of translation, of course. Perhaps since each of us has 
many roles, we all face those difficulties. Maya in Delhi did. There is a dichotomy 
sometimes expressed in the women's movement between the academic and the 
activist. Although this is apparent in the extremes, where a woman with money may 
put)lish monographs on the work of others, and illiterate women prove very effective 
at community organisation, most of those whom I met combine the roles. Maya works 
with basti women living outside the institution of marriage'. Attempts to get mutual aid 
groups going are hindered by the fragmentation of life in the city, especially where
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people with diverse regional loyalties find themselves in competition for scarce 
resources.
Maya romanticises and dramatises the basti women. Having felt this, I later 
discovered that she is a poet and writer as well as community worker; but how many 
people can genuinely interpret between the sere precision and intellectual rigour that 
is commonplace among academics into the demotic or the poetic or the visionary 
forms which make their ideas accessible and persuasive to those who have not 
leamed how to think?
Or, even more so, those who have leamed how not to think. Amongst these I would 
number the guru of Varanasi bus station, whose honoured guest I was for over two 
hours. Given the mercenary overtones that cynics detect in some eastem religions, 
Joni Mitchell's line "He gave me back my smile, but he kept my camera to sell” came 
to mind as a waming. This must be considered relevant to any discussion where there 
are vast disparities of wealth, and the potential advantage of being acquainted with a 
westemer can be significant. In this case, at least, however, there was no evidence 
that this played a part. Harrihar Pandey and I simply got along excellently, and if one 
accepts the notion that life is an elaborate metaphor for cricket, the principle medium 
of our conversation must be allowed. The bus station television showed Tendulkar on 
179 and Sidhu 100 not out, against the West Indies, as I remember, so his eagemess 
to talk of cricket was understandable.
Whether or not a transcript of our discussion would persuade others that Harrihar had 
contributed to the legitimation process or not I do not know. At one point, while I was 
chuntering on about the market, he interrupted by saying "Wally Hammond"; at least I 
had the sense to revert to cricket then. Perhaps I should be content with his
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conception of spiritual development as the transcendence of ego. like Alex on the 
Oregon farm, and Boulding in his synthesis of empathy and exchange. I wouldn't 
dream of claiming that he gave approval to my paradigm. His principal response to 
specific issues I raised seemed to be amazement that this way of looking at things 
should be in question. Life is a metaphor for cricket, and those who do not speak 
cricket would not have been able to translate our conversation.
Sometimes the Weltanschauung makes translation virtually impossit)le, and not 
because of different home towns. It's simply a matter of moral, ontological, aesthetic 
or epistemological commitments. Consider the lectures I delivered to the senior years 
at Ham College, the graduates of which are probably at about first year level of a 
reputable British University, if there are any of those left. There I met the head of 
English, who after my lecture to 70 students and 5 staff, asked several questions in 
public that had me leaping around, and then thanked me privately, and, I felt, 
sincerely. One of his questions made me realise that I had to clarify the priority I give 
to co-operation; even though he shared my view, how was I rationalising it? Another 
question concemed the role of the humanities in co-operation, a point I had not 
property considered. A good question though, to which I replied, adlib, (of which I am 
rather proud), that aesthetic pleasure need not be resource intensive, that our stories 
are our lessons, and that if co-operation is concemed with social construction, 
communicative skills are essential.
Several of the students followed the argument well; I asked them to reconstruct it with 
help, as part of the lecture. Several liked it, too; but there was also a personable but 
repugnant business studies teacher, who collected signed certificates from US 
academics thanking him for helping with their research. He hoped to get another from 
me, and perhaps I owe him something, because when I spoke to his dass, I was
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reminded how selective I've been with my audiences. They just thought that if you've 
got an edge you use it. Empathy was not a construct that resonated, reverberated, 
tingled, or in any other way impinged on their understanding of social organisation; 
and without that idea of mutual responsibility in your head, there is little of my 
argument to latch on to.
Usually though, I feel, a well constructed paradigm should be accessible to translation 
into most relevant discourses. Sometimes it is not surprising. With Gita Sen, a 
professor at the Indian Institute of Management, who has worked with the 
development studies group at the Open University, it was hardly surprising to find a 
high degree of common ground between the paradigm and her answers to the 
question:
What would you suggest as the likeliest points of failure of a sustainable 
development system managed by
a] a coercive superstructure
b] according to "invisible hand" ideology
c] according to co-operative principles?
A precis of her reply might go something like this.
Coercion is sometimes presented as the least costly option, but this is an illusion. 
Those who bear the costs are often inaudible. The lack of accountability and 
transparency in a coercive system prevents any true audit being accomplished, as 
well as licensing corruption. Simultaneously, where there is little responsiveness, there 
are many needs which remain unrecognised. Coercion also begets the need for further 
coercion.
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The invisible hand ideology is rather different. A coercive government may devise and 
vary its own criteria according to its circumstances; the market ideology is easier to 
assess as a general phenomenon in terms of its own claims. In this respect, it may be 
thought to fail. There are several profound and pervasive weaknesses, most notable 
amongst which are that it fails to account for social needs, and assumes equal 
opportunities in its rationale of equity. Evidently, however, past discriminations and 
inequalities are embodied in present opportunities. Sustainability is threatened by any 
system which puts private interest before the public, though it must be conceded that 
the System appears to promote Innovation. The most damning feature. In the end. Is 
probably that costs and benefits are unevenly and inequitably distributed.
One reason why it can be difficult to consider co-operation is that although it may t>e a 
matter of principle, it can also emerge as a response to niche market opportunities; 
the famous Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is an example that many people know, and 
credit unions in the UK may also be considered to fit this category. A further difficulty 
in assessing co-operation is that it seems always to take place in an environment 
dominated by either coercion or by the market. Problems often attributed to co­
operation - inertia and a lack of innovation - were dismissed as contingent.
There are, however, intrinsic problems. Hierarchies may offer lower quality of life, but 
demand only manageable information flows. The success of co-operation depends a 
lot on participants being able to handle complexity; and where participation shifts 
towards managerial specialisation, the control of information allows the power of 
definition and various forms of degeneration. Furthermore, ideas of consensuality and 
self-discipline not only demand trustworthlneK, but Impose an obligation to take 
others at their word. The unscrupulous, or even the unaware, may easily take
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advantage of this to distort equity of reward or control. Nevertheless, co-operation is 
the most promising of the three dynamics.
Leaming
I hope that no-one would suspect that I would take parallel lines of thought t>etween 
myself and a professor as confirmation of my theory. A contribution to legitimation or 
validation, yes. Confirmation of anything else, no. Nevertheless, it encouraged me to 
consider how to communicate a potentially useful paradigm, and how to put an 
audience in the mood to consider changing their mindset.
The South African management consultant had praised the aim: creative thinking can 
transform apparent conflicts of interest into win/win opportunities. At a later 
conference we mused over the difficulties of persuading people to go through the pain 
of leaming to do so. Rajagopalan and Santhakumar, of the humanities department at 
the Indian Institute of Technology at Madras, also spend a lot of time trying to develop 
the capacity of decision-making organisations to become more amenable to the idea 
that effective decision-making relies on more than the application of validated 
paradigms. They are up against two barriers. The first is the tradition of authoritarian 
education in this part of the world - Rajagopalan co-ordinates workshops for the whole 
region on coastal management. Secondly, there is a tradition of authoritarian 
govemment. Rajagopalan assured me that Siva's confusion over values is reproduced 
throughout India. The British Raj and the caste system: Gandhi and market 
economics. Both he and Santhakumar believe that an ideological paradigm such as 
mine might help to resolve some of these apparent confusions, but their practical 
concerns reflected how to open people to the possibilities of reconstructing their belief 
systems.
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In this they reflected the very reasonable pre-occupation .of Richard Bawden; how do 
we shift people towards holonocentrism - or however else we may describe the 
phenomenon of accepting the partiality of descriptions. For Santhakumar this issue 
might be discussed in terms of a model not dissimilar to Bawden's. Santhakumar 
believes that the agencies of economic development have moved past the 
technocentric phase, into a more ecocentric mode, but in our discussions we agreed 
that even this required extension into a recognition of the role of ideology. Is it 
acceptable to argue that the holistic relativism of holonocentrism is reflected in 
political terms as a co-operative paradigm?
One approach Rajagopalan and I considered to open up people's minds. My 
suggestion was based on role play; two similar scenarios, one to be acted out at the 
beginning and another at the end, to emphasise the change in conception that 
Rajagopalan was seeking to establish; roughly speaking, technocentric to ecocentric. 
(That has proved to be a useful paradigm.) We ended up with a compromise, with 
Rajagopalan planning to adopt a role that is familiar to both Indian and European 
theatre; the intermediary between stage and audience, who comments, jokes, links 
and challenges. He felt that the senior civil servants whom he addressed would be 
able to pick up on a relativist interpretation of the papers delivered, but that they would 
feel threatened by any chance of making fools of themselves. Making choices 
between diverse authorities is only part of the joumey, but is a stage beyond the belief 
in a unitary authoritative algorithmic knowledge. It is at least a step towards 
acceptance of the equitable construction of social institutions.
Others in India felt that the education system failed to encourage conceptual 
pluralism. A young teacher in northem Kerala, Puroshotoman, shared my concem for
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the way in which the education of children can instil in them an ideology without 
teaching them to question it.
The education system itself is severely affected by market forces; what might be 
called the Harman syndrome. To do your t>est for your children you put them into 
private education. This reduces resources in the public system, creating a further 
inducement to withdraw your children. In this panchayat, they have acted vigorously to 
reverse this process. The schools share resources and best practice, the community is 
much involved, and there is a much greater tendency towards pupil centred leaming 
than seems to be the norm in this part of the world; but, according to Puroshothaman, 
pupil centred should be understood to mean the student community. We shared the 
view that all achievements are built on the efforts of others as well as ourselves, while 
the aggressive individualism that permeates much of traditional English schooling, on 
which the Indian was based, instils a zero-sum game mentality. The whole school 
system is a lesson in social practice that may be beneficial, or may simply reflect an 
ideological hegemony.
It was this that drove both myself and Paul out of the school system. He seemed to be 
my alter ego. I met him in Amsterdam, at a sculpture warehouse and eatery on the old 
docks, and we met again the next day. We re both teachers who loved teaching but 
not staff rooms. We've both made our livings doing building work, because it is 
practical and leaves you your independence. He's off to Angola to work with refugees. 
This is what he said about it: We want to work together, to enter a shared space; not to 
get into sonic healing with a dijeridoo, joyful though that may be. I go as an imperfect 
person to share what I have to offer, and to accept what others bring. To develop 
myself I must work with others. The best teacher is always yourself, but you must work 
with others as well as with a mirror. No wonder he didn't survive the staffroom.
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Education, of course, does not only take place In schools. P K Swamy could easily be 
descrit)ed as an educationalist, even If his formal job description Is as a promoter with 
the Entrepreneurial Development Institute of Ahmedabad. We spoke for two hours on 
a station platform, and then for a further four or five at his home, so that I nearly 
missed my train; but it was worth it. EDI seem to be able to knit together the local, 
state and national Interests In a way that Community Development Foundation seem 
to see as beyond their capacity.
I may be prejudiced, since Swamy was so enthusiastic about the paradigm, and about 
the Idea of paradigms and conceptual Intervention. Nevertheless, an extract from the 
annual report of the organisation may help to Indicate another reason for me to be so 
disposed: "An Institution belongs to the society. And to the society It Is
accountable we are presenting ourselves for social audit." Perhaps this perspective
is unsurprising In a venture which Is funded largely by publicly owned banks, but It Is 
surely not Inescapable.
Their approach Is to work at all levels simultaneously, through advocacy and 
networking. To take one of Swam/s projects: while the temple maids [I.e. slave 
prostitutes] are encouraged to reinvent their lives, so the bankers are encouraged to 
re-evaluate their understanding of the women. The aim Is to comtxne movements 
towards self-management with economic Independence, to lay the foundations of 
social dignity; but the entrepreneurial orientation does not preclude the obligations for 
fair trading and other social responsibilities.
In terms of technique, the project Illustrates the iteration that may be necessary to 
conceptual Intervention, since the bankers tend to work from the general and abstract
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to the particular and concrete, while Swam/s paradigm for facilitation at the grass 
roots Is
known to unknown
simple to complex
concrete to abstract
short term to long term
Individual to group
The aim is shared problem definition and response, with acceptance of leaders as 
facilitators. I was impressed, and delighted that there were practitioners who seemed 
to recognise that intuitive co-operation is only a part of the whole picture. Dealing with 
difference is the only way to maintain diversity and accessibility, even if I understand 
why Siddique and others prefer to work with homogeneous groups.
However much can be done in such circumstances, however, co-operation may well 
be best leamed In the home, as Mary at Asllomar and others suggested, or through a 
voluntary apprenticeship. This may make the paradigm or any other formal leaming 
aid superfluous; though I tend to think that It could help to bring to the surface and 
resolve many tensions that are familiar in co-operative groups.
James and Angie at the farm commune in Oregon seemed to think so, having taken a 
year out to think about things. James had been in the commune for a long time, and 
Angie nearly as long. We sat at a table on the fourth of July, watching the volleyt)all, 
and the lets-see-how-mâliy-ûf-uS-kids-can-get-in-â-hàmmOûk-wHhûut-fâIling-ûut. 
Amongst their comments were these:
when we see what we think of as a dysfunctional family, do we not feel quite 
strongly that people are Intemallsing false values, Including evaluations of 
themselves?
some people have to leam to listen, but others have to leam to be assertive
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we have to leam to be adaptable, to accept that fulfilment can come in many 
forms. (I invented The Golden Rule that everyone can understand this, and the 
rule was endorsed by The Disconfirmation of Angie's Mother, who Is, apparently, 
as inflexible as a determined goat on crack.)
If we then accept that not all families are likely to Instil co-operative values, the 
importance of other leaming environments is established. Some, but not all, co­
operative enterprises function well In this respect.
A city farm in Bristol seems to be one such place. Nick cares for the animals. He 
comes from an agricultural family. He feels himself to be in transition from a family- 
orientation that seems quite common among farming folk, to participating in 
developing a collective purpose at the city farm. Responsibility is the key issue for 
him. Too much diffusion is dangerous. He's not sure how he'll be able to translate that 
when he goes back to rural farming, but he wants to try. Both he and Sarah (who has 
the daughter who watches cartoons) seem to be into a leaming curve directed towards 
Inventing a co-operative process that will work In their context.
Sally at the farm commune seemed further down that road. She has a child from a 
conventional marriage, from the days when she used to t>e conventional. Her 
negotiations with her daughter, which I witnessed while around the farm, suggested 
how she might go about developing a capacity for co-operation. That others 
responded to her qualities was evident in her election to roles of responsibility 
whenever the farm routine was disrupted by a special occasion. Part of her charm can 
be summed up In her ability to convey that her gain could never be at your expense, 
since your loss was her loss, too. The principle is familiar; in the hippie argot, murder 
is suicide, cruelty is masoctiism. Wilfred Owen said it too: V\lhatever dream was your 
dream was my dream, too....I am the enemy you killed, my Mend. Most of us are, I
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imagine, capable of grasping this, but not everyone is gifted with the ability to live it, 
and to stimulate the living of it in others.
We talked a bit about this. She was sitting on a hay-box back of the food-stail run by 
the farm at the Oregon Country Fair. I sat on the ground. We agreed that in the end 
you can only leam how to co-operate by living in a co-operative environment, but that 
co-operative environments needed protection and support from some ideology or 
other, if we do not take on the ideologists of other persuasions, we end up with 
Thatcher. I was happy as a peripheralite community development worker until she 
came along. What Sally does and what i do are both necessary, but I envy her, and 
view what I do as necessary rather than adorable.
I'd like to tell you her history, which would be worth a whole chapter to itself; but we 
have no room for such luxuries. We are here to use our intellects, rather than our 
intuitions. That's our job at the moment, even if I do my best to subvert it at intervals.
At Auroville the social environment was also very conducive to mutual respect. Josie, 
a teacher there, spoke with me for some while. The example of life in a commune, 
albeit one privileged by european remittances, makes moral formulations less 
essential. Co-operation, as respect for others, can be absort)ed through the pores. 
However, when Josie's eldest daughter went out into the world, she was shocked at 
the racism and class inequalites she discovered; so perhaps a rationale of co­
operation may be useful to those who already behave according to it, as well as an 
attempt to persuade those who do not.
I couldn't discuss such a paradigm with Logu, because he is not an abstract thinker.
He is a local youth who has joined the commune, and it has transformed his life. He is
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learning to leam, and learning to grow, whereas his previous livelihood strategy of 
rickshaw driving, carpentry and labouring seemed nothing but struggling against 
constraints and limitations. No doubt his life is subsidised by the commune, indirectly 
at least, but he does not consume significantly more than he would on the outside.
The gratifications are spiritual and personal, and he can share them with his sister and 
her children, who live outside Auroville.
I think he lives the co-operative paradigm. He has a right iiveiihood - night security, 
teaching sports, learning, serving in a cafe; he accepts the pre-existent rules, though 
these are norms rather than legislation; and he is growing into participation in their 
evolution. When I think of him and Siva, i see the market ideology as the villain in 
Siva's life. Logu is happier with less materially, because he has so much more 
spiritually; but I must recall that part of that spiritual happiness is that the tribe to which 
Logu belongs is unfragmented, and offers security. Siva's tribe is being tom up by 
aggressive competition for personal gain. The market shrinks the community as 
people exchange trust for immediate gain; as Etzioni remarked [Etzioni, 1988:250], 
the more people believe in the market, the less possible it becomes to sustain one.
Could a paradigm change Logu's conceptual set? Maybe not, though in narrative form 
it might. Example should never be underestimated, since so many people leam in that 
way. Others, perhaps, have a latent ability to deal in abstracts that was poisoned or 
discouraged by the 'filling the pot' rather than lighting the fire' school of 
educationalists.
A co-operative worker in the play world claimed to be non-intellectual, so it was a good 
test of the more visual and demotic attempts at presenting the paradigm. From later 
remarks i think it was just that people expect abstract arguments to be obscure, which
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isn't necessarily the case; and she provided me with an excellent illustrative story. She 
runs the bulk buy store, and was seeking balloons. A good price could be obtained in 
Mexico, but she tracked down a worker there by phone to ensure that the working 
conditions were not horrifically exploitative. Good for her, say I. Another thing i'd say 
is that many people, including myself, could leam from her about managing anger, 
and the positive expression of disagreement. There is a lot of technical ability in co­
operatives in Bristol, where management committees are not afraid to spend money 
on facilitators.
Transcendence of ego
if there's one message above ail others that cannot be understood in the abstract it is 
probably the transcendence of the ego. To attempt then to analyse the idea vert>ally 
may seem ridiculous, but in the first stage of legitimation, you record what seems 
important, even if you don't understand it.
Caroline, one of the founders of the farm commune, is deeply interested as a 
professional in personal politics; how meetings are run, and how we develop as 
individuals. To quote from my notes: "we must hold the possibility of reconstructing 
ourselves very much to the forefront of our minds if we are to prepare ourselves to 
meet the consequences of our present eco-political trajectory.” Within this context, the 
agreement to agree, which would seem to be a fourth level of co-operation, beyond 
the procedural, receives more emphasis than it did in my political ideology. At a 
personal level I agree with this. The development of empathie dispositions is 
remarkably important, whether through yoga, conversation, touching, or meditation.
As a quasi-Quaker I could understand the commitment expressed by Carol and her
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husband to the Society of Friends; from which flows, perhaps, an appreciation of her 
meaning when she distinguishes between unanimity and consensus. The wiil of the 
meeting is not merely aquiescence in the majority view. The synergetic transcendence 
of the individualistic perspective is an integral part of the value of co-operation; the 
failure to recognise or achieve this benefit is a common source of distress among 
those who are well-intentioned but lacking experience of collective action.
Alex from the farm, whom I've also mentioned earlier, and I spent a lot of time on 
metaphysics; we share the view that my whole approach would be rendered redundant 
if we could ail leam to transcend the ego. Not that a commune is all sweetness and 
light, of course. There was considerable brangling over the polystyrene cups for the 
fourth of July. That was settled by reference to the way in which responsibiiities had 
been allocated; because Jed had been asked to deal with food-services in a 
consensual meeting, it would be fair to comment on his performance, but unless he 
started pouring hot soup down the back of someone's neck, it was up to him how he 
dealt with it.
There are no algorithms. Only an understanding that you bump into in the way people 
behave. Not always expected people; and the expected people don't always behave 
that way. I reckon, however, that y/e have to fight the political battle at the same time 
as spreading the spiritual message; and since i'm spiritually deficient, it doesn't do me 
much harm to take on the hostile ideologies, while others wake up each morning in a 
wooded valley in Oregon, and milk the cows.
Lucky bastards.
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15. Extroduction
We began at a beginning and end with another.
My own direction is uncertain, but the co-operative paradigm is now an inextricable 
part of my conceptual framework, and so will be exercised whatever I do next. I have 
already explored its potential to some extent, and will report on some of the 
responses. However, despite my commitment to practical justification, any judgement 
at this moment will necessarily focus on the quality of the paradigm, and the 
exploration of method.
To recapitulate: no socially constructed knowledge is certain. The uncertainty of our 
sense data, the implausibility of neutrality, and the limitations of language all militate 
against such a possibility. Rather than seek certain descriptions, then, one might 
prefer to think in terms of constructing useful ways of mapping experience. Paradigms 
may have great potential in such conceptual intervention; assimilable, abstracted tools 
of understanding.
Uncertainty does not preclude the usefulness of academic research, txit limits it to the 
validation of theory; a subordinate criterion. Uncertainty also combines with 
consequentiaiism to support the importance of participation. As a criterion this 
emerges as legitimation; an acceptance of the relevance of stakeholders in the initial 
fomnulation of an issue, in assessing its fomnalisation, and in adopting and adapting 
understandings should they so choose. Justification is the predominant criterion; 
though any attempt to assess justifiability is dependent on the quality or legitimation 
and validation of the assessment.
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One proposed intervention is a paradigm expressing the rationale of co-operation.
This may be stated very simply.
Wa have needs, and resources. AKhou^ some resources are synergetic, 
and some adequate, there is sufficient scarcity to suggest th^ humans, 
as we are presently constituted, will find themselves in competitive 
circumstances. We can choose to respond in a variety of ways. The 
criteria by which ttwse responses wili be assessed are equity, 
sustainability, diversity and productivity.
A complete absence of social co-ordination would seem to fail on most 
counts. Enforced co-ordination would seem to fare little better. The ideal 
might be voluntary co-ordination. Where there is not an immediate 
coincidence of interests, we can formulate rules by which we voluntarily 
abide; thougfi if this is to be our habit, equity in ttm construction of the 
rules would seem to be essential. From this derives the idea of three 
ievels of co-operation: intuitive, regulative, and procedural.
Unfortunately, problems of scale and exploitation inhibit the practice of co­
operation, which necessitates the use of coercion in a reluctant, 
reformahve and normative fashion. Coercion does not, however, become 
ttie central dynamic of social co-ordination, any more than does the free 
market. That ideology has some pretensions to being a complete solution 
to the problem of scale, as it is manifested in complexity. Judged by the 
Chosen criterion this is not the case. Rather it may be seen as a dynamic 
which can be combined with defensive coercion and co-operation as a 
justifiable response to the problem of social co-ordination.
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The three dynamics are not, however, symrhetrical. Coercion and the free 
market are destructive of the equilibrium, and are only useful in so far as 
they are regulated by principles established through procedurai co- 
operation; hence the primacy of the equitable construction of social 
institutions.
Some reflections on the method
The method and the outcome may therefore be seen as consistent with each other; as 
indeed they should. Equity in the construction of research is impiicit to the paradigm, 
and if the impiications of the paradigm indicated the primacy of coercion or the 
market, a different method could be justified.
Nevertheless, it would be disappointing if nothing had been leamed from the attempt 
to appiy the methodological conclusions. On reflection, however. I'm not sure I would 
approach it much differently..
Several problems were identified in advance. Forcing people to be free is an age old 
paradox, and, I would judge, inescapable, at least in the sense that ail persuasion is in 
some sense coercive; and the very act of communication is intrinsically of persuasive 
intent. Encouraging others to be criticai of, as weil as sympathetic to one's thoughts is 
perhaps the best that can be done; as weil as to listen uncritically untii one is confident 
that one can reproduce their argument to their satisfaction. In that respect, I think I 
might have reduced the numbers of participants, or ancillary activities, in order to 
spend more time going back to peopie; in other words, iteration might be a more 
productive use of resources than diversity.
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Circularity is another irresoiubie problem, but basing selection on behaviour rather 
than on membership of formal co-operatives seems in retrospect a sound approach. 
Involving some who are unsympathetic did no hann either; if equitable social 
construction is the aim, the paradigm needs to be intelligible to them as well. I think it 
is, but perhaps should have specifically built in an inherently hostile audience for the 
paradigm, once it had been constructed by sympathisers.
Resource constraints are inevitable. I could continue this research for the rest of my 
life. Time might have been better spent. An investigation of the use of interactive 
screen work was useful, but pertiaps could have come later. Some of the marginal 
work, which is discussed later, introducing the paradigm as a potential intervention 
might also have been postponed; but in this latter case, I think it was probably 
necessary as a way of seeing if the presentation of the paradigm was heading along 
the right lines. Form and content are inextricably related. Had it proved necessary to 
alter the form, the content would have been affected, and the course of the research 
would have had to be amended. In particular, there was useful criticism of my 
tendency to expect too much; it is possible to start small and build, particularly if one 
goes for iteration rather than diversity. Of this, more later.
The fourth problem of those which I identified in advance was that of imposed 
discourse. I did my best to enter the world of those with whom I spoke. Again, iteration 
might have been a preferable approach; although given my desire to work with people 
from around the world, this would have stretched the funding even more thinly. In the 
end, it probably went well, and I dont know what else I could have done. In depth 
analysis of others' discourses and translation of the paradigm might be a response to 
this issue, but not necessarily a preferable one. Recall Polanyi's remark about our 
dependence, in the end, on someone else's intuitive grasp of our messages. Recall
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also that the analytic tools you use are not neutral, nor equally owned; so the 
advantages of being methodical may be defensive, rather than directed to the 
equitable construction of useful understandings.
Another problem that was foreseen as inherent to the method was whether the 
paradigm remained reasonably isomorphic, if the process is seen as a refinement of a 
paradigm, ail the participants were contributing to its legitimation. That is pretty well 
how it appeared to me; but without being privy to the conversations, there is no way 
for you to assess the value of my opinion. Evidence is available in the appendices 
which present the research material used [appendices B and D]; but since a paradigm 
is only seen as belonging to a transient temporal, spatial, and cultural context, the 
imperfection of second phase legitimation appears to be an inescapable phenomenon; 
we can only ever achieve an approximation of the ideal. That, however, is not a 
reason for not trying our best.
Asking myself, then, since you are convinced its worth trying, how else might you do 
it?, I would still approach the research in roughly the same way. The amendments I 
would make would be to
• stage the process from questionnaire to narrative more gradually.
• suit the audience more to the stages; the initial process of checking whether the 
components were inteiligibie might be best suited to those who are used to 
reflective thought, though not necessarily to academics.
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•  once under way, select a smaller group (perhaps 25 people from around the 
world), though as nearly equally diverse as was possible, and keep returning to 
them, ideally, though impracticably, gather them together once you feel you have 
a coherent paradigm.
• test the paradigm with people whose behaviour suggests that they might be 
unsympathetic towards it, or unfamiliar with the broader philosophy of co­
operation.
Looking back at my aspirations for the construction of paradigms might also be 
informative. I described a paradigm as
a proposition, not necessarily in verbal form, that cannot be tested 
empirically, but that can be used to generate empirical propositions;
not a representation of reality, but a heuristic and hermeneutic device; 
neither valid nor invalid, but more or less useful;
transdisdplinary, adaptable, and holistic, and with the capacity to be 
integrated with other paradigms;
transculturai, and applicable from an individual to a global scale
The paradigm constructed here would seem to meet the first of these criteria. 
Empirical propositions can very readily be abstracted from it: for example, that
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coercion is opposed to productivity, or that a community in which the humanities are 
valued is more likeiy to have effective and equitable institutions. Indeed, the co­
operative paradigm would seem to score highly in terms of Lakatos' notion of 
progressive research programmes.
On the second point, the whoie process of construction has been experimental; 
although I may once again regret that its utility has yet to be assessed. The third 
criterion asserts the virtues of transdisdplinarity, which is very evident in the 
validation of the paradigm; of adaptability, which is apparent in the use of the 
paradigm, which has been applied coherently to issues ranging from the trajectory of 
the Bangladeshi political trajectory, as well as to make proposals for responding to 
homelessness; holism is achieved, one might daim, by the capacity of the paradigm 
to act as common ground for superfidally incompatible ideologies; and the ease with 
which it may be integrated with, for example, the paradigms of deconstructionism. 
Finally, that people of many different backgrounds should have been willing to 
endorse it is evidence of its transculturai heritage; and it could influence personal 
behaviour as readily as it could be applied to intemational trade relations.
All in all, then, I am pleased with it. The real test would be its use in a substantial 
intervention. I have little doubt that the prindple of paradigmatic intervention is 
potentially effective. A trivial but useful example occurred when someone said to me 
that he was a reasonable man, but that you had to draw a line somewhere. Using two 
beer-mats, I illustrated the possibility of thinking instead of a grey area of doubt, 
confusion, and, if possible negotiation. He bought me a pint two days later, telling me 
that his life at work had been made an awful lot easier by that simple shift in 
conception; and has since come back with colleagues for further experiments in 
mapping problems at work.
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Another straw in the wind was an essay on Bangladesh, which used the co-operative 
paradigm to analyse the development prospects of that country, it was preferred by an 
Irish, American, and two Bangladeshi aid workers to other analyses published by 
established academics; t>ut since they are my friends and my supervisor ignored it, I 
did not push it any further. Again, in Liverpool, I presented a workshop in which i 
simplified the ideas so that they were represented by a set of concentric circles.
setting the rules
rules of the game
I, rights and responsibilities
This proved very effective as a context in which to discuss the problems of a 
community which has funds available for economic regeneration, but under conditions 
which do not recognise the difficulties of claiming them. Where in Toxteth does one 
seek matching funds? How do you set up a viable local enterprise where the majority 
of the people lead a marginal existence on state benefits, and where even the local 
Co-op stores are dosing down? Local conditions have not been recognised in 
establishing the rules, and a renegotiation of the sodai contrad would be necessary 
for a sustainable reinvigoration of the area.
Interpreting the paradigm in the language of sodal contracts also proved useful in an 
analysis of the response to homeiessness, prepared with the research departments of 
three major charities dealing with the issue, in that instance the coercive, market and 
co-operative dynamics were used in the analysis, suggesting that homelessness might
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be perceived as a need to renegotiate unsustainable personal-social contracts. From 
this point of view, the case for action research, independent monitoring, and advocacy 
became evident. Again the argument was well received, both by people working with 
the homeless, and by the research committee of the Intemational Sociological Society 
for whom it was prepared.
Alas, none of this amounts to justification; as I have already suggested, these are no 
more than straws in the wind. The jury is out. The fickle finger of fate is wavering. 
Nevertheless, as I write these last few sentences, watching the headlights as my 
neighbours come home from work on a chilly November evening, the work I have 
done makes sense to me. I would rather be Chagall, and have painted Donkey on the 
roof, but I ain't, and I haven't. This is what I have done instead.
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Appendix A: The participants, broken down by age, sex, socio­
economic status, family, and religion.
Sex
Of the 117 participants, 65% were male, and 35% female; an imbalance caused by the 
number of interviews carried out on the Indian sub-continent. Of the others, 29 were 
male, compared to 32 females.
Religion
Similarly, religious affiliations were imbalanced. The 53% who declared a religious 
affiliation were constituted by Christians [15%], Hindus [30%], a Buddhist [1%], and 
Muslims [7%]. The preponderance of Hindus is not seen as a gross distortion, given 
the casual commitment that is demanded. Where a European might choose to 
dissociate themselves from organised religion, an Indian who is not of another faith is 
likely to describe themselves as Hindu.
Socio-economic status
The figures for socio-economic status represent my own Judgement, and are relative to 
the situation of the participant. Only two participants would be widely considered to be 
poor, and nine to have a high socio-economic status. Of the remaining 89% there was 
a fairly normal distribution within the middle-classes.
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Age
Age distribution, again an estimate, suggests that 6% of the participants were over 60 
years old, 59% t>etween 30 and 60 years, and 35% younger than 30 years old.
Familv status
For six of the participants the data is unknown. Of the remaining 111, 58% were 
married at the time of the interview, and 42% unmarried. 59% had children, including 
six instances of single parenthood.
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Appendix B: The questionnaire offered to colleagues at the Open 
University
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Greetings.
At the CTS seminar on Wednesday 20th April, I am pr^enting my work to date.
For the remaining hour and fifty minutes, I thought a juggling workshop might be fun. 
However, to pod out my miserable offerings it seemed like a good idea to ask you to do 
something, so here It is....
As you may have gathered, I am interested in how it is possible to convey the rationale 
of co-operation (as opposed to conflict or coercion) as a way of organising human 
behaviour. Clearly an early stage is to produce a conceptualfeation of co-operation 
which could be conveyed. I"ve done this, but I would now like to see if It makes sense to 
anyone.
What I'd like you to do. If you will, is to complete the exercise described on the 
remaining pages. It is rather simplistic and methodologically naive, perhaps, but that will 
give you the opportunity to contribute a few ideas on how I might o mend it.
One alteration from the instructions given - there's no scale on which to mark the extent 
of your ogreement or disagreement, so could you simply use a numerical notation in 
which 0 = "strongly disagree" and 5 = "strongly agree".
If you feel that there are ambiguities at any point, please mark the text with d large "A".
The form looks quite long, but It shouldn't take more than about 15 minutes; please bring 
it along to the session, and accept that I will remain eternally indebted to you.
best wishes
Tony Brouer 
14th April 1994
is this co-operation?
Draft text 
Is this OD—operation? 
Propositions for assessment by co-operators
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of 
these statements by making a mark somewhere between "agree" and "disagree" 
on the scale that appears with each of them.
There are no hidden purposes. This is singly an attempt to find out who 
agrees or disagrees with the ideas expressed. Take as little or as much 
time as you like, but please indicate at the end roughly how long you spent 
on it, [There's a reminder at the end. The form can be completed in about 
fifteen minutes, though you may prefer to take longer,]
Because it might be interesting to know whether the ideas are shared by 
people with particular experiences, you will be asked, again at the end, to 
indicate some general information about yourself; but your reply will still 
be appreciated if you decide not to fill this section in.
The same applies to the section which asks if you'd object to the 
possibility of some follow up questions.
Finally, if you'd like to add some comments of your own, please do so. They 
will be read, and will contribute to our understanding of the issues we are
studying.
Thank you.
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is this co-operation? 
The quality of our lives is the quality of our awareness.
social a nd°^yL“ o S a i  neeS- to ^tls“ “ff 
Amongst common human needs are
a place in a community; 
somebody, or something, to love;
protection from some of the dangers of the environment; 
fuel;
a degree of independence;
a sense of how we fit into the general scheme of things; 
the chance to do something harmless for no particular reason; 
a feeling that we have made a difference.
m i e  tie needs at any one human being may be similar to those of another, 
the way we satisfy them will vary immensely.
Some of the resources which help us to satisfy our needs can be looked on
as an endowment from nature, chance, a deity, providence, or something 
Similar.
The other resources which help us to satisfy our needs arise from human 
activities.
H um n  beings have established sets of laws and social practices which 
4®cide who is entitled to which resources.
further sets of laws and social practices concerned with how 
entitlement to resources may Cor must] be transferred.
The principles which decide who gets what usually claim that entitlement to 
resources depends on, in the first place, merit, and, in the second place, 
on need, either of which may be modified by a reasonable measure of luck.
page 2 of 5
is this co-operation? "
There is no way of describing merit that allows us to formulate exact, 
objective, and unarguable rules for distribution.
Some resources are scarce; [for example, each of us would probably like 
entitlement to more land, sea and airspace than an equal distribution would 
give us.]
There's probably enough of certain other resources to go round - we know 
how to produce enough food for everyone, for example - even if distribution 
remains a problem.
People are not perfectly idealistic, so that....
we have to control distribution according to how much people contribute, in 
order to keep people producing what's needed.
When we are with friends, the exchange of affection does not diminish our 
ability to be friendly; rather, it increases it.
It appears that some of the resources from which we can gain satisfaction 
are scarce; others would be adequate if they were distributed equally; and 
some resources don't get used up, but actually increase with use.
Although we often share purposes with others, it seems highly unlikely that
there could be two or more people who share every purpose with each other.
There are circumstances in which we are not competing for resources; when 
the resources increase with use, for example; or when we share a purpose; 
or when we get as much pleasure from someone else's pleasure as it has cost 
us for them to obtain that pleasure,
The usual state of affairs is for us to be in competition for resources, 
even though this need not always lead to conflict.
Co-operation arises most readily when we are not in competition, but co­
operation can also be achieved when we are in competition for resources 
we can agree on fair rules for settling the differences of our interests.
There is no absolute or objective definition of fair rules, but it is 
possible to describe the conditions that such rules must meet.
Three such conditions are these;
1] that everyone must be taken into consideration
21 that everyone who accepts the first condition has a say in the
formation of the rules which settle differences of interest
3] that we can't base our rules on an objective morality, but we can
try to formulate them so that we would support them whoever we were
The lack of objective rules and the unpredictability of human responses 
makes social organisation a complex task.
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is this co-operation?
The complexity of social organisation can be dealt with in a number of
ways;
i] some people hope that a mechanism like the free market will 
disentangle the complexity, even though it is based on the idea that 
we have no active responsibilities towards each other;
C Please indicate not whether you hope this, but whether you think that it 
is how some people hope to deal with complexity of social organisation.!
ii] some people believe it is necessary to have some form of central 
authority intended to make people accept their responsibilities;
ill] some people hope that we have a variety of responsibilities to 
each other, that we should try to understand each others needs and 
settle conflicts of interest through personal negotiation
It is unlikely that any one of these approaches will be sufficient on its
own:
the market still requires some form of central authority to regulate 
it
no human society could be entirely controlled from the centre
leaving it entirely up to individuals depends on a level of trust that 
would be extraordinarily difficult or Impossible to achieve
The first two approaches require less understanding than the third.
We could increase the extent to which we left it up to individuals to 
recognise each others' needs through various forms of education.
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is this-co-operation?
Thank you for getting this far.
If you'd like to complete any or all of this last page, it would also be 
appreciated.
Approximate time taken to complete the form so far: .......  minutes
Age range: 15-30 C ] 30-45 [ ] 45-60 C ] 60+ C ]
Range of occupations - your choice/for others/to earn your keep
Have you ever worked in a co-operative? yes/no 
If yes, for less than 1 year Cin total] I ]
1 - 2  years C ]
2 - 5  years C ]
5+ years C ]
Female/male
Do you feel that your attitudes have been formed by a recognisable culture 
such as eg: Hepall Buddhism, Norwegian socialism, Dutch pantheism....
Do you feel committed to, and willing to disclose, any particular political 
orientation?
and if you dQu't sdnd the possibility of answering follow up enquiries: 
Fame:................
Contact address/phone:.....................
Any other comments?
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Appendix C: Exploring presentation at the University of Hull
1. Copy of a completed response
2. Presentation of response data - range from black [correct] to white [no response]
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Appendix D - An earty form of the argument
A view of co-operation
There are a number of possible ways of co-ordinating the way we behave towards 
each other.
• People can be forced to work together. This is the authoritarian approach.
• People can be made to work together because if they don't they wont be allowed 
to have much of what they want. This approach is based on commercial 
relationships between people.
• A third approach Is co-operation. This is based on people trying to help each other 
to achieve what each of them wants.
The discussion here looks at why we might prefer one or other of these approaches, or 
why a mixture of all three may be necessary.
Meeting our needs
It can be argued that although we spend a lot of time co-operating with each other, our 
circumstances frequently place us in competition.
The reasoning goes like this.
Human beings have a wide variety of needs, some of which are material, and some of 
which are emotional, involving how we feel about ourselves, and how we relate to 
others and to our environment
We use a variety of resources to meet those needs. We have limited stocks of some 
of these resources, but not all resources are scarce. For example, looking at the stars 
can satisfy our need for beauty, but it doesn't mean there's any less sky for others to 
enjoy.
It is also possible to argue that we can create sources of satisfaction. When someone 
smiles at me. It contributes to my well-tielng, but need not Involve any costs to the 
person who smiles. Indeed, if you smile at me. I feel good, and smile at someone else, 
and so it goes on. We are creating goodwill, and there need be no significant costs 
invoived.
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It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that trying to meet our needs will sometimes 
demand the use of scarce resources. On the other hand, it will sometimes cost nothing 
to meet our needs, and at other times we seem able to give pleasure to ourselves and 
others at the same time.
Unfortunately, we cant meet all our needs from these free resources. However dose 
we may feel to another person, however much pleasure we take in their happiness, 
there are likely to be times when our needs put us into competition with each other.
The problem of social organisation
This competition ieads to the problem of sodal organisation.
Of course, it is possible to do without sodal organisation. One can simply try to satisfy 
oneself without caring about other people at all. However, while this may work in the 
short term for a few people, it seems likely that in the longer term we are likely to get 
further by working together to some extent.
At times this wiil be very obvious; if we re all aboard a leaking lifeboat, it would be silly 
to fight rather than to bail, for example. At other times it will be less obvious, until we 
consider what sodety would be like if we didn't have some measure of co-operation.
However, even if we agree on the need for some measure of co-operation, there are 
still questions left unanswered. Perhaps the most important of these is how are we to 
decide on the besf form of social organisation?
One answer goes like this.
Sodal organisation is a set of rules which, at least in theory, apply to everyone in the 
community. Obviously, different communities have tended to use different sets of rules. 
Maoist China was organised differently to France, and both were organised differently 
to the Kingdom of Lesotho.
It is interesting to note, though, that iooking round the world today, there seems to be 
more agreement about the conditions that any set of rules for sodal organisation 
should try to meet.
Some would argue that these are expressed in the United Nations Dedaration on 
Human Rights. Without wishing to disagree with the ideas behind the dedaration, the 
guidelines will be expressed differently here.
What makes rules fair?
The guidelines expressed here are intended to help us dedde when the rules applied 
to any human community are fair and reasonable. They are intended to apply not only 
to the formal laws written into the statute books of nations, but also to the informal laws 
and agreements which exist between friends and colleagues. Even though these 
agreements will not always have been written down, and may not even have been put 
into words, they are still the rules by which we seek to co-ordinate our behaviour with 
others.
The suggestion made here is that there are four guidelines which enable us to identify 
rules which are fair and reasonable.
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• firstly, that everyone who is affected t>y a rule should be taken into account when it 
is formed.
• secondly, that we should take the whole person into account; emotional needs 
may not always be as urgent as physical needs, but this does not mean they are 
less important in the long run.
• thirdly, that rules should be designed by the people they are going to affect. There 
is no justice in the powerful forcing their own laws onto others.
•  fourthly, that, when designing rules, we should try to share others concerns.
These guidelines are perhaps most easily remembered by the single-word tags; 
concern, holism, consent, and listening. The guidelines form a group. None of them is 
likely to work on Its own.
The elements of social organisation
One comment may immediately leap to mind. These guidelines sound fine, but they're 
idealistic and thoroughly impractical.
This is a fair criticism.
It seems likely that there will always t)e some people who dont want to go along with 
the guidelines. Another difficulty is that unless people are skilled at reaching 
agreements, it can be a long and complicated business.
These two difficulties are often used as reasons for denying the third guideline; that 
rules should be designed by the people who are going to be affected by them. To a 
greater or lesser extent, it is argued that people are not in a position to decide what is 
t>e  ^for themselves.
In some communities, the state takes over control of as many aspects of human life as 
it can. In most societies, nowadays, there is at least a pretence of consulting people; 
tMJt being allowed to vote every four or five years is not the same as choosing the rules 
that are going to structure your life.
Having a powerful state, then, may help to overcome the difficulties of agreeing and 
enforcing coliective decisions, but does so at a cost to our freedom. This is the 
weakness of the authoritarian approach.
In response, many people have taken the view that the state should restrict itself to 
protecting commercial exchanges by punishing fraud, theft and physical brutality. As 
iong as you are not actively harming someone, it is said, no-one has the right to 
interfere with what you do, but fraud, theft and physicai brutality interfere with fair 
exchange. Fair exchange is seen as a mechanism which ensures that everyone gets 
what they deserve.
Going further, it is often argued that if no-one gets more than they deserve, there is a 
strong incentive to work hard. As a result, everyone will work to have goods to 
exchange, and we will all be better off.
It would be silly to deny that fair exchange benefits all who are involved. The difficulty 
is that not all exchange is fair; and to have a system of exchange which is both fair and
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effective in meeting our needs, it is not enough simpiy to avoid theft, fraud and physical 
brutality. There are two huge problems with this approach.
Firstly, those with power will get the best of most exchanges, simply because they are 
powerful, and there will be increasing differences between those who have and those 
who do not. Since the exchanges that have taken place have not been fair, the 
increasing difference between the rich and powerful and the weak and poor cannot be 
seen as fair, either. This seems to lead to a cyde of protest, repression and hostility.
Organising society on the basis of commercial relations is therefore unlikely to meet 
the first and third guidelines; those that suggest that concem and consent are 
necessary to a just society.
There is a second reason for challenging this approach. If we believe that we will only 
get from others what we can squeze from them, there is a strong incentive to squeeze. 
Encouraging us to see each other simply in tenus of a commercial relationship 
discourages us from recognising our needs for positive emotional relationships.
The commercial approach, then, also fails to meet the second and the fourth 
guidelines; that we take the whole person into account, and that we try to understand 
what matters to them.
Where does that act us?
It seems, then, that even if we decide that it is preferable for people to try to work 
within certain rules, we will still have problems.
We can certainly try to agree to guidelines which descrit)e fair and reasonable sets of 
rules.
Indeed, if guidelines such as concem, consent, holism and listening could be followed, 
it seems iikely that the rules we lived by would be fair and reasonable.
However, we cannot expect this approach to work on its own.
Unless or until we all become expert at following the guidelines, we will have to accept 
some degree of state authority; and since we cannot get to know everyone we deal 
with personally, we will have to accept some degree of commercialism in our dealings 
with each other.
All the same, state authority and commerdai relations are necessary evils.
If we wanted to claim that they are actually desirable in themselves, we would either 
have to explain why the guidelines were wrong, or show that state authority or 
commercialism complied with them. If we re not willing to make either of these daims, 
it seems necessary to take a thoroughly different approach.
This would indude seeking to develop our skills at taking others into account, reaching 
agreements, and t>eing aware of the whole range of needs that are important to others 
and ourselves: concem, consent, holism and listening.
There is a further point. The authoritarian and commerdai approaches actually prevent 
us from moving doser to a set of rules that would meet the guidelines for a fair and 
reasonable fomi of sodal organisation.
This preferred form can be called co-operation.
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A View of Co-operation
The view of co-operation suggested here can t)e summarised like this
Human t)eings have a wide range of needs. Very often these needs put us into 
competition with each other. We can respond to this in a variety of ways, txjt if we can 
manage to co-operate, we are likely to get further in the long run.
There are three kinds of co-operation noted here. The first and simplest kind is when 
working together is ot>viously for everyone's immediate t>enefit; when you have flour 
and I have yeast, and together we bake bread.
The second kind of co-operation is when we are in competition, but are able to agree 
to work within a set of rules; we agree that if you cut the loaf in haif. I'll get first choice 
of which half to take.
The third kind of co-operation is trying to agree the guidelines that will indicate when 
the agreements we reach are fair.
Concem, consent, holism and listening have been suggested here; the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights is another example of this third level of co-operation.
[Some might say we need a fourth level of co-operation - an agreement about how to 
decide which of these sets of guidelines is to be preferred. Fortunately, the ideas 
expressed here are just another way of saying what the United Nations have already 
agreed.]
It must be admitted that there is still a long way to go before we all have the skills to 
apply the third level guidelines to our attempts at second level co-operation; that is, co­
operation in competitive circumstances.
Ail the same, if we want bur own fulfilment to be matched by other people's, co­
operation would seem to be preferable as a basis for social organisation to the 
authoritarian and commercial approaches. It is also quite probable that through helping 
each other, we can each get further than we would be able to do on our own. This is 
especially likely when we consider the whole range of human needs.
A final point should also t>e made: there is no good reason for authoritarian and 
commercial approaches other than to compensate for our lack of co-operative skills. 
For those who believe that the aim of social organisation is to try to satisy our needs 
without injustice, learning howto co-operate may seem to be the most important 
learning that anyone could do.
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